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
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THE  
H I S T O R Y  
OF THE  
PROGRESS AND TERMINATION  
OF THE  
ROMAN REPUBLIC.

By ADAM FERGUSON, LL. D.  
PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY  
OF EDINBURGH.

IN THREE VOLUMES.  
ILLUSTRATED WITH MAPS.

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## E R R A T A.

- Page 194, line 1, for o read of.  
 196, — 2, for of empire read of the empire.  
 435, — 15, for besiegers read besieged.  
 444, — 18, for Sextus read Cneus.  
 447, — 6, for Acroseraunus read Acroceraunus.  
 457, — 3, for exercise read the exercise.  
 459, — 15, for when read at which.  
 489, — 25, for Macedonia read Epirus.  
 499, — 15, for that they read who.  
 510, — 24, for expressing in read containing.  
 520, — ult. for to read by.  
 530, — 16, for eighth of December read tenth of November.

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T H E  
H I S T O R Y  
O F T H E  
P R O G R E S S A N D T E R M I N A T I O N  
O F T H E  
R O M A N R E P U B L I C.

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*State of the Commonwealth and Numbers of the People.—Characters of Persons who began to appear in the Times of Sylla.—Faction of Lepidus.—Sertorius harbours the Marian Party in Spain.—Is attacked by Metellus and Pompey.—His Death, and final Suppression of the Party.—First Appearance of C. Julius Cæsar.—Tribunes begin to trespass on the Laws of Sylla.—Progress of the Empire.—Preparations of Mithridates.—War with the Romans.—Irruption into Bithynia.—Siege of Cyzicus.—Raised.—Flight of Mithridates.—Lucullus carries the War into Pontus.—Rout and Dispersion of the Army of Mithridates.—His Flight into Armenia.—Conduct of Lucullus in the Province of Asia.*

THE public was so much occupied with the contest of Sylla and his antagonists, that little else is recorded of the period in which it took place. Writers have not given us any distinct account of the condition of the city, or of the number of citizens. As the

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State was divided into two principal factions, the office of Censor was become too important for either party to entrust it with their opponents, or even in neutral hands. The leaders of every faction, in their turn, made up the rolls of the People, and disposed, at their pleasure, of the equestrian and senatorian dignities.

At a survey of the city, which is mentioned by Livy<sup>1</sup>, preceding the admission of the Italians on the rolls of the People, the number of citizens was three hundred and ninety-four thousand three hundred and thirty-six. At another survey, which followed soon after that event, they amounted, according to Eusebius, to four hundred and sixty-three thousand<sup>2</sup>; and it seems that the whole accession of citizens from the country made no more than sixty-eight thousand six hundred and sixty-four. The great slaughter of Romans and Italians, in which it is said that three hundred thousand men were killed, preceding the last of these musters, and the difficulty of making complete and accurate lists when the citizens were so much dispersed, will account for the seemingly small increase of their numbers.

In this period were born, and began to enter on the scene of public affairs, those persons whose conduct was now to determine the fate of the republic. Pompey had already distinguished himself, and was a person of real consequence. He had been educated in the camp of his father, and, by accident, at a very early age; and, before he had attained to any of the ordinary civil or political preferments, commanded an army. Cicero, being of the same age, began to be distinguished at the bar. He pleaded, in the second consulate of Sylla, the cause of Roscius Amerinus, in which he was led to censure the actions of Chrysogonus and other favourites of the Dictator, and, by his freedom in that instance, gained much honour to himself.

<sup>1</sup> Liv. lib. lxxiii.

<sup>2</sup> Euseb. in Chronico.



Cæsar, now connected with the family of Cinna, whose daughter he had married, and being nearly related to the elder Marius, who had married his aunt, narrowly escaped the sword of the prevailing party. Being commanded to separate from his wife, he retained her in defiance of this order, and for his contumacy was put in the list of the proscribed. He was saved, however, by the intercession of some common friends, whose request in his favour Sylla granted, with that memorable saying, "Beware of him: there is many a Marius in the person of that young man." A circumstance which marked at once the penetration of Sylla and the early appearances of an extraordinary character in Cæsar.

Marcus Porcius, afterwards named Cato of Utica, was about three years younger than Cæsar, and being early an orphan, was educated in the house of an uncle, Livius Drusus. While yet a child, listening to the conversation of the times, he learned that the claim of the Italian allies, then in agitation, was dangerous to the Roman commonwealth. Pompeius Silo, who managed the claim for the Italians, amusing himself with the young Cato, pressed him with caresses to intercede with his uncle in their behalf; and, finding that he was not to be won by flattery, likewise tried in vain to intimidate him by threatening to throw him from the window. "If this were a man," he said, "I believe we should obtain no such favour." In the height of Sylla's military executions, when his portico was crowded with persons who brought the heads of the proscribed to be exchanged for the reward that was offered for them, Cato being carried by his tutor to pay his court, asked, if "no one hated this man enough to kill him?" "Yes, but they fear him still more than they hate him." "Then give me a sword," said the boy, "and I will kill him." Such were the early indications of characters which afterwards became so conspicuous in the commonwealth.

With the unprecedented degradation of the Tribune Octavius, and the subsequent murder of Tiberius Gracchus, began, among the parties at Rome, a scene of injuries and retaliations, with intervals of anarchy and violent usurpation, which must have speedily ended in the ruin of the commonwealth, if the sword had not passed at last into hands that employed it for the restoration of public order, as well as for the avenging of private wrongs.

It is indeed probable, that none of the parties in these horrid scenes had a deliberate intention to subvert the government, but all of them treated the forms of the commonwealth with too little respect; and, to obtain some revenge of the wrongs which they themselves apprehended or endured, did not scruple in their turn to violate the laws of their country. But to those who wished to preserve the commonwealth, the experience of fifty years was now sufficient to show, that attempts to restore the laws by illegal methods, and to terminate animosities by retorted injuries and provocations were extremely vain. The excess of the evil had a tendency to exhaust its source, and parties began to nauseate the draught of which they had been made so plentifully to drink. There were, nevertheless, some dregs in the bottom of the cup, and the supplies of faction which were brought by the rising generation, were of a mixture more dangerous than those of the former age. The example of Sylla, who made himself lord of the commonwealth by means of a military force, and the security with which he held his usurpation during pleasure, had a more powerful effect in exciting the thirst of dominion, than the political uses which he made of his power or his magnanimity in resigning it, had to restrain or to correct the effects of that dangerous precedent. Adventurers accordingly arose, who, without provocation, and equally indifferent to the interests of party as they were to those of the republic, proceeded, with a cool and deliberate purpose, to

gratify their own ambition and avarice, in the subversion of the government of their country.

C H A P.  
I.

While Sylla was yet alive, *Æmilius Lepidus*, a man of profligate ambition, but of mean capacity, supported by the remains of the popular faction, stood for the Consulate, and was chosen, together with *Q. Lutatius Catulus*, the son of him who, with *Marius*, triumphed for their joint victory over the *Cimbri*, and who afterwards perished by the orders of that usurper.

U. C. 675.  
M. *Æm. Lepidus*, Q.  
*Lut. Catulus*,  
Cofs.

*Pompey* had openly declared for *Lepidus*, and was told upon that occasion by *Sylla*, that he was stirring the embers of a fire which would in the end consume the republic. After the death of *Sylla* it appeared, from a mark of disapprobation well known to the Romans, that of not being mentioned in his will, that *Pompey* had lost his esteem. This prudent young man, however, in opposition to *Lepidus* and others, who wished to insult the memory of *Sylla*, was among the first in recommending and performing the honours that were paid to his remains.

*Lepidus*, upon his accession to the Consulate, moved for a repeal of the proscribed exiles, a restitution of the forfeited lands, and a repeal of all the ordinances of the late Dictator. This motion was formally opposed by *Catulus*; and there ensued between the two Consuls a debate which divided the city. But the party of the Senate prevailed to have the motion rejected.

In the allotment of provinces the *Transalpine Gaul* had fallen to *Lepidus*; and, upon his motion being rejected in the assembly of the People, although it had been some time the practice for Consuls to remain at Rome during their continuance in office, he prepared to leave the city, in order to take possession of his province. This resolution, as it implied great impatience to be at the head of an army, gave some jealousy to the Senate, who dreaded the designs of a

Consul



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Consul desirous to join military power with his civil authority. They recollected the progress of sedition which began with the Gracchi and Apuleius raising popular tumults, and ended with Marius and Sylla leading Consular armies in the city, and fighting their battles in the streets. And in this point the decisive spirit of Sylla, although it may have snatched the commonwealth from the flames by which it began to be consumed, yet showed the way to its ruin in the means which he employed to preserve it<sup>3</sup>. The Senators were willing that Lepidus should depart from the city; but they had the precaution to exact from him an oath, that he should not disturb the public peace. This oath, to avoid the appearance of any particular distrust in him, they likewise exacted from his colleague<sup>4</sup>.

Lepidus, notwithstanding his oath, being arrived in his province, made preparations for war; and, thinking that his oath was binding only while he remained in office, determined to remain in Gaul at the head of his forces until the term was expired. The Senate, in order to remove him from the army, appointed him to preside at the election of his successor. But he neglected the summons which was sent to him for this purpose, and the year of the present Consul was by this means suffered to elapse, before any election was made.

The ordinary succession being thus interrupted, the Senate named Appius Claudius, as Interrex, to hold the elections, and at the same time deprived Lepidus of his command in Gaul. Upon this information he hastened to Italy with the troops he had already assembled, and greatly alarmed the republic. The Senate gave to Appius Claudius, and to Catulus, in the quality of Proconsul, the usual charge to watch over the safety of the State. These officers accordingly, without delay, collected a military force, while Lepidus advanced through Etruria,

<sup>3</sup> Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. i.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

and

and published a manifesto, in which he invited all the friends of liberty to join him, and made a formal demand of being re-invested with the consular power. In opposition to this treasonable act of Lepidus, the Senate republished the law of Plautius, by which the Prætors were required, in the ordinary course of justice, to take cognizance of all attempts to levy war against the State, and joined to it an additional clause or resolution of their own, obliging those magistrates to receive accusations of treason on holy-days, as well as on ordinary days of business.

Mean time Lepidus advanced to the gates of Rome, seized the Janiculum and one of the bridges that led to the city. He was met by Catulus in the Campus Martius, repulsed and routed. All his party dispersed; he himself fled to Sardinia, and soon after died. His son, a young man, with part of the army, retired to Alba, and was there soon after taken, and suffered for a treason in which he was engaged by his father.

Marcus Brutus, the father of him who, in the continuation of these troubles, afterwards fell at Philippi, having joined with Lepidus in this rash and profligate attempt against the republic, was obliged at Mantua to surrender himself to Pompey, and, by his orders, was put to death. But the most considerable part the army of Lepidus penetrated, under the conduct of Perperna, into Spain, and joined Sertorius, who was now become the refuge of one party in its distress, as Sylla had formerly been of the other. In this province accordingly, while peace began to be restored in Italy, a source of new troubles was opening for the State. The prevailing party in the city was willing to grant an indemnity, and to suffer all prosecution, on account of the late offences, to drop; the extreme to which Sylla had carried the severity of his executions, disposing the minds of men to the opposite course of indulgence and mercy.

Before the arrival of Lepidus with his army in Italy, Mithridates had sent to obtain from the Senate a ratification of the treaty he had

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concluded with Sylla : but upon a complaint from Ariobarzanes, that the king of Pontus had not himself performed his part of that treaty by the complete restitution of Cappadocia, he was directed to give full satisfaction on this point before his negotiation at Rome could proceed. He accordingly complied ; but by the time his ambassador brought the report, the Romans were so much occupied by the war they had to maintain against Lepidus and his adherents, that they had no leisure for foreign affairs. This intelligence encouraged Mithridates to think of renewing the war. Sensible that he could not rely on a permanent peace with the Roman republic, he had already provided an army, not so considerable in respect to numbers as that which he formerly had, but more formidable by the order and discipline he had endeavoured to introduce on the model of the legion. He flattered himself that the distraction under which the Romans now laboured at home, would render them unable to resist his forces in Asia, and give him an opportunity to remove the only obstruction that remained to his own conquests. He avoided, in the time of a negotiation, and without the pretext of a new provocation, to break out into open hostilities ; but he encouraged his son-in-law Tigranes, king of Armenia to make war on the Roman allies in his neighbourhood, and thereby laid the foundation of a quarrel which he might either adopt or decline at pleasure. This prince accordingly, being then building a city, under the name of Tigranocerta, for which he wanted inhabitants, made an incursion into the kingdom of Cappadocia, carried off from thence three hundred thousand of the People to replenish his new settlement.

Soon after this infraction of the peace, Mithridates, in order to have the co-operation of some of the parties into which the Roman State was divided, entered into a treaty with Sertorius, and wished, in concert with this general, to execute the project of a march, by a route afterwards practised by the Barbarians who invaded the Roman empire.



empire. From the shores of the Euxine it appeared easy to pass over land to the Adriatic, and once more to repeat the operations of Pyrrhus and of Hannibal, by making war on the Romans in their own country.

C H A P.  
I.

Sertorius, who had erected the standard of the republic in Spain, gave refuge to the Roman exiles from every quarter, and was now at the head of a formidable power, composed of Italians as well as natives of that country. By his birth and abilities he had pretensions to the highest preferments of the State, and had been early distinguished as a soldier, qualified either to plan or to execute. He was attached to Marius in the time of the Cimbric war, and became a party with this leader in his quarrel with Sylla. His animosity to the latter was increased by the mutual opposition of their interests in the pursuit of civil preferments. At the beginning of the civil war Sertorius took an active part, but showed more respect to the constitution of his country, and more mercy to those who were opposed to him, than either of his associates Marius or Cinna. When his party were in possession of the government, he was appointed to command in Spain, and, after the ruin of their affairs in Italy, withdrew into that Province. He was received as a Roman governor; but, soon after the other party prevailed in Italy, was attacked on their part by Caius Annius, who came with a proper force to dislodge him. He had established posts on the Pyrenees for the security of his province; but the officer to whom they were entrusted being assassinated, and the stations deserted, the enemy had free access on that side. Not in condition to maintain himself any longer in Spain, he embarked with what forces he had at Carthagena, and continued for some years, with a small squadron of Cilician galleys, to subsist by the spoils of Africa and the contiguous coasts. In this state of his fortunes he formed a project to visit the Fortunate Islands, and if a settlement could be effected there, to bid farewell for ever to

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the Roman world ; to its factions, its divisions, and its troubles. But while he was about to set sail in search of this famous retreat in the ocean, he received an invitation from the unsubdued natives of Lusitania to become their leader. At their head his abilities soon made him conspicuous. He affected to consider the Lusitanians as the Senate and People of Rome, treating the establishment of Sylla in Italy as a mere usurpation. He himself took the ensigns of a Roman officer of State, selected three hundred of his followers, to whom he gave the title of Senate, and in all his transactions with foreign nations, assumed the name and stile of the Roman Republic. In treating with Mithridates he refused to cede the province of Asia, or to purchase the alliance of that prince by any concessions injurious to the Roman empire, of which he affected to consider himself and his Senate as the legal head.

While Sertorius was acting this farce, the report of his formidable power, the late accession he had gained by the junction of some of the Marian forces under the command of Perperna, and his supposed preparations to make a descent upon Italy, gave an alarm at Rome. Metellus had been some time employed against him in Spain ; but being scarcely able to keep the field, his opposition tended only to augment the reputation of his antagonist. The Consuls lately elected were judged unequal to this war, and the thoughts of all men were turned on Pompey, who, though yet in no public character, nor arrived at the legal age of state preferments, had the address on this, as on many other occasions, to make himself be pointed at as the only person who could effectually serve the republic. He was accordingly, with the title of Proconsul, joined to Metellus in the conduct of the war in Spain<sup>6</sup>. It no doubt facilitated the career of this young man's pretensions, that few men of distinguished abilities were

U. C. 676.  
D. Junius  
Brutus,  
Mam. Emili-  
anus Livianus.

<sup>6</sup> Claudius, in making this motion, said, that Pompey should be sent pro Consul, to the insignificance of both Consuls, *fulibus*.

now in view to sustain the fortunes of the republic. Such men, of whatever party, had always, in their turns, been the first victims of the late violent massacres; and the party of Sylla, which was now the republic, when considered as a nursery of eminent men, had some disadvantage, perhaps in the superiority of its leader, who was himself equal to all its affairs, and taught others to confide and obey, not to act for themselves. Pompey was not of an age to have suffered from this influence. He came into the party in its busiest time, and had been entrusted with separate commands. He had already obtained for himself part of that artificial consideration which, though it cannot be supported without abilities, often exceeds the degree of merit on which it is founded; and this consideration to the end of his life he continued to augment with much attention and many concerted intrigues. He had a genius for war, and was now about to improve it in the contest with Sertorius, an excellent master, whose lessons were rough but instructive.

Pompey having made the levies destined for this service, passed the Alps by a new route, and was the first Roman general who made his way into Spain through Gaul and the Pyrennees. Soon after his arrival, a legion that covered the foragers of his army was intercepted and cut off by the enemy. Sertorius was engaged in the siege of Laura. Pompey advanced to relieve it. Sertorius, upon his approach, took post on an eminence. Pompey prepared to attack him, and the besieged had hopes of immediate relief. But Sertorius had made his disposition in such a manner, that Pompey could not advance without exposing his own rear to a party that was placed to attack him. "I will teach this pupil of Sylla," he said, "to look behind as well as before him;" and Pompey, seeing his danger, chose to withdraw, leaving the town of Laura to fall into the enemy's hands, while he himself continued a spectator of the siege, and of the destruction of the place. After this unsuccessful be-



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U. C. 677.  
Cn. Octavius,  
C. Scribonius  
Curio,

ginning of the war, he was obliged to retire into Gaul for the winter<sup>7</sup>.

The following year, Cn. Octavius and C. Scribonius Curio being Consuls, Pompey still remained in his command; and, having re-passed the Pyrennees, directed his march to join Metellus. Sertorius lay on the Sucro<sup>8</sup>, and wished to engage him before the junction; and Pompey, on his part, being desirous to reap the glory of a separate victory, an action ensued, in which the wing on which Pompey fought was defeated by Sertorius; but the other wing had the victory over Perperna. As Sertorius was about to renew the action on the following day, he was prevented by the arrival of Metellus. "If the old woman had not interposed," he said, "I should have whipt the boy, and sent him back to his schools at Rome."

This war continued about two years longer with various success, but without any memorable event, until it ended by the death of Sertorius, who, at the instigation of Perperna, was betrayed and assassinated by a few of his own attendants. Perperna, having removed Sertorius by this base action, put himself at the head of the army, and endeavoured to keep them united, at least until he should be able to purchase his peace at Rome. He was, however, deserted by numbers of his own people, and at last surprised by Pompey, and slain. He had made offers to disclose the secrets of the party, and to produce the correspondence which many of the principal citizens at Rome held with Sertorius, inviting him to return into Italy, and promising to join him with a formidable power. The letters were secured by Pompey, and, without being opened, were burned. So masterly an act of prudence, in a person who was yet considered as a young man, has been deservedly admired. It served to extinguish all the remains

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch. in Pompeio & Sertorio. Ap-  
pian. Liv. Obsequens. Frontinus Stratagim. Valentin.  
lib. ii. c. 5.

<sup>8</sup> The Xucar, which falls into the Bay of

of the Marian faction, and reconciled men, otherwise disaffected; to a situation in which they were assured of impunity and concealment.

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While Pompey was thus gathering laurels in the field, C. Julius Cæsar, being about seven years younger, that is, twenty-three years of age, was returned from Asia; and, to make some trial of his parts, laid an accusation against Dolabella, late Proconsul of Macedonia, for oppression and extortion in his province. Cotta and Hortensius, appearing for the defendant, procured his acquittal. Cicero says, that he himself was then returned from a journey he had made into Asia, and was present at this trial. The following year Cæsar left Rome, with intention to pass some time under a celebrated master of rhetoric at Rhodes. In his way he was taken by pirates, and detained about forty days, until he found means to procure from Metellus a sum of fifty talents<sup>9</sup>, which was paid for his ransom. He had frequently told the pirates, while yet in their hands, that he would punish their insolence; and he now told them to expect the performance of his promise. Upon being set on shore, he assembled and armed some vessels on the coast, pursued and took his captors. Leaving his prisoners where he landed, he hastened to Junius Silanus, the Proconsul of Bythinia, and applied for an order to have them executed; but being refused by this officer, he made his way back with still greater dispatch, and, before any instructions could arrive to the contrary, had the pirates nailed to the cross. Such lawless banditti had long infested the seas of Asia and of Greece, and furnished at times no inconsiderable employment to the arms of the republic. Servilius Vatia, who afterwards bore the title of Isauricus, had lately been employed against them; and, after clearing the seas, endeavoured likewise to destroy or secure their ports and strong holds

<sup>9</sup> Near to 10,000 l.

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on shore. They, nevertheless, recovered this blow, and continued to appear at intervals in new swarms, and to the great interruption of commerce by sea, and of all the communications in the empire.

Under the reformatations of Sylla, which, by disarming the tribunitian power, in a great measure shut up the source of former disorders, the republic was now restored to some degree of tranquillity, and resumed its attention to the ordinary objects of peace. The bridge on the Tiber, which had been erected of wood, was taken down and rebuilt with stone; bearing the name of *Æmilius*, one of the *Questors* under whose inspection the fabric had been reared; and as a public work of still greater consequence, it is mentioned, that a treatise on agriculture, the production of *Mago* a Carthaginian, and in the language of Carthage, was, by the express orders of the Senate, now translated into Latin. At the reduction of Carthage, the Romans were yet governed by husbandmen, and, amidst the literary spoils of that city, this book alone, consisting of twenty-eight rolls or volumes, was supposed to merit public attention, and was secured for the State. A number of persons skilled in the Punic language, together with *Silanus*, who had the principal charge of the work, were employed in translating it<sup>10</sup>.

The calm, however, which the republic enjoyed under the ascendant of the aristocracy, was not altogether undisturbed. In the Consulate of *Cn. Octavius* and *C. Scribonius Curio*, the Tribune *Licinius* made an attempt to recover the former powers of the office. He ventured, in presence of both the Consuls, to harangue the People, and exhorted them to reassume their antient rights. As a circumstance which serves to mark the petulant boldness of these men, it is mentioned that the Consul *Octavius*, on this occasion, being ill, was muffled up, and covered with a dressing which brought

<sup>10</sup> *Plin lib. xviii. c. 3.*



flies in great numbers about him. His colleague Curio, having made a vehement speech, at the close of it, the Tribune called out to Octavius, " You never can repay your colleague's service of this day ; " if he had not been near you, while he made this speech, and beat " the air so much with his gesticulations, the flies must by this time " have eaten you up ". The sequel is imperfectly known ; but the dispute appears to have been carried to a great height, and to have ended in a tumult, in which the Tribune Licinius was killed.

Upon a review of Sylla's acts intended to restore the authority of the Senate, it may be questioned, whether that clause in the law relating to the Tribunes, by which all persons having accepted of this office were excluded from any further preferment in the State, may not have had an ill effect, and required correction. It rendered the Tribunate an object only to the meanest of the Senators, who, upon their acceptance of it, ceasing to have any pretensions to the higher offices of State, were, by this means, deprived of any interest in the government, and exasperated against the higher dignities of the commonwealth. Aurelius Cotta, one of the Consuls that succeeded Cn. Octavius and Curio, moved perhaps by this consideration, proposed to have that clause repealed, and was warmly supported by the Tribune Opimius, who, contrary to the prohibition lately enacted, ventured to harangue the People ; and for this offence, at the expiration of his office, was tried and condemned <sup>11</sup>.

U. C. 678.  
L. Octavius,  
C. Aurelius  
Cotta.

By the defects which the People began to apprehend in their present institutions, or by the part which their demagogues began to take against the aristocracy, the Roman State, after a very short respite, began to relapse into its former troubles, and was again to exhibit the curious spectacle of a nation divided against itself, broken and distracted in its councils, which nevertheless prevailed in all its ope-

<sup>11</sup> Cicero de Claris Oratoribus.

<sup>12</sup> Cicero, 3tio, in Verrem, & Padianus, ibid.

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rations abroad, and gained continual acceffions of empire, under the effect of convulfions which shook the commonwealth itfelf to its bafe ; and, what is ftill lefs to be paralleled in the hiftory of mankind, was to exhibit the fpectacle of a nation, which proceeded in its affairs abroad with a fuccefs that may be imputed in a great meafure to its divifions at home.

War, in the detail of its operations, if not even in the formation of its plans, is more likely to fucceed under fingle men than under numerous councils. The Roman conftitution, though far from an arrangement proper to preferve domeftic peace and tranquillity, was an excellent nurfery of ftatefmen and warriors. To perfons brought up in this fchool, all foreign affairs were committed with little refponfibility and lefs controul. The ruling paffion, even of the leaft virtuous citizens, during fome ages, was the ambition of being confiderable, and of rifing to the higheft dignities of the State at home. They enjoyed the condition of monarchs in the provinces ; but they valued this condition only as it furnifhed them with the occafion of triumphs, and contributed to their importance at Rome. They were factious and turbulent in their competition for power and honours in the capital ; but, in order the better to fupport that very conteft, were faithful and inflexible in maintaining all the pretentions of the State abroad. Thus Sylla, though deprived of his command by an act of the oppofite party at Rome, and with many of his friends, who efaped from the bloody hands of their perfecutors, condemned and outlawed, ftill maintained the part of a Roman officer of ftate, and prefcribed to Mithridates, as might have been expected from him in the moft undifturbed exercife of his truft. Scrtorius, in the fame manner, acting for the oppofite faction, in fome meafure preferved a fimilar dignity of character, and refufed to make confeffions unworthy of the Roman republic. Contrary to the fate of other nations, where the ftate is weak, while the conduct of individuals

viduals is regular ; here the State was in vigour, while the conduct of individuals was in the highest degree irregular and wild.

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The reputation, as well as the arms of the Romans, procured them accessions of territory without labour, and without expence. Kingdoms were bequeathed to them by will ; as that of Pergamus formerly by the will of Attalus ; that of Cyrene by the will of Ptolomy Appion ; and that of Bithynia, about this time, by the will of Nicomedes. To the same effect, princes and states, where they did not make any formal cession of their sovereignty, did somewhat equivalent, by submitting their rights to discussion at Rome, and by soliciting grants from the Romans, of which the world now seemed to acknowledge the validity, by having recourse to them as the basis of tenures by which they held their possessions. In this manner, the sons of the last Antiochus, king of Syria, stated themselves as subjects or dependants of the Roman People, having passed two years at Rome, waiting decisions of the Senate, and soliciting a grant of the kingdom of Egypt, on which they formed some pretensions.

In Asia, by these means, the Roman empire advanced on the ruin of those who had formerly opposed its progress. The Macedonian line, in the monarchy of Syria, was now broke off, or extinct. The kingdom itself, consisting of many provinces, began to be dismembered, on the defeat of Antiochus at Sipylus, by the defection of provincial governors and tributary princes, who, no longer awed by the power of their former master, entered into a correspondence with the Romans, and were by them acknowledged as sovereigns. In this manner the states of Armenia, long subject to the Persians, and afterwards to the Macedonians, now became the seat of a new monarchy under Tigranes. And, to complete this revolution, the natives of Syria, weary of the degeneracy and weakness of their own court, of the irregularity of the succession to the throne of their own kingdom ; weary of the fre-



quent competitions which involved them in blood, invited Tigranes to wield a sceptre which the descendants of Seleucus were no longer in condition to hold. This prince, accordingly, extended his kingdom to both sides of the Euphrates, and held Syria itself as one of its divisions<sup>13</sup>.

In these circumstances, the Romans were left undisturbed to re-establish their province in the Lesser Asia: and under the auspices of Servilius, who, from his principal acquisition in those parts, had the name of Isauricus, were extending their limits on the side of Cilicia, and were hastening to the sovereignty of that coast, when their progress was suddenly checked by the re-appearance of an enemy, who had already given them much trouble in that quarter.

Mithridates, king of Pontus, who appears to have revived in his own breast the animosities of Pyrrhus and of Hannibal against the Romans, had never ceased, since the date of his last mortifying treaty with Sylla, to devise the means of renewing the war. Having attempted in vain to engage Sylla in a league with himself against the Romans, he made a similar attempt on Sertorius in Spain. Affecting to consider this fugitive, with his little Senate, as heads of the republic, he pressed for a cession of the Roman province in Asia in his own favour, and in return offered to assist the followers of Sertorius with all his forces in the recovery of Italy. In this negotiation, however, he found, as has been already remarked, that whoever assumed the character of a Roman officer of state, supported it with a like inflexible dignity. Sertorius refused to dismember the empire, but accepted of the proffered aid from Mithridates, and agreed to send him Roman officers to assist in the formation and discipline of his army.

The king of Pontus, now bent on correcting the error which is common in extensive and barbarous monarchies, of relying intirely

<sup>13</sup> Strabo, lib. xi. fine.

on numbers, instead of discipline and military skill, proposed to form a more regular army than that which he had assembled in the former war; and, however little successful in his endeavours, meant to rival his enemy in every particular of their discipline, in the use of their weapons, and in the form of their legion. With troops beginning to make these reformatations, and amounting to one hundred and twenty thousand foot, and sixteen thousand horse, he declared war on the Romans, and, without resistance, took possession of Cappadocia and Phrygia, beyond the bounds they had set to his kingdom. As he was to act both by sea and by land, he began with customary oblations to Neptune and to Mars. To the first he made an offering of a splendid carriage, drawn by white horses, which he precipitated and sunk in the sea; to the other he made a sacrifice, which, as described by the historian<sup>14</sup>, filled the imagination more than any of the rites usually practised by antient nations. The king, with his army, ascended the highest mountain on their route, formed on its summit a great pile of wood, of which he himself laid the first materials, and ordered the fabric to be raised in a pyramidal form to a great height. The top was loaded with offerings of honey, milk, oil, wine, and perfumes. As soon as it was finished, the army around it began the solemnity with a feast, at the end of which the pile was set on fire, and in proportion as the heat increased, the army extended their circle, and came down from the mountain. The flames continued to ascend for many days, and were seen, it is said, at the distance of a thousand stadia, or above a hundred miles<sup>15</sup>.

After this solemnity was over, Mithridates endeavoured to animate and to unite in a common zeal for his cause the different nations that were collected from remote parts of the empire, to form his army. For this purpose he enumerated the successes by which he

<sup>14</sup> Appian.<sup>15</sup> Ibid. de Bell. Mithridat.

had raised his kingdom to its present pitch of greatness, and represented the numerous vices of the enemy with whom he was now to engage, their divisions at home and their oppression abroad, their avarice, and insatiable lust of dominion.

The Romans were some time undetermined whom they should employ against this formidable enemy. Pompey, being still in Spain, saw with regret this service likely to fall to the share of another; and he had his partizans at Rome who would have gladly put off the nomination of any general to this command, until he himself could arrive with his army to receive it. He accordingly about this time wrote a letter to the Senate, complaining, in petulant terms, of their neglect, and of the straits to which the troops under his command were reduced for want of pay and provisions, and threatening, if not speedily supplied, to march into Italy. The Consul Lucullus, apprehending the consequence of Pompey's preference in Italy, at the head of an army, and wishing not to furnish him with any pretence for leaving his present province, had the army in Spain completely supplied, and, at the same time, took proper measures to support his own pretensions to the command in Asia. From his rank as the Consul in office, he had a natural claim to this station; and from his knowledge of the country and of the war<sup>16</sup> with this very enemy, in which he had already borne some part under Sylla<sup>17</sup>, was intitled to plead his qualifications and his merits.

<sup>16</sup> Vide Ciceronis in Lucullo, c. 1 & 2.

<sup>17</sup> Plutarch. in Lucull. initio. edit. Lond. 4to. vol. iii p. 137.

Cicero is often quoted to prove that Lucullus, at this time, was a mere novice in war, and owed the knowledge by which he came to be distinguished, to speculation and study, not to experience. It is observed by lord Bolingbroke, that Cicero had an interest in having it believed, that great officers

might be formed in this manner; and it is probable, that he affected to consider the part which was assigned to Lucullus by Sylla, as mere civil employment. He is mentioned as having charge of the coinage with which Sylla paid his army, and of the fleet with which he transported them into Asia: but it is not to be supposed, that these were the only operations confided by Sylla to a lieutenant of so much ability.

When

When the provinces came to be distributed, the difficulties which presented themselves in Asia were thought to require the presence of both the Consuls. The kingdom of Bythinia, which had been lately bequeathed to the Romans, was in danger of being invaded before they could obtain a formal possession of this inheritance; at the same time that the enemy, by whom they were threatened, was not likely to limit his operations to the attack of that country. Of the Consuls, Cotta was appointed to seize on the kingdom of Bythinia, and Lucullus to lead the army against Mithridates wherever else he should carry the war. Cotta set out immediately for his province. Lucullus, being detained in making the necessary levies, followed some time afterwards; but before his arrival in Asia, the king of Pontus had already invaded Bythinia, defeated the forces of Cotta, and obliged him to take refuge in Chalcedonia. The king of Pontus, being superior both by sea and by land, over-ran the country in the neighbourhood of this place; and, having broke the chain which shut up the mouth of the harbour, he entered and burnt some Roman galleys, which were stationed there. Not thinking it adviseable to attack the town of Chalcedonia, he turned his forces against Cyzicus, a port on the Propontis, blocked up the place both by sea and by land; and, being well-provided with battering engines, and the other necessities of a siege, he had hopes of being soon able to reduce it by storm. The inhabitants, nevertheless, prepared for their defence, in expectation of being speedily relieved by the Romans.

Such was the state of affairs when Lucullus arrived in Asia; and having joined his new levies to the legions which had served under Fimbria, and to the other troops already in the province, he assembled an army of about thirty thousand men, with which he advanced to re-establish Cotta in his province, and to relieve the town of Cyzicus. The king of Pontus, being elated by his successes, and by the superiority of his numbers, gave no attention to the motions of Lucullus,



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lus, suffered him to get possession of the heights in his rear, and to cut off his principal supplies of provisions and forage. Trusting, however, that his magazines would not be exhausted before he should have forced the town of Cyzicus to surrender, he continued the siege. But his engines not being well served, and the defence being obstinate, his army began to be distressed for want of provisions, and it became necessary to lessen his consumption. For this purpose he secretly moved away part of his cavalry. These were intercepted by the Romans on their march, and cut off or dispersed; and the king, being reduced with the remainder of his army to the greatest distress, embarked on board one of his galleys, ordered the army to force their way to Lampascus, while he himself endeavoured to escape with his fleet. The army being attacked by Lucullus, the greater part of them perished in passing the Asopus and the Grannicus. The king himself, having put into Nicomedia, and from thence continuing his voyage through the Bosphorus to the Euxine, was overtaken on that sea by a storm, and lost the greatest part of his fleet. His own galley being sunk, he himself narrowly escaped in a barge.

The whole force with which the king of Pontus had invaded Bythinia, being thus dispelled like a cloud, Lucullus employed some time in reducing the towns into which any of the troops of Mithridates had been received; and having effectually destroyed the remains of the vanquished army, took his route by Bythinia and Galatia towards Pontus. At his entrance into this kingdom was situated the town of Amysus, a considerable fortress on the coast of the Euxine, into which the king had thrown a sufficient force to retard his progress. Mithridates, under favour of the time he gained by the defence of this place, assembled a new army at Cabira, near the frontier of Armenia. Here he mustered about forty thousand foot, and a considerable body of horse, and was soliciting the Scythians, Armenians, and all the nations of that continent to his aid. Lucullus,

in order to prevent, if possible, any further reinforcements to the enemy, committed the siege of Amyfus to Murena, and advanced with his army into the plains of Cabira. On this ground the Roman horse received repeated checks from those of the enemy, and were kept in continual alarm until their general, having time to observe the country, avoided the plains on which the king of Pontus, by means of his cavalry, was greatly superior. Though very much straitened for provisions, Lucullus kept his position on the heights, until the enemy should be forced to a general action. The skirmishes which happened between the foraging parties drew considerable numbers from the respective armies to engage; and the troops of Mithridates, having been routed in one of these partial encounters, the king took a resolution to decamp in the night, and remove to a greater distance from the Romans. As soon as it was dark, the equipage and the attendants of the leading men in the camp, to whom he had communicated this resolution, began to withdraw; and the army, greatly alarmed with that appearance, was seized with a panic, and could not be restrained from flight. Horse and foot, and bodies of every description crowded in disorder into the avenues of the camp, and were trod under foot, or in great numbers perished by each other's hands. Mithridates himself, endeavouring to stop and to undeceive them, was carried off by the multitude.

The noise of this tumult being heard to a great distance, and the occasion being known in the Roman camp, Lucullus advanced with his army to take advantage of the confusion in which the enemy were fallen, and by a vigorous attack put many to the sword, and hastened their dispersion.

The king was, by one of his servants, with difficulty mounted on horseback, and must have been taken, if the pursuing party had not been amused in seizing some plunder, which he had ordered on purpose to be left in their way. A mule, loaded with some part of  
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the royal treasure, turned the attention of his pursuers, while he himself made his escape.

In his flight he appeared to be most affected with the fate of his women. The greatest number of them were left at the palace of Pharnacea, a place that must soon fall into the hands of the enemy. He therefore dispatched a faithful eunuch with orders to put them to death, leaving the choice of the manner to themselves. A few are particularly mentioned. Of two, who were his own sisters, Roxana and Statira, one died uttering execrations against her brother's cruelty, the other extolling, in that extremity of his own fortune, the generous care he took of their honour. Monimé, a Greek of Miletus, celebrated for her beauty, whom the king had long wooed in vain with proffers of great riches, and whom he won at last only by the participation of his crown, and the earnest of the nuptial rites, had ever lamented her fortune, which, instead of a royal husband and a palace, had given her a prison, and a barbarous keeper. Being now told, that she must die, and that the manner of her death was left to her own choice, she unbound the royal fillet from her hair, and, using it as a bandage, endeavoured to strangle herself. It broke in the attempt: "Bauble," she said, "it is not fit even for this!" then stretching out her neck to the eunuch, bid him fulfil his master's purpose. Berenicé of Chios, another Græcian beauty, had likewise been honoured with the nuptial crown; and, having been attended in her state of melancholy elevation by her mother, who, on this occasion, likewise resolved to partake of her daughter's fate; they chose to die by poison. The mother intreated that she might have the first draught; and died before her daughter. The remainder of the dose not being sufficient for the queen, she put herself likewise into the hands of the executioner, and was strangled. By these deaths, the barbarous jealousy of the king was gratified, and the future triumph of the Roman general deprived of its principal ornaments.

Lucullus,

Lucullus, after his late victory, having no enemy in the field to oppose him, passed through the country, and entered without molestation into many of the towns in the kingdom of Pontus. He found many palaces enriched with treasure, and adorned with barbarous magnificence; and, as might be expected under such a violent and distrustful government, every where places of confinement crowded with prisoners of state, whom the jealousy of the king had secured, and whom his supercilious neglect had suffered to remain in custody, even after his jealousy was allayed.

Mithridates, from his late defeat, fled into Armenia, and claimed the protection of Tigranes, who, being married to his daughter, had already favoured him in his designs against the Romans.

This powerful prince, now become sovereign of Syria as well as Armenia, still continued his residence in the last of these kingdoms at Tigranocerta, a city he himself had built, filled with inhabitants, and distinguished by his own name. On the arrival of Mithridates to sue for his protection, Tigranes declined to see him, but ordered him a princely reception in one of the palaces.

Lucullus continued his pursuit of this flying enemy only to the frontier of Armenia, and from thence, sending Publius Clodius, who was his brother-in-law, to the court of Tigranes, with instructions to require that Mithridates should be delivered up as a lawful prey, he himself fell back into the kingdom of Pontus, and soon after reduced Amysus, together with Sinopé, and other places of strength, which were held by the troops of the king.

The inhabitants of these places had been originally colonies from Greece, and having been subdued by the Persians, were, on the arrival of Alexander the Great, from respect to their origin, restored to their freedom. In imitation of this example, and agreeably to the profession which the Romans ever made of protecting the liberties of Greece, Lucullus once more declared those cities to be free. Having



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now sufficient leisure to attend to the general state of the Roman provinces in Asia, he found, that the collectors of the revenue, under pretext of levying the tax imposed by Sylla, had been guilty of the greatest oppressions. That the inhabitants, in order to pay this tax, borrowed money of the Roman officers and merchants at exorbitant interest; and, when the debts became equal to their whole effects, were then distrained for payment, under pain of imprisonment and even tortures: that private persons were reduced to the necessity of exposing their children to sale, and corporations of selling the pictures, images, and other ornaments of their temples, in order to satisfy these inhuman creditors. Willing to restrain, or to correct these abuses, the Proconsul ordered, that where the interest exacted was equal to the capital, the debt should be cancelled; and in other cases, fixed it at a moderate rate. These acts of beneficence or justice to the provinces were, by the farmers of the revenue, represented as acts of oppression and cruelty to themselves, and were, among their connections, and the sharers of their spoils at Rome, stated against Lucullus as subjects of complaint and reproach.

## C H A P. II.

*Escape and Revolt of the Gladiators at Capua.—Spartacus.—Action and defeat of Lentulus the Roman Consul.—And of Cassius the Prætor of Gaul.—Appointment of M. Crassus for this Service.—Destruction of the Gladiators.—Triumph of Metellus and Pompey.—Consulship of Pompey and Crassus.—Tribunes restored to their former Powers.—Consulate of Metellus and Hortensius.—War in Crete.—Renewal of the war in Pontus and Armenia.—Defeat of Tigranes.—Negotiation with the King of Parthia.—Mutiny of the Roman Army.—Complaints of Piracies committed in the Roman Seas.—Commission proposed to Pompey.—His Conduct against the Pirates.—His Commission extended to Pontus.—Operations against Mithridates.—Defeat and Flight of that Prince.—Operations of Pompey in Syria.—Siege and Reduction of Jerusalem.—Death of Mithridates.*

SOON after the war, of which we have thus stated the event, had commenced in Asia, Italy was thrown into great confusion by the accidental escape of a few gladiators from the place of their confinement at Capua. These were slaves trained up to furnish their masters with a spectacle, which, though cruel and barbarous, drew numerous crowds of beholders. It was at first introduced as a species of human sacrifice at funerals, and the victims were now kept by the wealthy in great numbers for the entertainment of the People, and even for private amusement. The handsomest, the most active, and the boldest of the slaves and captives were selected for this purpose. They were sworn to decline no combat, and to shun no hardship, to which they were exposed by their masters; they were of

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different denominations, and accustomed to fight in different ways ; but those from whom the whole received their designation, employed the sword and buckler, or target ; and they commonly fought naked, that the place and nature of the wounds they received might the more plainly appear.

Even in this prostitution of valour, refinements of honour were introduced. There were certain graces of attitude which the gladiator was not permitted to quit, even to avoid a wound. There was a manner which he studied to preserve in his fall, in his bleeding posture, and even in his death. He was applauded, or hissed, according as he succeeded or failed in any of these particulars. When, after a tedious struggle, he was spent with labour and with the loss of blood, he still endeavoured to preserve the dignity of his character, dropt or resumed the sword at his master's pleasure, and looked round to the spectators for marks of their satisfaction and applause<sup>1</sup>.

Persons of every age, condition, and sex, attended at these exhibitions ; and when the pair who were engaged began to strain and to bleed, the spectators, being divided in their inclinations, endeavoured to excite, by their cries and acclamations, the party they favoured ; and when the contest was ended, called to the victor to strike, or to spare according as the vanquished was supposed to have forfeited or to have deserved his life<sup>2</sup>. With these exhibitions, which must create so much disgust and horror in the recital, the Romans were more intoxicated than any populace in modern Europe now are with the baiting of bulls, or the running of horses, probably because they were more deeply affected, and more violently moved.

<sup>1</sup> Cicer. Tusculanarum, lib. ii. c. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero pro Sexto, c. 27. Tuscul. Quæst. Spartacus, lib. ii. c. 17.

Spartacus, a Thracian captive, who, on account of his strength and activity, had been destined for this barbarous profession, with about seventy or eighty of his companions, escaped from their place of confinement, and arming themselves with such weapons as accident presented to them, retired to some fastness on the ascent of Mount Vesuvius, and from thence harassed the country with robberies and murders. "If we are to fight," said the leader of this desperate band, "let us fight against our oppressors, and in behalf of our own liberties, not to make sport for this petulant and cruel race of men." Multitudes of slaves from every quarter flocked to his standard. The Præfect of Capua armed the inhabitants of his district against them, but was defeated.

This feeble and unsuccessful attempt to quell the insurrection, furnished the rebels with arms, and raised their reputation and their courage. Their leader, by his generosity in rejecting his own share of any booty he made, by his conduct and his valour, acquired the authority of a legal commander; and, having named Crixus and Oenomaus, two other gladiators, for his subordinate officers, he formed the multitudes that resorted to him into regular bodies, employed a certain number to fabricate arms, and to procure the necessary accommodations of a camp, till at length he collected an army of seventy thousand men, with which he commanded the country to a great extent. He had already successively defeated the Prætors Clodius, Varinus, and Cossinius, who had been sent against him with considerable forces, so that it became necessary to order proper levies, and to give to the Consuls the charge of repressing this formidable enemy.

Spartacus had too much prudence to think himself fit to contend with the force of the Roman State, which he perceived must soon be assembled against him. He contented himself, therefore, with a more rational scheme of conducting his army by the ridge of the

Apennines.



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U. C. 681.  
L. Gel'. Pop-  
licola, Cn.  
Corn. Lent.  
Clodius.

Apennines, till he should gain the Alps from whence his followers, whether Gauls, Germans, or Thracians, might separate, each into the country of which he was a native, or from which he had been originally brought.

While he began his progress by the mountains, in order to execute this project, the Consuls, Gellius and Lentulus, had already taken the field against him. They at first surprised and cut off a considerable body under Crixus, who had fallen down from the heights in order to pillage the country. But Lentulus afterwards pressing hard upon Spartacus, who led the main body of the rebels, brought on an action, in which the consular army was defeated with considerable loss. Cassius too, the Prætor of Cisalpine Gaul, having advanced upon him with an army of ten thousand men, was repulsed with great slaughter.

In consequence of these advantages, Spartacus might no doubt have effected his retreat to the Alps; but his army being elated with victory, and considering themselves as masters of Italy, were unwilling to abandon their conquest. He himself formed a new project of marching to Rome; and for this purpose destroyed all his useless baggage and cattle, put his captives to death, and refused to receive any more of the slaves, who were still in multitudes resorting to his standard. He probably expected to pass the Roman armies without a battle, and to force the city of Rome itself by an unexpected assault. In this he was disappointed by the Consuls, with whom he was obliged to fight in the Picenum; and, though victorious in the action, he lost hopes of surprising the city. But still thinking himself in condition to keep his ground in Italy, he only altered his route, and directed his march towards Lucania.

The Romans, greatly embarrassed, and thrown into some degree of consternation, by the unexpected continuance of an insurrection which had given them much trouble, exposed their armies to much

danger,

danger, with little prospect of honour; not being courted, as usual, for the command, they imposed it on Marcus Crassus, then in the rank of Prætor, and supposed to be a person of consequence, more on account of his wealth than of his abilities; though in this service, after others had failed, he laid the foundation of a more favourable judgment. They at the same time sent orders to Pompey, who had finished the war in Spain, to hasten into Italy with his army; and to the Proconsul of Macedonia, to embark with what forces could be spared from his province.

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Crassus assembled no less than six legions, with which he joined the army which had been already so unsuccessful against the revolt. Of the troops who had misbehaved he is said to have executed, perhaps only decimated, four thousand, as an example to the new levies, and as a warning of the severities they were to expect for any failure in the remaining part of the service.

Upon his arrival in Lucania he cut off ten thousand of the rebels who were stationed at a distance from the main body of their army, and he endeavoured to shut up Spartacus in the peninsula of Brutium, or head of land which extends to the Straits of Messina. The gladiators desired to pass into Sicily, where their fellow-sufferers, the slaves of that island, were not yet intirely subdued, and where great numbers at all times were prepared to revolt; but they were prevented by the want of shipping. Crassus at the same time undertook a work of great labour, that of intrenching the land from sea to sea with a ditch fifteen feet wide, and as many deep, extending, according to Plutarch, three hundred stadia, or above thirty miles. Spartacus endeavoured to interrupt the execution of this undertaking; but being repulsed in every attack, his followers began to despond, and entertained thoughts of surrendering themselves. In order to supply by despair what they lost in courage, he put them in mind that they fought not upon equal terms with their enemies; that they must  
either

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either conquer or be treated as fugitive slaves; and, to enforce his admonitions, he ordered one of his captives to be nailed to the cross in sight of both armies. "This," he said to his own people, "is an example of what you are to suffer if you fall into the enemy's hands."

Whilst Crassus was busy completing his line, Spartacus prepared to force it; and, having provided faggots and other materials for this purpose, filled up the ditch at a convenient place, and passed it in the night with the whole body of his followers. He directed his march to Apulia, but was pursued, and greatly harassed in his flight.

Accounts being received at once in the camp of Crassus and in that of Spartacus, that fresh troops were landed at Brundisium from Macedonia, and that Pompey was arrived in Italy, and on his march to join Crassus, both armies were equally disposed to hazard a battle; the gladiators, that they might not be attacked at once by so many enemies as were collecting against them; and the Romans under Crassus, that Pompey might not snatch out of their hands the glory of terminating the war. Under the influence of these different motives, both leaders drew forth their armies; and when they were ready to engage, Spartacus, with the valour rather of a gladiator than of a general, alighting from his horse, and saying aloud, in the hearing of his followers, "If I conquer to-day, I shall be better mounted; if not, I shall not have occasion for a horse," he plunged his sword into the body of the animal. With this earnest of a resolution to conquer or to die, he advanced towards the enemy; directing the division in which he himself commanded to make their attack where he understood the Roman general was posted. He intended to decide the action by forcing the Romans in that quarter; but after much bloodshed, being mangled with wounds, and still almost alone in the midst of his enemies, he continued to fight till he was killed; and the victory of course declared for his enemy. About a thousand of the Romans

were slain; of the vanquished the greatest slaughter, as usual in ancient battles, took place after the flight began. The dead were not numbered; about six thousand were taken, and, in the manner of executing the sentence of death on slaves, they were nailed to the crosses in rows, that lined the way from Capua to Rome. Such as escaped from the field of battle, being about five thousand, fell into the hands of Pompey, and furnished a pretence to his flatterers for ascribing to him the honour of terminating the war.

The mean quality of the enemy, however, in the present case, precluded even Crassus from the honour of a triumph; he could have only an ovation or military procession on foot. But instead of the myrtle wreath, usual on such occasions, he had credit enough with the Senate to obtain the laurel crown<sup>3</sup>.

Pompey too arrived at the same time with new and uncommon pretensions, requiring a dispensation from the law and established forms of the commonwealth. The war he had conducted in Spain being of the nature of a civil war against Roman citizens or subjects, with a Roman general at their head, did not give a regular claim to a triumph: Pompey himself was yet under the legal age, and had not passed through any of the previous steps of *Questor*, *Ædile* and *Prætor*; yet on the present occasion he not only insisted on a triumph, but put in his claim likewise to an immediate nomination to the office of *Consul*.

It now became extremely evident, that the established honours of the State, conferred in the usual way, were not adequate to the pretensions of this young man: that he must have new and singular appointments, or those already known bestowed on him in some new and singular manner. His enemies observed, that he avoided every occasion of fair competition; that he took a rank of importance

<sup>3</sup> A. Gellius, lib. v.



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which he did not submit to have examined ; and that he ever aspired to stand alone, or in the first place of public consideration and dignity. His partizans, on the contrary, stated the extraordinary honours which had been done to him, as the foundation of still farther distinctions \*. In enumerating his services upon his return from Spain, they reckoned up, according to Pliny, eight hundred and seventy-one towns, from the Pyrennees to the extremities of that country, which he had reduced ; observed that he had surpassed the glory of all the officers who had gone before him in that service ; and, in consequence of these representations, though still in a private station, he was admitted to a triumph, or partook with Metellus in this honour.

Pompey had hitherto, in all the late disputes, taken part with the aristocracy ; but not without suspicion of aiming too high for republican government of any sort. While he supported the Senate, he affected a degree of pre-eminence above those who composed it, and was not content with equality, even among the first Nobles of his country. He acquiesced, nevertheless, in the mere shew of importance, without assuming a power which might have engaged him in contests, and exposed his pretensions to too near an inspection. Upon his approach at the head of an army from Spain, the Senate was greatly alarmed ; but he gave the most unfeigned assurances of his intention to disband his army as soon as they should have attended his triumph. The Senate accordingly gave way to this irregular pretension, and afterwards to the pretension, still more dangerous, which, without any of the previous conditions which the law required, he made to the Consulate. Crassus, who had been Prætor in the preceding year, now stood for the same office, entered into a concert with Pompey, and, notwithstanding their mutual jealousy of each other, they joined their interests, and were elected together.

U. C. 683.  
M. Licin.  
Crassus, Cn.  
Pomp. Magnus.

\* Vid. Cicer. pro Lege Manilia.

Under the administration of these officers some important laws are said to have passed, although most of the particulars have escaped the notice of historians. It appears that Pompey now began to pay his court to the People; and, though he professed to support the authority of the Senate, wished to have it in his power, on occasion, to take the sense of what was called the assembly of the People against them, or, in other words, to counteract them by means of the popular tumults which bore this name.

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The Tribunes, Quinctius and Palicanus, had for two years successively laboured to remove the bars which had, by the constitution of Sylla, been opposed to the tribunitian power. They had been strenuously resisted by Lucullus and others, who held the office of Consul, during the dependence of the questions which had arisen on that subject. By the favour of Pompey and Crassus, however, the Tribunes obtained a restitution of the privileges which their predecessors, in former times of the republic, had so often abused; and, together with the security of their sacred and inviolable character, and their negative in all proceedings of the State, they were again permitted to propose laws, and to harangue the people; a dangerous measure, by which Pompey at once rendered fruitless that reformation which was the only apology for the blood so lavishly shed, not only by Sylla, but likewise by himself. Caius Julius Cæsar, at the same time, having the rank of Legionary Tribune conferred upon him by the choice of the People, was extremely active in procuring those popular acts; a policy in which he was more consistent with himself than Pompey, and only pursued the course of the party with which he embarked in his youth<sup>5</sup>.

Under this Consulate, and probably with the encouragement of Pompey, the law of Sylla, respecting the judicatures, was, upon the

<sup>5</sup> Suetonius in C. Jul. Cæsar. lib. i.

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Judiciaria.

motion of the Prætor, Aurelius Cotta, likewise repealed ; and it was permitted to the Prætors to draught the judges in equal numbers from the Senate, the knights, and a certain class of the People<sup>o</sup>, whose description is not clearly ascertained. This was, perhaps, a just correction of Sylla's partiality to the Nobles ; and, if it had not been accompanied by the former act, which restored the tribunitian power, might have merited applause.

In the mean time, corruption advanced among all orders of men with a hasty pace ; in the lower ranks, contempt of government ; among the higher, covetousness and prodigality, with an ardour for lucrative provinces, and the opportunities of extortion and flagrant abuse. As the offices of State at Rome began to be coveted with a view to the appointments abroad, with which they were followed, Pompey, in order to display his own disinterestedness, with an oblique reproof to the Nobility who aspired to magistracy with such mercenary views, took a formal oath in entering on his Consulate, that he would not, at the expiration of his office, accept of any government in the provinces ; and by this example of generosity in himself, and by the censure it implied of others, obtained great credit with the People, and furnished his emissaries, who were ever busy in founding his praise, with a pretence for enhancing his merit. It may, however, from his character and policy in other instances, be suspected, that he remained at Rome with intention to watch opportunities of raising his own consideration, and of obtaining, by the strength of his party, any extraordinary trust or commission of which the occasion should arise.

Pompey, in the administration of his Consulate, had procured the revival of the Censors functions. These had been intermitted about sixteen years, during great part of which time the republic had been

<sup>a</sup> Tribuni Erazii.

in a state of civil war ; and the prevailing parties, in their turns, mutually had recourse to acts of banishment, confiscations, and military executions against each other. In such times, even after the sword was sheathed, the power of Censor, in the first heat of party-resentment, could not be safely intrusted with any of the citizens ; and the attempts which were now made to revive it, though in appearance successful, could not give it a permanent footing in the commonwealth. The public was arrived at a state in which men complain of evils, but cannot endure their remedies.

L. Gellius Poplicola and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, being entrusted, in the capacity of Censors, to make up the rolls of the People, mustered four hundred and fifty thousand citizens. They purged the Senate with great severity, having expunged sixty-four from the rolls, and among those C. Antonius, afterwards Consul, assigning as their reason, that he, having the command on the coasts of Asia and Greece, had pillaged the allies, and mortgaged and squandered his own estate. But what most distinguished this Censorship was an incident, for the sake of which, it is likely, the solemnity of the Census had been now revived.

It was customary on those occasions for the Knights to pass in review, each leading his horse before the Censors. They were questioned respecting their age, their services, and the persons under whose command they had served ; and if they had already served the ten years prescribed by law, they received an exemption from future services, and were vested with the privileges which were annexed to this circumstance. At this part of the ceremony the People were surprised to see their Consul, Pompey the Great, descending into the market-place, leading his horse in quality of a simple knight, but dressed in his consular robes, and preceded by the lictors. Being questioned by the Censor, whether he had served the stated number of years, he answered that he had, and all of them in armies commanded



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manded by himself. This farce was received with loud acclamations of the People; and the Censors having granted the customary exemption, rose from their seats, and, followed by a great multitude, attended this equestrian Consul to his own house<sup>7</sup>.

It is observed that Crassus and Pompey, although they entered on office in concert, yet differed in the course of their administration on subjects which are not particularly mentioned. As Crassus was in possession of great wealth, he endeavoured, by his liberalities, to vie with the imposing state and popular arts of his colleague. He gave an entertainment to the whole People at ten thousand tables, and distributed three months provision of corn. To account for his being able to court the People in this manner, it is said, that he inherited from his father a fortune of three hundred talents, or near sixty thousand pounds; that he increased it, by purchasing at a low price the estates of those who were proscribed in the late troubles, and by letting for hire the labour of a numerous family of slaves, instructed in various arts and callings; and was become so rich by these means, that when, some time after this date, he was about to depart for Asia, and consecrated the tenth part of his estate to Hercules, he was found to possess seven thousand one hundred talents, or about one million three hundred and seventy thousand and three hundred pounds sterling<sup>8</sup>.

Pompey, at the expiration of his year in the Consulship, in observance of the oath he had taken, remained at Rome in a private station; but, agreeably to the character he formerly bore, maintained the reserve and stateliness of a person raised above the condition of a citizen, or even above that of the first Senators of consular rank. Other candidates for consideration and public honours endeavoured, by their talents and eloquence, to make themselves necessary to those who had

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch. in Pompeio.

<sup>8</sup> Plutarch. in Crasso. As the interest of money was prohibited at Rome, under the

denomination of usury, but in fact was unlimited, the annual returns from such a capital must have been immense.

affairs to solicit with the public, or even to make themselves feared. They laboured to distinguish themselves as able advocates or formidable accusers at the bar, and to strengthen their interest by procuring the support of those to whom their talents either were or might become of importance. Pompey, on the contrary, stating himself as an exception to common rules, avoided the courts of justice and other places of ordinary resort, did not commit his talents to the public judgment, nor present his person to the public view; took the respect that was paid to him as a right; seldom went abroad, and never without a numerous train of attendants\*. He was formed for the state of a prince, and might have stolen into that high station even at Rome, if men, born to equality, could have suffered an elevation which was not supported by adequate abilities; or had been willing, when troubled with faction, to forego their own importance, in order to obtain peace and the comforts of a moderate government. The pretensions of Pompey, however, were extremely disagreeable to the Senate, and not otherwise acceptable to the People, than as they tended to mortify the pride of that order of men.

The Consulate of Crassus and Pompey was succeeded by that of Q. Hortensius and Q. Cæcilius Metellus. In the distribution of provinces, Crete, with the command of an armament to be sent into that island, fell to the lot of Hortensius; but this citizen, having acquired his consideration by his eloquence in pleading the causes of his friends, and being accustomed to the bar, perhaps in a degree that interfered with his military character, declined to accept of this government; leaving it, together with the command of the army that was to be employed in the reduction of the island, to his colleague Metellus, who afterwards received the appellation of Creticus, from the distinction he acquired in this service.

C H A P.  
II.

U. C. 684.  
Q. Hortensius, Q. Cæcilius Metellus Creticus.

\* Plutarch. in Vit. Pomp.

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The Cretans, and most of the other seafaring people on the confines of Asia and Europe, had in the late war taken an active part against the Romans. They had, by the influence of Mithridates, and by their own disposition to rapine and piracy, been led to prey upon the traders, and upon the carriers of the revenue that were frequently passing from the provinces to Rome. The desire of sharing in the profits that were made by this species of war, had filled the sea with pirates and freebooters, against whom the Romans sent forth a succession of officers, with extensive commands, on the coasts both of Asia and Europe. Among others, M. Antonius had been employed in this service, and was accused of abusing his power, by oppressing the Sicilians and the people of other maritime provinces, who were innocent of the crimes he was employed to repress. In a descent on the island of Crete he was defeated and killed<sup>10</sup>, and left the Romans engaged with the people of that island in a war which was thought to require the presence of one of the Consuls. The lot, as has been observed, fell on Hortensius, but was transferred to his colleague Metellus.

U. C. 685.  
L. Cæc. Metellus, Q.  
Mar. Rex.

Such was the state of affairs, and such the destination of the Roman officers, when Lucullus received from Tigranes a return to the demand which he made of having Mithridates delivered up as his prisoner. This prince, at the arrival of Clodius, who bore the message, had made a progress to the coasts of Phœnicia, and to the farther extremities of his empire. To verify the state and title which he assumed of King of Kings, he affected, when he mounted on horseback, to have four captive sovereigns to walk by his stirrup, and obliged them, on other occasions, to perform every office of menial duty and servile attendance on his person. Lucullus, instead of the title which was affected by this prince, had accosted him in his letter

<sup>10</sup> Pædianus in Orat. in Verrem.

only with the simple title of king. His messenger, however, was admitted to an audience, and made his demand that Mithridates, a vanquished prince, whose territories were already in the possession of the Romans, should be delivered up to adorn the victor's triumph. This, if refused, said the bearer of the message, the Roman general would be intitled to extort by force, and would not fail, with a mighty army for that purpose, to pursue his fugitive wherever he was received and protected. Tigranes, unused even to a plain address, much less to insult and threats, heard this demand with real indignation; and though, with an appearance of temper, he made offer of the customary presents and honours to the person who delivered it, he took his resolution against the Romans, and, from having barely permitted Mithridates to take refuge in his kingdom, determined to espouse his cause. He gave for answer to Clodius, that he would not deliver up the unfortunate king, and that, if the Romans invaded his territories, he knew how to defend them. He soon afterwards admitted Mithridates into his presence, and determined to support him with the necessary force against his enemies.

Upon receiving this answer from Tigranes, Lucullus resolved without delay to march into Armenia. He chose for this expedition two legions and a body of horse, on whom he prevailed, though with some difficulty, to enter on a new war at a time when they flattered themselves that their labours were ended, and that the rewards they expected were within their reach. With hasty marches he arrived on the Euphrates, and passed that river before the enemy were aware of his approach. Tigranes treated the first reports of his coming with contempt, and ordered the person who presumed to bring such accounts to be punished. But being assured, beyond a possibility of doubt, that an enemy was actually on his territories, he sent Metrodorus, one of his generals, at the head of a considerable force, with orders to take alive the person of Lucullus, whom he



was desirous to see, but not to spare a man of the whole army besides.

With these orders, the Armenian general set out on the road by which the Romans were supposed to advance, and hastened to meet them. Both armies, on the march, had intelligence of each other. Lucullus, upon the approach of the enemy, halted, began to intrench, and, in order to gain time, detached Sextilius, with about three thousand men, to observe the Armenians, and, if possible, without risking an action, to amuse them till his works were completed. But such was the incapacity and presumption of the enemy, that Sextilius, being attacked by them, gained an entire victory with but a part of the Roman army; Metrodorus himself being killed, his army was put to the rout with great slaughter.

After this victory Lucullus, in order the more effectually to alarm and to distract the Armenians, separated his army into three divisions. With one he intercepted and dispersed a body of Arabs, who were marching to join the king; with another he surprised Tigranes himself, in a disadvantageous situation, and obliged him to fly with the loss of his attendants, equipage, and the baggage of his army. At the head of the third division he himself advanced to Tigranocerta, and invested that place.

After these disasters Tigranes made an effort to assemble the force of his kingdom; and bringing into the field all the troops of his allies, as well as his own, he mustered an army of one hundred and fifty thousand heavy-armed foot, fifty-five thousand horse, and twenty thousand archers and slingers. He was advised by Mithridates not to risk a battle, but to lay waste the country from which the Romans were supplied with provisions, oblige them to raise the siege of Tigranocerta, and repass the Euphrates, with the disadvantage of having an enemy still in force to hang on their rear. This counsel

counsel of Mithridates, founded in the experience he had so dearly bought, was ill suited to the presumption of the king. He therefore advanced towards the Romans, impatient to relieve his capital, and the principal feat of his magnificence. Lucullus, trusting to the specimens he had already seen of the Armenian forces, ventured to divide his army, and, without raising the siege, marched with one division to meet this numerous enemy. In the action that followed, the Armenian horse being in the van, were defeated and driven back on the foot of their own army, threw them into confusion, and gave the Romans an easy victory, in which, with very inconsiderable loss to themselves, they made a great slaughter of the enemy. The king himself, to avoid being known in his flight, unbound the royal diadem from his head, and left it to become a part in the spoils of the day.

Mariæus, who commanded in Tigranocerta, hearing of his master's defeat, and fearing a revolt of the Greeks and other foreigners, who had been forced to settle at that place, ordered them to be searched and disarmed. This order they looked on as the prelude to a massacre, and crowding together, defended themselves with the staves and other weapons they could seize. They surrounded a party that was sent to disperse them, and having by that means got a supply of arms, they took possession of a tower which commanded one of the principal gates, and from thence invited the Romans to enter the place. Lucullus accordingly seized the opportunity, and became master of the city. The spoil was great; Tigranes having collected here, as at the principal seat of his vanity, the wealth and magnificence of his court.

Mithridates, who had been present in the late action, met the king of Armenia in his flight; and, having endeavoured to re-establish his equipage and his retinue by a participation of his own, exhorted him not to despair, but to assemble a new force, and to persist in the war. They agreed, at the same time, on an embassy to the king of

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Parthia, with offers of reconciliation on the part of Tigranes, who, at this time, was at war with that prince, and of satisfaction on the subjects in contest between them, provided the Parthians would join in the confederacy against the Romans. They endeavoured to persuade the king, that he was by no means an unconcerned spectator in the present contest; that the quarrel which the Romans now had with the kings of Armenia and Pontus, was the same with that which they formerly had with Philip and with Antiochus; and which, if not prevented, they would soon have with Arsaces, and was no other than his being possessed of a rich territory, which tempted their ambition and avarice. Those republicans, they said, originally had not any possessions of their own, and were grown rich and great only by the spoils of their neighbours. From their strong hold in Italy, they had extended their empire on the West to the coast of the ocean; and, if not stopped by the powerful monarchies that lay in their way, were hastening to reach a similar boundary on the East. The king of Parthia, they added, might expect to be invaded by these insatiable conquerors, and must now determine whether he would engage in a war joined with such powerful allies, of whom one by his experience, the other by his resources, might enable him to keep the danger at a distance from his own kingdom<sup>o</sup>, or wait until these powers being overthrown, and become an accession to the Roman force, he should have the contest to maintain in his own territory singly and unsupported from abroad. To these representations Arsaces seemed to give a favourable ear, agreed to the proposed confederacy, on condition that Mesopotamia, which he had formerly claimed, was now delivered up to him. At the same time he endeavoured to amuse Lucullus with offers of alliance against the king of Armenia.

<sup>o</sup> Letter of Mithridates in the Fragments of Sallust.

In this conjuncture it probably was, that Lucullus, in the apprehension of being superseded and deprived of the honour of terminating the war, made his report that the kingdom of Mithridates was now in his possession, and that the kingdom of Tigranes was also in his power; and therefore, that the Senate should, instead of a successor, send the usual commission to settle the form of the province, and to make a proper establishment to preserve the territories which he had already subdued. But after these representations were dispatched, it became apparent that the king of Parthia had deceived him with false professions, while he actually made great progress in his treaty with the kings of Armenia and Pontus, and meant to support them with all his force. In resentment of this act of treachery, and to prevent the effects of it, Lucullus proposed to carry the war into Parthia; and, for this purpose, ordered the legions that were stationed in Pontus to march without delay into Armenia.

These troops, however, already tired of the service, and suspecting that they were intended for some distant and hazardous enterprise, broke out into open mutiny, and refused to obey their officers. This example was soon afterwards followed by other parts of the army; and the general was obliged to confine his operations to the kingdom of Armenia. He endeavoured, by passing the mountains near to the sources of the Euphrates and the Tigris, to penetrate as far as Artaxata, the capital of the kingdom. By this march he forced Tigranes once more to hazard a battle, and obtained a victory; but his own army, notwithstanding their success, were so much discouraged with the change of climate, which they experienced in ascending the mountains of Armenia, and with the early and severe approach of winter in those high lands, that they again mutinied, and obliged their general to change the plan of his operations. He turned his march to the southward, fell down on Mesopotamia, and, after a short siege, made himself master of Nisibis, a rich city in that territory, where,  
with



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manded in the place.

Here, however, the mutinous spirit still continuing to operate in the Roman army, it began to appear, that the general, who had so often overcome the kings of Pontus and Armenia, was better qualified to contend with an enemy, than to win or to preserve the goodwill of his own troops. A report being spread that he was soon to be recalled, he, from that moment, lost the small remains of his authority; the legions deserted their colours, and treated, with contempt or indifference, all the attempts he made to retain them.

This mutiny began in that part of the army, which, having been transported into Asia, under the command of Valerius Flaccus, had murdered this general, to put themselves under the command of Fimbria, and afterwards deserted their new leader to join with Sylla. Such crimes, under the late unhappy divisions of the republic, either remained unpunished, or were stated as merits with the party in whose favour the crime was committed. These legions, however, were, by Sylla, who was not willing to employ such instruments, or to intrust his own, or the fate of the commonwealth in such hands, left in Asia, under pretence of securing the province; and they accordingly made a considerable part in the armies successively commanded by Murena and by Lucullus. The disposition which they now shewed, and that of the whole army, to disorder and mutiny, was greatly excited by the factious spirit of Publius Clodius, the relation of Lucullus, who, having himself taken offence at the general, gave this specimen of his future conduct in the State, by endeavouring to stir up rebellion among the troops. "We who have already undergone so many hardships," he said, "are still kept on foot to escort the camels that carry the treasures of our general, and made to pursue, without end, a couple of barbarous princes, that lead us over deserts, or uncultivated wastes, while the soldiers

“ diers of Pompey, after a few campaigns in Spain, or in Italy, are  
 “ enjoying the fruits of their labour in comfortable settlements, pro- C H A P.  
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 “ cured by the favour of their leader.”

Lucullus was so much aware of the decline of his authority, that he did not chuse to expose it, by attempting to effect even a mere change of position. He hoped, that while he issued no orders of any moment, the resolution of his army not to obey him might remain a secret to the enemy. This state of his affairs, however, soon became known to Mithridates, and filled him with hopes of being able to recover his kingdom. That he might not suffer the opportunity to escape him, he fell back into Pontus, with what troops he had then under his command, and, by his authority and influence over his own subjects, soon augmented his force, penetrated among the scattered quarters of the Romans, who were left to occupy the country, and separately surpris'd or destroyed considerable bodies of their troops. Among these, he attacked and defeated Fabius, the officer who was trusted with the general command in that kingdom; and though now turned of seventy, exposed his own person in the action, and received a wound which stopped him in the pursuit, and by that means prevented the full effect of his victory.

Lucullus, being informed of what had passed in Pontus, had influence enough with the army to put them in motion towards that kingdom with some appearance of order; but before his arrival, Mithridates had shut up Fabius in Cabira, and defeated Triarius with considerable slaughter. Here again the old man was wounded; and, to satisfy the army that he was not dead, was raised up into view, and remained in sight of the army while his wound was dressed. In this last defeat the Romans lost twenty-four legionary Tribunes, one hundred and fifty Centurions, and seven thousand men.

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It was not doubted, however, that Lucullus, on his arrival, if the army had been disposed to act under him, would have been able soon to retrieve his affairs: but he was at this time superseded; and it was known in the army, that Acilius Glabrio was set out from Rome to assume the command. The legions therefore, under pretence that Lucullus was no longer their general, and that they themselves, by a decree of the People, had received their dismissal, refused to obey him; and the men of his army, in great numbers, actually took the route of Cappadocia on their return to Italy.

This was the state of affairs when the commissioners, who, upon the report of Lucullus, had been sent by the Senate to settle the kingdom of Pontus in the form of a province, actually arrived. They found the Proconsul destitute of power in his own camp, and Mithridates, whom they believed to be vanquished, again master of his own kingdom, and joining to the experience of old age all the ardour and enterprize of youth<sup>21</sup>.

The Roman army in Asia, as a prelude to their present defection, had been taught to upbraid the parsimony of their own general by a comparison with the liberality and munificence of Pompey, and in this comparison showed a disposition to change their leader, which, it is not doubted, Pompey, by his intrigues, and with the aid of his agents, greatly encouraged. He could in reality ill brook the private station to which, by his late oath, in entering on the Consulship, he had bound himself. He studied to support the public opinion of his importance, and wished for an occasion to derive some advantage from it; but nothing had occurred for two years that was worthy of the high distinction to which he aspired. The command in Asia he coveted the more, that it was secured to Lucullus by the splendor of his own successes, and by the unanimous judgment of the Senate

<sup>21</sup> Appian. Bell. Mithridat. Plutarch. in Lucullo. Dio Cassius.

and Nobles, who knew his faithful attachment to their order, and his fidelity to the aristocratical part of the constitution. The difficulties in that service were over, and nothing but the glory of terminating the war remained. Pompey, either from envy to Lucullus, or from a design to open a way to this glory for himself, contributed to the nomination of Glabrio, and to the nomination of the Prætors, who were sent with separate commands into the provinces of Asia and Bythinia. If, upon this change, the war should become unsuccessful, or languish, he had hopes to be called for by the general voice of the People, as the only person fit to bring it to a happy conclusion. Meantime a project was started, which was likely to place him near to this scene of action, and to facilitate his removal, if judged expedient, to the command of the army in Pontus.

The pirates still continued to infest the seas, and were daily rising in their presumption, and increasing in their strength. They received continual accessions of numbers from those, who, by the unsettled state of Asia, were forced to join them for subsistence. The impunity which they enjoyed during the distractions of the Roman commonwealth, and the profits they made by their depredations encouraged many who frequented the seas to engage in the same way of life. They had been chased, and numbers of them taken by M. Antonius the orator, by Servilius Isauricus, and, last of all, by C. Antonius, the father of him who, in the capacity of Triumvir, is to become so conspicuous in the sequel of this history. But they had their retreats; and, upon the least remission of vigilance in the Roman officers, they again multiplied apace, put to sea in formidable squadrons, and embarked such numbers of men, as not only enabled them to scour the seas, but likewise to make descents on the coasts, to enter harbours, destroy shipping, and pillage the maritime towns. They even ventured to appear off the mouth of the Tiber, and to plunder the town of Ostia. All the coasts of



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the empire were open to their depredations. The Roman magistrates were made prisoners in passing to and from their provinces; and citizens of every denomination, when taken by them, were forced to pay ransom, kept in captivity, or put to death. The supply of provisions to Italy was rendered extremely difficult, and the price in proportion enhanced. Every report on these subjects was exaggerated by the intrigues of Pompey, who perceived, in this occasion of public distress, the object of a new and extraordinary commission to himself.

Frequent complaints having been made, and frequent deliberations held on this subject in the Senate, Gabinius, one of the Tribunes, at last proposed, that some officer of Consular rank should be vested, during three years, with absolute powers, in order to put an effectual stop to these outrages, and to eradicate the cause of them, so as to secure for the future the inhabitants of the coast, as well as to protect the navigation of the seas. As Gabinius was known to be in concert with Pompey, the design of the proposition was manifest; and it was received in the Senate with a general aversion. "For this," it was said, "Pompey has declined the ordinary turn of Consular duty upon the expiration of his office, that he might lie in wait for extraordinary and illegal appointments." Gabinius being threatened with violence if he should persist in his motion, thought proper to withdraw from the assembly.

A report was immediately spread in the city, that the person of the Tribune Gabinius had been actually violated; multitudes assembled at the doors of the Senate-house, and great disorders were likely to follow; it was judged prudent for the Senate to adjourn; and the members, dreading some insult from the populace, retired by separate ways to their own houses. Gabinius, without farther regard to the dissent of the Senate, prepared to carry his motion to the People; but the other nine Tribunes were inclined to oppose him. Trebellius and Roscius, in particular, promised, by their negative,

gative, to put a stop to any farther proceedings on that business. Pompey, in the mean time, with a dissimulation which constituted part of his character, affected to disapprove of the motion, and to decline the commission with which it was proposed to vest him. He had recourse to this affectation, not merely as the fittest means on the present occasion to disarm the envy of the Nobles, and to confirm the People in their choice ; but still more as a manner of proceeding which suited his own disposition, no less desirous to appear forced and courted into high situations, than solicitous to gain and to hold them. He thus provoked the citizens of his own rank, no less by the shallow arts which he practised to impose on the public, than by the state which he assumed. He could scarcely expect to find a support in the order of Nobles, and least of all among those who were likely to become the personal rivals of his fortune in the commonwealth : and yet it is mentioned, that Julius Cæsar, now about two-and-thirty years of age, and old enough to distinguish his natural antagonists in the career of ambition, took part with the creatures of Pompey on this occasion. He was disposed to court the People, and to oppose the aristocracy ; either of which principles may explain his conduct in this instance. He had himself already incurred the displeasure of the Senate, but more as a libertine than as a disturber of the State, in which he had not hitherto taken any material part. In common with the youth of his time, he disliked the Senators, on account of the remaining austerity of their manners, no less than the inferior people disliked them on account of their aristocratical claims to prerogative. But whatever we may suppose to have been his motives, Cæsar, even before he seemed to have formed any ambitious designs of his own, was ever ready to abet those of every desperate adventurer who counteracted the authority of the Senate, or set the orders of government at nought ; and seemed to be actuated by a species of instinct, which set him at variance

with those forms of a civil nature, which checked the licence of faction<sup>22</sup>.

On the day on which the question on the motion of Gabinius was to be put to the People, Pompey appeared in the Comitium; and, if we may judge from the speech which is ascribed to him, employed a dissimulation and artifice somewhat too gross even for a popular assembly. He took occasion to thank the People for the honours he had so often received; but complained, that, having already toiled so much in the public service, he still should be destined for new labours. “You have forgotten,” he said, “the dangers I encountered, and the fatigues I underwent, while yet almost a boy, in the war with Cinna, in the wars in Sicily and in Africa, and what I suffered in Spain, before I was honoured with any magistracy, or was of age to have a place in the Senate. But I mean not to accuse you of ingratitude; on the contrary, I have been fully repaid. Your nomination of me to conduct the war with Sertorius, when every one else declined the danger, I consider as a favour; and the extraordinary triumph you bestowed in consequence of it, as a very great honour. But I must entreat you to consider, that continued application and labour exhaust the powers of the mind as well as those of the body. Trust not to my age alone, nor imagine that I am still a young man, merely because my number of years is short of what others have attained. Reckon my services and the dangers to which I have been exposed; they will exceed the number of my years, and satisfy you, that I cannot longer endure the labours and cares which are now proposed for me. But if this be not granted me, I must beg of you to consider what loads of envy such appointments are likely to draw upon me from men, whose displeasure, I know,

<sup>22</sup> Zonaras, An. lib. x. c. 3.

“ you neither do, nor ought to regard, although to me their envy  
 “ would be a great misfortune : and I confess, that, of all the diffi- C H A P.  
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 “ culties and dangers of war, I fear nothing so much as this. To  
 “ live with envious persons ; to be called to account for miscarriage,  
 “ if one fails in public affairs ; to be envied, if one succeeds ; who  
 “ would chuse to be employed on such conditions ? For these, and  
 “ many other reasons, I pray you to leave me at rest ; leave me to  
 “ the care of my family, and of my private affairs. As for the pre-  
 “ sent service, I pray you to chuse, among those who desire the em-  
 “ ployment, some proper person ; among so many, you cannot sure-  
 “ ly be at a loss. I am not the only person that loves you, or that  
 “ has experience in military affairs. There are many, whose names,  
 “ to avoid the imputation of flattery, I will not mention.”

To this speech Gabinius replied ; and, affecting to believe the sin-  
 cerity of Pompey's declarations, observed, that it was agreeable to  
 the character of this great man, neither to desire command, nor  
 rashly to accept of what was pressed upon him. “ They who are  
 “ best able to surmount difficulties,” he said, “ are likewise least  
 “ inclined to engage in them. But it is your business, fellow-citi-  
 “ zens, to consider, not what is agreeable to Pompey, but what is  
 “ necessary to your own affairs ; not to regard those who court you  
 “ for offices, but those who are fit to discharge the duties of them.  
 “ I wish we had many persons of this description, besides the man I  
 “ have proposed to your choice. Did we not all wish for such per-  
 “ sons likewise, when we searched among the young and the old for  
 “ some one whom we could oppose to Sertorius, and found none  
 “ but himself ? But wishes cannot avail us ; we must take men as  
 “ they are ; we cannot create them. If there be but one man formed  
 “ for our purpose, with knowledge, experience, and good fortune,  
 “ we must lay hold of him, and seize him, if necessary, even by  
 “ force. Compulsion here is expedient and honourable for both  
 “ parties ;



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“ parties ; for those who employ it, because it is to find them a  
“ person who can conduct their affairs ; for him who suffers it,  
“ because he is to have an opportunity of serving his country, an  
“ object for which no good citizen will refuse to expose his person,  
“ or to sacrifice his life.

“ Do you think that Pompey, while yet a boy, was fit to command  
“ armies, to protect your allies, to reduce your enemies, to extend  
“ your empire ; but that now in the prime of life, ripe in wisdom  
“ and experience, he can serve you no longer ? You employed the boy,  
“ you suffer the man to be idle. When a private citizen of Equestrian  
“ rank, he was fit for war and affairs of state ; now he is a Senator,  
“ he is fit for nothing ! Before you had any trial of him, you made  
“ choice of him for the most important trust ; now that you have  
“ experience of his ability, of his conduct, and of his success, you  
“ hesitate. Is the present occasion less pressing than the former ?  
“ Is the antagonist of Sertorius not fit to contend with pirates ? But  
“ such absurdities cannot be received by the Roman People. As for  
“ you, Pompey, submit to the will of your fellow-citizens. For  
“ this you was born, for this you was educated. I call upon you as  
“ the property of your country ; I call upon you as its defence and  
“ safe-guard ; I call upon you to lay down your life, if necessary.  
“ This I know, if your country require it, you will not, you cannot  
“ refuse.

“ But it is ridiculous to accost you in this manner ; you, who  
“ have proved your courage and your love to your country in so  
“ many and such arduous trials. Be ruled by this great assembly.  
“ Despise the envy of a few, or study the more to deserve the  
“ general favour. Let the envious pine when they hear of your  
“ actions, it is what they deserve. Let us be delivered from the  
“ evils that surround us, while you proceed to end your life as you  
“ began it, with success and with glory.”

When

When Gabinius had finished his speech, Trebellius, another of the Tribunes, attempted to reply ; but such a clamour was immediately raised by the multitude that he could not be heard. He then, by the authority of his office, forbade the question ; and Gabinius instantly proposed to have the sense of the Tribes, Whether Tribellius had not forfeited the character of Tribune ? Seventeen Tribes were of this opinion, and the eighteenth would have made the majority, when Trebellius thought proper to withdraw his negative. Roscius, another of the Tribunes, intimated by signs (for he could not be heard) that a second should be joined with Pompey in this commission. But the clamour was renewed, and the meeting likely to end in riot and violence. Then all opposition to the motion was dropt. In this state of affairs, Gabinius, trusting that, in the present humour of the People, no man would dare to oppose the measure, and wishing to increase the honour of Pompey's nomination, by the seeming concurrence of some of the more respectable citizens, called upon Catulus, who was then first on the roll of the Senate, to deliver his opinion, and led him up into the rostra for this purpose.

This citizen, by the equability of his conduct, and by his moderation in support of the aristocracy had great authority even with the opposite party. He began his speech to the People with professions of public zeal, which obliged him to deliver with plainness what he thought was conducive to their good, and which intitled him to a deliberate hearing, before they should pronounce on the merits of what he was about to deliver. “ If you listen,” he said, “ something may still be offered “ to inform your judgment ; if you break forth again into disorders “ and tumults, your capacity and good understanding will avail you “ nothing. I must begin with declaring my opinion, that powers “ so great, and for so long a time, as are now proposed for Pompey, “ should not be committed to any single citizen.

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“ The precedent is contrary to law, and in itself, in the highest degree, dangerous to the State. Whence came the usurpations of Marius, but from the habit of continued command; from his being put at the head of every army, entrusted with every war, and no less than six times re-elected Consul in the space of a few years? What inflamed to such a degree the arrogant spirit of Sylla, but the continual command of armies, and the continual power of Dictator? Such is human nature, that, in age as well as in youth, we are debauched with power; and if inured for any time to act as superiors, we cannot submit afterwards to the equal and moderate station of citizens.

“ I speak not with any particular reference to Pompey; I speak what the law requires, and what I am sure is for your good. If high office and command be an honour, every one who has pretensions should enjoy them in his turn; if they be a load or a burden, every one ought to bear his part. These are the laws of justice and of republican government. By observing them, republics have an advantage over every other state. By employing many men in their turns, they educate and train many citizens for the public service, and have numbers amongst whom they may chuse the fittest to serve on every particular emergence. But if we suffer one or a few to engross every office of public service or public trust, the list of those who are qualified for any such trust will decrease in proportion. If we always employ the same person in every public service, we shall soon have no other person to employ. Why were we so much at a loss for experienced commanders when Sertorius appeared to threaten Italy with an invasion? Because command, for a considerable time before that period, had been engrossed by a few, and those few alone had any experience. Although, therefore, I have the highest opinion of Pompey’s abilities

“ for

“ for this service, I must prefer to his pretensions the public utility  
 “ and the express declaration of the laws.

“ You annually elect Consuls and Prætors : to what purpose ? to  
 “ serve the State ? or to carry for a few months the ensigns of power ?  
 “ If to serve the State, why name private persons with unprecedented  
 “ commissions to perform what your magistrates are either fit to per-  
 “ form, or are not fit to have been elected ?

“ If there be any uncommon emergency that requires more than  
 “ the ordinary exertions of government, the constitution has provided  
 “ an expedient. You may name a Dictator. The power of this  
 “ officer has no bounds, but in respect to the place in which it is to  
 “ be exercised, and to the time during which it is to last. It is  
 “ to be exercised within the limits of Italy, where alone the vitals  
 “ of the State can be exposed to any great or pressing attack ; it is  
 “ limited to six months, a sufficient period in which to remove the  
 “ cause of any sudden alarm. But this unlimited power, which is  
 “ now proposed for so long a time, and over the whole empire, must  
 “ end in calamities, such as this and other nations have suffered  
 “ from the ambition and usurpation of arbitrary and seditious men.

“ If you bestow unlimited power by sea and by land on a single  
 “ man, in what manner is he to exercise his power ? Not by him-  
 “ self in person, for he cannot be every where present ; he must  
 “ have lieutenants or substitutes who act under his orders. He can-  
 “ not even attend to what is passing at once in Egypt and in Spain,  
 “ in Africa, Syria, and in Greece. If so, then why may not those  
 “ who are to act be officers named by you, and not by any interme-  
 “ diate person ; accountable to you, and not to another ; and in the  
 “ dangers they run, animated with the prospect of honour to them-  
 “ selves, not to a person who is unnecessarily interposed between  
 “ them and their country ? Gabinus proposes to invest this officer  
 “ with authority to name many lieutenants ; I pray you consider,



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“ whether these officers should depend upon any intermediate person,  
“ or upon yourselves alone? and whether there be sufficient cause to  
“ suspend all the legal powers, and to supersede all the magistrates in  
“ the commonwealth, and all the governors of provinces in every  
“ part of your empire, in order to make war on pirates?”

So much of what Catulus is supposed to have delivered on this occasion is preserved among the fragments of Dion Cassius. It is mentioned by others, that the audience expressed their good-will and respect for this Senator in a compliment which they paid to him, probably near the close of his speech, when urging some of his former arguments, he asked, “ If this man to whom alone, by thus  
“ employing him in every service, you give an opportunity of  
“ learning the profession of a statesman or soldier, should fall, to  
“ whom will you next have recourse?” The People answered, with a general acclamation, *To yourself*<sup>11</sup>. They revered, for a moment, the candour and ability of this eminent citizen, but could not withstand the arts of Pompey, and the tide of popularity, which then ran so much in his favour.

This day being far spent in debate, another day was appointed in which to collect the votes, when a decree passed to vest Pompey with the supreme command over all the fleets and armies of the republic, in every sea without distinction or limit, and on every coast within four hundred stadia, or fifty miles of the shore. This commission took place in Italy, and extended throughout every province, during three years from the time of passing the edict.

As Pompey owed these extraordinary powers intirely to the Tribune Gabinius, he intended to have employed him next in command to himself; but the law which excluded the Tribunes from succeeding to any such commands, in the first year after the expiration of

<sup>11</sup> Cicero pro Lege Manlia.

their office, stood in the way of this choice; and Pompey did not persist in it.


Upon the publication of an edict investing an officer of such renown with so high powers for restoring the navigation of the seas, corn and every other article of importation at Rome considerably fell in their price. The friends of Pompey already triumphed in the success of their measure, and he himself soon after, notwithstanding the meanness of the enemy opposed to him, gained much credit by the rapid, decisive and effectual measures he took to obtain the end of his appointment. Although it was the middle of winter, a season too rough, even in the Mediterranean, for such shipping as was then in use, he gave orders to arm and put to sea as many vessels as could be collected on every part of the coast. In a little time he had returns of two hundred and seventy galleys fit for service, one hundred and twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse embodied on the coasts to which his command extended. That the pirates might be every where attacked at once, and find no refuge by changing their usual places of retreat, he divided the maritime parts of the empire into separate districts, appointed lieutenants with full powers in each, assigned their stations, and allotted their quotas of shipping and troops. He himself, with a squadron of sixty ships, proposed to visit every quarter, and to give his presence where it should be most required. He began with the coasts of Spain and Gaul, and the seas of Sardinia and Corsica; and in passing from thence, while the fleet coasted round the peninsula of Italy, he himself went on shore, and travelled by land to meet them at Brundisium. In this journey, upon his approach to Rome, he enjoyed, in all respects, the state of a great monarch, was received with acclamations by the People, and was courted by multitudes of every condition who went forth to receive him. All his complaints and representations were received as commands. The Consul Piso, being supposed not to forward his levies

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with sufficient alacrity, would have been degraded, if Pompey himself had not interposed to prevent a motion which the Tribune Gabinius intended to make for this purpose.

The fleet being arrived at Brundisium, Pompey hastened to join it, and from thence passed by the stations of his several lieutenants in the sea-ports of Macedonia and Greece, to the coasts of Pamphylia and Cilicia, which were the principal resort of the pirates. Such of these banditti, as he took in his way, were treated with mildness; and this circumstance, together with the great preparations which were reported from every quarter to be making against them, with the small hopes they had of being able to escape, induced them, in great numbers, to surrender themselves. In the bay of Cilicia he found a squadron of their ships assembled, and ready to cover the harbours at which they had been accustomed to collect their stores, and to lodge their booty. They separated, however, upon his appearance, took refuge in different creeks of that mountainous coast, and afterwards surrendered at discretion, delivering up all the forts they had erected, with all their stores of timber, cordage, and sails, of which they had made a considerable provision.

By these means the war was finished about the middle of summer, six months after the nomination of Pompey to this command. In that time seventy-two galleys were sunk, three hundred and six were taken, and a hundred and twenty piratical harbours or strong-holds on shore were destroyed. Ten thousand of the pirates were killed in action, and twenty thousand, who had surrendered themselves, remained prisoners at the end of the war. These Pompey, having sufficiently deprived of the means of returning to their former way of life, transplanted to different parts of the continent, where the late or present troubles, by thinning the inhabitants, had made room for them. Upon this occasion he re-peopled the city of Soli in Cilicia, which had been lately laid waste, and forcibly emptied of its

inhabitants by Tigranes, to replenish his newly established capital of Tigranocerta in Armenia. After this re-establishment of Soli, the place, in honour of its restorer, came to be known by the name of Pompeiopolis <sup>C H A P. II.</sup> .

Whilst Pompey was thus employed in disposing of the pirates on the coast of Cilicia, he received a message from Lappà in the island of Crete, now besieged by Metellus, intimating that the people of this place, although they held out against Metellus, were willing to surrender to Pompey. This sort of preference implying estimation and popular regard, was one of the temptations which Pompey was supposed unable to resist; he accordingly, without consulting with Metellus, sent an officer to receive the surrender of Lappa.

Metellus had now been near two years in the island of Crete, had almost entirely reduced it, and had a near prospect of that triumph, which he afterwards actually obtained, with the title of Creticus, on account of this conquest. Pompey's commission, as commander in chief of all the sea and land forces of Rome within fifty miles of the coast, no doubt, extended to this island; but it was justly reckoned invidious to interfere in the province of a Proconsul, whose appointment preceded his own. And this step revived all the former imputations against him, that he considered himself as every one's superior, strove to suppress every growing fame, and threw his personal consideration as a bar in the way of every rising merit. Metellus, stung with resentment, and trusting to the support of the Senate, ventured to contemn his orders; even after Octavius, who had been sent by Pompey to take the inhabitants of Lappa under his protection, had entered the town, and in his name commanded Metellus to desist from the attack of a place already in possession of the Romans. He nevertheless continued the siege, forced the town to surrender, and threatening to treat Octavius himself as a rebel,

<sup>14</sup> Dion. Cassius, lib. xxxvi. c. 20.



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obliged him to leave the island. The Senate, without otherwise deciding the controversy which was likely to arise on this subject, afterwards acknowledged Metellus as the conqueror of Crete, and decreed him a triumph in that capacity <sup>15</sup>.

The dispute, however, at this time, might have led to disagreeable consequences, if Pompey, while he was preparing to pass into Crete against Metellus, had not found another object of more importance to his plan of greatness <sup>16</sup>. Lucullus had always appeared to him a more formidable rival in power and consideration than Metellus, and the war in Pontus and Armenia likely to furnish a more ample field of glory than the destruction of pirates.

Mithridates, though once nearly vanquished, was, by means of the distractions which, communicating from the popular factions at Rome, had infected the army of Lucullus, enabled to renew the war with fresh vigour. Knowing that the Roman general was no longer obeyed, he not only returned, as has been mentioned, into his own kingdom, but, together with Tigranes, began to act on the offensive, and made excursions even into Cilicia. Acilius Glabrio, the Proconsul appointed to succeed in the command of the Roman army, hearing the bad state of affairs, stopped short in Bithynia, and even refused to furnish Lucullus with the reinforcements he had brought from Italy. In these circumstances the province of Asia, likely to become a principal source of revenue to the commonwealth, was in imminent danger of being wrested from their hands. The friends of Pompey seized the opportunity to obtain a farther enlargement of his powers. Manilius, one of the Tribunes, in concert with Gabinius, moved the People to extend his commission to the provinces of Phrygia, Bithynia, Cappadocia, and Pontus; and of course to commit the war in Armenia and Pontus to his direction.

<sup>15</sup> Liv. Epit. Plutarch. in Pompeio. Dion. Cass. lib. xxxv.

<sup>16</sup> Dion. Cass. lib. xxxvi. c. 28.

This motion was strenuously opposed by Catulus, Hortensius, and all the principal members of the Senate. It was supported by Marcus Tullius Cicero and by Caius Julius Cæsar, who both intended, on this occasion, to court the popular party, by espousing the cause of a person so much in favour with the People.

Cicero was one of the first of the Romans who rested his consideration intirely on civil accomplishments, and who became great by the services he was qualified to render his friends in a civil capacity, without any pretensions to the merit of a soldier. The character of a pleader was become one of the most powerful recommendations to public notice, and one of the surest roads to consequence and civil preferments. Cicero, with a fine genius and great application, was supposed to excel all who had gone before him in this line of pursuit. His talents were powerful instruments in his own hands; they rendered him necessary to others, and procured him the courtship of every party in its turn. He was understood to favour the aristocracy, and was inclined to support the Senate, as the great bulwark of the State, against the licence of the populace, and the violence of factious leaders. But being now Prætor, with a near prospect of the Consulate, he sacrificed much to his ambition in the pursuit of preferments, which were new in his family, and which the antient nobility were disposed to envy him. His speech, upon the motion of Manilius, was the first he had ever made in a political character: it is still extant, and does more honour to his talents as a pleader, than to his steadiness in support of the constitution and government of his country<sup>17</sup>. He turned aside, by artful evasions, the wise councils of Hortensius and Catulus; and, under pretence of setting forth the merits of Pompey, and of stating precedents in his favour, dazzled his audience, by enumerating the irregular ho-

<sup>17</sup> Cicero. Orat. pro Lege Manilia.

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nours which they themselves had already conferred on this object of their favour.

With such able advocates, in a cause to which the People were already so well disposed, the interest of Pompey could not miscarry; and an addition was accordingly made to his former commission, by which he became in reality sovereign of the fairest part of the empire. Upon the arrival of this news in Cilicia, where he then was, he affected surprise and displeasure. "Are my enemies," he said, "never to give me any respite from war and trouble?" He had talents, undoubtedly, sufficient to support him in the use of means less indirect; but a disposition to artifice, like every other ruling passion, will stifle the plainest suggestions of reason, and seems to have made him forget, on the present occasion, that his own attendants at least had common penetration. They turned away from the farce which he acted with shame and disgust<sup>13</sup>; and he himself made no delay in showing the avidity with which he received what he thus affected to dislike; laid aside all thoughts of other business; immediately dispatched his orders to all the provinces that were now subjected to his power; and, without passing his mandates through the hands of Lucullus, summoned Mithridates, then with an army of between thirty and forty thousand men on the frontier of Pontus, to surrender himself at discretion. This prince, being then in treaty with Phraates, who had lately succeeded his father Arsaces in the kingdom of Parthia, and being in expectation of a powerful support from that quarter, refused to listen to this imperious message: being disappointed in his hopes of assistance from the Parthians, and finding that Phraates had joined in a league with his enemies, he at first endeavoured to pacify the Roman general; but finding that his advances for this purpose had no effect, he prepared for a vigorous resistance.

<sup>13</sup> Plutarch. in Pompeio.

Pompey set out for Pontus, and in his way had an interview with Lucullus, who was then in Galatia. They accosted each other at first with laboured expressions of respect and of compliment on their respective services, but ended with disputes and sharp altercations. Pompey accused Lucullus of precipitation, in stating the kingdom of Pontus as a Roman province, while the king himself was alive and at liberty. Lucullus suspected that the late mutiny had been fomented by the emissaries of Pompey, to make way for his own succession to the command. He persisted in maintaining the propriety of the report which he had made to the Senate, and in which he had represented the kingdom of Pontus as conquered, and in which he had desired that commissioners should be sent as usual to secure the possession; observed, that no province could be kept, if the troops stationed to preserve it refused to obey their general; that if such disorders were made the engine of politics in the competition of candidates for office, the republic had worse consequences to fear than the loss of any distant province; that although the fugitive king had taken advantage of the factions at Rome and in the army, to put himself again at the head of some forces, he had not yet recovered any considerable portion of his kingdom, nor been able to disturb the commissioners of the Senate, who were employed in settling the province; that there was nothing left for a successor, but the invidious task of snatching at the glory which had been won by another.

From this conference Pompey entered on the command with many indications of animosity to Lucullus; he suspended the execution of his orders; changed the plan of his operations; remitted the punishments, and recalled the rewards he had decreed to particular persons, in a manner which seemed to justify the suspicion of his having encouraged the late disorders, suffering them to pass with impunity; and treating with the usual confidence even the legions which had refused to obey the orders of their general. His own



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authority, however, seemed to be secured by the animosity of the army to their late commander, and by their desire to contrast their own conduct, and the success of the war under their present leader, with that which had taken place under his predecessor. Finding himself, therefore, at the head of numerous and well-affected forces, both by sea and by land, he lined the whole coast of the Egean and Euxine Sea with his galleys, and, at the head of a great army, advanced in search of the enemy.

Mithridates, upon the approach of Pompey, continued retiring before him towards the Lesser Armenia, laid waste the country through which the Roman army was to pass, and endeavoured to distress them by the want of provisions and forage.

For several days successively the armies encamped in sight of each other. Mithridates chose his stations, so that he could not be safely attacked; and as his object was to pass the Euphrates without being forced to a battle, he generally decamped in the night, and, by his superior knowledge of the country, passed through ways in which the Roman army could not hastily follow without manifest danger of surprize. Pompey, sensible that, upon this plan of operations, the king of Pontus must effect his retreat, took a resolution to pass him by a forced march, not in the night, but in the heat of the day, when the troops of Asia were most inclined to repose. If he should succeed in this design, and get between their army and the Euphrates, he hoped to force them to a battle, or oblige them to change their route. He accordingly, on the day he had chosen for this attempt, doubled his march, passed the enemy's camp at noon-day unobserved, and was actually posted on their route, when they began to decamp, as usual, on the following night. In the encounter which followed, having all the advantages of a surprize, and in the dark, against an army on its march, and little accustomed to order, he gained a decisive victory,

tory, in which he cut off or dispersed all the forces on which the king of Pontus relied for the defence of his kingdom<sup>19</sup>.

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Mithridates escaped with a few attendants; and, in this extremity, proposed to throw himself again into the arms of Tigranes; but was refused by this prince, who was himself then attacked by a rebellion of his own son. Upon this disappointment he fled to the northward, passing by the sources of the Euphrates to the kingdom of Colchis, and from thence, by the eastern coasts of the Euxine, to the Scythian Bosphorus, now the Straits of Cossâ, in order to take refuge in the Chersonesus, or Crim Tartary, at Panticapæa, the capital of a kingdom which he himself had acquired, and which he had bestowed on Machares, one of his sons. Upon his presenting himself at this place, he found that Machares had long since abandoned his father's fortunes; and, upon hearing of the ill state of his affairs on his first flight from Lucullus into Armenia, had sent, as an offering of peace, a golden crown to that general, and sued for the protection of the Romans. The father, highly provoked with this act of pusillanimity or treachery, assembled a force among his Scythian allies, and, deaf to all offers of submission or intreaties of this undutiful son, dragged him from the throne, and either ordered him to be put to death, or made his situation so painful, that he thought proper to put an end to his own life.

In this manner Mithridates entered anew on the possession of a kingdom, in which he had not only a safe retreat, but likewise the means of executing new projects of war against his enemies. By the maxims of the Romans, no kingdom was supposed to be conquered, till the king was either killed, taken, or forced to surrender himself; and Pompey, by this flight of the king of Pontus, found himself under a necessity either of pursuing him into his present retreat, or of doing

<sup>19</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvi. c. 32.

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what he had blamed in Lucullus, by making his report of a conquest before it was fully completed. While he was deliberating on the measures to be taken in these circumstances, he was invited by Tigranes, son to the king of Armenia, then in rebellion against his father, to enter with his army into that kingdom, and to give judgment on the differences subsisting between the father and the son.

In consequence of this invitation, Pompey marched into Armenia, joined the rebel prince, and, under pretence of supporting the son, was about to strip the father of his kingdom, when this monarch, with an excess of meanness, proportioned to the presumption with which he had enjoyed his prosperity, now resolved to cast himself intirely upon the victor's mercy. For this purpose he desired to be admitted into Pompey's presence, and, with a few attendants, presented himself for this purpose. Being told, at the entrance of the camp, that no stranger could pass on horseback, he dismounted, and was conducted on foot to the general's tent. Still bearing the diadem on his head, he took it from thence, and offered to lay it on the ground at Pompey's feet; but was told with great courtesy, that he might resume it; that, by submitting himself to the generosity of the Romans, he had not lost a kingdom, but gained a faithful ally<sup>20</sup>. At the same time, under pretence of reimbursing the expence of the war, a sum of six thousand talents, or about one million one hundred and twenty-eight thousand pounds sterling, was exacted from him; and he himself, to this great sum which was paid to the State, added a gratuity to the army of a talent<sup>21</sup> to each of the tribunes, ten minæ<sup>22</sup> to each of the Centurions, and half a mina<sup>23</sup> to each private man.

Pompey, in disposing of the two Armenias, which were now in his power, allotted Sophene, or the Lesser Armenia, on the right of the Euphrates, to Tigranes the son, reserving Syria and Phœnicia, to

<sup>20</sup> Dio Cass. lib. xxxvi. c. 35. Plutarch. in Pompeio.

<sup>21</sup> 93l. 15s.

<sup>22</sup> 32l. 5s. 10d.

<sup>23</sup> 1l. 12s. 3½d. Vid. Arbuthnot of Antient Coins.

which

which Antiochus, the last representative of the Macedonian line, had been restored by Lucullus, together with Cilicia and Galatia, to the disposal of the Romans.

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Tigranes the father with great submission acquiesced in this partition; but the son, who probably expected to have been put in possession of the whole of his father's kingdom, was greatly discontented, and, while Pompey was yet in Armenia, entered into a correspondence with the king of Parthia, and solicited his assistance to overturn this establishment. On account of these practices, whether real or supposed, the son was taken into custody, carried into Italy, and made a part in the ornaments of the victor's triumph<sup>21</sup>.

The Roman general, having in this manner disposed of the kingdom of Armenia, and secured the permanency of his settlement by the confinement of the rebel prince, resumed the thoughts of pursuing Mithridates into his present retreat. For this purpose he left Afranius in Armenia, with a force sufficient to secure his rear, and to prevent any disturbance on this side of the Euphrates. He himself passed the Araxes, and wintered on the Cyrus, or the Cyrrus, on the confines of Albania and Iberia. In the following summer, having defeated the natives of those countries in repeated encounters, he advanced to the mouth of the Phasis, where he was joined by his fleet, then plying in the Euxine Sea, under the command of Servilius. Here he appears to have deliberated, whether he should attempt to pursue Mithridates any farther; but upon considering the difficulties of the voyage, and of the march along a coast and a country entirely unknown, unfurnished with any safe harbour for his ships, or even with any means of subsistence to his army by land, he took his resolution to return, and to avail himself, in the best manner he was able, of the possessions which had been abandoned to him by the flight of

<sup>21</sup> Plutarch. in Pompeio, ad p. 458.



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the king". With this resolution he directed his march, by the coast, back into the kingdom of Pontus; and, finding no resistance, took all his measures as in a conquered province. At one place he found a considerable treasure, which Stratonice, one of the concubines of the king, by whom he had a son named Xipharchus, disclosed to him, on condition that, if the chance of war should throw Xipharchus into the hands of the conqueror, his life should be spared. But this unhappy son was exposed to other dangers besides those the mother apprehended. Mithridates, upon hearing of the price which was paid for his life, ordered him to be slain. "That woman," he said, "should have likewise bargained with me in favour of her son." At other places the Roman army found the vestiges of great magnificence, joined to monuments of superstition and of cruelty. They found some productions of an art, in which the king was supposed to be master, relating to the composition of poisons, and of their antidotes, and some records of dreams, together with the interpretations", which had been given by his women.

From Pontus, Pompey, having made a proper disposition of the fleet in the Euxine, to cover the coast from any attempts which Mithridates might make from the Bosphorus and opposite coasts, set out for the kingdom of Syria, which he now determined to seize in behalf of the Romans. Lucullus had already, agreeably to the policy of his country, and under pretence of setting the Syrians free, separated their kingdom from the other possessions of Tigranes: but the pretence upon which he acted in this matter being sufficient to prevent his seizing upon Syria as a Roman province, he was content with restoring it to Antiochus, the last pretender of the Macedonian line, who had lived eighteen years in the greatest obscurity in Cilicia. Pompey now proposed to complete the transaction, by seizing for the

<sup>22</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. 37. c. 3. Plutarch. in Pompeio. Appian. in Mithridat.

<sup>23</sup> Plutarch. in Pomp. p. 462.

Romans themselves, what the other affected only to restore to the lawful owner<sup>24</sup>; and this intended owner now pleaded in vain against the Romans that right of descent from the Macedonian line, which Lucullus had employed with so much force to supplant Tigranes<sup>25</sup>.

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On the march into Syria Pompey, either in person or by his lieutenants, received the submission of all the principalities or districts in his way, and made the following arrangements. The Lesser Armenia, once intended for Tigranes the son, he gave to Dejotarus, king of Galatia<sup>26</sup>, who afterwards was long continued on the frontier of the empire as a faithful dependant, and with possessions which served as a barrier against hostile invasions from that quarter. Paphlagonia was given to Attalus and Pylæmenus, who were likewise liberal tributaries to the Roman officers, and vigilant guards on the frontiers of the empire. Upon his arrival at Damascus, he had many applications from the late subjects or dependants of the Syrian monarchy; among others, from Hyrcanus and Aristobulus, two brothers contending for the sovereignty of Judea, who now repaired to him for judgment, and requested the interposition of his power in behalf of the party he should be pleased to favour.

Of these rivals, who were the sons of Alexander, late high priest of the Jews, Hyrcanus the elder had succeeded to his mother Alexandra, whom the father had left his immediate successor in the throne; but was dispossessed by his younger brother Aristobulus, who, being of a more active spirit, had formed a powerful faction among the people.

Hyrcanus took refuge among the Arabs, and prevailed upon Aretas, the chieftain of some powerful tribe of that people, to support him with an army, in recovering the sovereignty of the Jews. In conjunction with this ally, he accordingly laid siege to Jerusalem, but

<sup>24</sup> Justin. lib. xl. c. 1 & 2.

<sup>25</sup> Appian. in Mithridat. p. 244.

<sup>26</sup> Eutropius, lib. vi.

was disappointed of his object by Scaurus, one of Pompey's lieutenants, who being then in Syria at the request of Aristobulus, from whom he received a present of three hundred talents, or about fifty-seven thousand and nine hundred pounds sterling, interposed, and obliged the Arabs to raise the siege. Upon the arrival of Gabinus, whom Pompey had sent before him into Syria, Aristobulus thought proper to make him likewise a present of fifty talents, and by these means remained in possession of the sovereignty at the arrival of Pompey.

It is alleged that each of the contending parties made their presents to the general himself; Hyrcanus in particular, that of a beautiful piece of plate, admired for its workmanship and weight, being the imitation of a spreading vine, with its leaves and fruit in massy gold<sup>27</sup>; and these circumstances merit attention, as they furnish some instances of the manner in which great riches, now in so much request at Rome, were amassed by Roman generals in the course of their services. Besides what they gained in this manner, it is likely that every conquest they effected, every revolution they brought about, and every protection they granted were extremely profitable.

Pompey, on hearing the merits of the question between the two brothers, declared for Hyrcanus, and advanced towards the city, to execute the decree he had passed. Upon his approach he was again met by Aristobulus, who made fresh offers of submission, and of a public contribution in money; and Pompey sent forward Gabinus to take possession of the place, in terms of this submission. But upon a report that the gates were still kept shut by the party of Aristobulus, who yet remained in his camp, he ordered this prince into confinement, and advanced with his army.

The citizens being divided, those who espoused the cause of Hyrcanus were willing to receive the Romans; the others, who were

<sup>27</sup> Joseph. Antiq. lib. xiv. c. 2.

attached to Aristobulus, retired into the temple, and broke down the bridge by which this edifice was joined to the streets, and made every other preparation to defend themselves to the last extremity.

The gates of the city, in the mean time, were thrown open by the party of Hyrcanus; and the Romans being admitted, took possession of all the principal stations within the walls, and prepared to attack the temple. This building had all the advantages of a citadel, built on a height, surrounded with natural precipices, or with a deep ditch, overhung with lofty battlements and towers. Pompey sent for battering engines to Tyre, and cut down all the woods in the neighbourhood to furnish materials for filling up the ditch, raising his mound of approach<sup>28</sup>, and erecting his towers. All his works were with great obstinacy counteracted by those who had taken refuge in the Temple. He observed, however, in the course of his operations, that the people within, although they defended their persons when attacked on the Sabbath-day, yet they did not labour, either in repairing any of their own defences, or in opposing or demolishing the works of the besiegers. He accordingly took advantage of this circumstance, made no assaults on that day, but carried on his attack in filling up the ditch, and carrying on his approach. In this manner his towers, without interruption, were raised to the level of the battlements, and his engines playing from thence, made great havock among the besieged. The Jews, however, even under the discharge of the enemy's missiles, still continued at the altar to perform their usual rites. While they were engaged in these holy exercises they took so little precaution against the dangers to which they were exposed, that numbers perished in offering up the sacrifices, and mingled their blood with that of the victims.

In the third month after the siege began, one of the towers of the Temple was brought in ruin to the ground; and Faustus, the son of

<sup>28</sup> The Agger.



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Sylla, with two Centurions at the head of the divisions they commanded, entered the breach, and putting all whom they met to the sword, made way for more numerous parties to follow them, and covered the avenues and porches of the Temple with the slain. The priests, who were even then employed in the sacrifices, waited for the enemy with great composure, and, without discontinuing their duties, were slain at the altars. Numbers of the people threw themselves from the precipices; and others, setting fire to the booths in which they had lodged under the walls of the Temple, were consumed in the flames. About twelve or thirteen thousand perished on this occasion, without any proportional loss to the besiegers, or to those who conducted the storm.

Pompey, being master of the Temple, and struck with the obstinate valour with which the people had devoted themselves to its preservation, was curious to see the interior recess. This place, into which no one was ever admitted besides the high priest, he supposed to contain the sacred emblems of that power who inspired his votaries with so ardent and so unconquerable a zeal. And he ventured, to the equal consternation and horror of his own party among the Jews, as of those who opposed him, to enter with his usual attendance into the Holy of Holies. He found it adorned with lamps, candlesticks, cups, vessels of incense, with their supports all of solid gold, with a great collection of the richest perfumes and a sacred treasure of two thousand talents, or about three hundred and eighty-six thousand pounds sterling.

Having satisfied his curiosity, it is mentioned that he respected the religion of the place so much as to have left every part of this treasure untouched, and to have given directions that the Temple itself should be purified, in order to expiate the profanation of which he himself had been guilty. He restored Hyrcanus to the priesthood or sovereignty of the kingdom, but charged him with a considerable tribute.

tribute to the Romans, and at the same time strip the nation of all those possessions or dependencies in Palestine and Celestria, which had been acquired or held in subjection by their ancestors. Such were Gadara, Scythopolis, Hyppus, Pella, Samaria, Marissa, Azotus, Jamana, Arethusa, Gaza, Joppa, and Dora, with what was then called Strato's Tower, and afterwards Cesarea. Under pretence of restoring these several places to their liberties, they were detached from the principality of the Jews, but in reality annexed to the Roman province of Syria<sup>29</sup>.

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Pompey now recollecting that he had formerly carried his arms to the shores of the Atlantic, and to the boundaries of Numidia and of Spain; that he had recently penetrated to the coasts of the Euxine, and to the neighbourhood of the Caspian Sea; to the end that he might not leave any part of the known world unexplored by his arms, now formed a project to finish this round of exploits, by visiting the shores of the Asiatic or Eastern Ocean: a circumstance which was to complete the glory of his approaching triumph, and raise him, as his flatterers were pleased to observe, to a rank above every conqueror of the present or any preceding age<sup>30</sup>.

But while Pompey was employed in the settlement of Syria, in the reduction of Jerusalem, and meditating these farther conquests, Mithridates was busy in making preparations to renew the war. Having heard of the extremities to which the citizens of Rome had been frequently reduced by the invasion of the Gauls and of Hannibal, and by the insurrections of their own subjects and slaves, he concluded that they were weakest at home, or might be attacked with the greatest advantage in Italy. He again, therefore, resumed the project of marching an army of Scythians by the Danube and the

<sup>29</sup> Joseph. de Bell. Jud. lib. i. & vii. & Ant. lib. xiv. c. 6.

<sup>30</sup> Plutarch. in Pom. p. 463.

## THE PROGRESS AND TERMINATION

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Alps. He visited all the princes in his neighbourhood, made alliances with them, which he confirmed by giving to some of them his daughters in marriage, and persuaded them, by the hopes of a plentiful spoil, to join with him in the project of invading Europe. He even dispatched his agents into Gaul, to secure the co-operations of nations on that side of the world, and trusted that, on his appearance in Italy, many of the discontented inhabitants would join him as they had joined Hannibal; and that the slaves, so lately at open war with their masters, would likewise be a plentiful supply of recruits to his army.

These projects, however, appeared to his own nation too hazardous and vast. They were suited to the state of a king who wished to perish with splendor; but not to that of subjects and followers who had humbler hopes, and who chose to be governed by more reasonable prospects of success. The king himself, while he meditated such extensive designs, being confined by an ulcer in his face, had been for a considerable time concealed from public view, and had not admitted any person to his presence besides some favourite Eunuchs. The minds of his subjects, and of his own family in particular, were much alienated from him by some late acts of barbarous severity against Machares and Xiphares, two of his children, who, with some others as we have mentioned, had incurred his resentment.

Pharnaces, another son, attended the father; and, though disposed to betray him, was still much in his confidence. The people of Phanagoria, a town on the shore of the Bosphorus, opposite to the fortress at which the king now resided, together with the inhabitants of the country, pretending a variety of provocations, revolted against him; and the army, during his confinement, losing the usual awe of his person, mutinied, and acknowledged Pharnaces for king. They assembled round the fort in which Mithridates was lodged, and which he had garrisoned with a chosen body of men. When he ap-  
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peared on the battlements, and desired to know their demands: "To exchange you," they said, "for Pharnaces; an old king for a young one." Even while he received this answer, and while many of his guards deserted him, he still hoped that, if he were at liberty, he might retrieve his affairs. He desired, therefore, by repeated messengers, to know whether he might have leave to depart in safety? But none of the messengers he sent with this question being suffered to return, he apprehended that there was a design to deliver him up into the hands of the Romans. Under this apprehension he had recourse to his last resort, a dose of poison, which, it is said, he always carried in the scabbard of his sword. Being to employ this sovereign remedy of all his evils, he dismissed, with expressions of kindness and gratitude, such of his attendants as still continued faithful to him; and being left with two of his daughters, who earnestly desired to die with their father, he allowed them to share in the draught, and saw them expire. But the portion which he had reserved for himself not being likely to overcome the vigour of his constitution, or, as was believed in those credulous times, being too powerfully counteracted by the effect of many antidotes he had taken against poison, he ordered a faithful slave who attended him, to perform with his sword what was in those times accounted the highest proof, as it was the last act, of fidelity in a servant to his master.

Accounts of this event were brought to Pompey, while his army was encamped at the distance of some days march from the capital of Judea, in his way to Arabia. The messengers appeared carrying wreaths of laurel on the points of their spears; and the army, crowding around their general to learn the tidings, were informed of the death of Mithridates. This they received with acclamations, and immediately proceeded to make all the ordinary demonstrations of joy. Pompey, having now accomplished the principal object of the war, dropped his design on Arabia, and directed the march of his army towards



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wards Pontus. Here he received the submission of Pharnaces, and, with many other gifts, was presented with the embalmed corpse of the king. The whole army crowded to see it, examined the features and the scars, testifying, by these last effects of their curiosity, the respect which they entertained for this extraordinary man. He had, with short intervals, occupied the arms of the Romans during forty years; and, though he could not bring the natives of Asia to match with the Roman legions, yet he frequently, by the superiority of his own genius, stood firm in distress, or rose from misfortune with new and unexpected resources. He was tall, and of a vigorous constitution, addicted to women, and, though superior to every other sort of seduction, to this his ardent and impetuous spirit made him a frequent and an easy prey. He appears to have loved and trusted many of that sex with a boundless passion. By some of them he was followed in the field; others he distributed in his different palaces; had many children, and entertained more parental affection than commonly attends the polygamy of Asiatic princes; yet even towards his own sons, as well as towards every one else, on occasions which alarmed the jealousy of his crown, he was sanguinary and inexorable.

Pompey proceeded to settle the remainder of his conquests; and, besides the arrangements already mentioned, annexed the kingdom of Pontus to the province of Bithynia, gave the Bosphorus to Pharnaces, and put the province of Syria, extending to the frontier of Egypt, under the government of Scæurus. He had now, from the time of his appointment to succeed Lucullus, for about three years, had the sole direction of the affairs of the Romans in Asia<sup>31</sup>; and had exchanged with the king of Parthia provoking messages, which, in a different conjuncture, might have led to immediate war. But

<sup>31</sup> Dion. Cass. lib. xxxvii. c. 6.

the circumstances were not yet ripe for such a measure, and Pompey had provided sufficient materials for a triumph, without attempting to break through those boundaries on which so many Roman generals were doomed to disappointments, and on which the progress of the empire itself was destined to stop.

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Without entertaining any farther projects for the present, he set out with two legions on the route of Cilicia towards Italy, having Tigranes, son to the king of Armenia, together with Aristobulus, late usurper of the Jewish throne, with his family, two sons and two daughters, as captives to adorn his triumph <sup>32</sup>.

<sup>32</sup> Joseph. de Bell. Jud. lib. i. c. 7.

## C H A P. III.

*Growing Corruption of the Roman Officers of State.—The love of Consideration changed for Avarice, Rapacity, and Prodigality.—Laws against Extortion.—Cataline a Candidate for the Consulship.—Conspiracy with Autronius.—Competition for the Consulate.—Election of Cicero and Antonius.—Condition of the Times.—Agrarian Law of Rullus.—Trial of Rabirius.—Cabals of the Tribunes.—Of Cataline.—His Flight from the City.—Discovery of his Accomplices.—Their Execution.*

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U. C. 686.  
C. Calpurnius Piso,  
M. Aul. Gla-  
brio.

*Lex Cornelia  
de Ambitu.*

**A**BOUT the time that Pompey obtained his commission to command with so extensive a power in the suppression of the pirates, the tide began to run high against the aristocratical party. The populace, led by some of the Tribunes, were ever ready to insult the authority of the Senate; and the vices of particular men gave frequent advantages against the whole order of Nobility. Corruption and dangerous faction prevailed at elections, and the preferments of State were generally coveted, as steps to the government of provinces, where fortunes were amassed by every species of abuse, oppression, and violence. Envy and indignation concurred in rousing the People against these abuses. Cornelius, one of the Tribunes, proposed a severe law against bribery, by which persons convicted of this crime should be disqualified for any office of State. The Senate wished to soften the rigour of this law, by limiting the penalty to a pecuniary fine; and the Consul, Calpurnius Piso, moved for an edict to this purpose, in order to anticipate and to preclude the more violent law of Cornelius. But the Tribune prevailed, and obtained an act imposing the severer penalty. He likewise, by another decree of the  
People,

People, attacked the discretionary jurisdiction of the Prætors<sup>1</sup>, obliged them to be more explicit in the edicts they published, and to observe them more exactly.

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The crime of extortion in the provinces, however, was the great disgrace of the Romans. To have found an effectual remedy for this evil, would have done more honour to the commonwealth than they had derived from all their conquests. Severe laws were accordingly enacted, complaints were willingly received, and prosecutions encouraged. Candidates for popularity and public favour generally began with endeavouring to bring some offender under this title to public justice; but the example of this State, after all, has left only this piece of instruction to mankind: That just government over conquered provinces is scarcely to be hoped for, and least of all where republics are the conquerors.

Manilius, one of the Tribunes of the People, in order to strengthen the inferior class of his constituents, had obtained by surprize an act<sup>2</sup>, by which the citizens of slavish extraction were to be promiscuously inrolled in all the Tribes. This act, having drawn upon him the resentment of the Senate, compelled him to seek for security under the protection of Gabinius and Pompey. With this view he moved his famous act, in which Cicero concurred, to vest Pompey with the command in Asia. This motion procured him a powerful support, and, on some occasions, the general voice of the People in his favour. Soon after this transaction, being prosecuted for some offence at the tribunal of Cicero, who was then Prætor, and being refused the usual delays, the Prætor was obliged to explain this step in a speech to the People; in which he told them, that he meant to favour Manilius, and that, his own term in office being about to expire, he could not favour him more effectually, than by hastening his trial, and by not

Lex Manilia.

<sup>1</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvi. c. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. lib. xxxvi.



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leaving him in the power of a successor, who might not be equally disposed in his favour. Such were the loose and popular notions of justice then prevailing at Rome<sup>3</sup>.

At the election of Consuls for the following year, there occurred an opportunity to apply the law against bribery. Of four candidates, Publius Autronius Pætus, Publius Cornelius Sylla, L. Aurelius Cotta, and L. Manlius Torquatus, the majority had declared for the former two; but these being convicted of bribery, were set aside, and their competitors declared duly elected.

About the same time L. Sergius Catalina, who has been already mentioned as one of the most violent executioners of Sylla's proscriptions, having returned from Africa, where he had served in the capacity of Prætor, and intending to stand for the Consulship, was accused of extortion in his province, and stopped in his canvas by a prosecution raised on this account. In his rage for this disappointment, he was ripe for any disorder; and, being readily joined by Autronius and Piso, formed a conspiracy to assassinate their rivals<sup>4</sup>, to massacre the Senate, to seize the ensigns of power, and, with the aid of their faction, to lay hold of the government<sup>5</sup>. Julius Cæsar and Crassus are mentioned by Suetonius as accomplices in this plot. Crassus was to have been named Dictator, and Cæsar his general of the horse<sup>6</sup>. Cæsar was to have given the signal for the execution of the massacre, by uncovering his shoulders of his gown; but Crassus, having relented, absented himself from the Senate on the day appointed, and Cæsar, though present, omitted to give the signal, by which means the whole was disconcerted. Sylla was tried some years after as an accessory, and was defended by Cicero.

Many of those who, by their birth and distinction, were destined to run the career of political honours, found their fortunes, by the

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch. in Vit. Cicer.

<sup>4</sup> Cic. in Catal. i. c. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Dion. lib. xxxvii. &c.

<sup>6</sup> Sueton. in Cæsar.

extravagant expence of public shows, and of gratuities to the People, by bribes to private persons, as well as by their own debauchery and prodigality, ruined before they attained their end. They sought to repair their ruin by any unwarrantable means<sup>7</sup>, and were ready to engage in any dangerous design. The State appears to have apprehended an increase of this danger from the number of foreigners, who, from every quarter, crowded to Rome as to the general resort of persons who wished to gratify their own extravagance, or to prey upon that of others. Under this apprehension, an edict was obtained, upon the motion of C. Papius, Tribune of the People, to oblige all strangers to leave the city: but it is likely, that the state was in greater danger from natives than foreigners. Cataline, having prevailed upon Clodius, by the consideration of a sum of money, to drop the prosecution, which had been intended against him, was left to offer himself a candidate for the Consulate of the following year<sup>8</sup>.

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Lex Papia de  
Perigrinis.

The office of Censor had been revived in the persons of Catulus and Crassus; but these officers found that its authority, so powerful in former times, was now of little effect. They scarcely ventured to give it a trial within the city; and, having differed about the enrolment of citizens residing beyond the Po, and about some other particulars, they resigned their power<sup>9</sup>. Censors were again named in the following year, but with no greater effect; some of the Tribunes, fearing to be degraded from the Senate, forbade them to proceed in making up the roll<sup>10</sup>.

In the next Consulate, Caius Julius Cæsar, at this time thirty-five years of age, entered on his career of popularity and ambition. Being Edile, together with Marcus Bibulus, he not only concurred with his colleague in all the expensive shews that were given to the

U. C. 689.  
C. J. Cæsar,  
C. Mar. Fi-  
gulus.

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch. in Vit. Ciceronis.

<sup>8</sup> Cicero de Auspiciis Responsis.

<sup>9</sup> Dion. lib. xxxvi. Plutarch. in Crasso.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. Plut.

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People, but gave separate entertainments on his own account. The multitudes of gladiators he had assembled on this occasion gave an alarm to the magistracy, and he was ordered not to exceed a certain number. In the administration of his office as Prætor, he took some steps that were likely to revive the animosity of the late parties of Marius and Sylla; and, notwithstanding the act of indemnity which had passed, raised prosecutions on a charge of assassination, against all those who had put any citizen to death in execution of Sylla's proscription<sup>11</sup>. From this time Suetonius observes, that Cicero dated the beginning of Cæsar's project to subvert the republic, and to make himself master of the State<sup>12</sup>.

What has most distinguished this Consulate, however, is the competition of candidates for the succession to that office on the following year, and the consequences of the election which followed. The candidates were M. Tullius Cicero, C. Antonius, son of the late celebrated orator, L. Sergius Catalina, P. Sulpitius Galba, and L. Cassius Longinus, Quintus Cornificius, and Licinius Sacerdos.

Cicero was the first of his family who had ever resided, or enjoyed any honours, at Rome. He was a native of Arpinum, a country-town of Italy, and was considered as an obscure person by those who were descended of antient families, but had great consideration on account of his eloquence and the consequences of it, to all such as had any interests at stake before the tribunals of justice. Being solicited by Cataline to undertake his defence on a trial for malversation in Sicily, he did not at once reject the request, nor always deny his aid to the factious Tribunes in support of their measures. He was undoubtedly, like other ambitious men at Rome, disposed

<sup>11</sup> Sueton. in Vit. C. J. Cæsaris.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. c. ix. Suetonius supposes, that Cicero alluded to the conspiracy of Autronius

and Sylla, in which Crassus, as well as Cæsar, was said to be engaged.

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to court every party, and willing to gain individuals<sup>14</sup>; and had of late, in particular, considerably strengthened his interest, by having supported the pretensions of Pompey, and by having joined the popular Tribunes, in what they proposed in behalf of that officer. He was, notwithstanding, probably by his aversion to appear for so bad a client as Cataline, saved from the reproach of having espoused his cause; and by his known inclination in general to support the authority of the Senate, he disposed the aristocratical party to forgive the occasional part which he took with the Tribunes in particular questions, not immediately supposed to affect their government.

In the course of this competition for the Consulship, Antonius and Cataline joined interests together, and spared no kind or degree of corruption. Cicero complained of their practices in the Senate, and moved to revive the law of Calpurnius against bribery, with an additional penalty of ten years banishment<sup>15</sup>. Cataline considered this measure as levelled against himself; and incited by this provocation, as well as by the animosity of a rival, was then supposed to have formed a design against Cicero's life, and to have expressed himself to this purpose, in terms that gave a general alarm to the electors, and determined great numbers against himself. He had drawn to his interests many persons of infamous character and desperate fortune, many youths of good family, whom he debauched or encouraged in their profligacy. His language, at their meetings, was full of indignation at the unequal and supposed unjust distribution of fortune and power. "All the wealth of the State, all authority," he said, "is engrossed by a few, while others of more merit are kept in poverty and obscurity, and oppressed with debts." He professed his intention, when in office, to remove these grievances, to cancel the debts of his friends, to enrich them by

<sup>14</sup> Ep. ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 2.<sup>15</sup> Dio. lib. xxxvii. c. 39.



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plentiful divisions of land, and to place them in the highest stations.

These declarations, being made to a numerous meeting, were ill concealed. Curius, one of the faction, boasted to Fulvia, a woman of rank, with whom he had a criminal correspondence, that a revolution must soon take place, and specified the particular hopes and designs of their party. This woman mentioned the subject to her own confidants, but concealed the author of her information. In the mean time, Cataline was considered as a person of the most dangerous designs, and was opposed in his election by all who had any regard to public order, or to the safety of the commonwealth. Cicero, at the same time, being supported by the Senate, was elected, together with Caius Antonius. The latter stood candidate upon the same interest with Cataline, and was preferred to him only by a small majority.

U. C. 690.  
M. Tullius  
Cicero,  
C. Antonius.

By this event the designs of Cataline were supposed to be frustrated; but the Consuls were not likely to enter on a quiet administration. The Tribunitian power, from the time of its restoration, was gradually recovering its force, and extending its operations. Every person that could give any public disturbance, that could annoy the Senate, or mortify any of its leading members; every one that had views of ambition adverse to the laws, or who wished to take part in scenes of confusion and tumult; every person oppressed with debt, who wished to defraud his creditors; every person who, by his profligacy or crimes, was at variance with the tribunals of justice, was comprehended under the general denomination of the popular party. The Roman People had once been divided into Patrician and Plebeian, next into Noblemen and Commoners; but now they took sides with little regard to former distinctions against or for the preservation of public order. In the assembly of the centuries, as well as in that of the Tribes, the disorderly and the profligate began to prevail; and

as it was impossible that the collective body of the People could meet, the comitia, for the most part, was but another name for such riotous assemblies, as were made up of the persons who haunted the streets of Rome. The minds of sober men were full of fear and distrust, alarmed with surmises of plots, and various combinations of desperate persons, who united their influence, not to carry elections or attain to preferments, but to overturn the government, or to share in its spoils<sup>15</sup>.

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One of the Tribunes of the present year, Servilius Rullus, soon after his admission into office, under pretence of providing settlements for many of the citizens, promulgated the heads of an Agrarian Law, which he carried to the Senate and the People. The subject of former grants was now in a great measure exhausted, and all Italy was inhabited by Roman citizens. This Tribune proposed a new expedient to open settlements for the indigent, not by conquest, but by purchase. It was proposed, that all estates, territories, or possessions of any sort, which belonged to the republic, should be sold; that all acquisitions of territory recently made, and the spoils taken from any enemy, should be disposed of in the same manner; that the money arising from such sales should be employed in purchasing arable and cultivable lands, to be assigned in lots to the needy citizens; and that, to carry this law into execution, ten commissioners should be named in the same manner in which the Pontiffs were named, not by the whole People, but by seventeen of the Tribes selected by lot: that these commissioners should be judges, without appeal, of what was or was not public property; of what was to be sold, of what was to be bought, and at what price; that they were to receive and judge of the accounts of every Consul, or other officer, except Pompey, commanding in any

Lex Servilia  
Agraria.

<sup>15</sup> Cicero de Lege Agraria.

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province, where any capture was made, or new territory acquired : and in short, that they should, during five years, which was the intended term of their commission, be the sole masters of all property within the empire, whether public or private.

On the day that the new Consuls entered on their office, when they returned in procession from the Capitol, and gave the first meeting to the Senate, Rullus had the presumption to propose this law, and to move the Conscrip't Fathers, that they would be pleased to give it the sanction of their approbation and authority in being carried to the People. Upon this occasion, Cicero made his first speech in the character of Consul. The former part of it is lost ; the remainder may be reckoned among the highest specimens of his eloquence. In this and the two speeches he delivered to the People, on the same subject, he endeavoured to demonstrate (if we may venture to imitate his own expressions) that, from the first clause of this law to the last, there was nothing thought of, nothing proposed, nothing done but the erecting, in ten persons, under the pretence of an Agrarian Law, an absolute sovereignty over the treasury, the revenue, the provinces, the empire, the neighbouring kingdoms and states ; and, in short, over all the world as far as it was known to the Romans. He painted in such lively colours the abuses which might be committed by Rullus, and by his associates in judging what was private and what public property, in making sales, in making purchases, in planting the colonies ; and so exposed the impudence of the cheat, by which it was proposed to surprise the People into the granting of such powers, the absurdity and the ruinous tendency of the whole measure, that it was instantly rejected, and its author hissed from the assembly ; and treated as an object of ridicule and scorn.

The splendour of the Consul's eloquence, on this occasion, appeared with great distinction, and the spirit of the times continued to flourish

nish him with opportunities to display it<sup>16</sup>. Roscius Amerinus, having been Tribune of the People a few years before, had, by the authority of his office, set apart some benches in the theatre for the Equestrian order. This gave offence to the People, so that Roscius was commonly hissed when he appeared at any of the public assemblies. On some one of these occasions the Consul interposed; and, in a popular harangue, secured the attachment of the Knights to himself, and reconciled the People to the distinction which had been made in favour of that body.

There happened under the same Consulate a business of greater difficulty, being a motion to restore the sons of the proscribed to the privilege of being chosen into the offices of State, of which they had been deprived by an ordinance of Sylla. Their fate was undoubtedly calamitous and severe. Many of them who had been too young to have incurred the guilt of their party, were now come of age, and found themselves stript of their birthright, and stigmatized with this mark of dishonour. It was proposed, in their behalf, to take away this cruel exclusion. But Cicero, apprehending that this proposal tended to arm and to strengthen persons, who, from long use, had contracted an habitual disaffection to the established government, powerfully opposed the motion, and succeeded in having it rejected<sup>17</sup>.

Though the orations on the two subjects last mentioned have perished, great part of that which he spoke on the trial of C. Rabirius still remains. This man, of a great age, a respectable Senator, at the distance of six-and-thirty years, was brought to trial as an accomplice in the death of Apuleius Saturninus, the factious Tribune, who, as has been related, having seized the Capitol, was, by the

<sup>16</sup> It is probable that Cicero did not write in order to speak, but wrote after he had spoken, for the use of his friends. *Epist. ad Atticum*, lib. ii. c. 1.

<sup>17</sup> *Plin. lib. vii. c. 30.*



Consuls Marius and Valerius Flaccus, acting under the authority of the Senate, and attended by all the most respectable citizens in arms, forced from his strong-hold, and put to death as a public enemy.

Titus Atius Labienus, one of the Tribunes, was the declared prosecutor of C. Rabirius; but historians agree, that this Tribune acted at the instigation, and under the direction, of C. Julius Cæsar. The intention of the popular party was, by making an example of this respectable person in so strong a case where the authority of the Senate, and the commands of the most popular Consul, where even the prescription of so old a date should have repelled every danger, effectually, for the future, to deter every person from acting in support of the Senate, or from opposing force to the designs of factious Tribunes, however turbulent or dangerous.

The Senate, and all the friends of government, were greatly alarmed, and united in defence of Rabirius. The popular party, as already described, the ambitious, the profligate, the bankrupt, who were earnest to weaken the hands of government, and in haste to bring on scenes of confusion and trouble, took the opposite side.

The prosecutor laid his charge for treason of the most heinous kind, and destined the accused to die on the cross, the ordinary manner of executing the sentence of death on slaves. "The executioner stalks in the Forum," said Cicero, "and the cross is erected for a Roman citizen in the field of Mars." The accusation was first brought before the Prætor, who possessed the ordinary jurisdiction in such cases. This magistrate empannelled two judges, who were to determine in this mighty cause. These were Caius Julius and Lucius Cæsar. At this court the defendant was condemned; and with appearances of animosity, on the part of Caius Cæsar, that greatly increased the alarm. This rising citizen had always courted the populace, and was strongly supported by them. That he should aim at honours and power, it was said, is common; but that he wished to provide

provide impunity for the disturbers of the commonwealth, was alarming. The crime of Rabirius, even if he could be convicted of it, had been committed the year before Cæsar was born. In the person of the accused every circumstance, even on the supposition of a true charge, pleaded for compassion, and even for respect: the fact, at the same time, was denied, and a positive evidence was brought, that another had received a reward for killing Saturninus: but the policy of the faction required this victim; and the sentence must have been executed, if the condemned had not fled, by appeal, to the judgment of the People, where indeed his cause might be reckoned more desperate than if it had been before a select court. The parties attended this trial with great ardour. Hortensius conducted the appeal and defence. Cicero pleaded in behalf of justice and government; painted the age, the infirmities, the forlorn state of the defendant, who had survived his relations and his friends. He pointed out the danger to government and to order from this precedent, in terms that must have melted every heart, not callous from ambition, faction, or profligacy of manners: but in vain. Even in the assembly of the Centuries, the majority was hastening to affirm the sentence, when Q. Cæcilius Metellus Celer, then Prætor, and one of the Augurs, hastened to the Janiculum, and tore down the ensign which was planted there as a sign of peace. A silly piece of superstition stopt the proceedings of those whom neither justice nor compassion, nor regard to government, could restrain.

It was established, as has been formerly noticed<sup>18</sup>, that the assembly of the Centuries could not proceed without this signal in view. In the first ages of Rome, the enemy were always at the gate. While the People were assembled in the field on one side of the city, they were in danger of being assailed on the other. When they assembled,

<sup>18</sup> See book i. c. 1.

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therefore, in the field of Mars, a guard was always posted on the Janiculum, and an ensign displayed. If any enemy appeared, the ensign was taken down, the assembly dismissed, and the People took to their arms. This ceremony, like many other customs both of superstition and law, remained after the occasion had ceased; and it was held illegal or impious in the People to proceed in any affair without the ensign in view. By this means the trial was put off, and the prosecutors, despairing of being able to work up the People again into an equal degree of violence, dropt the prosecution. The cause still remained undecided, and the power of the Senate, to defend its own authority, continued in a state of suspense.

The Tribune Labienus laid aside thoughts of renewing the prosecution, in order to pursue the object of some other popular acts; one in particular, to repeal the almost only remaining ordinance of Sylla; that which related to the election of priests. The right of election was again taken from the college, and, according to the law of Domitius, given to seventeen of the Tribes that were to be drawn by lot. This change was intended to open the way of Caius Julius Cæsar into that office; and he was accordingly promoted to it in the following year.

Others of the Tribunes likewise endeavoured to distinguish themselves by acts of turbulence and sedition. Metellus Nepos endeavoured to repeal that clause of the act against bribery and corruption, which declared the party convicted to be disqualified for any of the offices of State. This Tribune, though sufficiently disposed to disorderly courses, had many connections among the most respectable citizens, and was persuaded, in this instance, to drop his design.

But among the several confederacies into which the popular party was divided, none was more desperate, nor supposed more dangerous, than that of Cataline, the late disappointed candidate for the Consulship. His rival Cicero had intimation, before the elections, of a design formed by this desperate faction against his own person, and

still continued to observe them. He entered into a correspondence with Fulvia, who had given the first hints of a dangerous conspiracy; and, by means of this woman, procured the confidence of Curius, who gave him minute information of all the proceedings of the party.

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In public, Cataline again professed himself a candidate for the office of Consul, in competition with Servius Sulpicius, P. Muræna, and J. Silanus. He boasted of support from Antonius; but Cicero, to divert his colleague from this dangerous connection, made him every concession. Having, in drawing lots for the provinces of Gaul and Macedonia, drawn the latter, which was thought to be preferable, he yielded it up to Antonius; and by this, and every other means in his power, persuaded him to value the secure possession of dignities and honours, lawfully obtained, in preference to expectations formed on the projects of a few desperate men.

In secret, Cataline encouraged his adherents by professing to have many resources, and to be supported by numbers who were ready to take arms at his command. In a numerous meeting of his party in October, a few days before the Consular elections, he opened the whole of his design; and in the speech which he made on that occasion, is said to have used expressions to the following purpose: "The distressed can rely for relief only on those who have a common cause with themselves. Whoever, in his own fortune, is at ease, will not regard the misery of others. If you would know how I stand affected to the parties which now divide the commonwealth, *rich creditors*, and *needy debtors*, recollect what every one knows, that I have no safety but in the destruction of the one, and in the relief of the other: that my interest is the same with yours, and that I have courage to attempt what may be necessary for your benefit."

From the strain of this passage, the description of a party to whom it was with propriety addressed, may be easily collected. Cicero,

who



who had frequently taxed Cataline with dangerous designs, now determined to lay the whole of his intelligence before the Senate; and for this purpose deferred the Consular elections, which were to have been held on the eighteenth of October, to a future day, and assembled the Senate. Cataline having, with the other members, attended, and hearing the charge, did not pretend to deny or to palliate his words. "There are," he said, "in this republic two parties; one weak both in its members and head; the other strong in its members, but wanting a head: while I have the honour of being supported by this party, it shall have a head." Upon these words, a general cry of indignation arose in the Senate; but no resolution was taken. Many, who were there present as members, were pleased to see the Senate itself insulted; and Cataline, as if in condition to brave all his enemies, was, in all his expressions, equally ungarded in the streets and in the Senate. To Cato, who, in the public Forum, some days before this meeting, had threatened him with a prosecution: "Do," he said; "but if you light a flame in my fortunes, I will extinguish it under the ruins of the commonwealth".

A prosecution was actually raised against him in the name of Lucius Paulus, a young man of distinction, for carrying arms against the public peace. On this occasion, however, he thought proper to dissemble his thoughts, and offered to commit his person to custody till his innocence should appear. "No one," he said, "who knows my rank, my pretensions, and the interest I have in the preservation of the commonwealth, will believe, that its destruction is to be apprehended from me, and that its safety is to come from a native of Arpinum<sup>20</sup>." He offered to commit himself to the custody of Cicero, of Metellus, or of any other magistrate, till this injurious

<sup>19</sup> Cicero Orat. pro Muræna.<sup>20</sup> The town of which Cicero was native.

asperſion were removed. To this offer the Conſul replied, That he who did not think himſelf ſafe within the ſame ramparts with Cataline, would not receive him into his houſe <sup>21</sup>. C H A P.  
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By one effect of the unparalleled freedom now enjoyed by Roman citizens, perſons accuſed of the moſt dangerous crimes were at liberty, during the dependence of their trial, either to proceed in perpetrating their crime, or to withdraw from juſtice. This effect was derived from the laws of Valerius and Porcius, which ſecured againſt violence, or the power of the magiſtrate, the perſon of every citizen, until he were finally condemned by the People. In ſupport of this privilege, which was ſalutary, when the abuſe of power in the magiſtrate was to be dreaded more than the licence of crimes in the ſubject, the Romans perſiſted even after vice was become too ſtrong for the laws, and when exemption from every juſt reſtraint was fatally miſtaken for liberty. The State had now been thrown, on many occaſions, into the moſt violent convulſions, becauſe there was no ordinary or regular method of preventing diſorders, or of ſuppreſſing them on their firſt appearance.

Cataline, ſoon after the elections, at which, by the preference given to Muræna and Silanus, he received a freſh diſappointment in his hopes of the Conſulſhip, ſent Mallius, or Manlius, an experienced ſoldier, who had ſerved with himſelf under Sylla, to prepare for an inſurrection in the diſtrict of Etruria. This officer, in the end of October, under pretence of giving refuge to debtors from the oppreſſion of their creditors, had actually aſſembled a conſiderable body of men <sup>22</sup>. Accounts at the ſame time were received, that Publius Sylla was making a large purchaſe of gladiators at Capua, and inſurrections were accordingly apprehended on the ſide of Campania and Apulia. In this ſtate of affairs continual informations being brought of

<sup>21</sup> Cicero in Catalinam, i. c. 8.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. in Catalinam, i. c. 3.

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Cataline's designs, the Senate gave in charge to the Consuls to watch over the safety of the State ; and these officers accordingly put chosen bodies of men under arms, and secured all the posts of consequence in the city. Metellus, the conqueror of Crete, who still remained without the walls in hopes of a triumph, was appointed to command on the side of Apulia. The Prætor Metellus Celer was sent into Cisalpine Gaul, in order to secure the peace of that province<sup>23</sup>; and the Consul Antonius was destined to suppress the insurrection of Mallius at Fæsulæ<sup>24</sup>.

Cataline mean while remained in the city, and had frequent consultations for the preparation and the execution of his plot. At a meeting of the party, held in the beginning of November, in the house of M. Porcius Lecca<sup>25</sup>, a general massacre of the principal Senators was projected. The conspirators severally chose their stations, and undertook their several parts. Two in particular, who were familiar in Cicero's house, undertook next morning, under pretence of a visit, to surprise and assassinate the Consul. But he being the same night apprised of his danger by Fulvia, gave the proper orders, and the intended murderers, upon their appearance at his door, were refused admittance. He immediately after assembled the Senate in the temple of Jupiter. Cataline presented himself with his usual presumption ; and Cicero, as appears from an oration which he then delivered, instead of laying the matter in form before the Senate, accosted Cataline in a vehement invective, urging him to be gone from the city, where all his steps were minutely observed, where his meaning was understood, and precautions taken against all his designs. " I told you," said the Consul, " that your emissary Mallius would be in arms by the first of November ; that you intended a massacre of the Senators about the same time. I now

<sup>23</sup> Cicero in Cat. i. c. 12.<sup>24</sup> Now Florence.<sup>25</sup> Cicero pro Pub. Sylla, c. 16.

" repeat

“ repeat the memorable words you made use of when you were told,  
 “ that many of the Senators had withdrawn from the city. You  
 “ should be satisfied, you said, with the blood of those who re-  
 “ mained. Were you not surrounded, hemmed in, and beset on  
 “ every side by the guards posted to watch you? Did your intention  
 “ to surprise Prænesté, on the night of the first of November, escape  
 “ me? Did you not find precautions taken that argued a knowledge  
 “ of your design? There is nothing, in short, that you do, that you  
 “ prepare, that you meditate, which is not heard, which is not seen,  
 “ which is not felt by me in every circumstance. What of last  
 “ night? Were you not at the house of Porcius Lecca? Deny it!  
 “ I have evidence. There are here present persons who were of your  
 “ company. But where are we? What manner of government or  
 “ republic is this? The enemies and destroyers of the commonwealth  
 “ make a part in its highest councils! We know them, and yet they  
 “ are suffered to live! But, be gone. The time of enduring you  
 “ is past. The world is convinced of your guilt. Stay only till  
 “ there is not a single person that can pretend to doubt of it; till  
 “ your own partizans must be silent, and till the clamour, which they  
 “ would willingly raise against every necessary act of government, be  
 “ suppressed.”

This being the general tendency of the Consul's speech, fraught  
 with such alarming matter, and urged with so much confidence, the  
 audience was seized with terror, and numbers, who happened to be  
 on the same bench with Cataline, withdrew from his side. He him-  
 self arose, and attempted to vindicate his character, but was silenced  
 with a general cry of indignation; upon which he left the Senate;  
 and, after concerting farther measures with those of his party, not  
 thinking that a longer stay in the city could be of any use to his  
 affairs, he withdrew in the night, leaving letters behind him to some  
 of the Senators, in which he complained, that, by a combination of



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his enemies, he was driven into exile; and that, rather than be the occasion of any disturbance in the commonwealth, he was willing to retire. While these letters were handed about in the city, he took his way, preceded by the ushers and ensigns of a Roman Proconsul, freight for the camp of Mallius, and entered into a state of open war. The features of this man's portrait are probably exaggerated by the vehement pencils and lively colourings of Cicero and of Sallust. He is represented as able to endure hardships of any kind, and as fearless in any danger; as, from his youth, fond of discord, assassinations, and bloodshed; as having, under pretence of Sylla's proscription, murdered his own brother to possess his estate; as having murdered his own child, to remove the objection made to him by a woman who refused to marry him with the prospect of being a step-mother. He is represented as rapacious, prodigal, gloomy, impetuous, unquiet, dissembling, and perfidious; a description, of which the horrors are probably amplified: but for which it cannot be doubted there was much foundation, as he far exceeded in profligacy and desperation all those who, either in this or the former age, were, by their ambition or their vices, hastening the ruin of the commonwealth.

Cicero always professed to have particular intelligence of the progress of Cataline. This, according to Sallust, he owed to Fulvia, by whose means he obtained a correspondence with Curius; but he himself, in none of his orations, gives any intimation of the manner in which he obtained his information. It is probable that Curius insisted on being concealed, that he might not be exposed to the rage of the conspirators as an informer and a traitor. On this account the Consul, although he was minutely apprised of particulars, was obliged to adopt the plan he hitherto followed, to urge the conspirators into open hostilities, and into a full declaration of their purpose. He had succeeded with respect to Cataline; but his accomplices were yet  
very

very numerous in the city, and were taking their measures to co-operate with those who were in arms.

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In this state of affairs Fabius Sanga, a Roman citizen of distinction, came to the Consul, and informed him, that the ambassadors of the Allobroges, a people then inhabiting what is now called the territory of Geneva, and part of Savoy, whose patron he was, had made him privy to a very momentous affair; that, upon being disappointed in a suit, on which they had been employed to the Senate, they had been carried by P. Umbrenus to Publius Cornelius Lentulus the Prætor, who condoled with them on the subject of the wrong they had received, assured them of redress if they would merit the favour of a party that was soon to have the ascendant at Rome; and proposed, that they should immediately, upon their return to their own country, prevail on their nation to march an army, for this purpose, into Italy. Cicero immediately laid hold of this intelligence, as affording means to bring the plot to light, and furnish a sufficient evidence to convict the conspirators. He desired Sanga to encourage the correspondence, to advise the ambassadors to insist on proper credentials to be shown to their countrymen, to procure a list of the Roman citizens who, in case they should rise in rebellion against the Romans, were to become bound to protect them; and when they should be thus provided, and about to depart, he instructed Sanga to bring him intimation of their motions, that they might be secured, with their writings, and other evidence of the facts to be ascertained. Sanga, having instructed the ambassadors accordingly, gave notice of their motions to the Consul. In the evening before they were to depart, Cicero ordered the Prætors, L. Flaccus and C. Pontinus, to march by different ways, and in small parties, after it was dark, a sufficient armed force to intercept the ambassadors of the Allobroges. The parties were stationed on different sides of the river, at the bridge called Milvius, without knowing of each other,

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and without having any suspicion of the purpose for which they were placed, farther than arose from their having been told, that they were to seize any person who should attempt to pass. About three o'clock in the morning the ambassadors entered on the bridge with a numerous retinue; and being challenged, and commanded to stop by the party that was placed to intercept them, they endeavoured to force their way; and some blood was shed. But on the appearance of the Prætors, with their ensigns of office, the ambassadors ceased to resist. Their dispatches were secured. Volturcius, a Roman citizen, who was found in their company, was taken and searched. Letters were found upon him, in different hands, and under different seals, addressed to Cataline. These, together with the prisoners, were immediately carried back to the city.

The Consul being apprised of the success which attended this part of his design, sent, before any alarm could be taken by the party, messages to Gabinus, Statilius, Cethegus, and Lentulus, desiring to see them at his own house. The three former came with the messenger; but Lentulus was newly gone to bed, and, by his delay, gave some cause to suspect that he was aware of his danger. He too, however, came; and the house of Cicero was presently crowded, not only with numbers of the Equestrian order that were in arms for the defence of his person, but likewise with many senators whom he desired to be present. The ambassadors of the Allobroges, now prisoners, were likewise conducted thither and the letters found upon them were produced unopened. Cicero declared his intention to assemble the Senate without delay, in order to lay the whole matter before them. Many of the company were of opinion, that the letters should be first opened, in order to see, whether they contained any matter of so much moment, as to require assembling the Senate, at a time when so great an alarm was likely to be taken. Cicero, however, having no doubt of the contents of the letters, and of the im-

portance of the matter, over-ruled those scruples, and the Senate was accordingly called. Mean time the Allobroges dropt some expressions which implied, that arms were concealed in the house of Cethegus. This occasioned a search being then made, and a considerable quantity of daggers and swords were accordingly found.

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At the meeting of the Senate, Volturcius was first examined; he denied his knowledge of any treasonable designs, but appeared disconcerted; and, upon being reminded of the reward that had been offered for the discovery of any plot against the State, and of the danger to which he himself would be exposed in prevaricating, he confessed, that the letters seized in his custody were sent by the Prætor Lentulus and others: that he had besides a verbal message to Cataline, informing him, that the plan was now ready for execution; that the station of every person was assigned; that some were appointed to set fire to the city in different places, and some to massacre their enemies in the midst of the confusion that was likely to be occasioned by the fire; and desiring that Cataline, in order to support his friends, and to profit by the diversion they were to make in his favour within the walls, should issue a proclamation to arm the slaves, and that he himself should march directly to Rome.

The deputies of the Allobroges being next introduced, acknowledged, that they had been charged by Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, and Cassius, with assurances of support to the council of their nation, confirmed by oath, accompanied with directions, without delay, to march a body of horse into Italy, where they should be joined by a numerous infantry, and receive proper directions in what manner they should farther proceed: that, to encourage them, Lentulus quoted a prophecy, found in the collection of the Sybils, by which he himself was pointed out as the third of the Cornelii <sup>26</sup> destined to

<sup>26</sup> The former two were Cinna and Sylla.



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arrive at the sovereignty of Rome: that the conspirators had differed about the time of executing their design. Lentulus was of opinion it should be deferred to the holy-days in December; that Cethegus, notwithstanding, and the others, were impatient, and desired a nearer day.

The supposed conspirators were next called in their turns; and the letters, with the seals unbroken, were exhibited before them. Cethegus, being the first examined, persisted in denying his knowledge of any conspiracy; accounted for the arms that were found in his house, by saying, He was curious of workmanship of that nature, and always bought what he liked. He maintained his countenance well, till his letter was produced, and then fell into great confusion, as the seal was immediately known to be his.

Lentulus next, with great confidence, denied the charge; affected not to know either Volturcius or the ambassadors; asked them upon what occasion they ever could pretend to have been admitted into his house? He, however, owned the seal affixed to the letter that was now produced against him. It was the head of his grandfather. But the letter being opened, was found to be unsigned, and in the following general terms: "The bearer will inform you who I am. Fear nothing. Remember where you stand; and neglect nothing. Call in every aid, even the meanest." While he persisted in his denial, some one asked him, If he had never quoted the Sybilline oracles to these Gauls? Confounded with this question, he forgot his disguise, and confessed.

Gabinus too was at last brought to own his guilt; and in this manner the conspiracy was fully laid open. L. Julius Cæsar, the Consul of the former year, in the presence of Lentulus, who was married to his sister, gave his opinion, that this unhappy man should be immediately put to death. "This," he said, "is no unprece-

dented measure. My grandfather, Fulvius Flaccus, was slain by

“ order of the Consul Gabinus. His son was taken into custody and “ put to death in prison.” In the mean time Lentulus was ordered to divest himself of the office of Prætor, and, together with his accomplices, was committed to close imprisonment. This Cornelius Lentulus was distinguished by the name of Sura. He had been Consul about eight years before, and was afterwards, for his debaucheries, struck off the rolls of the Senate. He had now again condescended to accept of the office of Prætor, in order to recover, in the capacity of a magistrate, his seat in the Senate.

A proclamation was issued to apprehend M. Caparius, who had been sent to raise an insurrection in Apulia, together with P. Furius, Magius Chilo, and P. Umbrenus, who had first introduced the Gaulish ambassadors to Gabinus. The Senate voted thanks to the Consul Cicero for his great vigilance, and for the consummate ability he had shewn in the discovery and suppression of this treasonable design; to the Prætors, for the faithful execution of the Consul's orders; and to Antonius, his colleague, for having detached himself from men with whom he was known to have been formerly connected. A public thanksgiving to the gods was likewise decreed in honour of the Consul, and in consideration of this deliverance of the city from fire, of the People from massacre, and of Italy from devastation and war.

An assembly of the People being called, Cicero gave this account of the proceedings in a speech which is still extant<sup>27</sup>, and early on the following day assembled the Senate to deliberate on the farther resolutions to be taken with respect to the prisoners. An agent had been busy in the night to raise some disturbance in favour of Lentulus; but the design of setting fire to the city struck the people in general with so much horror, that not only such as were possessed of

<sup>27</sup> In Cat. 3.



property, but every inhabitant, trembled for his own person, and for the safety of his house. The avenues to the Senate, the Capitol, the Forum, all the Temples in the neighbourhood, by break of day, were crowded with armed men. The Consul had summoned the equestrian order in arms to protect the Senate, and citizens of every rank came forth to strengthen the hands of the magistrates.

When the Senate met, the members differed in their judgment. Junius Silanus, one of the Consuls-elect, being called up first in order, declared himself for a sentence of death. Tiberius Nero differed from him, and proposed perpetual imprisonment. The majority, however, joined Silanus, until Caius Julius Cæsar spoke. This able advocate declared against the opinion of Silanus, not as too severe, but as contrary to law; and insisted on the danger of a precedent which might set the life of every citizen at the mercy of a vote in the Senate. Death, he said, was the common destination of all men; what no one could avoid, and what the wise frequently coveted. It was not, therefore, a punishment; and he did not propose to mitigate, but to increase, the severity of the sentence in this case. He proposed, therefore, that the estates of the prisoners should be confiscated; that their persons should be committed for life to the keeping of the most secure and best affected towns in Italy; and that it should be declared treason for any one hereafter to move the Senate or the People for any mitigation of their punishment.

Cæsar might be considered as uttering what the popular faction were to urge, and as laying the ground upon which the proceedings of the Senate, and the conduct of each particular member, might be afterwards arraigned before the People. The terrors of the Porcian and Sempronian laws, when likely to be urged by so powerful an advocate, alarmed the greater part of the Senate. Silanus is said to have retracted his opinion. The Consul submitted the question to the judgment of the Senate, and declared his willingness to execute

any

any decree they should form. He treated Cæsar with great respect, and laid hold of the severe terms in which he spoke of the conspiracy, as a pledge of his future conduct, in case the proceedings of government, with respect to the matter now before them, should hereafter be questioned or brought under review. "The Senate," he observed, "had no cause to dread the imputation of cruelty. It was mercy to prevent, in the most effectual manner, a crime to be perpetrated in so much blood. If this crime were not prevented, they were to see that city, the resort of nations, and the light and ornament of empire, perish at one blow. They were to see heaps of her citizens unburied, and lying in their blood: to see the fury of Cethegus let loose in murder; to see Lentulus become a king, Cataline commanding an army, and every where to hear the cries of mothers, to see the flight of children, and the rape of virgins.—If the father of a family," he continued, "should spare a slave who had shed the blood of his children, who had murdered his wife, and set fire to his dwelling, how should such a father be considered—as cruel, or as void of affection?"

"He desired them not to regard what was given out, of their not being in condition to attempt any thing vigorous against these men. He himself, as first magistrate, had not neglected the necessary precautions; and the general ardour with which all ranks of men concurred in the defence of their families, their properties, and the seat of empire, rendered every resolution they could take secure of the utmost effect. The forum is full, all the temples in its neighbourhood are full, all the streets and avenues to this place of assembly are full of citizens of every denomination, armed for the defence of their country. He requested that the Senate would issue their orders before the sun went down, and seemed to apprehend dangerous consequences, if these matters were left undetermined,

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“ determined, and the city exposed to the accidents of the following night. For himself, he professed to have taken his resolution. Although he felt the occasion full of personal danger, he would execute the orders of the conscript fathers,” he said; “ but, if he fell in the attempt, implored their protection for his wife and his children <sup>28</sup>. ”

All this appears to have passed in debate before Cato spoke. This virtuous citizen, then about thirty-three years of age, had, in the former part of his life, taken a very different course from the youths of his own time, and, both by his temper and education, was averse to the libertine principles which had crept into the politics and the manners of the age. He spoke chiefly in answer to Caius Cæsar, who, he observed, seemed to mistake the question. “ We are not enquiring,” he said, “ what is the proper punishment of a crime already committed, but how we may defend the republic from an imminent danger with which it is threatened. It is proposed to send the prisoners to safe keeping in the country. Why into the country? Because perhaps the faction of profligate citizens is more numerous in Rome, and may rescue them. Is Rome the only place to which profligate men may resort, or are prisoners of State most secure where the force of government is least? This proposal is surely an idle one, if the author of it professes to entertain any fear of these men. But if, in this general alarm of all the city, he and such persons be not afraid, so much the more cause have we to be on our guard. We are beset with enemies, both within and without the walls. While Cataline with fire and sword is hastening to your gates, you hesitate, whether you will cut off or spare his associates, that are taken with the torch in their hands and the dagger at your breast! You must strike those who

<sup>28</sup> Cicero in Catalinam, orat. iv.

“ are now in your power, if you mean to intimidate those who are  
 “ coming to support their designs. The remissness or the vigour  
 “ which you now show will be felt in the camp of Cataline, and  
 “ will be attended with suitable effects. I am therefore of opinion,  
 “ that we order these men, agreeably to the practice which our an-  
 “ cestors followed in all cases of treason and of open war against the  
 “ commonwealth, to immediate death.”

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Such is said to have been the speech of Cato, by which the Senate was determined in the very momentous resolution which was taken on the present occasion ; and however little we may be inclined to consider such compositions in many parts of antient history as records of fact, much credit is due to this representation, as it is given by a person who himself became a partizan of Cæsar, and as the speech itself must have been offered to the perusal of many who were present at the delivery of it<sup>28</sup>. The execution of the prisoners was accordingly determined, and Cornelius Lentulus, in the beginning of the following night, was, by order of the Consul, committed to a vaulted dungeon under ground, and strangled. His accomplices had the same fate ; and the minds of men, though somewhat quieted of their fears, were nevertheless stunned with the scene, and beheld with amazement a Patrician of the Cornelian family, of the first rank in the commonwealth, who himself had been Consul, suffering, without any formal trial, by the hands of the common executioner of justice<sup>29</sup>.

While these things were in agitation at Rome, Cataline was endeavouring to augment his force in the field. He found about two

<sup>28</sup> The more credit is due to this account of Cato's speech, that the speech which is ascribed to Cicero by the same historian, is a faithful extract from the oration which still remains.

<sup>29</sup> Salust. Bell. Catal. Cur ergo in sententiam Catonis ? quia verbis luculentioribus et pluribus, rem eandem comprehenderat. Cicer. ad Atticum, lib. xii. epist. 21.

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thousand men under Mallius. These he formed into two legions, and as his party increased he completed their numbers. He refused for some time to enrol the fugitive slaves, of whom many took refuge in his camp; thinking it would discredit and weaken his cause to rest any part of it on this support. But the freemen that joined him being ill armed, he was obliged to keep in the neighbourhood of the mountains, and frequently to change his ground, to avoid an engagement with the Consul; and he endeavoured to gain time, in hopes that, the intended blow being struck at Rome, a general defection of the opposite party would ensue. But when accounts came that his design had failed in the city, and that his principal associates were no more, those who were inclined to his cause were discouraged, and numbers who had already joined him began to fall off, he determined to remove to a distance from his enemies; and for this purpose directed his march to a pass in the Apennines, by which he might escape into Gaul. This design the Prætor Metellus had foreseen, made a forced march to prevent the effect of it, and Cataline at last, finding himself beset on every quarter, determined to hazard a battle. Of the armies that were in the field against him he chose to face that of Antonius; either because it lay on his route to Rome, and, if defeated or removed, might open his way to the city, or because he hoped to meet in the commander of it some remains of inclination in his favour. In whatever degree these hopes were at first reasonably conceived, they ceased to have any foundation; as Antonius, being taken ill, had left the army under the command of Petreius. With this commander Cataline engaged in battle, and, after many efforts of valour and of conduct, fell, with the greater part of his followers, and thus delivered the State from a desperate enemy, whose power was happily not equal to his designs, and who has owed much of his celebrity to the orator and the historian, who have made him the subject of their eloquent

compositions. Sallust appears to have been so intent on raising and finishing particular parts of his work, that he neglected the general order of his narrative. I have, therefore, in most parts of the relation, preferred the authority of Cicero to his. This great man was undoubtedly best informed, and he rested so much of his reputation on this transaction, that he loses no opportunity of returning to it, and in different parts of his writings, when collected, has furnished a pretty full narration of circumstances respecting the origin and termination of this wild and profligate attempt to subvert the government of the republic.



## C H A P. IV.

*Character of the Times.—Philosophy.—Opposite Tenets and Voluntaries.—Proceedings of the Senate.—Tribunate of Metellus, Nepos, and of Cato.—Proposal to recall Pompey at the head of his army frustrated.—His arrival in Italy—And Triumph.*

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IT may appear strange, that any age or nation should have furnished the example of a project conceived in so much guilt, or of characters so atrocious as those under which the accomplices of Cataline are described by the eloquent orator and historian<sup>1</sup>, from whose writings the circumstances of the late conspiracy are collected. The scene, however, in this republic was such as to have no parallel, either in the past or in the subsequent history of mankind. There was less government, and more to be governed, than has been exhibited in any other instance. The people of Italy were become masters of the known world; it was impossible they could ever meet in a fair and adequate convention. They were represented by partial meetings or occasional tumults in the city of Rome; and to take the sense of the People on any subject was to raise a riot. Individuals were vested with powers almost discretionary in the provinces, or continually aspired to such situations. The nominal assemblies of the People were often led by profligate persons, impatient of government, in haste to govern. Ruined in their fortunes by private prodigality, or by the public expence in soliciting honours; tempted to repair their ruins by oppression and extortion where they were entrusted with command, or by desperate attempts against the govern-

<sup>1</sup> Cicero in Sallust.

ment of their country if disappointed in their hopes. Not only were many of the prevailing practices disorderly, but the law itself was erroneous<sup>2</sup>; adopted indeed at first by a virtuous people, because it secured the persons and the rights of individuals, but now anxiously preserved by their posterity, because it gave a licence to their crimes.

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The provinces were to be retained by the forces of Italy; the Italians themselves by the ascendant of the capital; and in this capital all was confusion and anarchy, except where the Senate, by its authority and the wisdom of its councils, prevailed. It was expedient for the People to restrain the abuses of the aristocratical power; but when the sovereignty was exercised in the name of the collective body of the Roman People, the anarchy and confusion that prevailed at Rome spread from one extremity of her dominion to the other. The provinces were oppressed, not upon a regular plan to aggrandize the State, but at the pleasure of individuals, to enrich a few of the most outrageous and profligate citizens. The People were often assembled to erect arbitrary powers, under the pretence of popular government. The public interests and the order of the State were in perpetual struggle with the pretensions of single and of profligate men. In such a situation there were many temptations to be wicked; and in such a situation likewise, minds that were turned to integrity and honour had a proportionate spring to their exertions and pursuits. The range of the human character was great and extensive, and men were not likely to trifle within narrow bounds; they were destined to be good or to be wicked in the highest measure, and, by their struggles, to exhibit a scene interesting and instructive beyond any other in the history of mankind.

<sup>2</sup> Lex Valeria & Porcia de tergo Civium lata. Liv. lib. ii. c. 8. lib. iii. c. 55. lib. x. c. 9. By these laws a Roman citizen could not be imprisoned, any more than suffer punishment, before conviction; he might stop

any proceeding against him by an appeal to the People at large; and, being at liberty during trial, might withdraw whenever he perceived the sentence likely to be given against him.

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Among the causes that helped to carry the characters of men in this age to such distant extremes, may be reckoned the philosophy of the Greeks, which was lately come into fashion, and which was much affected by the higher ranks of men in the State<sup>3</sup>. Literature being, by the difficulty and expence of multiplying copies of books<sup>4</sup>, confined to persons having wealth and power, it was considered as a distinction of rank, and was received not only as an useful, but as a fashionable accomplishment<sup>5</sup>. The lessons of the school were considered as the elements of every liberal and active profession, and they were practised at the bar, in the field, in the Senate, and every where in the conduct of real affairs. Philosophy was considered as an ornament, as well as a real foundation of strength, ability, and wisdom in the practice of life. Men of the world, instead of being ashamed of their sect, affected to employ its language on every important occasion, and to be governed by its rules so much as to assume, in compliance with particular systems, distinctions of manners, and even of dress. They embraced their forms in philosophy, as the sectaries in modern times have embraced theirs in religion; and probably in the one case honoured their choice by the sincerity of their faith and the regularity of their practice, much in the same degree as they have done in the other.

In these latter times of the Roman republic the sect of Epicurus appears to have prevailed; and what Fabricius wished, on hearing the tenets of this philosophy, for the enemies of Rome, had now befallen her citizens<sup>5</sup>. Men were glutted with national prosperity; they thought that they were born to enjoy what their fathers had won,

<sup>3</sup> Vid. Cicero's Philosophical Works.

<sup>4</sup> The grandees had their slaves sometimes educated to serve as secretaries to themselves, or as preceptors to their children.

<sup>5</sup> See Plutarch. in Pyrr. The philosopher

Cyneas, in the hearing of Fabricius, entertained his prince with an argument, to prove that pleasure was the chief good. Fabricius wished that the enemies of Rome might long entertain such tenets.

and saw not the use of those austere and arduous virtues by which the State had increased to its present greatness. The votaries of this sect ascribed the formation of the world to chance, and denied the existence of Providence. They resolved the distinctions of right and wrong, of honour and dishonour, into mere appellations of pleasure and pain. Every man's pleasure was to himself the supreme rule of estimation and of action. All good was private. The public was a mere imposture, that might be successfully employed, perhaps to defraud the ignorant of their private enjoyments, while it furnished the conveniences of the wise<sup>6</sup>. To persons so instructed, the care of families and of states, with whatever else broke in upon the enjoyments of pleasure and ease, must appear among the follies of human life. And a sect under these imputations might be considered as patrons of licentiousness, both in morality and religion, and declared enemies to mankind. Yet the Epicureans, when urged in argument by their opponents, made some concessions in religion, and many more in morality. They admitted the existence of gods, but supposed those beings of too exalted a nature to have any concern in human affairs. They owned that, although the value of virtue was to be measured by the pleasure it gave, yet true pleasure was to be found in virtue alone; and that it might be enjoyed in the highest degree even in the midst of bodily pain. Notwithstanding this decision on the side of morality, the ordinary language of this sect, representing virtue as a mere prudent choice among the pleasures to which men are variously addicted, served to suppress the specific sentiments of conscience and elevation of mind, and to change the reproaches of criminality, profligacy, or vileness, by which even bad men are restrained from iniquity, into mere imputations of mistake, or variations of taste.

<sup>6</sup> Cicero in Pisonem.



Other sects, particularly that of the Stoicks, maintained, almost in every particular, the reverse of these tenets. They maintained the reality of Providence, and of a common interest of goodness and of justice, for which Providence was exerted, and in which all rational creatures were deeply concerned. They allowed, that in the nature of things there are many grounds upon which we prefer or reject the objects that present themselves to us, but that the choice which we make, not the event of our efforts, decides our happiness or our misery; that right and wrong are the most important and the only grounds upon which we can at all times safely proceed in our choice, and that, in comparison to this difference, every thing else is of no account; that a just man will ever act as if there was nothing good but what is right, and nothing evil but what is wrong; that the Epicureans mistook human nature when they supposed all its principles resolvable into appetites for pleasure, or aversions to pain; that honour and dishonour, excellence and defect, were considerations which not only led to much nobler ends, but which were of much greater power in commanding the human will; the love of pleasure was groveling and vile, was the source of dissipation and of sloth; the love of excellence and honour was aspiring and noble, and led to the greatest exertions and the highest attainments of our nature. They maintained that there is no private good separate from the public good; that the same qualities of the understanding and the heart, wisdom, benevolence, and courage, which are good for the individual, are so likewise for the public; that these blessings every man may possess, independent of fortune or the will of other men; and that whoever does possess them has nothing to hope, and nothing to fear, and can have but one sort of emotion, that of satisfaction and joy; that his affections, and the maxims of his station, as a creature of God, and as a member of society, lead him to act for the good of mankind; and that for himself he has nothing more to desire,

desire, than the happiness of acting this part. These, they said, were the tenets of reason leading to perfection, which ought to be the aim of every person who means to preserve his integrity, or to consult his happiness, and towards which every one may advance, although no one has actually reached it.

Other sects affected to find a middle way between these extremes, and attempted, in speculation, to render their doctrines more plausible; that is, more agreeable to common opinions than either; but were, in fact, of no farther moment in human life than as they approached to the one or to the other of these opposite systems.

Cæsar is said to have embraced the doctrines of Epicurus; Cato those of Zeno. The first, in compliance with fashion, or from the bias of an original temper. The other, from the force of conviction, as well as from the predilection of a warm and ingenuous mind. When such characters occur together, it is impossible not to see them in contrast. When Sallust writes of the proceedings of the Senate, in the case of the Cataline conspiracy, he seems to overlook every other character, to dwell upon these alone. Cæsar, at the time when this historian flourished, had many claims to his notice<sup>7</sup>; but Cato could owe it to nothing but the force of truth. He was distinguished from his infancy by an ardent and affectionate disposition. This part of his character is mentioned on occasion of his attachment to his brother Cæpio, and the vehement sorrow with which he was seized at his death. It is mentioned, on occasion of his visit to the dictator Sylla, when he was with difficulty restrained by the discretion of his tutor from some act or expression of indignation against this real or apparent violator of public justice. He had from his infancy, according to Plutarch, a resolution, a steadiness, and a composure of mind not to be moved by flattery, nor to be shaken by threats. Without

<sup>7</sup> Sallust attached himself to Cæsar, and was employed by him in the civil wars.

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fawning or insinuation, he was the favourite of his companions, and had, by his unaffected generosity and courage, the principal place in their confidence. Though in appearance stern and inflexible, he was warm in his affections, and zealous in the cause of innocence and justice. Such are the marks of an original temper, affixed by historians as the characters of his infancy and early youth. So fitted by nature, he imbibed with ease an opinion, that profligacy, cowardice, and malice, were the only evils to be feared; courage, integrity, and benevolence, the only good to be coveted; and that the proper care of a man on every occasion is, not what is to happen to him, but what he himself is to do. With this profession he became a striking contrast to many of his contemporaries; and to Cæsar in particular, not only a contrast, but a resolute opponent; and though he could not furnish a sufficient counterpoise, yet he afforded always much weight to be thrown into the opposite scale. They were both of undaunted courage, and of great penetration; the one to distinguish what was best; the other to distinguish the most effectual means for the attainment of any end on which he was bent. It were to mistake intirely the scene in which they were engaged, to judge of their abilities from the event of their different pursuits. Those of Cato were by their nature a series of struggles with almost insurmountable difficulties: those of Cæsar, a constant endeavour to seize the advantages of which the vices and weaknesses of the age, except when he was resisted by persons bent on the same purpose with himself, gave him an easy possession. Cato endeavoured to preserve the order of civil government, however desperate, because this was the part it became him to act, and in which he chose to live and to die. Cæsar proposed to overturn it; because he wished to dispose of all the wealth and honours of the State at his own pleasure.

Cæsar, as versatile in his genius, as Cato was steady and inflexible, could personate any character, and support any cause; in  
debate

debate he could derive his arguments from any topic; from topics of pity, of which he was insensible; from topics of justice and public good, for which he had no regard. His vigour in resisting personal insults and wrongs appeared in his early youth, when he withstood the imperious commands of Sylla to part with his wife, the daughter of Cinna, and when he revenged the insults offered by the pirates to himself; but while his temper might be supposed the most animated and warm, he was not involved in business by a predilection for any of the interests on which the State was divided. So long as the appetites of youth were sufficient to occupy him, he saw every object of State, or of faction, with indifference, and took no part in public affairs. But even in this period, by his application and genius, in both of which he was eminent, he made a distinguished progress in letters and eloquence. When he turned his mind to objects of ambition, the same personal vigour which appeared in his youth, became still more conspicuous; but, unfortunately, his passions were ill directed, and he seemed to consider the authority that was exercised by the Senate, and the restraints of law on himself, as an insult and a wrong.

Cæsar had attained to seven-and-thirty years of age before he took any part as a member of the commonwealth. He then courted the populace in preference to the Senate or better sort of the People, and made his first appearance in support of the profligate, against the order and authority of government. With persons of desperate fortune and abandoned manners, he early bore the character of liberality and friendship. They received him as a generous patron come to rescue them from the morose severity of those who judged of public merits by the standard of public virtue, and who declared against practices, however fashionable, which were inconsistent with public safety. Himself, a person of the greatest abilities, and the most accomplished talents, having an opportunity to live on terms of equality



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equality with the greatest men that have yet appeared in the world, he chose to start up as the chief among those who, being abandoned to every vice, saw the remains of virtue in their country with distaste and aversion. When he emerged from the avocations of pleasure, or from the sloth which accompanies the languor of dissipation, his ambition or desire to counteract the established government of his country, and to make himself master of the commonwealth, became extreme. To this passion he sacrificed every sentiment of friendship or animosity, of honour, interest, resentment, or hatred. The philosophy which taught men to look for enjoyment indiscriminately wherever it pleased them most, found a ready acceptance in such a disposition. But while he possibly availed himself of the speculations of Epicurus to justify his choice of an object, he was not inferior to the followers of Zeno, in vigorous efforts and active exertions for the attainment of his ends. Being about seven years younger than Pompey, and three years older than Cato; the first he occasionally employed as a prop to his ambition, but probably never ceased to consider him as a rival; the other, from a fixed animosity of opposite natures, and from having felt him as a continual opponent in all his designs, he sincerely hated.

Cato began his military service in the army that was formed against the gladiators, and concluded it as a legionary Tribune, under the Prætor Rubrius in Macedonia, while Pompey remained in Syria. He was about three-and-thirty years of age when he made his speech relating to the accomplices of Cataline; and by the decisive and resolute spirit he had shown on this occasion, came to be considered as a principal support of the aristocracy, or of the authority of the Senate<sup>s</sup>. To this body, as usual, every flagrant disorder repressed was a victory. The discovery of a design, so odious as that of Cata-

<sup>s</sup> Plutarch. in Caton. edit. London. p. 238.

line, covered under popular pretences, greatly weakened their antagonists. One of the first uses they proposed to make of their advantage, was to have Cato elected among the Tribunes of the subsequent year. His services were likely to be wanted in opposition to Metellus Nepos, then arrived from the army of Pompey, with recommendations from his general to offer himself a candidate for the same office; and, as was expected, to start some new gratification to the ambition or vanity of this insatiable suitor for personal consideration.

It had not yet appeared what part Pompey was to take in the disputes that were likely to arise on the legality or expedience of the late measures; but it is not to be doubted, that he wished to hold the balance of parties, and that he would come prepared for the part that was most likely to promote his own importance. Metellus was sent on before him to be supported by his friends in the canvass for the office of Tribune, and with his instructions to take such measures as were likely to favour the pretensions of his general. The leading men of the Senate were now, for some time, aware of the intrigues of Pompey, and bore, with indignation, the personal superiority which he affected even to the first and most respected of their order. They took occasion, in the present crisis, to mortify him by admitting Lucullus and Metellus Creticus to the triumphs to which, by their victories in Pontus and in Crete, they were long intitled. Hitherto their claims had been over-ruled by the popular faction, either to annoy the Senatorian party, to which they were attached, or to flatter Pompey, who was supposed to be equally averse to the honours of both. They had waited in Italy about three years, and, in the manner of those who sue for a triumph, had abstained from entering the city, and still retained the fasces or ensigns of their late command.

<sup>s</sup> Cicero in Lucullo.

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Lucullus, having obtained the honour that was due to him, seemed to be satisfied with the acknowledgment of his right; and, as if merely to show with what sort of enemy he had fought, he entered the city with a few of the Armenian horsemen cased in armour, a few of the armed chariots winged with scythes, and about sixty of the officers and courtiers of Mithridates, who were his captives. He ordered the spoils he had gained, the arms and ensigns of war, the prows of the galleys he had taken, to be displayed to public view in the great circus, and concluded the solemnity with giving a feast to the People. The Senate hoped for his support against the ambition of Pompey, and the factious designs of the popular leaders; but he was disgusted, and scarcely ever after took any part in the affairs of State.

The triumph of Metellus Creticus did not take place till after the accession of the following Consuls, P. Junius Silanus and Lucius Muræna, after whose election, Cicero, before he had vacated his own office of Consul, had occasion to defend his intended successor Muræna, against a charge of corruption brought upon the statute of Calpurnius, by Servius Sulpicius, one of his late competitors, supported by Cato and others. The oration of Cicero on this occasion is still extant, and is a curious example of the topics, which, under popular governments, enter even into judicial pleadings. Great part of it consists in a ridicule of law terms; because Sulpicius, one of the prosecutors, was accustomed to give counsel to his friends who consulted him in matters of law; and in a ridicule of the Stoic philosophy, because Cato, another prosecutor, was supposed to have embraced the doctrines of that sect. Cato made no other remark on this pleading, but That the republic was provided with a merry Consul. The argument appeared sufficiently strong on the side of Muræna, and he was acquitted.

At the close of this trial, Cicero, about to resign his power with the usual asseveration, upon oath, That he had faithfully, and to the

best of his abilities, discharged his trust; he proposed, at the same time, to harangue the People, but was ordered by Metellus, already elected, and acting in capacity of Tribune, to confine himself to the terms of his oath. He accordingly refrained from speaking; but instead of swearing simply, That he had been faithful to his trust, he took an oath, That he had preserved the republic<sup>10</sup>. It was on this occasion, probably, that Cato, now another of the Tribunes, in a speech to the People, alluding to the suppression of the late conspiracy, called Cicero the Father of his Country<sup>11</sup>; and from this time entered upon an opposition to his colleague Metellus, which was not likely to drop while they continued in office.

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Soon after the accession of the new magistrates, a storm began to gather, which, though still aimed at the party of the Senate, burst at last in a personal attack upon the late Consul, who had been the author or instrument of the Senate in the summary proceedings against the accomplices of Cataline. Metellus Nepos seems to have come from Asia, and to have entered on the office of Tribune, with a particular design to bring about the introduction of Pompey with his army into Rome; and he was joined in this project by Caius Julius Cæsar<sup>12</sup>, now in the office of Prætor, who chose to support the Tribune, as an act of hostility to the Senate, if not as the means of embarrassing himself from the present forms of the commonwealth.

U C. 691.  
D. Junius  
Silanus,  
L. Muræna,

In consequence of a plan concerted with Cæsar, the Tribune Metellus moved in the Senate, as had been usual in the times of its highest authority, for leave to propose a decree in the assembly of the People recalling Pompey from Asia at the head of his forces, in order to restore the constitution of the commonwealth, which, in the terms he afterwards employed to the People, had been violated by the arbitrary administration of Cicero. This was the first attempt of the

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch. in Cicerone.

<sup>11</sup> Cicer. in Pisonem. c. 3.

<sup>12</sup> Sueton. in Jul. Cæs. c. 16.



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party to inflame the minds of the People on the subject of the late executions ; and Pompey was, in this manner, offered to the popular party as their leader to avenge the supposed wrongs they had received. Cato, when the matter was proposed in the Senate, endeavoured to persuade Metellus to drop it, reminded him of the dignity of his family, which had been always a principal ornament and support of the State. This treatment served only to raise the presumption of Metellus, and brought on a violent altercation between the Tribunes. The Senate applauded Cato, but had not authority enough to prevent the motion which was proposed from being made to the People.

Metellus, apprehending an obstinate resistance from his colleague, endeavoured to fill the place of assembly with his own partizans ; and, on the evening before the meeting, in order to intimidate his opponents, paraded in the streets with a numerous attendance of men in arms. The friends and relations of the other Tribunes earnestly beseeched them not to expose themselves to the danger with which they were threatened. But, on the following day, the other party being already assembled by Metellus, at the temple of Castor, and the place having been in the night occupied by persons under his direction, armed with sticks, swords, and other offensive weapons<sup>13</sup>, Cato went forth attended only by Minucius Thermus, another of the Tribunes, and a few friends. They were joined by numbers in the streets, who could not accompany them to their place, being prevented by the multitude of armed men that already crowded the avenues and the steps of the temple. But they themselves, from respect to their office, being suffered to pass, dragged along with them through the crowd, as an aid, in case any violence were offered, Munatius, a citizen much attached to

<sup>13</sup> Plutarch, in Catone, edit. Londin. p. 241, &c.

Cato. When they came to the bench of Tribunes, they found that Metellus, with the Prætor Julius Cæsar, had taken their places there; and that, in order to concert their operations in the conduct of this affair, they were closely seated together. Cato, to disappoint this intention, forced himself in betwixt them, and, when the ordinary officer began to read the intended decree, interposed his negative, and forbade him to proceed. Metellus himself seized the writing, and began to read; but Cato snatched it out of his hands. Metellus endeavoured to repeat the substance of it from his memory. Thermus clapt his hand to his mouth. A general silence remained in the assembly, till Metellus, having made a signal for his party to clear the comitium of their enemies, a great tumult and confusion arose; and the Tribunes who opposed Metellus were in imminent danger. The Senators had met in mourning, to mark their sense of the evils which threatened the commonwealth; and now, under the apprehension of some signal calamity, gave a charge to the Consuls to watch over the safety of the State, and empowered them to take such measures as might be necessary to preserve or to restore the public peace<sup>14</sup>.

In consequence of this charge, the Consul Muræna appeared with a body of men in arms, had the good fortune to rescue Cato and Minucius Thermus; and probably by this seasonable interposition effaced any remains of misunderstanding which might have subsisted between Cato and himself, on account of the prosecution for bribery which followed the late elections<sup>15</sup>.

Metellus, after the tumult was composed, having again obtained silence, began to read the proposed decree; but the Senatorian party, headed by the Consuls, being then in the comitium, he found it impossible to proceed; and, together with the Prætor Caius Julius

<sup>14</sup> Plutarch. in Catone, edit. Londin. p. 241, &c.

<sup>15</sup> Plutarch. ibid.

Cæsar, retired from the assembly. From this time, these officers made no attempt to resume their motion, but complained that the government was usurped by a violent faction, under whom even the persons of the Tribunes were unsafe; and Metellus, as if forced to break through the rules which obliged the Tribunes to constant residence at Rome, abandoned the city, even left Italy, and fled to the camp of Pompey in Asia, from which he was lately arrived<sup>16</sup>. He had already threatened his opponents at Rome with the resentment and military power of his general, and now endeavoured to excite the army and their commander to follow the example which had been set to them by Sylla and his legions, when oppressed citizens, a description in which he now comprehended himself, fled to them for protection and revenge.

It may well be supposed, that Cæsar, remembering his own escape from the ruin of the Marian faction, and considering Pompey as the head of an opposite interest, and a principal obstacle to his own ambition, must look upon him with some degree of personal dislike and animosity; but his conduct on this occasion sufficiently showed how little he was the dupe of any passion or sentiment which had a tendency to check his pursuits. Meaning for the present only to weaken the Senate, and to step in before them in the favour of Pompey; he undertook the cause even of a rival, and would have joined the populace, in delivering the commonwealth into his hands, rather than remain under a government which he hated. But if he really meant to overthrow the Senate by force, he mistook his instrument. Pompey, no doubt, aspired to the sovereignty of the empire, and wished to reign in the city with a military power; but even this he desired to receive as the fruit of consideration and personal respect, and he ever hoped to make the People bestow it, and even force him to accept

<sup>16</sup> Dio Cass. lib. xxxvii. c. 43.

of it as their gift. For this purpose he encouraged so many agents and retainers to sound his praise; and for this purpose he had recently sent Metellus Nepos from his camp to take upon him the functions of a popular Tribune; but having failed of his object, he by no means could think of extorting it by force. No one ever courted distinction with a more incessant emulation to his rivals; but he was intirely dependent on the public opinion for any satisfaction he enjoyed in the possession of power. Trusting to this last part of his character, Cæsar, though himself of unbounded ambition, was not yet alarmed at the elevation of Pompey, and thought that he was safe even in offering him the dominion of the State. Pompey was, at this conjuncture, with his army moving towards Italy, and his coming was matter of great solicitude to the friends of the commonwealth, who feared that, in return to the affront of his not being invited to come with his army, upon the motion of Metellus, he would employ it in person to enforce his commands. Upon his arrival at Brundisium, however, as formerly upon his return from Africa, he dispelled those fears by an immediate dismissal of the troops, with instructions, merely that they would attend at his triumph. He himself came forward to Rome with the single equipage of his Proconsular rank. Multitudes of every condition went forth to receive him, and with shouts and acclamations recompensed the moderation with which he acquiesced in the condition of a citizen.

Cæsar, from whatever motive he acted in regard to Pompey, gave every other sign of disaffection to the Senate, and employed the name of this rising favourite of the People, to mortify such of the members in particular as were objects of personal animosity to himself. The repairs or rebuilding of the Capitol being finished about this time, the honour of dedicating the edifice, and of being named in the inscription it was to bear, had, by a resolution of the Senate,



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been conferred on Catulus, under whose inspection the work was executed. But Cæsar, affecting to procure this honour for Pompey, alleged that Catulus had embezzled the money allotted for this service; that much yet remained to be done; and moved, that the inscription of Catulus should be erased; that the completion of the work being left to Pompey, should carry an inscription with his name<sup>17</sup>. Here he probably acted as much from antipathy to one, as from an intention to flatter the other. But the design being extremely odious to the whole body of the Nobles, who saw, with indignation, in that proposal an attempt to affront a most respectable citizen, in order to flatter the vanity of one person, and to gratify the profligate resentments of another, Cæsar was obliged to withdraw his motion<sup>18</sup>.

It was probably during this year in which Cæsar was Prætor, and before the arrival of Pompey from Asia (although historians refer it to an earlier date), that Cæsar promoted, as has been already mentioned, prosecutions upon a charge of assassination against some persons concerned in the execution of Sylla's proscriptions. The Prætors were appointed by lot to carry particular laws into execution. The law respecting assassination appears to have been the lot of Cæsar; and he was intitled in virtue of his office, the jurisdiction of which was still very arbitrary, to extend, by his edict or plan of proceeding for the year, the description of the crime under his cognizance to any special case.

While he seemed to have formed so many designs against the peace of the commonwealth, and in the capacity of Prætor supported them with the authority of a magistrate, the Senatorian party made a powerful exertion of their influence to have him suspended, and actually obtained a decree for this purpose. He affected at first to slight their authority; but finding that a power was preparing to enforce it, perhaps at the hazard of his life, he laid aside for some time

<sup>17</sup> Sueton. in Jul. Cæsare, c. 15.

<sup>18</sup> Dio Cass. lib. xlviii. c. 44.

the robes and badges of magistracy, dismissed his lictors, and abstained from the functions of Prætor, until, having rejected an offer of the People to restore him by force, he was, with proper marks of regard, for this instance of moderation, reinstated by an act of the Senate<sup>19</sup>.

The aristocratical party, at the same time, to confirm and perpetuate the evidence on which they proceeded against the accomplices of Cataline, continued their prosecutions on this subject, and obtained sentence of condemnation, in particular, against a citizen of the name of Vergunteius, and against Autronius, who, about two years before, having been elected Consul, was set aside upon a charge of bribery; and who, from the disgust which he took to the Senate upon that occasion, had connected himself with the more desperate party. Publius Sylla, in the same predicament with Autronius, was tried; but, being defended by Cicero, in an eloquent harangue which is still extant, was acquitted.

Cæsar likewise was accused by Vectius as accessory to the conspiracy of Cataline; but it is not likely that he was concerned farther than by the general encouragement he gave to every party at variance with the Senate. Opposition to this body was called the interest of the People, and was adopted by every person who had any passions to gratify by crimes of State, or who wished to weaken the government, to which they themselves were accountable. Among the supporters of this interest, Crassus also was accused, but probably on no better grounds than Cæsar.

The whole of these proceedings, however, were suspended by the approach of Pompey. This leader had now drawn the attention of all men upon himself, was quoted in every harangue as the great support of the empire, and courted by multitudes, who, without in-

<sup>19</sup>-Sueton. in Jul. Cæsare, c. 16.

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quity, affected to be classed with his admirers and friends. The contagion spread like a fashion among the vulgar of every description. He himself affected indifference to this mighty tide of renown, though not without much dignity and state, which he tempered with affability, employing the greatness he possessed to give the more value to his condescensions. His manner, though acceptable to the People and the army, was disagreeable to the Senate. Having previously sent Piso, one of his lieutenants, before him to stand for the Consulship, he had the presumption to desire that the Senate would defer the elections until he himself could be present to canvass for his friend. The Senate, according to Dio, complied with his desire; but, according to Plutarch, rejected the proposal with disdain. This author imputes the resolution, which they took upon this occasion, to Cato, and subjoins, that Pompey endeavoured to gain this opponent by a proposed marriage with one of his near relations; and that Cato declined the connexion, saying, That he should not be caught in a female snare. Piso, however, was elected together with Valerius Messala, and entered on his office before the triumph of Pompey.

U. C. 692.  
M. Pub. Piso  
Calpurnius,  
M. Val. Messala Niger.

This solemnity followed soon after; and, though continued for two days, could not make place for all the magnificent shews that had been provided for it. The list of conquests exceeded that which had ever been produced at any other triumph. Asia, Pontus, Armenia, Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, Medea, Colchis, Iberia, Albania, Syria, Cilicia, Mesopotamia, Phœnicia, Judæa, Arabia, Scythia, Crete<sup>22</sup>, with the sea in all its coasts. Among the people or potentates subdued, were the Bactriani, Mithridates, and Tigranes. Among the captures, a thousand fortresses, nine hundred cities reduced, eight hundred galleys taken, above two millions of men

<sup>22</sup> Plin. Nat. Hist. lib. vii. c. 26.

in captivity. Towns repeopled, not less than three hundred and ninety-nine. To this pompous list, it was subjoined by his friends, that, this being his third triumph, he had been round the known world, and had triumphed over all the three parts of the earth, Africa, Europe, and Asia.

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After rewarding the soldiers, of whom none received less than fifteen hundred denarii<sup>21</sup>, he carried to the treasury twenty thousand talents<sup>22</sup>. He led, among his principal captives, besides the chief pirates, Tigranes, son to the king of Armenia, with his wife and his daughter,—Zozimé, the queen of Tigranes,—the father Aristobulus, king of the Jews,—a sister of Mithridates with five sons, and some Scythian women;—the hostages of the Iberii, and the Com-mageni, together with trophies for every battle he had fought, making in all a more splendid exhibition than any that was to be found on the records of the State.

The triumphal processions of Pompey merit more attention than those of any other person, because they contained a public evidence of his character. Others took the benefit of an established practice to publish and to ratify the honours they had acquired; but Pompey, it is likely, would have invented the triumph, even if it had not been formerly thought of; and it is not to be doubted, that he over-ran some provinces in which the enemy were subdued, or in which they were so weak, as not to be able to make any resistance, merely to place them in the list of his conquests; and that he made some part of his progress in Asia to collect curiosities and ornaments for this pompous scene.

The triumph, in its ordinary form, contained only such exhibitions as had a reference to the service in which it was obtained; the captives and spoils of the enemy, with effigies and represent-

<sup>21</sup> About 50 l.

<sup>22</sup> About 3,860,000 l.



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ations where the originals, by any accident, could not be displayed. But in these solemnities, executed for the honour of Pompey, were admitted whatever could distinguish or signalize the occasion. Among these, according to the record transcribed by Pliny <sup>23</sup>, there were many costly ornaments of gold and of precious stones, which were fabricated on purpose to be shown. Tables or plates, used for some species of play, made of one intire chrystal; a representation of the moon in gold, weighing thirty pondo; tables, utensils, statues, crowns, models of different sorts in gold and precious stones, with the representation of a mountain in gold, having lions, deer, and other animals upon it: and what serves as an evidence that these exhibitions were not limited to the spoils actually taken in war, there is mentioned an image of Pompey himself incrusted with pearls. The whole conducted with more arrangement and order, than were necessary, perhaps, in the disposition of any of the battles which the triumph was intended to celebrate.

Among the images, representations, and memorials which were carried before the victor on this occasion, there was held up to view a state of the public revenue, from which it appeared, that, before Pompey's time it amounted to no more than fifty millions <sup>24</sup>; and that the addition which he alone brought to it amounted to eighty-five millions <sup>25</sup>.

Soon after this pomp was over, an assembly of the People was called in the Circus Flaminius to receive the address of this victorious general; but, from an extreme caution not to offend any party, the speech which he made, upon this occasion, was acceptable to none. "It gave no hopes," says Cicero <sup>26</sup>, "to the poor;

<sup>23</sup> Nat. Hist. lib. xxxvii. c. 2.

<sup>24</sup> 416,666 l.

<sup>25</sup> 703,333 l. Plutarch. in Pompeio, edit. Lond. p. 470.

<sup>26</sup> Cicer. ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 14.

“no flattery to the rich ; no satisfaction to the good ; no encouragement to the profligate.” Pompey was suffered to possess the highest place in the consideration of the public, merely because he assumed it ; and he preserved his dignity, by never committing his reputation without being prepared, and having concerted a variety of arts by which it might be supported.

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## C H A P. V.

*Transactions at Rome, and in the Provinces.—Julius Cæsar appointed in the Quality of Proprætor to his first Province of Lusitania.—Trial of Clodius.—Proposed Adoption into a Plebeian Family to qualify him for the Office of Tribune.—Cæsar, a Candidate for the Consulship.—The Triumvirate of Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus.—Consulship of Cæsar.—Motion of Vatinius, to confer on Cæsar, for five Years, the Command in Gaul.—Marriage of Pompey to Julia.—Of Cæsar to Calpurnia.—Plot of Vettius.—Consulate of Lucius Calpurnius and A. Gabinius.—Attack made upon Cicero.—His Exile.*

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POMPEY, at his departure from Syria, left that province with two legions under the command of M. Æmilius Scaurus, one of his lieutenants. This officer occupied the country from the Euphrates to the frontier of Egypt, and continued the war which his predecessor had begun with the Arabs.

Caius Antonius, the late colleague of Cicero in the Consulate, soon after the defeat of Cataline, proceeded to the province of Macedonia, of which, by the arrangements of the year, he had been appointed governor. He entered his province with the ensigns of victory, which had been obtained by the defeat of Cataline; but these he soon forfeited by his misconduct in a war against the Thracians, and by the disgrace which he otherwise incurred for the mal-administration of his province. Complaints were exhibited against him for extortion. On this occasion it had been reported by himself, or by some of his family, that, having agreed to divide the profits of his government with Cicero, part only was exacted on his own account.

This allegation, Cicero, in a letter to Atticus, mentions with indignation; and, being asked to undertake his defence, questions whether he can decently do so under this imputation<sup>1</sup>. But as he soon afterwards undertook the cause of Antony, and employed his interest to have him continued in his command, it is probable that this imputation either gained no credit, or was entirely removed<sup>2</sup>.

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The Allobroges, though deprived of the support they were made to expect from the party of Cataline, nevertheless took arms, and invaded the Roman province of Gaul. After a variety of events, they were repulsed by Pontinius, who then commanded the Roman forces in that quarter, and forced to retire into their own country<sup>3</sup>.

About the same time, Caius Julius Cæsar, upon the expiration of his term in the office of Prætor, obtained his first military command, being appointed by lot to the government of Lusitania, where, under different pretences, he found an opportunity to quarrel with the natives, to shew his capacity for war, and to lay some ground for his claim to a triumph<sup>4</sup>. In pushing his way to the preferments which he now held in the State, he had ruined his fortune by largesses, public shews, and entertainments to the People, by his lavish bounty in private to needy and profligate citizens, and in supporting every desperate cause against the Senate and the government; and is reported to have said of himself, that he needed one hundred and fifty millions Roman money, or one million two hundred thousand pounds sterling, to be worth nothing<sup>5</sup>. When about to depart from the city, he was pressed by his creditors, and had recourse to Crassus, who became his surety for great sums<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Cicero ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 12.

<sup>5</sup> Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. p. 715.

<sup>2</sup> Ad Familiar. lib. v. ep. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. About 160,000 l. Plutarch. in Cæfare.

<sup>3</sup> Dio, lib. xxxvii.

<sup>4</sup> Dio, c. 52, &c.

A person,



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A person, who, in any other state than that of Rome, could suppose such a fortune reparable, must have thought of means alarming to the State itself; but Cæsar had now quitted the paths of pleasure for those of ambition; and, in an empire which extended over so many opulent provinces, could easily proportion his wealth to the extent of his power. Although the province into which he was then sent was none of the richest, and was only a step to somewhat farther, more considerable, and more likely to supply him with the means of pursuing the objects of his ambition, he was nevertheless reported to have supplied his own wants, and to have enriched his army<sup>7</sup>.

In passing the Alps, on his way into Spain, at a village on the way, one of his company observed, that “*Here too there were probably parties and contests for power.*” “Ay,” said Cæsar, “and I would rather be the first man in this place than the second at Rome<sup>8</sup>.” Upon his arrival in Lusitania, he made the necessary augmentation of the army, and soon over-ran all the districts that were disposed to resist his authority. With the same ability with which he conducted his military operations, he supported the dignity of a Roman governor, no less in the civil than in the military department. Historians, upon an idea which occurred to them, that the disorder in his own affairs might have rendered him partial to insolvent debtors, are at pains to acquit him of any such charge, and observe that he gave proofs of the contrary, and for the most part ordered two thirds of the debtor’s effects to be sequestered for the use of his creditors<sup>9</sup>.

While these things passed in the provinces, the city was occupied with ordinary affairs, and suffered an increase of the political dis-

<sup>7</sup> Plutarch, in Cæfare, edit. Lond. p. 111.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. p. 112.

temper with which the public had been for some time infected. The expence and dissipation attending the public shews, in particular, were augmented to a great degree. Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus exhibited the baiting of an hundred bears by African huntsmen <sup>10</sup>; and whereas such entertainments had formerly ended at one meeting, they were now continued through many acts <sup>11</sup>, and were intermitted only while the People retired to their meals.

The office of Censor, as appears from the transactions which are mentioned relating to the farms of the revenue and the rolls of the Senate, was in being at this time, although the names of the persons by whom it was exercised are not recorded. The Censors are said to have let the revenues of Asia at a rate, of which the farmers afterwards complained, alleging, that their own avidity in grasping at the profits to be made in this new province had misled them <sup>12</sup>. They likewise put upon the rolls of the Senate all who had ever held any office of magistracy, and by this addition increased the number of members beyond the former and ordinary rate <sup>13</sup>.

About the same time happened the memorable trial of Publius Clodius, for the scandal he had given by profaning the sacred rites in Cæsar's house. This debauchee was supposed, for some time, to have sought for an opportunity of a criminal correspondence with Pompeia, Cæsar's wife; but to have been prevented, if not by her own discretion, at least by the attention and vigilance of her family <sup>14</sup>. In these circumstances, in the preceding year, it fell to the lot of Pompeia, as being wife to one of the Prætors in office, to celebrate, at her house, the festival of a certain female deity <sup>15</sup> worshipped by the Romans; and at whose rites women alone were admitted. Every male domestic, even the husband, was obliged to absent himself from

<sup>10</sup> Plin. Nat. Hist. lib. viii. c. 36.

<sup>11</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvii. c. 47.

<sup>12</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 17.

<sup>13</sup> Dio. lib. xxxvii. c. 46.

<sup>14</sup> Plutarch. in Cæsare, edit. Lond. p. 109.

<sup>15</sup> Called the Bona & Dea.

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home while the rites were administered. Clodius took this opportunity to carry on his intrigue; he put himself in a female dress, and, being young and of an effeminate aspect, expected to pass for a woman<sup>16</sup>. Pompeia was supposed to be apprised of the design, and to have stationed a female slave to receive and conduct her paramour through the apartments. Being met, however, by another slave who was not in the secret, his voice betrayed him. A cry of amazement and horror was immediately raised, communicated through all the apartments, and the occasion of it discovered to the matrons, who were met to celebrate the rites. Clodius escaped, but not without being known. The college of Pontiffs made a report, that the sacred rites had been profaned. The Senate resolved, that inquiry should be made into the grounds of the scandal; and that the People should be moved to authorise the Prætor to select, without drawing lots, proper judges for the trial of the accused.

Clodius, by the suspicion of an incestuous commerce with his own sister, the wife of Lucullus; by his perfidy in seducing the troops of that general to mutiny, and by his profligacy on every occasion, had incurred a general detestation; and many of the Senators combined, as the likeliest way of removing him from the commonwealth, in urging the prosecution against him.

He himself, foreseeing this storm, had taken refuge in the popular party, and endeavoured to silence the voice of infamy, by professing extraordinary zeal for the People, and vehement opposition to the Senate. These parties accordingly became interested in the issue of his cause. The popular leaders endeavoured to preserve him as an useful instrument, and the Senate to remove him as a vile and dangerous tool from the hands of their enemies. Even Cæsar, though personally insulted, and so far moved by the scandal which had been

<sup>16</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 12, 13.

given in his own house as to part with his wife, still affected to consider as groundless the charge that was brought against the accused; and being asked, why he had parted with a woman who, upon this supposition, must appear to be innocent, said, that his wife must not only be innocent, but above imputation. Pompey, to avoid giving offence, declined to favour either party; but being called upon in the assembly of the People to declare his opinion, whether this trial should proceed according to the decree of the Senate; made a long speech, full of respect to the Nobles, and of submission to the Senate, whose authority, in all questions of this sort, he said, should ever with him have the greatest weight. He afterwards, in the Senate itself, being called upon by Messala the Consul, delivered himself to the same purpose; and when he had done, whispered Cicero, who sat by him, that he thought he had now sufficiently explained himself; intimating probably, that he meant to comprehend, in this declaration, his judgment with respect to all the acts of the Senate which had passed relating to the accomplices of Cataline<sup>16</sup>.

The Consul Piso was instructed to carry to the People, for their assent, an act for the better conduct of the trial of Clodius, dispensing with the usual mode of draughting judges by lot, and authorising the Prætor to select them, that he might name the more respectable persons. On the day on which this motion was to be made, a numerous party of young Nobility appeared for the defendant. His hirelings and retainers crowded the Comitium. Even Piso, who moved the question, dissuaded the People from passing the law, and allowed the friends of Clodius to put a ridiculous trick on the assembly, by distributing to the People, as they came forward to vote, two ballots, which, instead of being, as usual, one negative and the other affirmative, were both negative. This trick being observed, Cato sus-

<sup>16</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. i. epist. 13, 14. 16.



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pended the ballot, and strongly remonstrated against the proceeding of the Consul<sup>17</sup>. He was supported by Hortensius and Favonius. The assembly broke up, and the affair again returned to the Senate. The members were importuned by Clodius, who cast himself at their feet as they entered; they, nevertheless, confirmed their former resolution by a majority of four hundred to fifteen<sup>18</sup>.

Hortensius, however, having proposed that, instead of the motion which the Consuls had been instructed to make for the selection of the judges, the Tribune Fufius should move the People to grant commission for the trial, leaving the judges, as usual, to be drawn by lot; an edict was framed and passed to this effect. Hortensius, who conducted the trial, was confident that no jury could acquit the accused. The court accordingly, in all their proceedings, seemed at first inclined to severity. They even applied for a guard to protect their persons against the partizans of the criminal; but the majority, nevertheless, suffered themselves to be corrupted, and took money in the course of the trial. Of fifty-six judges that were inclosed, twenty-five gave their voice to condemn, and thirty-one to acquit. Catulus, on this occasion, asked the majority to what purpose they had desired a guard? "Was it," he said, "to secure the money "you expected to receive for your votes?"

Soon after this judgment the Senate resolved that enquiry should be made concerning those judges who had been corrupted in the trial. And by this resolution gave a general offence to the equestrian order, who considered it as an imputation on their whole body<sup>20</sup>.

Pompey, in the course of this transaction, had been obliged to declare himself for the Senate; but his object was to be on good

<sup>17</sup> Cicer. ad Att. lib. i. epist. 13, 14.  
16.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. ep. 14.

<sup>19</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvii. c. 46. Cicero ad Att. lib. i. ep. 16.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. ep. 17.

terms with all parties, and to manage his interest, by having some of his creatures always chosen into the highest offices of State. He offered, as candidate for the Consulate of the following year, Afranius, one of his dependants, who is represented by Cicero as a person of mean character, and who, having no personal dignity, nor any credit with the People, was to be supported in his canvass by money alone. Pompey himself, and the Consul Piso, openly employed bribery in obtaining votes in his favour".

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A variety of resolutions were obtained in the Senate to restrain these practices. Two of them were proposed by Cato and Domitius. The first was levelled against the Consul Piso, and gave permission, on the suspicion of illicit practices respecting elections, to visit the house even of a magistrate. By the other it was declared, that all those who were found distributing money to the People should be considered as enemies to their country".

The Senate, at the same time, encouraged Lurco, one of the Tribunes, to propose a new clause to corroborate the laws against bribery. By this clause promises of money made to the People, if not performed, did not infer guilt; but, if performed, subjected the guilty person from thenceforward to pay to each of the Tribes an annual tax of three thousand Roman money, or about twenty-four pounds sterling; and there being thirty-five Tribes, this tax amounted in all to about eight hundred and forty pounds of our money. That the Tribune might not be interrupted in carrying this law, the Senate farther resolved, that the formalities or restrictions of the *Lex Ælia* and *Fufia*<sup>20</sup> should not be opposed to him". It appears, however, that the liberality of Pompey prevailed against these precautions, as Afranius was elected, together with Q. Cæcilius Metellus Celer.

<sup>18</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. i. ep. 16.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> These were formalities and restrictions

provided to check the precipitate passing of laws.

<sup>21</sup> Cicer. ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 16.

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Soon after the election of these officers the farmers of the revenue of Asia, supported by the whole equestrian order, complained, as has been mentioned, of the terms of their contract, in which they alleged that they had greatly exceeded what the funds of that province could afford, and made application to the Senate for relief. Their plea was contested for some months with great animosity on both sides <sup>22</sup>.

Upon the accession of the new Consuls, several other matters, tending to innovation and public disturbance, were introduced. Metellus Nepos, late Tribune, being now in the office of Prætor, procured a law to abolish the customs payable at any of the ports of Italy. The Romans, as has been observed, upon the accession of wealth derived from Macedonia, had exempted themselves from all the antient assessments, and they now completed the exemption of all the Italians from every tax besides that of quit-rents for public lands, and the twentieth penny on the value of slaves when sold or emancipated. They were become the sovereigns of a great empire, and as such, thought themselves intitled to receive, not obliged to pay, contributions <sup>23</sup>.

The Tribune Herennius, at the same time, made a motion for an act to enable Publius Clodius to be adopted into a plebeian family, which, though an act of a more private nature than any of the former, tended still more to embroil the parties of the Senate and the People. This factious and profligate person had entertained great resentments against many of the Senators on account of the prosecution he had lately incurred, and against Cicero in particular, who, having been called as an evidence on his trial, gave a very unfavourable account of his character. The summary proceedings against the accomplices of Cataline, in which Cicero presided as Consul, exposed

<sup>22</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. i. ep. 17, 18.  
lib. xxvii. c. 51.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. lib. ii. ep. 16. Dio. Cass.

him to the resentment of the popular faction; and Clodius now proposed to qualify himself to be elected Tribune of the People, in order to wreck his vengeance on that magistrate in particular, as well as on the other abettors of the senatorian party. The motion, however, for the present was rejected, though not finally dropt, by Clodius himself, nor by the popular faction, whose cause he professed to espouse<sup>24</sup>.

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Two other motions were made in which Pompey was deeply interested: one, to ratify and confirm all his acts in the province of Asia: another, to procure settlements for the veterans who had served under his command. The first, as it implied a reflection on Lucullus, many of whose judgments Pompey had reversed, roused this statesman from the care of his household and his table, to that of the republic<sup>25</sup>. He opposed this motion with vigour, and insisted that the acts of Pompey should be separately examined, and not confirmed in a single vote. In this he was supported by Catulus, by Cato, by the Consul Metellus, and by the Senate in general. Afranius, though vested with the Consulship, and acting almost as the agent of Pompey, had neither dignity nor force to support such a measure; and Pompey, finding it rejected by the Senate, declined carrying it to the People<sup>26</sup>.

The other proposal, relating to the provision to be made for the soldiers of Pompey, was, by L. Flavius, one of the Tribunes, moved in the assembly of the People, under the title of an Agrarian Law. In this act, to prevent the imputation of partiality to any particular description of men, certain gratuities were projected for the indigent citizens in general<sup>27</sup>; and, to enable the commonwealth to extend its bounty, it was proposed first of all to revoke the conveyance of certain lands, which, having belonged to the public in the Consulship

<sup>24</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvii c. 51.

<sup>26</sup> Dio. lib. xxxvii. c. 49.

<sup>25</sup> Plutarch. in Lucullo, edit. Lond. p. 197.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. lib. 50.



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of P. Mucius and L. Calpurnius, were sold by the Senate; and that the price should be restored to the purchasers. It was proposed likewise to seize certain lands which had been confiscated by Sylla, but not appropriated; and to allot, during five years, the revenues of the late conquests in Asia to purchase lands, which should be distributed in terms of this act<sup>28</sup>.

The Consul Metellus Celer, supported by the Senate, strenuously opposed the passing of this law. The Tribune persisted with great obstinacy, and, to remove the obstruction he met with, committed the Consul to prison. The whole Senate would have attended him thither, and numbers accordingly crowded to the place, when the Tribune, vested with the sacred defences of his person, to bar their way, planted his stool or chair of office in the door of the prison; and, having seated himself upon it, "This way," he said, "you cannot pass; if you mean to enter, you must pierce through the walls<sup>29</sup>." He declared his resolution to remain all night where he sat. The parties were collecting their strength, and matters were likely to end in greater extremities than suited the indirect and cautious conduct of Pompey. This politician, although he engaged all his friends to support the motion of Flavius, affected to have no part in the measure, and now probably instructed the Tribune to remove from the doors of the prison. Flavius accordingly withdrew of a sudden, saying, he had done so at the request of the prisoner, who begged for his liberty<sup>30</sup>.

It is supposed that Pompey, on this occasion, severely felt the checks which his ambition received from the senate; that he regretted for a moment the dismissal of his army, and wished himself in condition to enforce what his craft or his artifice had not been able to obtain. The error he had committed in resigning the sword, if he conceived it as such, might have still been corrected by recovering

<sup>28</sup> Cicer. ad Att. lib. i. ep. 19.

<sup>29</sup> Dio. lib. xxxvii. p. 50.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

the possession of some considerable province, which would have given him the command of an army and of proper resources to support his power. He, nevertheless, appears to have preferred the scene of intrigue in the city and the capital of the empire; a choice in which he was probably confirmed by Cæsar, who professed great attachment to him, and who was about this time returned from the government which he held as Proprætor in Lusitania.

This officer, according to Dio, had found some pretence for a war with the nations on the frontier of the Roman province; had obliged them to take refuge in some of the islands on the coast, and afterwards reduced them in that retreat. His object was to return to Rome with the reputation of victory, to obtain a triumph, and to offer himself as a candidate for the Consulship of the following year. For this purpose he quitted his province without waiting for a successor, and, upon his arrival at Rome, halted, as usual, with the ensigns of his military command at the gates of the city, applied for a triumph, and at the same time made interest for votes at the approaching election<sup>31</sup>. The Senate, and the friends of the republic in general, were become extremely jealous of his designs, and of his credit with the People. From a libertine he was become an ardent politician, seemed to have no passion but ambition or animosity to the Senate; without committing himself, he had abetted every factious leader against them, and seemed to be indifferent to consideration or honours, except so far as they led to power. Cicero and Cato were at this time the principal, or most conspicuous, members of the Senate. The first was possessed of consular rank, great ingenuity, wit, and accomplished talents: the other, possessed of great abilities and an inflexible resolution, embraced the cause of the republic with the same ardour that others engaged in pursuing the object of their own ambition, their

<sup>31</sup> Dio, *Cass. lib. xxxvii. c. 50, &c.*

pleasures, or personal interests. He had penetration enough to perceive in Cæsar, long before the Senate in general was alarmed, a disposition to vilify the aristocracy, and, in conjunction with needy and profligate citizens, to make a prey of the republic. Under this apprehension he opposed him with a degree of keenness which Cæsar endeavoured to represent as a personal animosity.

The Senators in general, now aware of their danger from Cæsar, were disposed to resist his applications, whether made for honours or for public trust. They, on the present occasion, disputed his pretensions to a triumph; and, while he remained without the city in expectation of this honour, refused to admit him on the list of candidates for the office of Consul. But the day of election being fixed, Cæsar, without hesitation, preferred the consulate to the triumph, laid down the ensigns of his late military command, assumed the gown, and entered the city as a candidate for the Consulship<sup>22</sup>.

The People were at this time divided into a variety of factions. Pompey and Crassus distrusted each other, and both were jealous of Cæsar. Their divisions strengthened the party of the Senate, and furnished that body with the means of thwarting separately many of their ambitious designs. This Cæsar had long perceived, and had paid his court both to Pompey and Crassus, in order to hinder their joining the Senate against him. The expedience of this precaution now appeared more clearly than ever, and he is supposed to have separately represented to these rivals the advantage which their enemies derived from their misunderstanding, and the ease with which, if united, they might concert among themselves all the affairs of the republic, gratify every friend, and disappoint every enemy. Upon this representation Pompey and Crassus were reconciled, and agreed

<sup>22</sup> Sueton. in Cæfare, c. 18. Dio. lib. xxxvii. c. 54.

to act in concert with Cæsar, and to support him in his pretensions at the approaching elections <sup>33</sup>.

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This private combination, which remained some time a secret, was afterwards, by a kind of mockery, alluding to the ordinary names of public office, taken from the number of those who were joined in them <sup>34</sup>, called the Triumvirate. In the mean time, these supposed leaders of opposite factions, in abating their violence against each other, took a favourable appearance of moderation and candour. They paid their court separately to persons whom they wished to gain, and flattered them with hopes of being able to heal the divisions of their country. This sort of court they paid in particular to Cicero; and by their flatteries, and real or pretended admiration of his talents, seem to have got intire possession of his mind. Pompey affected to place the merits of Cicero greatly above his own. "I, indeed," he said, "have served my country, but this man has preserved it <sup>35</sup>". The Senators, with whom Cicero had hitherto acted, were alarmed; and it appears that Atticus, about this time, had taxed him with leaving his party, to commit himself into the hands of their enemies. In his answer to this imputation, he seems to have flattered himself that he had made an acquisition of Pompey, not surrendered himself into his power; at least, that he had reclaimed or diverted him from the dangerous projects in which he had been lately engaged, and that he thought himself likely to succeed in the same manner with Cæsar: so much, that he triumphed in the superiority of his own conduct to that of Cato, who, by his austerity and vehemence, had alienated the minds of men otherwise well disposed to the republic <sup>36</sup>,

<sup>33</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvii. c. 54, 55. Plutarch. in Pompeio, Cæsare, & Crasso.

<sup>34</sup> As the Decemvirs, Septemvirs, &c.

<sup>35</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. ii. epist. 1.

<sup>36</sup> Alluding to the opposition which Cato

gave to the farmers of the revenue, in their petition for an abatement of their rent. But Cato followed his judgment in this matter; and there is no reason to prefer the judgment of Cicero to his.



"While I," he said, "by a little discretion, reclaim, or even disarm its enemies<sup>37</sup>."

Few persons were naturally possessed of more penetration than Cicero, although it will afterwards appear how egregiously he was mistaken on this occasion; but he chose not to see what checked his vanity, or prevented his enjoying the court which was paid to him by Pompey and Cæsar. His own glory intercepted every other object from his view, and made him the dupe of every person who professed to admire him, and secretly displeased with every one who did not pay him, on every occasion, the expected tribute of praise; a description under which Cato, though his most sincere well-wisher and friend, appears at this time to have fallen.

Cæsar, to the other arts which he employed to secure his election, added the use of money, which he obtained by joining his interest, in opposition to Bibulus with that of Luceius, another of the candidates possessed of great wealth. He himself having squandered his fortune, as has been observed, was still greatly in debt, and Luceius willingly furnished the money that was given to the People in the name of both. This illegal proceeding, together with the menacing concerts of which he began to be suspected with Pompey and Crassus, greatly alarmed the friends of the republic. They determined to support Bibulus against Luceius; and, in order to give Cæsar a colleague who might occasionally oppose his dangerous intentions, they even went so far as to contribute sums of money, and to bid for votes as high as their opponents. In this crisis, even Cato owned it was meritorious to bribe<sup>38</sup>.

During the dependence of this contest, the Senate, by the death of Lutatius Catulus, was deprived of an able member, and the People of a fellow-citizen of great integrity, moderation, fortitude, and

<sup>37</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. ii. epist. i.

<sup>38</sup> Sueton. in Cæso Cæsare, c. xix. Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

ability; a model of what the Romans in this age should have been, in order to have preserved their republic. He partook with Cato in the aversion which Cæsar bore to the most respectable members and best supports of the Senate, and would probably have taken part with him likewise in the continual efforts he made to preserve its authority. The aristocratical party, notwithstanding this loss, prevailed in carrying the election of Bibulus against Luceius; and though they could not exclude Cæsar from the office of Consul, they hoped, by means of his colleague, to oppose and to frustrate his designs<sup>39</sup>.

Cæsar, well aware of their purpose, opened his administration with a speech praising unanimity, and recommending good agreement between those who are joined in any public trust. While he meant to vilify the Senate, and to foster every disorderly party against them, he guarded his own behaviour, at least in the first period of his Consulship, with every appearance of moderation and candour, paid his court not only to leaders of faction, but to persons of every description, and while he took care to espouse the popular side in every question, was active likewise in devising regulations for the better government of the Empire: so that the Senate, however inclined to counteract his designs, as calculated to raise himself on the ruins of the commonwealth, could scarcely, with a good grace, oppose him in any particular measure. He set out with a project for the relief of indigent citizens having numerous families, including the veterans and disbanded soldiers of Pompey; proposing to settle them on some of the public lands in Italy. He gave out that he expected the concurrence of Cicero in this measure, sent him a message by Balbus<sup>40</sup>, with assurances *that he meant to consult with Pompey and himself in all*

<sup>39</sup> Plutarch. Appian. Dio. Sueton. &c.

Catone, &c. &c. Sueton. in Cæfare. Ap-

<sup>40</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. viii. initio. Plutarch. in Cæfare. In Pompeia, Pompeio, Lucullo,

pian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

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*matters of importance, and that he had hopes of bringing Crassus into the same mind:* words, from which it is manifest that the coalition of these persons was not yet publicly known. “What a fine prospect I have before me,” says Cicero to Atticus; “a perfect union with Pompey, even with Cæsar if I please; peace with my enemies, and tranquillity in my old age.” But his heart misgave him; the honours of his former life recurred to his mind. With his great talents, he was destined to transmit a more honest fame to posterity, and to become the lamented victim of his country’s betrayers, not the detested associate of their crimes”.

This Consulate is distinguished by the passing of many laws, particularly this, which was devised for the settlement of citizens on certain public lands; and therefore known by the title of the Agrarian Law. On this act Cæsar was to rest his popularity, and his triumph over the Senate. He gave out that he was to make a provision for twenty thousand citizens, without any burden to the revenue. But he well knew that his antagonists would perceive the tendency of the law, and not suffer it to pass without opposition; and he affected great moderation in the general purpose, and in framing every part of his plan; affecting solicitude to obtain the consent of the Senate; but, in reality, to make their opposition appear the more unreasonable and the more odious to the People. He declared, that he did not mean to strip the revenue of any branch that was known to carry profit to the public, nor to make any partial distribution in favour of his friends; that he only meant to plant with inhabitants certain unprofitable wastes, and to provide for a number of citizens, who, being indigent and uneasy in their circumstances, filled the city itself with frequent disorders and tumults; and that he would not proceed a step without consulting the Senate, and persons of credit and authority in the State.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. ii. ep. 3.

In a way to save these appearances, and with these professions, Cæsar formed the first draught of an act which he brought to the Senate for their approbation, and the support of their authority in proposing it to the People. It was difficult to find topics on which to oppose a measure so plausible, and conducted with so much appearance of moderation and candour. But the tendency of the act itself was evidently not to promote the peace of the commonwealth, but to constitute a merit in the party that procured it, and to give power to those who were to be entrusted with its execution.

In great and populous cities indigent citizens are ever likely to be numerous, and would be more so, if the idle and profligate were taught to hope for bounties and gratuitous provisions, to quiet their clamours and to suppress their disorders. If men were to have estates in the country because they are factious and turbulent in the city, it is evident that public lands, and all the resources of the most prosperous state, would not be sufficient to satisfy their claims.

The commissioners appointed for the distribution of such public favours would be raised above the ordinary magistrates, and above the laws of their country. They might reward their own creatures, and keep the citizens in general in a state of dependence on their will. The authors of such proposals, while they were urging the State and the People to ruin, would be considered as their only patrons and friends. "It is not this law I dread," said Cato; "it is the reward expected for obtaining it."

Odious as the task of opposition on such difficult ground might appear to the People, this Senator did not decline it. Being asked his opinion in his turn, he answered, That he saw no occasion for the change that was now proposed in the state of the public lands; and entered on an argument with which he meant to exhaust the whole time of the sitting of the Senate, and to prevent their coming to a question. He was intitled, by his privilege as a member in that  
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assembly, to speak without interruption, and might, if he chose to continue speaking, persist until all the members had left the house. Cæsar suspecting his design, and finding it impossible otherwise to silence him, ordered him into custody. The whole Senate instantly rose in a tumult. "Whither go you before the meeting is adjourned?" said Cæsar to Petreius, who was moving from his side. "I go," said the other, "into confinement with Cato. With him a prison is "preferable to a place in the Senate with you." The greater part of the members were actually moving away with Cato, and Cæsar felt himself at once stript of the disguise of moderation he had assumed, and dreaded the spirit which he saw rising in so numerous a body of men, who, on former occasions, had maintained their authority with becoming vigour. He had relied on their want of decision, and on their ignorance of their own strength. But his rashness broke the charm. He wished that the prisoner would procure some friend among the Tribunes to interpose; but Cato, seeing him embarrassed, and the Senate engaged in the cause, went off in the custody of the Lictor without any signs of reluctance. Cæsar immediately recollecting himself, and never hurried too far by any passion, dispatched a Tribune of his own party with secret directions to rescue the prisoner; and this being done, the Senators again returned to their places. "I meant," said Cæsar, "to have submitted this law to "your judgment and correction; but if you throw it aside, the "People shall take it up."

Cæsar, upon this occasion, encreased his own popularity, and diminished that of his enemies in the Senate, who were supposed in this, as in some other instances, to withstand with keenness every measure that was devised for the comfort of the People. The imputations cast out against him by Cato and others, were supposed

<sup>42</sup> Dio. lib. xxxviii. c. 1, 2, 3. Plutarch. Sueton. Appian, &c.

to proceed from malice or cynical prejudices. He found himself strong enough to extend his bounty to the People, so as to comprehend the lands of Campania, which were hitherto considered as unalienable, and the richest demesne of the public, together with a valuable district near the confluence of the Volturnus and the Sabbatus, formerly consecrated to pious uses. In these valuable tracts of land there was sufficient subject for an ample provision for the soldiers of Pompey, and for the retainers of those who, together with Crassus and Cæsar himself, were proposed to be commissioners for carrying this act into execution.

At the first assembly of the People, Cæsar proposed his scheme to appropriate the lands of Campania, with the above additions; and first of all called on his colleague Bibulus to declare his mind on the subject. Bibulus spoke his dissent; and in vehement terms declared, that no such alienation of the public demesne should be made in his Consulship. Cæsar next called upon Pompey, though in a private station; and the audience, ignorant of the concert into which these leaders had entered, were impatient to hear him on the subject of a measure which was likely to elevate a supposed rival so high in the favour of the People. To the surprise of all who were present, Pompey applauded the general design, and, in a speech of considerable length, discussed all the clauses of the act, and with great approbation of each. When he had done speaking, Cæsar, alluding to what had dropt from his colleague, and affecting to fear the interposition of force; "Will you support us," he said to Pompey, "in case we are attacked?"—"If any one," said the other, "shall lift up a sword against you, I shall lift up both sword and shield<sup>43</sup>." Crassus being called upon, spoke to the same purpose. The concurrence of these leaders portended the unanimous consent of all parties;

<sup>43</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. ii. Plutarch. in Pompeio. Dio. Cass. lib. xxxviii. c. 5.

and a day being fixed for putting the question, the assembly for the present adjourned.

To oppose a measure so popular, and from which such numbers had great expectations, no means remained so likely to succeed as superstition. To this aid Bibulus accordingly had recourse, and, by virtue of the authority with which he was vested, proclaimed a general fast, and a suspension for the present year of all the affairs of State. The design of this suspension, and the extravagant length of time to which it was extended, probably enabled his colleague to treat it with contempt, and to proceed in the design of putting his question, as if no such proclamation had been issued. The assembly was accordingly summoned in the temple of Concord. Cæsar, early in the morning, secured all the avenues and the steps of the portico with an armed force; had Vatinius, one of the Tribunes of the People, who was intirely devoted to his interest, and even in his pay<sup>44</sup>, stationed with this party, in order to take the odium of all violent measures on himself. Bibulus, however, attended by numbers of the Senate, and three of the Tribunes, who were prepared, by their negative, to put a stop to every proceeding, came into the place of assembly with a firm countenance; he protested against the legality of any meeting to be formed in a time of general fast: but the opposite party being in possession of the temple, forced him from the steps, broke the ensigns of the Lictors, wounded the Tribunes that interposed in his defence, and effectually removed all farther obstruction to their own designs. The question then being put, the law passed without opposition, including a clause to oblige every Senator, under pain of exile or death, to swear to the observance of it.

<sup>44</sup> Cicero in Vatinius. Cæsar was reported to have said at Acquileia, some time after this date, when Vatinius was disappointed of the Edileship, that he had no business with honours, being intent on money only; and that he was paid for all his services in the Tribunate.

This oath was probably a snare laid by Cæsar for the most resolute of his opponents, like that which was formerly laid by Marius, on a like occasion, for Metellus Numidicus, and by which that virtuous citizen was actually for some time removed from the commonwealth<sup>45</sup>.

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Metellus Celer, the late Consul, together with Cato and Favonius, were likely to have fallen into this snare. They at first declared their resolution not to swear to the observance of any such ruinous law; but, on mature consideration, they became sensible that in this they were serving the cause of their enemies. "You may have no need of Rome," said Cicero to Cato, "and may go into exile with pleasure; but Rome has need of you. Give not such a victory to her enemies and your own." Upon these considerations it was determined to comply<sup>46</sup>.

Bibulus, on the day following that of his violent expulsion from the assembly of the People, assembled the Senate, complained of the outrage he had received, and submitted the state of the republic to their consideration. But even this assembly, though consisting of above six hundred of the most powerful citizens of Rome, not destitute even of courage, were declined in their spirit, and became averse to exertions of vigour. They were occupied with their villas, their equipages, and the other appurtenances of wealth and of high rank. "They appear," says Cicero upon this occasion, "to think that even if the republic should perish, they will be able to preserve their fish-ponds."

The Consul Bibulus, even Cato, though far removed from any ambiguity of conduct, saw no possibility of resisting the torrent. The first retired to his own house, and from thence forward, during

<sup>45</sup> See b. ii. c. 6.

<sup>46</sup> Plutarch. in Catone. Appian, de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.



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the remainder of the year, did not appear in any public place. Cato absented himself from the Senate<sup>47</sup>.

While Cæsar engrossed the full exercise of the consular power, Bibulus was content with issuing his edicts or manifestos in writing, containing protests, by which he endeavoured to stop all proceedings in public affairs on account of the religious fast, or continuation of holidays, which he had instituted to restrain his colleague. In these writings he published violent invectives against Cæsar, in which, among other articles, he charged him with having had a part in the conspiracy of Cataline<sup>48</sup>. The Tribune Vatinius, in return, issued a warrant to commit the Consul Bibulus to prison; and, in order to seize him, attempted to break into his own house; but in this he was foiled, and the parties continued, during the remainder of this Consulate, in the same situation with respect to each other.

In dating the year, instead of the Consulate of Cæsar and Bibulus, it was called by some wag the Consulate of Julius and Cæsar<sup>49</sup>. This able adventurer, though suspected of the deepest designs, went still deeper in laying his measures for the execution of them than his keenest opponents supposed. He found means to tie up every hand that was likely to be lifted up against himself; as those of Pompey and Crassus, by their secret agreement, of which the articles were gradually disclosed in the effect. He confirmed to Pompey all the acts of his administration in Asia, and, by putting him on the commission for dividing the lands of Campania, and for settling a colony at Capua, gave him an opportunity, which the other earnestly desired, of providing for many necessitous citizens of his party. He flattered Crassus sufficiently, by placing him on the same commission, and by admitting him to a supposed equal participation of that political consequence which the Triumvirs proposed to secure by

<sup>47</sup> Cicero pro Sextio. Plutarch, in Catone.

<sup>48</sup> Sueton. in C. Cæsare.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. c. 20. Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvii. c. 6. 8.

their union. He gained the Equestrian order, by granting a suit which they had long in dependence, for a diminution of the rents payable by the revenue farmers in Asia<sup>49</sup>. These he reduced a third; and with that order of men acquired the character of great liberality and candour. He himself was the only person who in appearance was not to profit by these arrangements. He was occupied, as his retainers pretended, in serving the republic and in promoting his friends; was the general patron of the distressed and the indigent, and had nothing to propose for himself.

With his consent, and under his authority, Fufius, one of the Prætors, and Vatinius, one of the Tribunes, obtained two laws, both of them equitable and salutary: the first, relating to the use of the ballot in the Comitia, or assembly of the People: the other, relating to the challenge of parties in the nomination of judges or juries. The introduction of the ballot in political questions had greatly weakened the influence of the aristocracy over the determinations of the People; and resolutions were frequently carried in this manner, which no party, nor any particular order of men, were willing to acknowledge as their measure. The Nobles imputed the absurd determinations to the majority that was formed by the People, and these sometimes retorted the imputation. To leave no doubt in such matters for the future, Fufius proposed that the orders of Patrician, Equestrian, and Plebeian, should ballot apart<sup>50</sup>. This regulation had some tendency to restore the influence of the superior classes.

Vatinius proposed that in criminal actions, when the judges were drawn by lot, the defendant and prosecutors might, in their turns, challenge, or strike off from the list, persons to whom they took a particular exception<sup>51</sup>.

<sup>49</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. ii. ep. 1. Appian.  
de Bell. Civil. lib. ii. p. 435.

<sup>50</sup> Dio. lib. xxxviii. c. 8.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. Appian.

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Cæsar himself was busy in devising new regulations to reform the mode of elections, and to improve the forms of business in some of the public departments. By one of his acts the priests were to be elected agreeably to the former laws of Atius and Domitius, with this difference, that candidates might be admitted even in absence. By another of his acts, regular journals were to be kept in the Senate and in the assemblies of the People, and all their proceedings recorded for the inspection of the public. By a third, persons convicted of treason were subjected to new penalties, and governors of provinces to additional restraints in the exercise of their power. Such officers were not allowed to receive any honorary gift from their provinces, until their services being considered at Rome, were found to have intitled them to a triumph<sup>52</sup>. They were restrained from encroaching on the right of any State or principality beyond the limits of their province. They were obliged to leave copies of their books and of their acts at two of the principal towns in their government<sup>53</sup>, and, immediately upon their arrival at Rome, to give in a copy of the same accounts to the treasury. They were doomed to make restitution of all subjects received in extortion, not only by themselves, but by any of their attendants<sup>54</sup>.

With these acts Cæsar adorned his Consulate, and in some measure discountenanced the party which was disposed to traduce him. He is, nevertheless, accused of having stolen from the treasury, to which he had access in the capacity of Consul, bars of gold weighing three thousand pondo, and of having concealed the theft by substituting brass gilt, and of the same form, in its place<sup>55</sup>.

<sup>52</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. v. ep. 16. & lib. vi. ep. 7.

<sup>53</sup> Cicero ad Famil. lib. ii. ep. 17. & lib. v. ep. 20.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. in Vatinius pro Sext.

<sup>55</sup> Sueton. in Jul. c. 44. Cæsar is said to have sold the gold bullion he brought from Spain at 3000 H. S. or about 25l. of our money. This will make his supposed theft about 75,000l.

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Whatever foundation there may have been for this report, it soon appeared that Cæsar had objects of a more serious nature, could copy, on occasion, the example of Pompey, and, in his manner, cause what was personal to himself to be proposed by others, whom he might be free to support or disavow according to the reception which his proposal met from the public. It cannot be doubted that he now conceived the design of bringing a military force to support his pretensions in the city. Hitherto kingly power being odious at Rome, whoever had aspired to it had always perished in the attempt, and the mere imputation, however supported, was fatal. The most profligate party among the populace were unable or unwilling to support their demagogues to this extent; and the People in general became jealous of their most respectable citizens, when it appeared that merit itself approached to monarchical elevation. Marius, by the continued possession of the highest offices, and by the supreme command of armies, had acquired a species of sovereignty which he knew not how to resign. Cinna came into partnership with Marius, and wished to govern after his decease. Sylla, to avenge his own wrongs and those of his friends, to cut off a profligate faction, and restore the republic, took possession of the government. He led his army against usurpers, and had the power to become himself the most successful usurper, as he was put in possession of a sovereignty which he no doubt might have retained. So far he was a model to every ambitious adventurer, and pointed out the only means which could insure to a single person the sovereignty of Rome. Cataline, with his accomplices Lentulus and Cethegus, had vainly attempted to overturn the State, or to usurp its government, by means of a profligate party among the populace or citizens of desperate fortune<sup>56</sup>. Cæsar

<sup>56</sup> Speaking of the imaginary danger to a State of being overturned by the rabble; of the present age, that a city would be drowned by the overflowing of its own kennels. we might as much fear, said a witty writer



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was become head of the same party; but an army like that of Sylla, a convenient station, and the resources of a great province, were necessary to support the contest, and to carry it against his rivals, as well as against the republic itself, to a favourable issue.

The republic had taken many precautions to prevent the introduction of military power at Rome. Although the functions of State and of war were entrusted to the same persons, yet the civil and military characters, except in the case of a Dictator, were never united at once in the same person. The officer of State resigned his civil power before he became a soldier, and the soldier was obliged to lay aside his military ensigns and character before he could enter the city; and if he sued for a triumph in his military capacity, must remain without the walls till that suit was discussed. The command of armies and of provinces in the person of any officer was limited to a single year at a time, at the end of which, if it were not expressly prolonged, it was understood to expire, and to devolve on a successor named by the Senate.

That no leader of a party might have an army at hand to overawe the republic, no military station was supposed to exist within the limits of Italy. The purpose, however, of this precaution was in some measure frustrated by the near situation of a province in which an army was kept within the Alps. Italy was understood to extend only from the sea of Tarentum to the Arnus and the Rubicon: beyond these boundaries, on the northwest, all those extensive and rich tracts on both sides of the Apennines, and within the Alps, which now make the duchies of Ferrara, Bologna, Modena, Milan, the States of Piedmont and Venice, with the duchy of Carniola, and the whole of Lombardy, were considered, not as a part of Italy, but as a province termed the Cisalpine Gaul, and, like the other Roman provinces, was to be held by a military officer, supported by an army.

This

*Italy.**Arnus and Rubicon.**Cisalpine Gaul.*

This then was the most commodious station at which a political adventurer might unite the greatest advantages, that of having an army at his command, and that of being so near the capital as to be able, by surprise, to occupy the seats of government whenever his designs were ripe for such an attempt.

Sylla had an army devoted to his pleasure; but, having the seas of Asia and Ionia to pass in his way to Italy, could not, without giving an alarm from a great distance, and without putting his enemies on their guard, approach to the city. He therefore, when he had this object in his view, made no secret of his purpose.

Cæsar had formed a design on the commonwealth, and acted from his original disposition, and a deliberate intention to make himself master of it; not urged, like Sylla, by great provocations, and the suggestion of singular circumstances. He arranged his measures like the plan of a campaign, which he had the ability to digest, and the patience to execute with the greatest deliberation. He proposed to make himself master of an army at the gates of Rome, and to have the resources of a province contiguous to the capital. He secured the possession of these advantages by an unprecedented prolongation of the usual appointments for five years; so that the People themselves could not, without a breach of faith, recal their grant upon any sudden alarm of the improper use he might propose to make of their favours.

The Cisalpine Gaul, or that part of Italy which lay from the Rubicon to the Alps, was peculiarly suited to the purpose of Cæsar. But the distribution of the provinces was still within the prerogative of the Senate; and the provincial governments were filled by their appointment, in pursuance of an express regulation ascribed to Caius Gracchus, and known, from his name, by the title of the Sempronian Law<sup>54</sup>. Cæsar had ever been at variance with the greater part of.

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*Cæsars deliberate  
and sagacious am-  
bition.*

*Prolongation*

*Distribution of Pro-  
in the Senate.*

*Sempronian Law.*

<sup>54</sup> Lex Sempronia, Vid. b. ii. c. 3.

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the Senate. In the office of Prætor he had been suspended by their authority. In his present office of Consul he had set them at open defiance. He had no prospect of being able to obtain from them the choice he had made of a province; and the proposal to put him in possession of the Cisalpine Gaul for a term of years, joined to the preceding parts of his conduct, would have given a general alarm, and opened at once the whole extent of his design.

It was necessary, therefore, in order to obtain this object, to set aside the authority of the Senate, and to procure his nomination by some degree of surprize. The Tribune Vatinius accordingly, upon a rumour that the Helvetii, or the nations inhabiting from Mount Jura to the Alps, were likely to cause some commotion on the frontier of Gaul, moved the People to set aside the law of Sempronius, and, by virtue of their own supreme power, to name Cæsar as Proconsul of the Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum for five years, with an army of three legions. The senatorian party, as might have been expected, were greatly alarmed at this proposal. They vainly, however, hoped to evade it by substituting another appointment for Cæsar in place of this province. It was proposed to make him superintendant of the public forests throughout the empire; a charge which, though not, in our acceptation of the word, a province, was however, like every other public department in that empire, known by this name. This substitute for the government of the Cisalpine Gaul was thought to be the better chosen, that it neither implied nor required the command of an army, and was to withhold the engine of military power from a person so likely to abuse it. This weak attempt, however, against so able an adversary, only tended to expose the meaning of those by whom it was made, and by shewing to the Senate their own weakness, hurried them into concessions which perhaps might have been otherwise avoided. In order that Cæsar might not owe every thing to the People and nothing to them, they extended his command at once

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to both sides of the Alps. On the one side of these mountains he had a station from which to overawe the city: on the other, he had a great extent of territory, and a theatre of war on which he might form an army and inure them to service. The Senate, seeing he had already, by a vote of the People, obtained the first with an army of three legions for five years; and imagining that it was no longer of any use to oppose him; or hoping to occupy his attention, or to wear out the five years of his command in wars that might arise beyond the Alps, they joined to his province on the Po that of the Transalpine Gaul, with an additional legion. In this manner, whether from these or any similar reasons, it is affirmed by some of the historians<sup>55</sup>, that the Senate even outran the People in concessions to Cæsar; and to this occasion is referred the memorable saying of Cato: "Now you have taken to yourselves a king, and have placed him with his guards in your Citadel<sup>56</sup>."

Cæsar, at the same time, on the motion of the Tribune Vatinius, was empowered to settle a Roman colony on the Lake Larius at Novum Comum, with full authority to confer the privilege of Roman citizens on those he should settle in this place. Having obtained the great object of his Consulship, in his appointment for a term of years to the command of an army within the Alps, he no longer kept any measures with the Senate, nor allowed them any merit in the advantages he had gained. He was aware of their malice, he said, and had prevailed in every suit, not by their concession, but in direct opposition to their will. Though capable of great command of temper, and of the deepest dissimulation when in pursuit of his object, he appears, on this and other occasions to have had a vanity which he indulged, in braving the world when his end was obtained<sup>57</sup>. As he insulted the Senate when no longer depending on

<sup>55</sup> Sueton. in Jul. Cæsare, c. 22.

<sup>56</sup> Plutarch. in Catone. Dio. Cass. lib. xxxviii. Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

<sup>57</sup> Sueton. in Cæsare, lib. ii. c. 24.



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their concurrence for any of his objects, so he no longer disguised his connection with Pompey and Crassus, or the means by which, in his late measures, the concurrence of these rivals had been obtained.

As such combinations and cabals generally have an invidious aspect to those who are excluded from them, the Triumvirate, for so it began to be called in detestation and irony<sup>56</sup>, notwithstanding the popularity or influence enjoyed by those who had formed it, became an object of aversion and general abuse<sup>57</sup>. They were received at all public places with groans and expressions of hatred. An actor, performing on the public theatre, applied to Pompey a sentence of reproach, which occurred in the part he was acting. The application was received with peals of applause, and called for again and again<sup>58</sup>.

The edicts that were published by Bibulus in opposition to Cæsar were extolled, and received with avidity. The places of the streets at which they were posted up were so crowded with multitudes assembled to read them, that the ways were obstructed. Cæsar and Pompey endeavoured to lessen the effect of these edicts in speeches to the People, but were ill heard. Pompey lost his temper and his spirit, and sunk in his consideration as much as Cæsar advanced in power. It became manifest, even to the People, that Cæsar had procured their conjunction for his own conveniency<sup>59</sup>; but Pompey himself probably felt that he was too far advanced to recede.

<sup>56</sup> The titles of Duumvirs, Triumvirs, and so on, were the designations of legal commissions at Rome acting under public authority; such title was given to the private coalition of these adventurers in mere irony.

<sup>57</sup> Cicer. ad Att. lib. ii. ep. 16.

<sup>58</sup> "To our misfortune thou art great." He was called upon to repeat these words again and again innumerable times. "The

"time will come when thou shalt rue this State;" likewise repeated with peals of applause, &c. Cicero ad Att. lib. ii. epist. 19. Val. Max. lib. vi. c. 2.

<sup>59</sup> One of the sentences, so much applauded in its application to him at the theatre, was, "Eandem virtutem tempus veniet cum graviter gemes."

The Senate, and all the most respectable citizens of Rome, though unanimous in their detestation of the design that was formed by Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus, to dispose of the republic at their pleasure, yet either were, or believed themselves, unable to cope with the power of so many factions united. Cæsar, in order to hold by force what he gained by artifice, and by some degree of surprize, filled the streets with his retainers in arms, and showed, that, in case of any attempt to recal what had been so weakly given up to him, he was in condition to resist, and to lay the city in blood. If he were driven from Rome, he had provided within the Alps an army of two or three complete legions, with which he could maintain his province, or even recover his possession of the city. Every one censured, complained, and lamented; but there was little concert, and less vigour, even among the members of the Senate.

Cato, with his declared disapprobation of the late measures, was reduced to the single expedient of assisting Bibulus in drawing up the edicts or manifestos against the proceedings of Cæsar, which were, at this time, received with so much avidity by the People.

Cicero now declined taking part in any affair of State; but being known for an advocate, was courted in this capacity by many citizens, who had affairs in dependence before the courts of justice; and apprehending an attack which was likely to be made upon himself, on account of the transactions of his Consulship, he avoided, as much as possible, giving offence to any of the parties which divided the commonwealth. The storm was to be directed against him by Publius Clodius, under whose animosity to the government of the Nobles, and to Cicero in particular, it was perceived for some time to be gathering<sup>61</sup>.

This bustling profligate having, in the former year, in order that he might be qualified for Tribune of the People, got himself

<sup>61</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. ii. epist. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.

adopted into a Plebeian family, could not obtain the necessary ratification of the deed of adoption in the assembly of the Curia, until his cause was espoused by Cæsar, who seems to have taken his part, in resentment of some insinuations thrown out against himself by Cicero in pleading for M. Antonius, his late colleague in the Consulate. Antonius being, as has been mentioned, on account of his administration in Macedonia, accused of extortion, was defended by Cicero, who took that occasion to lament the state of the republic, brought under subjection as it was by a cabal which ruled by violence, and in contempt of the law. Cæsar was greatly provoked: "This person," he said, "takes the same liberty to vilify the reputation of others, that he takes to extol his own;" and upon those expressions, considered as a warning of the part which Cicero was likely to take in his absence, he determined not to leave him at the head of the Senatorian party to operate against him. His destruction might be effected merely by expediting the formality of Clodius's adoption into a Plebeian family, to qualify him for Tribune of the People<sup>62</sup>; and Cæsar, on the very day in which he received this provocation from Cicero, permitted the act of adoption to pass in the assembly of the Curia.

Pompey likewise concurred in executing this deed of adoption for Clodius, and assisted in the quality of Augur to carry it through the religious forms. Clodius, in the mean time, gave out, that he had no design on the Tribunate, but was soliciting an embassy to Tigranes king of Armenia. Cicero was so much blinded by this pretence, that he was merry in his letter to Atticus on the absurdity of Clodius, in having himself degraded into a Plebeian, merely to qualify him to appear at the court of Tigranes. He was merry likewise with his not being put on the commission of twenty for the execution of Cæsar's Agrarian Law. "Strange!" he said, "that he who was

<sup>62</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xxxviii. c. 10. &c. Plutarch. in Cicerone. Cicero pro domo sua, de Provinciis Consularibus, &c.

“once the only male creature in Cæsar’s house, cannot now find one  
 “place among twenty in this list of his friends<sup>63</sup>.”

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The more effectually to impose upon Cicero and his friends, Cæsar affected to believe, that the intention of Clodius was against himself, and taken up with the animosity of a person who had already attempted to dishonour his house<sup>64</sup>; and he pretended to dispute the validity of his adoption, and of consequence, his qualification to be elected a Tribune. Pompey joined in the same vile artifice. “Nay,” says Cicero, upon hearing of their pretended opposition to Clodius, “this is perfect tyranny. Only send the proper officers to me, and I will give my affidavit, that Pompey told me himself he had assisted as Augur in passing that decree<sup>65</sup>.”

With these transactions the year of Cæsar’s Consulship drew to a close. He ratified his treaty with Pompey, by giving him his daughter Julia in marriage. During the former part of the year, this lady had been promised to Servilius Cæpio, and had been of great use to her father, by securing the services of Cæpio against Bibulus. Servilius, on his disappointment, was pacified by the promise of Pompey’s daughter. Cæsar himself married the daughter of Calpurnius Piso, who, together with Gabinius, the creature of Pompey, was destined to succeed in the Consulship, and who was, by this alliance, secured in the interest of Cæsar. “Provinces, armies, and kingdoms,” said Cato on this occasion, “are made the dowries of women<sup>66</sup>, and the empire itself an appendage of female prostitution.”

In this situation of affairs, and among parties who dealt in impositions and artifices, as well as in open and daring measures, some particulars are recorded, which, to gain our belief, require some acquaintance with the manners of the times. Vettius, a citizen of some

<sup>63</sup> Cic. ad Att. lib. ii. epist. 7.

<sup>65</sup> Cic. ad Att. epist. 10. Vul. 12.

<sup>64</sup> In the intrigue with Cæsar’s wife.

<sup>66</sup> Plutarch. in Catone.

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note, who had been employed by Cicero in the time of his Consulship to gain intelligence of the Cataline conspiracy, now himself appeared as the author of a plot, of which the origin and the issue were matter of various conjecture. Knowing that Curio, a young man of high rank, and a declared enemy of Cæsar, was on bad terms likewise with Pompey, he told him in confidence, that he himself had determined to assassinate Pompey, and proposed to Curio to join with him in that design. The young man communicated the matter to his father, and the father to Pompey, who laid it before the Senate. Vettius being examined in the Senate, at first denied any intercourse with Curio, but afterwards confessed, that he had been drawn into a conspiracy with this young man, with Lucullus, Brutus, Bibulus, and some others, who had formed a design on Pompey's life.

It was strongly suspected, that Cæsar had employed Vettius to frame this imposture, in order that he might engage some of those persons in a criminal correspondence; and that it was intended, as soon as he had laid some foundation for an imputation of guilt against them, that he should, with a party of slaves, armed with daggers, put himself in the way of being taken; that he should at first deny the plot, but afterwards suffer himself to be forced, by degrees, to confess, and to declare his pretended accomplices; that this plan was disconcerted by the early intimation which Curio gave to his father, before all the circumstances intended to give it an air of probability were in readiness.

It was scarcely possible, however, that Cæsar should have committed his reputation to the hazard of detection in so infamous a project. He laid hold of it indeed with some avidity, and endeavoured to turn it against his opponents. After Vettius had been examined before the Senate, and was committed to prison for farther examination, Cæsar presented him to the People, and brought him into the rostra, to declare what he knew of this pretended bloody design. The  
prisoner

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prisoner repeated his confession, but varied in the account of his accomplices, particularly in leaving Brutus out of the list; a circumstance likewise, in the scandal of the times, imputed to the partiality of Cæsar, and considered as proof of his clandestine relation to this young man. Vettius was remanded to prison, and a process commenced against him on the statute of intended assassination. A trial must have probably disclosed the whole scene, and for this reason was said to have been prevented, by the sudden death of Vettius, who was supposed to have been strangled by order of Cæsar in prison<sup>67</sup>.

U. C. 695.  
L. Calpurnius Piso Cæsonianus,  
A. Gabinius  
Nepos.

By the influence of Pompey and Cæsar, Gabinius and Piso were elected Consuls; and, by their connivance, Clodius became Tribune of the People. The ascendant they had gained, however, was extremely disagreeable to many of the other officers of State, and even to some of the Tribunes. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and C. Memmius Gemellus joined in an accusation against Cæsar, late Consul, for proceedings in office contrary to law and religion. Cæsar, for some time, affected to join issue with him on these questions, and to submit his cause to judgment; but apprehending delay and trouble, without any advantage from such an inquiry, he pleaded his privilege as a person destined for public service; and accordingly, without staying to answer this charge, withdrew from the city, and continued to make his levies, and to assemble his army in the suburbs of Rome.

In this posture of affairs, one of the Quæstors, who had served under Cæsar in his Consulship, was convicted of some misdemeanor<sup>68</sup>; and the opposite party, as if they had of a sudden broke the chains in which they were held, commenced suits against all the tools that had been employed by him in his late violent measures. Gabinius had been charged with bribery by Caius Cato, then a young man.

<sup>67</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. ii. epist. 24. Sueton. in Cæfare, c. 20.

<sup>68</sup> Sueton. in Nerone, c. ii. & in Cæfare, c. 23.

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But the Prætor, whose lot it was to exercise the jurisdiction in such cases, being under the influence of Pompey, evaded the question. Caius Cato complained to the People, and, having said that Pompey usurped a Dictatorial power, narrowly escaped with his life<sup>69</sup>.

Vatinius was accused before the Prætor Memmius, who willingly received the accusation; but all proceedings were suddenly stopped by the interposition of Clodius in the capacity of Tribune; and the attention of the People and of the Senate soon came to be more intirely occupied with the designs of this factious adventurer.

The ruin of Cicero appears to have been the principal object which Clodius proposed to himself in entering on the office of Tribune; and this, though affecting to be of the popular party, he pursued chiefly from motives of personal animosity and resentment. Cicero had given evidence against him on his trial, and afterwards in the Senate made him the object of his wit and invective<sup>70</sup>. He is generally represented by Cicero as effeminate and profligate, void of discretion or prudence. On the present occasion, however, he seems to have managed with considerable steadiness and address. He acted evidently in concert with Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus; but probably had not from them any particular direction in what manner he was to proceed.

Ever since the summary proceedings which were employed against the accomplices of Cataline, the danger of this precedent was a favourite topic with the popular faction. Clodius professed that the object of his Tribunate was to provide a guard against this danger. He began with paying his court to different parties and different orders of men in the republic, by proposing acts favourable to each; and he stated his motion for the better securing of the People against arbitrary executions, which he meant in the end to apply to Cicero, as but one of many regulations intended by him for the benefit of the public, and which he joined with some acts of gratification to

<sup>69</sup> Cicero ad Quint. Frat. lib. i. epist. 2.

<sup>70</sup> Cicer. ad Att. lib. 1.

private persons. He gained the present Consuls by procuring them C H A P.  
V. lucrative appointments, at the expiration of their year in office; to Piso, Macedonia including Achaia; to Gabinius, Syria with a considerable addition beyond the usual bounds of the province<sup>71</sup>. He gained the indigent part of the People by an act to remit all the debts which were due for corn at the public granaries; and by ordering, for the future, the distributions from thence to be made gratuitously<sup>72</sup>. He, at the same time, procured another act extremely agreeable to many of the citizens, for restoring and increasing the number of corporations which had been abolished about nine years before, on account of the troubles to which they gave rise.

The meeting of corporate bodies, in a city so much addicted to faction and tumult, had been the cause of frequent disorders. As persons, affecting to govern the State, endeavoured to gain the People by indulging their passions for idleness and pleasure, with games, theatrical entertainments, combats of gladiators, and the baiting of wild beasts; so the head of every corporate body, though upon a smaller scale, had his feasts, his entertainments, and shews, forming his party of retainers, on occasion, to maintain his pretensions by force. The renewal, therefore, of such establishments, a measure which carried to every tradesman in his stall the feeling and consequence of a Crassus, a Pompey, and a Cæsar, affecting to govern the world in their respective ways, was greedily adopted by the lower People. And Clodius took the opportunity of the first popular meetings to awaken and to direct their zeal to his own purpose<sup>73</sup>. He even gained a considerable party in the Senate by affecting to circumscribe the discretionary power of the Censors over this body. Many of the members had reason to dread the Censorial animadversions, and were pleased with an act which he obtained to provide, that, for the future, no one could be struck off

<sup>71</sup> Plutarch. in Cicerone.

<sup>72</sup> Dio. lib. xxxviii. c. 13. Cicero in Pi-

<sup>73</sup> Padianus in Pisoniana. Dio. lib. xxxviii. Cicer. pro Domo sua.

sonem, c. 4. & Ascanius, ibid.



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the rolls of the Senate without a formal trial, and the concurrence of both the Censors<sup>74</sup>.

Joined to so many arts practised to reconcile different parties to the measures he affected to take for the security of the People's liberties, Clodius promulgated his law of provision against arbitrary executions, and gave it a retrospect which was undoubtedly meant to comprehend the summary proceedings which had been held against Cethegus and Lentulus in the Consulate of Cicero. While the subject was in dependence, he thought of two circumstances that might operate against him, and which he was therefore determined to prevent. One was, the practice of recurring to the celestial auspices by which the proceedings of the People were sometimes suspended; and the other was, the opposition which he might expect from Cato, who was likely to consider the cause of the Senate and the republic as involved in that of the magistrate, who had preserved the State by executing their decrees. To secure himself against the first, he procured an edict to prohibit all persons from observing the heavens while the People were deliberating on any affair of State; and to obviate the second, he thought of a pretence for a temporary removal of Cato from Rome.

In the preceding Consulate, Cato, though armed as he was solely with the reputation of integrity, unable to prevent the progress of a ruinous faction affecting popular measures, yet, by his unremitted opposition, he forced them, on occasion, to show what Pompey in particular was extremely desirous to conceal, that they prevailed by corruption and force, not by what they pretended, the free choice of their fellow-citizens. Clodius, foreseeing a like opposition, and possibly a disappointment in his design against Cicero, if Cato continued at Rome, devised a commission to employ him in foreign service. Ptolemy, king of Cyprus, had put a personal affront on Clodius, by refusing to pay his ransom when taken by pirates on the coast of Asia near to that island. He now took an opportunity to be revenged

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. See a summary of these acts. Cicero pro Sextio, from c. 15 to c. 28.

on him, by procuring an act to forfeit his kingdom and his treasure; and by making Cato the instrument of his revenge, he proposed to free himself at the same time from the interruption which this citizen was likely to give to his projects at Rome<sup>75</sup>.

At an interview with Cato, Clodius had the impudence to pretend great admiration of his virtue; told him, that the commission to reduce Cyprus into the form of a province was solicited by many; but that he knew of none who, by his faithfulness and integrity, was so well qualified for the trust as Cato, and that he meant to propose him to the People. "That," said Cato, "I know is a mere artifice; not an honour, but an indignity intended to me." "Nay," said Clodius, "if you do not go willingly, you shall go by force;" and on that very day moved and obtained his nomination from the People. Left the affair of Cyprus should not detain him a sufficient time, he was farther charged in his commission to repair to Byzantium to restore some exiles, and to quiet some troubles which had arisen at that place.

Cæsar and Pompey likewise concurred in procuring this commission to Cato, in order to remove a powerful support from the Prætors Memmius and Domitius, whose proposal to repeal all the acts of Cæsar was yet in dependence.

The storm was now prepared to fall upon the magistrate who had presided in the suppression of Cataline's party, and no man had any doubt of its direction. Cato, before he left Rome, seeing Cæsar in possession of the gates with an army, and ready, in the event of any tumult, under pretence of quieting disorders, to enter the city by force, and to seize on the government; and apprehending, that the cause in dependence, however just, was altogether desperate, earnestly exhorted Cicero, rather to yield and to withdraw from the city, than to bring matters to extremities in the present state of the republic.

<sup>75</sup> Cicero pro Sextio.<sup>76</sup> Plutarch. in Catone.

Cicero, however, was for some time undecided. Having secured the support of L. Ninius Quadratus, one of the Tribunes, he proposed to obstruct the proceedings of his enemy, and to give a negative to all his motions. Afterwards, upon assurances from Clodius, that the purpose of the act was altogether general, and had no special relation to himself; he was prevailed on not to divide the college of Tribunes, or to engage his friends in the invidious task of giving a negative to a law, that was intended merely to guard the People against arbitrary proceedings<sup>77</sup>.

Clodius, having obtained this advantage, no longer made any secret of his design against Cicero, and boasted of the concurrence of Cæsar and Pompey. In this neither of these professed friends of Cicero denied the imputation<sup>78</sup>; but excused themselves in private by pleading, that while their own acts of the preceding year were still questioned by the Prætor, it was necessary for them to keep terms with so violent a Tribune<sup>79</sup>; but Pompey, together with this apology for his present conduct, gave Cicero the strongest assurances of future protection. "This Tribune," he said, "shall kill me before he injure you." It is not credible that Pompey then meant to betray him; it was sufficiently base that, in the sequel, he did not keep his word. On the contrary, when his aid came to be most wanted by his injured friend, he retired to the country, under pretence of business; and being at his villa near Alba, where Lentulus, Lucullus, and many of the most respectable Senators repaired to him with the warmest intreaties in behalf of a person to whose eloquence and panegyric he owed so many of his honours, he coldly referred them to the ordinary officers of State for protection, saying, That as a private citizen he could not contend with a furious Tribune at the head of an armed People<sup>80</sup>.

<sup>77</sup> Dio. lib. xxxviii. c. 14.

<sup>78</sup> Cicero post Reditum in Senatum.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. pro Sextio, c. 17 & 18.

<sup>80</sup> Cicero in Pisonem.

In the mean time, the Consul Gabinius, though under the absolute direction of Pompey, promoted the attack against Cicero, and checked every attempt that was made in his favour. When the Equestrian order, together with numbers of the most respectable citizens from every quarter of Italy, crowded in mourning to Rome, and presented a memorial to the Senate in his behalf; and when the members proposed to take mourning, and to intercede with the People, Gabinius suddenly left the chair, broke up the meeting, went directly from thence to the assembly of the People, where he threw out injurious insinuations against the Senate, and mentioned the meetings which had been held by the Equestrian order, as riotous and seditious tumults; said, that the Knights ought to be cautious how they revived the memory of that part which they themselves had acted in the violent measures which were now coming under review, and which were so likely to meet with a just retribution from the People.

In this extremity Cicero attempted to see Pompey in person at his country-house; but while the suppliant was entering at one door, this treacherous friend withdrew at another<sup>80</sup>. No longer doubting that he was betrayed by a person on whom he had so fully relied, he began to be agitated by a variety of counsels and projects. He was invited by Cæsar to place himself in the station of lieutenant in his province of Gaul; and, in that public character abroad, to take refuge from the storm that was gathering against him in Italy. But this, from a person who had so much contributed to raise the storm, was supposed to proceed from a design to insult or betray him; or at best to reduce him to a state of dependence on himself. Being attended by a numerous body of citizens, chiefly of the Equestrian order, who had taken arms in his cause, he sometimes had thoughts

<sup>80</sup> Plutarch, in Cicerone.



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of defending himself by force ; at other times, he despaired of his fortunes, and, as appears from his letters, proposed to kill himself ; and was diverted from this intention only by the entreaties and anxious care of his friends.

Such was the state of affairs, when Clodius assembled the People to pass the act he had framed against arbitrary executions. He had summoned them to meet in the suburbs, that Cæsar, who on account of his military command was then excluded from the city, might be present. This artful politician being called upon among the first to deliver his opinion ; with an appearance of moderation, and unwillingness to bear hard on any person to whom the law might apply, referred the People to his former declarations ; said, that every one knew his mind on the subject of arbitrary executions ; that he approved the act which was now proposed, as far as it provided against such offences for the future ; but could not approve of its having a retrospect to any transaction already passed.

While Cæsar thus, in delivering his own opinion, affected to go no farther than consistency and a regard to his former conduct seemed to require, he permitted or directed his party to go every length with Clodius, and meant either to ruin Cicero, or force him to accept of protection on the terms that should be prescribed to him.

When the general law had passed, there was yet no mention of Cicero ; and his enemies might have still found it a difficult matter to carry the application to him ; but he himself, in the anguish of his mind, anticipated the accusation, went forth in mourning to the streets, and implored mercy of every citizen with an aspect of dejection, which probably did not encourage any party to espouse his cause. He was frequently met in this condition, and insulted by Clodius, who walked in the streets, attended by an armed rabble ; and he determined at last to abandon the city. Being escorted by a company of his friends, he passed through the gates in the middle of  
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the night on the first of April, took the road of Lucania, and intended to have made his retreat into Sicily, where the memory of his administration in the capacity of Quæstor, and the continued effects of his patronage at Rome, were likely to procure him a favourable reception<sup>21</sup>. But Clodius, immediately upon his departure, having carried a special attainder, by which, in the language of such acts, he was interdicted the use of fire and water; and by which every person within five hundred miles of Italy was forbid, under severe penalties, to harbour him; Virgilius, the Prætor of Sicily, though his friend, declined to receive him. He turned from thence to Brundisium, passed into Macedonia, and would have fixed his residence at Athens; but apprehending that this place was within the distance prescribed to him by the act of banishment, he went to Thessalonica in his way to Cyzicum. Here he had letters, that gave him intimation of some change in his favour, entertained some prospect of being speedily recalled, and accordingly determined to wait the issue of these hopes.

We have better means of knowing the frailties of Cicero, than perhaps is safe for the reputation of any one labouring under the ordinary defects of human nature. He was open and undisguised to his friends, and has left an extensive correspondence behind him. Expressions of vanity in some passages of his life, of pusillanimity in others, escape him with uncommon facility. Being at least of a querulous and impatient temper, he gives it full scope in his exile, perhaps not more from weakness, than from design to excite his friends to redouble their efforts to have him restored. He knew the value of fortitude as a topic of praise, and might have aspired to it; but would it not, he may have questioned, encourage his party to sleep over his wrongs? In any other view, his complaints resemble more the wailings of an

<sup>21</sup> Vid. *Agionem in Verrem*.

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infant, or the strains of a tragedy composed to draw tears, than the language of a man supporting the cause of integrity in the midst of undeserved trouble. "I wish I may see the day," he writes to Atticus, "in which I shall be disposed to thank you for having prevailed upon me not to lay violent hands on myself; for it is certainly now matter of bitter regret to me that I yielded to you in that matter<sup>82</sup>."

In answer to the same friend who had chid him for want of fortitude, "What species of evil," he says, "do I not endure? Did ever any person fall from so high a state? in so good a cause? with such abilities and knowledge? with so much public esteem? with the support of such a respectable order of citizens? Can I remember what I was, and not feel what I am? Stript of so many honours, cut off in the career of so much glory, deprived of such a fortune, tore from the arms of such children, debarred the view of such a brother, dearer to me than I was to myself, yet now debarred from my presence, that I may spare him what he must suffer from such a sight, and myself what I must feel in being the cause of so much misery to him. I could say more of a load of evils which is too heavy for me to bear; but I am stopped by my tears<sup>83</sup>."

From the whole of this correspondence of Cicero in his exile, we may collect to what degree the unjust reproaches which he had suffered, the desertion of those on whom he relied for support, the dangers to which he left his family exposed, affected his mind. The consciousness of his integrity, even his vanity forsook him; and his fine genius, no longer employed in the Forum or in the Senate, or busied in the literary studies which amused him afterwards<sup>84</sup> in a more calamitous time of the republic, now, by exaggerating the dif-

<sup>82</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iii. epist. 3.

<sup>84</sup> See the Book of Tusculan Questions.

<sup>83</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iii. epist. 10.

treasures of his fortunes, preyed upon himself. It appeared from this, and many other scenes of his life, that although he loved virtuous actions, yet his virtue was accompanied with so insatiable a thirst of the praise to which it intitled him, that his mind was unable to sustain itself without this foreign assistance; and when the praise which was due to his Consulship was changed into obloquy and scorn, he seems to have lost the sense of good or of evil in his own conduct or character; and at Thessalonica, where he fixed the scene of his exile, sunk or rose in his own esteem, as he seemed to be valued or neglected at Rome<sup>u</sup>.

<sup>u</sup> Vid. Cicero ad Att. lib. iii.



## C H A P. VI.

*Cæsar takes Possession of his Province.—Migration of the Helvetii.—Their Defeat.—War with Ariovistus.—Return of Cæsar for the Winter into Italy.—Great Concourſe of Citizens to his Quarters.—Motion to recal Cicero.—Diſorders that followed upon it.—Conſultations of Pompey and Cæſar.—Augmentation of the Army in Gaul.—Second Campaign of Cæſar.—Operations on the Aifue.—On the Meufe and Sambre.—Battle with the Nervii.—Successful Attempt for the Reſtoration of Cicero.—Controverſy relating to his Houſe.—Repeated Riots of Clodius.—Trial of Milo.*

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WHILE the tranſaction which terminated in the exile of Cicero was ſtill in dependance, Cæſar, although, by aſſuming the military character, he had diſqualified himſelf to take any part in civil affairs, had actually gone from the city and embodied his legions, yet he ſtill remained in the ſuburbs of Rome to obſerve the iſſue of that buſineſs, and to direct the conduct of his party. He thought himſelf too much intereſted in the event to leave it intirely under the direction of Pompey, with whom his own connection was precarious, and might be of ſhort duration. He was inclined to ruin, if he could, not gain, a perſon whoſe talents and character made him of ſo much conſequence to the parties who contended for power in the State. Having failed in his attempt to gain him as a dependant, and to carry him as part of his own retinue into Gaul, he ſecretly promoted the deſigns of Clodius, and employed his own retainers and friends againſt him, until he ſaw the purpoſe accompliſhed.

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The provinces of which Cæsar had obtained the command, comprehended, as has been observed, under the denomination of the two Gauls, considerable territories on both sides of the Alps. The Cisalpine Gaul, which was joined to Italy, extended to Lucca, not far from Pisa on one side of the Apennines, and to the Rubicon, not far from Ariminum on the other. Beyond the Alps, the whole territory from the Mediterranean to the Rhine and the Meuse, was known by the name of Gaul. A part of this tract, which was bounded by the Rhône, the mountains of Auvergne, the Garonne, and the Pyrenees, was already a Roman province, including, together with Languedoc and Dauphiné, what, from its early subjection to the Romans, is still named Provence.

The remainder of the country was divided into three principal parts, occupied by the Aquitani, the Celtes, and the Belgæ, nations differing in language, establishments, and customs. The first division extended from the Pyrenees to the Garonne; the second from the Garonne to the Seine; and the third from thence to the Meuse and the Scheld.

In each of these tracts there was a multiplicity of separate cantons and independent communities, of which Cæsar had occasion to enumerate no less than four hundred. Even the smallest of these communities, by his account, was broken into parties and factions, who had separate objects, and were engaged in opposition to each other. The People, in general, were held in a state of dependance by two separate orders of men, whose condition and character may account for the manifold divisions and animosities that took place in their country. One order was ecclesiastical, composed of the Druids, who, by their profession, had the keeping of such mysteries, and the performance of such rites as were then in use; and, having over their fellow-citizens the claim to a hierarchy, had, among themselves, in

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the various pretensions to preferment and rank in their own order, continual subjects of competition, jealousy, and quarrels.

The other order was intirely military, and consisted of persons whose principal distinction arose from the number of their armed adherents; and who, therefore, vied with each other in the multitude of their retainers, or in the force of their parties<sup>1</sup>.

The country, we learn, in general, was interspersed with what are called towns, and what were, in reality, safe retreats, or places of strength. It abounded in corn and cattle, the resources of a numerous people; armies were collected, and political assemblies were stately, or occasionally called: but how the people were accommodated, or in what degree they were supplied with the ordinary productions of mechanic or commercial arts, is no where described.

In these particulars however, as they were probably less skilful than the Italians, so they surpassed the Germans, to whom they yielded in the reputation of valour; and they were now in reality on the eve of becoming a prey to the rapacity and ferocity of the one, or to the ambition, refined policy, and superior arts of the other.

Among parties, who were already so numerous, and likely to be divided indefinitely by family or personal jealousies, Cæsar was about to find the occasions, which he undoubtedly sought for, of raising his reputation in war, of enriching himself and his dependants, and of forming an army inured to service, and attached to himself. While he was yet in Italy, he had intimation of a wonderful project formed by the Helvetii, natives of the tract which extends from the Jura to the Alps, and of the vallies which divide those mountains, to quit their own country in order to exchange it for a better settlement, in a less inclement region, on the lower and more fertile plains of Gaul.

<sup>1</sup> Cæsar de Bell. Gall. lib. vi. c. 10—20.

They had taken, for this purpose, an exact account of their own numbers in every canton, and mustered no less than three hundred and fifty-eight thousand souls, of whom ninety-two thousand were warriors, or men fit to bear arms. To put this multitude in motion, a great apparatus of provisions, of horses, and of carriages was necessary; and they allotted two years for the necessary preparations. This time was now elapsed, and the swarm began to dislodge on the twenty-fifth of March of the year in which Cæsar was to take possession of his province. On receiving the alarm, he set out from Italy, and with hasty journies arrived at Geneva, where, to prevent surprise, he broke down the bridge of the Rhône, and took other measures to preclude the access of strangers to his province.

In the mean time the Helvetians sent a pacific message, desiring, that they might be allowed to pass the Rhône, and giving assurances that they would abstain from every sort of hostility on their march through the Roman province. Cæsar, in order to gain time, affected to take their request into consideration, promised to give them an answer by the middle of April; and in this manner amused them, while he assembled the legion, that was dispersed in different parts of the province, and ordered new levies to be made with the greatest dispatch. At the same time, he fortified the banks of the river, from the Lake of Geneva, to the narrow pass<sup>a</sup> at which the Rhône enters between the Jura and the Vuache, and from thence running under cliffs and steep mountains, renders the access from Helvetia to Gaul either impracticable or easily obstructed.

Being thus prepared for his defence, he, on the return of the Helvetian deputies, gave them for answer, That the Romans never allowed strangers to pass through their country; and that if any attempt were made on his province, he should repel it by force. Upon receiving this answer, the Helvetians, though too late, endeavoured

<sup>a</sup> Fort l'Ecluse.



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to effect the passage of the Rhône, and made repeated attacks, either where the river was fordable, or where it admitted the use of rafts or of boats, but were repulsed in every attempt, and were at last obliged to turn to the right, where, by the consent of the Sequani, their neighbours in that part of the country, they passed over the Jura into Gaul.

Cæsar, probably not more alarmed for the safety of his province, than desirous to render it a scene of action, determined to observe the migrations of this enemy, and to seize the occasion they furnished him of forming his troops to service. For this purpose he himself, in person, repassed the Alps, and without any regard to the limitations of his commission, which restricted his military establishment to three legions, ordered additional levies, and with the forces assembled near Aquileia, returned to his northern province. In this march he met with opposition from the inhabitants of the mountains, who endeavoured to obstruct his way: but he had traversed the country of the Allobroges, and passed the Rhône above its confluence with the Soane\*, when he had intelligence that the Helvetii, having cleared the passes of Jura, and marched through the country of the Sequani, were arrived on the Soane; and although they had hitherto, agreeably to their stipulations with the natives, abstained from hostilities, that they threatened the nations inhabiting beyond this river with fire and sword.

Upon application made to him for protection from the natives inhabiting between the Soane and the Loire, this willing auxiliary continued his march; and being informed, that of the Helvetii, who had moved in four divisions (this being the number of their cantons), the three first had already passed the Soane; and that the fourth division being to follow, yet remained on the nearer bank of the river, he marched in the night with three legions, surprised

\* Then the Arar.

this rear-division; and, having put many of them to the sword, forced the remainder to take refuge in the neighbouring woods.

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As soon as the main body of Cæsar's army arrived on the Soane, he constructed a bridge, and passed that river in his way to the enemy. The Helvetians, sensible of their loss in the late action, and alarmed at the rapidity of his motions, he having executed in one day the passage of a river which had detained them above ninety days, sent a deputation to treat with the Roman Proconsul, and to obtain, if possible, his permission to execute their project of a new settlement on amicable terms. They offered, in case they were allowed to sit down in quiet, to leave the choice of the place to himself; bidding him remember, at the same time, that "the arms of the Helvetii had, on former occasions, been felt by the Romans. That the recent fate of a single canton taken by surprise ought not to flatter him too much: that the Helvetians had learned from their fathers to rely more on valour than on artifice or on negociation; but that they did not wish to have their present migration signalized with any massacres, nor their new settlement stained with Roman blood."

To this message, Cæsar replied, "That he could recollect to have heard of insults which had been offered to the Romans by their nation, and to which they now probably alluded: that he likewise had more recent provocations which he knew how to resent: nevertheless, if they meant to comply with his demand, to repair the injuries they had done to the Allobroges<sup>3</sup> and to the Edui<sup>4</sup>, and to give hostages for their future behaviour, that he was willing to grant them peace."

Upon this reply the Helvetian deputies withdrew, saying, That it was the practice of their countrymen to receive, not to give hostages; and both armies moved on the following day: the Helvetians, in

<sup>3</sup> Inhabitants of what is now the territory of Geneva, and part of Savoy.

<sup>4</sup> Occupying the country between the Soane and the Loire.

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search of some quarter where they might settle without interruption; and Cæsar, to observe their motions, and to restrain them from plundering the country of his allies. Both continued on the same route during fifteen days, with no more than an interval of five or six miles between the front of one army and the rear of the other.

On this march Cæsar's cavalry, having rashly engaged themselves on unfavourable ground, received a check; and he himself, being obliged to follow the course of the Soane, by which he received his provisions, was likely to lose sight of the enemy, when he had intelligence, that they had taken post at the foot of a hill, about eight miles in his front, and seemed to have formed a resolution to receive him, in that position, if he should chuse to attack them. Having examined the ground on which they were posted, and observing, that the height in their rear was not by nature inaccessible, nor sufficiently secured against him, he dispatched Labienus in the night at the head of two legions, with orders to possess himself of the eminence, and to fall down from thence on the enemy's rear whenever he saw them attacked by himself in front. Labienus accordingly got possession of the hill, and Cæsar advanced towards the foot of it to occupy the attention of the enemy, and to attack them in front. But the purpose of this disposition was frustrated by the misinformation of an officer of horse, who, being advanced before the army, reported, that the enemy still appeared on the height, and that Labienus probably had failed in his attempt to seize it. Cæsar, disconcerted by this information, made a halt, in which he lost so much time as to give the enemy an opportunity to decamp, and to retire in safety. He nevertheless continued his pursuit for one day longer, and at night encamped about three miles in their rear. But being obliged, on the following day, to alter his route in order to receive a supply of provisions, the enemy believed that he was retreating, and began to pursue in their turn. He halted on a rising ground to receive them,

placed his new levies with the baggage on the higher ground, and the choice of his army on the declivity towards the plain. Here the enemy advancing to attack him, after an obstinate engagement which lasted from one in the afternoon till night, were defeated with the slaughter of about two hundred thousand of their people; and the remainder, amounting to no more than one hundred and thirty thousand souls, reduced to despair by the sense of their losses, and the want of subsistence, surrendered at discretion. Cæsar ordered them back into their own country, charging the Allobroges to find them subsistence, until they should be able to provide for themselves. The Boii however, a part of this unfortunate migration, were received by the Edui, who, to gain this accession of people, allotted part of their own lands to accommodate these strangers<sup>5</sup>.

At the end of this first operation of Cæsar, while great part of the summer yet remained, another service on which to employ his army soon presented itself. The nations who inhabited the banks of the Soane and the Loire, being sensible of the deliverance they had received from a storm, which, by the uncertainty of its direction, alarmed every quarter of Gaul, sent deputies to congratulate the Roman general on his late victory, and to propose that they might hold, under his protection, a general convention of all their states. The object of their meeting, as it soon appeared, was to obtain some relief from the common oppression they underwent from the tyranny of Ariovistus, a German chief, who, when the Gauls were at war among themselves, had been invited as an auxiliary to one of the parties, and had obtained the victory for his allies; but took for the reward of his services possession of one third of their territory, which he bestowed on his own people, and assumed for himself the sovereignty of the whole. His force was daily augmented by the

<sup>5</sup> Cæf. de Bell. Gal. lib. i. c. 23, 29.



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continual arrival of more emigrants from Germany; so that, from fifteen thousand men, with whom the Chief had arrived, his followers had multiplied to an hundred and twenty thousand. To accommodate this numerous people, he had recently made a demand of another third of the territory of the Sequani, and was extending his possessions from the neighbourhood of the Rhine to the Soane. Most of the nations on this tract had been obliged to submit to a contribution levied by these strangers, and to give hostages for the regular payment of it.

The unfortunate nations, who, by trusting to the protection of a barbarous prince, had exposed themselves to this calamity, now applied for relief to another power, whose pretensions in the end were likely to be equally dangerous to their freedom. Sensible of the hazard to which they exposed their hostages by entering into any open concert against the Germans, they made their application to Cæsar in secret, and found him sufficiently willing to embrace every opportunity of rendering his province a theatre of action to his army, and of renown to himself. He sent without delay a message to Ariovistus, desiring to have a conference with him on affairs that concerned the general interests of Gaul. This haughty chieftain replied with disdain, "That if the Roman general meant to have an interview with him, his place of residence was known; that he neither could trust himself in the quarters of Cæsar, without an army, nor would be at the expence of assembling one, merely for the satisfaction of a conference with him."

Cæsar renewed the message with an express requisition that the hostages of the Edui should be restored; that Ariovistus should abstain from hostilities against this People, or against any other ally of the Romans; and that he should not suffer any more of his countrymen to pass the Rhine.

To this message Ariovistus replied, That he had conquered the possessions which he held in Gaul, and that he knew of no power who had a right to direct him in the use of his conquests; that whoever attacked him should do so at his peril; and that Cæsar, if he thought proper, might try the spirit of his people; they were ready to receive him, and had not for fourteen years slept under any cover.

Cæsar, not to seem backward in accepting this challenge, and in compliance with a maxim which he often observed with success, *That his blows should anticipate his threats, and outrun the expectations of his enemy*, advanced upon the Germans before they could think him in condition to act against them. For this purpose, without communicating his design to any person of his own army, he repassed the Soane, and ascended by the course of the Douze to Vesontio, now Besançon, a place of strength, which he understood Ariovistus meant to seize, as the principal resort of his forces.

Here, for the first time, his intention of making war on the Germans began to be suspected in his own army; and the legions, taking their account of the strength and ferocity of that enemy from the report of the Gaulish auxiliaries, were greatly alarmed. Many citizens of distinction who had crowded to the standard of Cæsar, as to a place of victory and honour, now, under various pretences, applied for leave to retire. Their example spread a kind of panic in the army, and both officers and men muttered their resolution not to obey, if they should be ordered upon what they were pleased to consider as a service so unreasonable and wild.

Cæsar, being thus called upon to exert that undaunted courage and masterly eloquence by which he was distinguished on many occasions, assembled all the officers of his army, and reprimanded them for attempting to penetrate the designs of their general, or for pretending to question the propriety of his motions. The matter in dispute with Ariovistus, he said, might be terminated in an

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amicable manner. This chieftain had very lately made advances of friendship to the Romans, had been favourably received, and there was no reason to believe that he would now wantonly provoke their resentment. “ But if he should, of whom are you afraid? Of a  
 “ wretched remnant of the Cimbri or Teutones, already vanquished  
 “ by Marius? Of a people confessedly inferior to the Helvetians,  
 “ whom you have subdued? But some of you, I am told, in or-  
 “ der to disguise your own fears under the affectation of wisdom,  
 “ talk of difficulties in the ways by which you are to pass, and of  
 “ the want of provisions which you are likely to suffer. I am not  
 “ now to learn from such persons as you what I owe to my trust,  
 “ nor to be told that an army must be supplied with provisions.  
 “ But our allies are ready to supply us in greater quantities than we  
 “ can consume, and the very country we are to pass is covered with  
 “ ripe corn. As for the roads, you shall speedily see and judge of  
 “ them. I am little affected with what I hear of a design to aban-  
 “ don me in case I persist in this expedition. Such insults, I know,  
 “ have been offered to commanders, who, by their avarice or by their  
 “ miscarriages, had forfeited the regard or the confidence of their  
 “ troops; what will happen to me a little time will discover. I  
 “ meant to have made a longer halt at this place, but shall not defer  
 “ giving you an opportunity to show, whether regard to your duty, or  
 “ the fear of a supposed enemy, is to have the greatest effect on your  
 “ minds. I mean to-morrow, at two in the morning, to decamp,  
 “ and shall proceed, if no other part of the army follows me, with  
 “ the tenth legion alone.”

This speech had a very sudden effect. The tenth legion, having been formerly distinguished by their general, felt this expression of confidence as an additional motive to deserve it, and sent a deputation of their officers to return their thanks. The whole army soon vied in excuses for their late misbehaviour, and in assurances of their  
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resolution to support their general in any service on which he might be pleased to employ them. He accordingly decamped at the hour appointed; and making a circuit of forty miles, to avoid some difficulties which lay on the direct road, after a continual march of seven days, in which he was conducted by Divitiacus, a native of Gaul, he arrived within twenty-four miles of the German quarters.

Upon this unexpected arrival, Ariovistus, in his turn, thought proper to desire a conference with Cæsar. He proposed that they should meet on horseback, and be attended only by cavalry. In this part of his army, which was composed chiefly of Gaulish horse, Cæsar was weak. But, not to decline the proposal that was made to him, he mounted his supposed favourite legion on the horses of the Gauls, and with this escort came to the place appointed for the conference.

It was an eminence in the midst of a spacious plain, about half-way between the two armies. The leaders, each attended by ten of his officers, met at the top of the hill. Their escorts drew up at the distance of two hundred yards on each side.

Cæsar began the conference, by reminding Ariovistus of the honours recently bestowed upon him by the Roman Senate, who ordered him the usual presents, and gave him the title of king. "The Edui," he said, "were the allies of the Roman People; they had formed this connection in the height of their prosperity, and when they were supposed to be at the head of the Gaulish nations; that it was not the custom of the Romans to let nations suffer by their alliance, but to render it in every instance, to the party who embraced it, a source of prosperity and honour. He therefore renewed his former requisition, that Ariovistus should not make war on the Edui, or on any nation in alliance with Rome; that he should remit their tribute, and release their hostages; and, if he could not send back into their own country such of the Germans

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“ as were already on this side of the Rhine, that he should at least prevent the arrival of any more from that quarter.”

In answer to these propositions, Ariovistus replied, That he had been invited into Gaul by the natives of this country; that he had done them services, and had exacted no more than a just reward; that, in the late quarrel betwixt them and himself, the Gauls had been the aggressors, and had suffered no more than the usual consequences of a defeat; that to indemnify him for his losses, they had subjected themselves to a tribute, and had given hostages for the regular payment of it. “ Am not I too,” he said, “ by your own account, in alliance with the Romans? Why should that alliance, which is a safeguard and an honour to every one else, be a loss and a misfortune to me? Must I alone, to preserve this alliance, resign the advantage of treaties, and remit the payments that are due to me? No; let me rather be considered as an enemy than as an ally upon these conditions. My countrymen have passed the Rhine, not to oppress the Gauls, but to defend their leader. If strangers are to be admitted here, the Germans, as the first occupiers, have a right prior to that of the Romans. But we have each of us our province. What do Roman armies on my territory? I disturb no possession of yours. Must I account to you likewise for the use which I make of my own?”

To this pointed reply Ariovistus subjoined a reflection, which showed that he was not unacquainted with the state of parties at Rome. “ I know,” he said, “ that the Romans are not interested in this quarrel, and that, by cutting you off, I should perform an acceptable service to many of your countrymen. But I shall take no part in your internal divisions. Leave me; make war where you please; I shall not interpose in any matter which does not concern myself.”

Cæsar

Cæsar continued to plead the engagements which the Romans had contracted with many of the nations who now claimed their protection. "If conquest could give any right to possession," he said, "we are the first conquerors. We have long since subdued the Arverni; but it is not our practice to enslave every nation we vanquish, much less to forsake those we have once patronized." While he yet spoke the German horse had advanced, and even began to throw darts, which made it expedient for Cæsar to break up the conference. He accordingly withdrew, giving strict orders to his people not to return the insults of the enemy.

In a few days after this conference, the German chieftain proposed another personal interview, or, if that were declined, desired that some person of confidence should be sent with whom he might treat. Being gratified in the second part of this alternative, but intending no more by this request than a mere feint to lull the enemy into some degree of security, he pretended to take offence at the quality of the persons who were sent to him, ordered them into custody, and on the same day put his army in motion upon a real design, which showed that, barbarian as he was, he understood the plan, as well as the execution, of military operations. Observing that the Romans derived their subsistence from the country behind them, he made a movement, by which he passed their camp, took a strong post about eleven miles in their rear, and by this means intercepted their ordinary supply of provisions.

Cæsar for many days successively endeavoured, by forming on the plain between the two armies, to provoke the enemy to a battle; but having failed in this purpose, he was obliged to divide his army, and to place it in separate posts, which he fortified, in order to recover a communication with the country behind him. He learned that the Germans had borne with great impatience the defiance he had given them; but that they were restrained from fighting by the predictions of

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of their women, who foretold that their own people would be defeated, if they should hazard a battle before the change of the moon.

The Germans, notwithstanding the awe in which they stood of this prediction, endeavoured to dislodge one of the divisions of Cæsar's army, and, having failed in that attempt, were afterwards attacked by the Romans in their camp, and defeated with great slaughter. Ariovistus himself, with the remains of his followers, fled to the Rhine, about fifty miles from the field of battle, passed that river in a small canoe; numbers of his people perished in attempting to follow him, and the greater part of those who remained were overtaken, and put to the sword by Cæsar's cavalry.

In this manner Cæsar concluded his first campaign in Gaul. And laid the foundation of his future conquests in that country, by stating himself as the protector of its native inhabitants against the Helvetii and the Germans, two powerful invaders who were likely to subdue it. He placed his army for the winter among the nations whom he had thus taken under his protection, and set out for Italy, under pretence of attending to the affairs of his province on that side of the Alps; but more probably to be near to Rome, where he had many political interests at stake, friends to support, and enemies to oppose, in their canvass for the offices of State. His head quarters were fixed at Lucca, the nearest part of his province to Rome; and that place began to be frequented by numbers who were already of his party, or who desired to be admitted into it, and with whom he had previously made his own terms in stipulating the returns they were to make for the several preferments in which he undertook to assist them.

At the election of Consuls for this year, P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther was joined with Q. Cæcilius Metellus Nepos, of whom the latter had, in the capacity of Tribune, distinguished himself as an instrument of the most dangerous factions. Lentulus had lately at-  
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attached himself intirely to Pompey, and, by the influence of this patron, probably now prevailed in his election. He had been Edile in the Consulate of Cicero, and had taken a vigorous part in those very measures for which Cicero was now suffering in exile <sup>6</sup>. He was likely to favour the restoration of that injured citizen, and upon this account was now the more acceptable to Pompey, who, having an open rupture with Clodius, was disposed to mortify him by espousing the cause of his enemies.

Clodius, soon after his late victory over Cicero, greatly rose in his presumption, and, forgetting that he had prevailed more by the connivance of Pompey and Cæsar, and by the support of their friends, than by any influence of his own, ventured to set Pompey himself at defiance, to question the validity of his acts in the late settlement of Asia, to set the young Tigranes, still the prisoner of Pompey, at liberty <sup>7</sup>, and proposed to restore him again to his kingdom. In the debates which arose on these measures in the assembly of the People, Pompey had the mortification to find that the sarcasms of Clodius were received by the audience in general with applause, as well as by the partizans of the Senate, in particular, with marks of satisfaction. Chiefly governed by vanity and impatient of obloquy, he absented himself from the public assemblies during the remainder of Clodius' term in office, and was ready to embrace every measure by which he might be revenged of that factious Tribune, or regain his own credit with the more respectable class of the citizens <sup>8</sup>.

Encouraged by this division among their enemies, the majority of the Senate, who justly considered the cause of Cicero as their own, had ventured, on the twenty-ninth of October, while Clodius was yet in office, to move for his recal. Eight of the Tribunes concurred

<sup>6</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iii. ep. 22.

<sup>7</sup> Vid. Aſcon. Padian. in Orat. pro Milone.

<sup>8</sup> Plutarch. in Vit. Cicer. p. 475 & 476.



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in urging this motion, and it was rejected only in consequence of the negative of Ælius Ligur, one of the college whom Clodius had prepared to act this part, and whom he was ready to support by force, if the opposite party should persist in their motion<sup>9</sup>.

Upon the election of the new Consuls and Tribunes for the following year, better hopes of success were entertained by the friends of Cicero. Lentulus declared that the restoration of this exile should be the first object of his administration; and that he would not fail to move it on the day that he entered on office. Metellus too, the brother-in-law of Clodius, though always inclined to favour the popular faction, could not in this matter set himself in opposition to Pompey, and declared his intention to concur with the Consul<sup>10</sup>. Milo, Sextius, and six more of the Tribunes, with all the Prætors except Appius Claudius, the brother of Publius, declared their intention to take an active part in forwarding this measure.

Encouraged by these appearances, Cicero left his retreat at Thessalonica, and arrived at Dirrachium, before the twenty-fifth of November, to be at hand to consult with his friends on the steps that were to be previously taken. Mean time the Consuls-elect had their provinces assigned. Lentulus was destined to command in Cilicia and Cyprus, and Metellus in the farther province of Spain. Both were amply gratified in every article of their appointments, in order to confirm them in the interest of the Senate: but Cicero expressed great anxiety lest these concessions should be found premature; and, being made before the new Tribunes entered on office, or could have their voice in these destinations, was afraid lest it might alienate their affections from his party, and render them less zealous to move for his recall.

The Consul Lentulus, notwithstanding, kept his word; and, on the first of January, the day of his entering on office, moved the Senate

U. C. 696.  
P. Corn. Lentulus Spinther, Q. Cæcil. Metell. Nepos.

<sup>9</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iii. ep. 23.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. ep. 24.

to resolve that Cicero should be immediately recalled from banishment; that all persons opposing his return should be declared enemies to their country; and that if the People should be disturbed by violence in passing this decree, it should, nevertheless, be lawful for the exile to avail himself of it".

This motion was received in the Senate with general applause. Eight of the Tribunes were zealous in support of it. On the contrary, two members of the college, Numerius and Serranus, were gained by Clodius to oppose it. Serranus, however, could venture no farther at this meeting than to plead for a delay. But he was prevailed upon, during the intervening night, to interpose his negative, and the motion accordingly could proceed no farther in the Senate.

It was resolved, notwithstanding, to propose a law to the People for Cicero's restoration; and a day was fixed for this purpose. Early in the morning of that day Fabricius, one of the Tribunes in the interest of the exile, endeavoured to occupy the place of assembly with an armed force, but found that Clodius, with a numerous troop of gladiators, was there before him. A conflict ensued, in which Fabricius, together with Cispus, another of the Tribunes who came to his assistance, with all the party of the Senate, were driven from the Forum.

Clodius, at the head of his gladiators, with swords already stained in blood, pursued his victory through the streets. The temple of the Nymphs, in which were kept some public records which he wished to destroy, was set on fire<sup>21</sup>; the houses of Milo and Cæcilius the Prætor were attacked. "The streets, the common sewers, the river," says Cicero, "were filled with dead bodies, and all the pavements were stained with blood." No such scene had been

<sup>21</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iii. ep. 26. & in Orat. post reditum.

<sup>22</sup> Cicero pro Milone, 27 Parad. 4 d. Haruspicum Responso 27.

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acted since the times of Octavius and Cinna, when armies fought in the city for the dominion of empire<sup>14</sup>.

Quintus Cicero escaped by hiding himself under the dead bodies of his own servants, who were slain in defending his house. The Tribune Publius Sextius actually fell into the hands of his enemies, received many wounds, and was left for dead among the slain. This circumstance, however, alarmed the party of Clodius not less than it alarmed his opponents. The odium of having murdered, or even violated the person of a Tribune, was likely to ruin their interest with the People; and they proposed to balance this outrage by putting to death Numerius, another Tribune, who, being of their own side, should appear to be killed by the opposite party; but the intended victim of this ridiculous and sanguinary artifice, receiving information of their design, avoided being made the tool of a party at the expence of his life, and made his escape<sup>15</sup>.

After so strange a disorder, parties for some months, mutually afraid of each other, abstained from violence. The Tribune Milo commenced a prosecution against Clodius for his crimes; but it was for some time eluded by the authority of Appius Claudius, brother of the accused, who was now in the office of Prætor; and the courts, when actually called, were repeatedly dispersed by the armed party of gladiators, with which Publius Clodius himself infested every public place. It was vain to oppose him without being prepared to employ a similar force, and Milo accordingly had recourse to this method. He purchased a troop of gladiators, and of Bestiarii, or baiters of wild beasts, the remainder of those who had been employed by the Ediles Pomponius and Cosconius, and who were now in the market for sale. He ordered the bargain to be secretly struck, concealing the name of the buyer, lest the opposite party, suspecting the design, should interpose to prevent him.

<sup>14</sup> Orat. pro Sext. c. 35, 36, 39.

<sup>15</sup> Cicero pro Sextio.

So provided, Milo ventured to encounter with Clodius. Their parties frequently engaged in the streets, and the populace, fond of such shews, enjoyed the spectacle which was presented to them in every corner of the city <sup>16</sup>. C H A P.  
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While the disorders which thus arose from the disputes relating to Cicero's restoration were daily augmenting, he himself fell from the height of his hopes to his former pitch of dejection and sorrow. The attempt which had been made in his favour might have succeeded, if Pompey had been fully prepared to concur in it. But all the measures of the Triumvirate being concerted at the quarters of Cæsar, Pompey was obliged, after declaring his own inclinations on the subject, to consult his associate, and found him by no means inclined to restore a citizen who was likely to be of so much consequence, and who was to owe the favour of his restoration to any other than himself. The Tribune Sextius, before the late dissolution, had made a journey into Gaul, to obtain the consent of Cæsar to this measure, but could not prevail; and it is probable that this artful politician was unwilling to restore an exile who was likely to ascribe the principal merit of that service to Pompey, and, by his own inclinations in favour the Senate, to become an accession to a party which Cæsar wished to degrade and to weaken by every means in his power. It was to strengthen himself against the Senate that Cæsar made his coalition with Pompey and Crassus; and from animosity to this body, he wished to crush every person of consequence to their party, and to favour the pretensions of every ambitious citizen who ventured to act in open defiance of their government.

Pompey, in the mean time, though committing himself as a tool into the hands of Cæsar, was flattered with the appearance of sovereignty which he enjoyed in the city, and willingly supported

<sup>16</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 2.



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Cæsar in every measure that seemed to fix his attention abroad, contented to the repeated augmentations of the army in Gaul, and approved of every enterprize in which their leader was pleased to employ them.

In this year, which was the second of Cæsar's command, two more additional legions were by his orders levied in Italy; and, under pretence of an approaching war with the Belgæ, a nation consisting of many cantons in the northern extremities of Gaul, this reinforcement was made to pass the Alps to the northward in the spring. As soon as the forage was up, he himself followed in person, took the field, and, in the usual spirit of his conduct, endeavoured, by the rapidity of his motions, to frustrate or to prevent the designs of his enemies.

His force now consisted of eight Roman legions, besides numerous bodies of horse and foot from different cantons in Gaul, archers from Crete and Numidia, and slingers from the Balearian islands; so that it is likely the whole may have amounted to about sixty thousand men. The greater part of his army had wintered on the Soane<sup>17</sup> and the Doufe<sup>18</sup>, as protectors, not as masters, of the country, being received only in the character of allies. Cæsar having now taken numbers of their people into his army as auxiliaries or as hostages, and having spent twelve days in preparing for his march, took his route to the northward, under pretence of carrying the war into the enemy's country, or of preventing them from gaining, to their supposed confederacy against the Romans, any of the nations in the southern parts of Gaul.

His way lay through the high, though level, countries, now termed Burgundy and Champagne, in which the Soane, the Moselle, the Meuse, and the Seine, with so many other considerable rivers

<sup>17</sup> Antiently named the Arar.

<sup>18</sup> The Dubis.

that run in different directions, have their source. After a march of fifteen days, he arrived in the Canton of the Remi<sup>19</sup>, where he found a people, though of the Belgic extraction, disposed to receive him as a friend, and to place themselves under his protection.

From this people he had a confirmation of his former intelligence relating to the designs of the Belgic nations, and an account of the forces which they had already assembled. From the track of country that is watered by the rivers, which are now called the Oise, the Scheld, and the Meuse, he understood that no less than three hundred and fifty thousand men could be mustered, and were actually assembled, or preparing to assemble, against him. To prevent the junction of this formidable power, or to distract part of its force, he detached his Gaulish auxiliaries to make a diversion on the Oise<sup>20</sup>, while he himself advanced to the Aisne<sup>21</sup>, passed this river, and fortified a station on its northern bank. Having a bridge in his rear, he left six cohorts properly intrenched before it, to secure his communication with the country behind him.

While he remained in this post, the Belgæ advanced with a great army, attacked Bibrax, a place of strength about eight miles in his front; and having spent many hours in endeavouring to reduce it, were about to renew their assault on the following day. But Cæsar having in the night thrown into the garrison a considerable reinforcement of archers and slingers, the appearance of this additional strength on the battlements induced the enemy to desist.

They nevertheless continued to advance, laid waste the country, and came within two miles of his camp. They had a front, as appeared from their fires, extending about eight miles.

Cæsar, considering the numbers and reputation of this enemy, thought proper to proceed with caution. He observed them for

<sup>19</sup> Now the district of Rheims.

<sup>20</sup> Jafara and Axona.

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some days from his entrenchments, and made several trials of their skill in partial encounters before he ventured to offer them battle. But being encouraged by the event of these trials, he chose a piece of sloping ground that lay before his camp, and was fit to receive his army. As the enemies front was likely to extend farther than his, he threw up intrenchments on the right and left to cover his flanks; and with this security, to prevent his being surrounded, drew forth his army. The Belgæ too were formed on their part; but the ground between the two armies being marshy, neither thought proper to pass that impediment in presence of the other; and after a few skirmishes of the horse and irregular troops, the Romans re-entered their camp. The enemy, upon this event, disappointed in their expectations of a battle, took their way to the fords of the Aisne<sup>21</sup>, in order to pass the river, and get possession of the bridge in the rear of the Romans. Cæsar had intelligence of this movement from the officer who was stationed to guard that post; and marching instantly with all the cavalry, archers, and slingers of the army, he arrived in time to overtake them, while yet entangled in the fords, and obliged them to retire.

The Belgæ, having made these successive attempts with much impetuosity, but without proper foresight, soon appeared to be ill qualified to maintain a permanent war with such an enemy. They were disheartened by their disappointments, and alarmed by the rumour of a diversion which Cæsar had caused to be made in a part of their own country. They had exhausted their provisions, and found themselves under a necessity to break up their camp. It was therefore resolved in their general council, that their forces, for the present, should separate; and if any of their cantons should be afterwards attacked by Cæsar, that the whole should assemble again for their common defence.

<sup>21</sup> Axona.

With this resolution they decamped in the night, but with so much noise and disorder that Cæsar suspected a feint, or an intention to draw him into a snare. He therefore remained in his lines till the morning, when it appeared that they were actually gone, and were seen at a distance on the plain moving in the greatest disorder, and as in a total rout, striving who should soonest get beyond the reach of their enemies. He pursued them with his cavalry so long as it was day, and, though with great bravery resisted in his attacks on their rear, made considerable havock. At the approach of night he discontinued the pursuit, and withdrew again to the camp he left in the morning. On the following day he moved with his whole army, and, that the enemy might not have time to re-assemble their forces, determined to penetrate into the heart of their country. In the beginning of his march he followed the course of the Aisne, and in his way reduced the Sueffones and Bellovaci, two cantons that lay on the right and the left, near the confluence of this river with the Oyse. From thence, being himself to march to the northward, to visit the banks of the Sambre and the Meuse, he detached the young Crassus, with a considerable force, towards the sea coasts, to occupy those cantons which now form the provinces of Normandy and Brittany.

Part of the country through which the Meuse and the Sambre passed, now forming the dutchy of Hainault, was then occupied by the Nervii, one of the fiercest of the Belgic nations, who, having heard with indignation of the surrender of the Bellovaci and Sueffones, their neighbours, prepared for resistance, sent such of their people as, by their sex or age, were unfit to carry arms into a place of security, assembled all their warriors, and summoned their allies to a place of general resort. They took post on the Sambre, where the heights on both sides of the river being covered with woods, enabled them to conceal their numbers and their dispositions. They



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had intelligence that Cæsar, except in presence of an enemy, usually moved his legions with intervals between them, which were occupied by their baggage; and they made a disposition to surprise him on the march, and under this disadvantage. For this purpose they chose their ground on the Sambre, and agreed that the van of the Roman army should be suffered to pass unmolested, but that the appearance of the first column of baggage should be the signal for a general attack to be made at once from all the different stations in which their parties were posted.

Cæsar, in the mean time, about three days after he had marched from Samarobriva, now supposed to be Amiens, being apprised that he was come within ten miles of the river, on the banks of which the enemy was posted, altered the form of his march, placed six legions, clear of incumbrance, in the van of his army, next to these the whole of his baggage, and in the rear the two legions that were last levied in Italy. When he entered the open grounds on the Sambre, a few parties of horse appeared, but were soon driven into the woods by his cavalry. The legions that came first to their ground began, as usual, to intrench, and received no disturbance till the column of baggage came in sight. At this signal multitudes of the enemy presented themselves on every side, drove in the cavalry that were posted to cover the working parties, and in many places were close in with the main body of the army before the infantry had time to uncover their shields, or to put on their helmets. The Roman soldier, nevertheless, ran to his colours, and, without waiting for the orders of his general, from whose abilities, on this occasion, he could derive no advantage, endeavoured to join his companions in the order to which they were accustomed.

The event of this tumultuary action was various in different places. The Nervii, in one part of the action, forced the imperfect works of the Roman camp; but in another part of it were themselves forced

forced from their ground, and driven in great numbers into the river. Some of the Roman legions were broken, lost the greater part of their officers, and when Cæsar arrived to rally them, were huddled together in confusion. He was reduced to act the part of a mere legionary foldier, and, with a shield which he took from one of his men, joined in the battle, and in this manner, by his presence and by his example, kept the enemy at bay, until he was relieved by the arrival of two legions of the rear-guard, and of two others, that were sent by Labienus to support him.

This seasonable relief, where the Romans were most distressed, changed the fortune of the day; and the confusion, which in the beginning of the action had been turned to so good account by the Nervii, now became fatal to themselves. The greater part of them fell in heaps on the ground where they first began the attack. The few who attempted to fly were met at every opening of the woods by parties of the enemy, by whom they were forced into the thickets or put to the sword; and as they fell in the end with little resistance, many became a prey to the followers of the legions, who put themselves in arms and bore a part in the massacre. Of four hundred chiefs only three escaped; and of an army of sixty thousand men, no more than five hundred left the field of battle. The piteous remains of this nation, consisting of superannuated men, of women, and of children, sent, from the marshes in which they had been concealed, a message to implore the victor's mercy; but it does not appear in what manner he disposed of them.

Another enemy yet remained in the field. The Attuatici, descendants of the Cimbri and Teutones, the late terrors of Gaul, of Spain, and of Italy, being settled below the confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, had been on their march to join the Nervii, when they heard of this unfortunate action; and then withdrew to their own country. Being pursued by Cæsar, they shut themselves up in their principal fortresses.

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Here they made a voluntary submission; and being commanded to lay down their arms, threw such a quantity of weapons from the battlements, as almost filled up the ditch to the height of the ramparts. But Cæsar, having delayed taking possession of the place till the following day, the besieged, whether they only meant to deceive him, or repented of their surrender, took arms again in the night, and in a sally endeavoured to surprise the Roman army. But four thousand of them being killed in this desperate attempt, and the remainder being forced into the town, were, in consequence of their former breach of faith, to the amount of fifty thousand persons, sold for slaves.

Thus Cæsar having, in the second year of his command, penetrated to the Meuse and the Scheld, and being master of the eastern frontier of Gaul as far as the Rhine, and even from beyond that river having received some offers of submission; being master too of several Cantons in Normandy and Bretanny, which had submitted to the young Crassus, placed his army for the winter in the midst of these conquests, and himself, as at the end of the former campaign, set out for Italy and the neighbourhood of Rome.

Here the principal point which he left in contest between the parties, relating to the restoration of Cicero, had been for some time determined. Clodius had found a proper antagonist in Milo, and, as often as he himself, or any of his party, appeared in the assemblies of the People, or in the streets, was every where attacked with his own weapons.

Every one agreed, that if the laws could not give protection to the citizens who were most willing to be governed by them, they should not by their formalities screen the disorderly and profligate in the practice of every species of crime.

Clodius had now for some months lain under an impeachment from Milo, and had declared himself candidate for the office of *Ædile*,  
endeavouring

endeavouring by violence, and by the artifices of his brother, to put off the trial till after the elections, when, if he should be vested with any public character, he might be able to screen himself under the privilege of his office. His own credit, however, and the fear which citizens entertained of his armed banditti, who were now in a great measure restrained by Milo, had abated so much, that the party of the Senate determined to make another vigorous effort for the restoration of their exiled member.

This business was accordingly again moved in the Senate; and about the beginning of June a decree was passed in the fullest terms for the restoration of Cicero. The Consul was charged with the farther conduct of this measure as of the utmost consequence to the commonwealth. This officer accordingly issued a proclamation, in terms employed only on the greatest occasions, requiring all who had the safety of the republic at heart to support him in the execution of this decree. There was, in consequence of this proclamation, a great concourse of citizens from all parts of Italy. The enemies of the measure shrunk and withdrew their opposition. The act passed in the assembly of the People on the fourth of August. Cicero had been so confident of this event, that he on the same day sailed from Dyrrachium, and on the following arrived at Brundisium. On the eighth day, being still at this place, he had intimation of the act being passed, set out for Rome, and continued his journey through multitudes of people, who were assembled on the roads to testify their joy upon his return: he entered the city on the fourth of September.

Next day he addressed the Senate in a harangue, which is still extant, composed of lavish panegyric or vehement invective, corresponding to the demerit or merit of parties in his late disgrace and restoration. The multitudes that were assembled on this occasion, their impatience to see him, their acclamations and wonderful unanimity,



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raised him once more to his former pitch of glory, and appeared to repay all the services he had rendered to the public, and to compensate all the sorrows of his late disgrace. The whole matter was, to persons of reflection, an evidence of that weakness with which this ingenious man suffered himself to be affected by popular opinion, and of the levity with which multitudes run into different extremes.

During these transactions Cæsar was at a great distance, in the northern extremities of Gaul, engaged with fierce and numerous enemies, and involved in difficulties, concerning which there were various reports, and of which the issue, with respect to himself and his army, was supposed to be uncertain. In these circumstances, however willing Pompey may have been to persevere in the measures concerted with Cæsar, it is probable that he found himself unable to resist the force of the Senate, which was now exerted to obtain the restoration of a person who had taken so distinguished a part in their measures.

It is possible likewise, that in these circumstances Pompey may have taken upon him to act independently of Cæsar, though he afterwards, in trying to gain Cicero to the party of the triumvirate, affected to give Cæsar equal merit with himself in procuring his recall, and he appealed to Quintus, the brother of Marcus Cicero, for the truth of this assertion<sup>22</sup>. Cicero himself, however, was not disposed to give Cæsar any credit upon this account; and, though both Cæsar and Crassus, after the matter was decided, affected to concur in it, yet he does not seem to have believed them sincere. He imputes to Cæsar an active part in the injury he had received, but none in the reparation that was done to him<sup>23</sup>.

Pompey, not the less jealous of Cæsar for their pretended union, and sensible of the advantage he had gained in a military command of

<sup>22</sup> Cicero ad Familiares. lib. i. ep. 9.

<sup>23</sup> Orat. in Senat. post Reditum, c. 15.

so long a duration at the gates of Rome, now wished to propose for himself some appointment of equal importance. The moment of cordiality in the Senate on their recovering a favourite member, and the first emotions of gratitude in the breast of Cicero, whom he had obliged, appeared to form a conjuncture favourable for such a proposition; and he laid, with his usual address and appearance of unconcern, the plan of a motion to be made for this purpose.

The importation of corn into Italy had lately miscarried, and a great scarcity and dearth had followed. The populace being riotous upon this complaint, had in the theatre attacked with menaces and violence numbers of the wealthy citizens who were present, and even insulted the Senate itself in the Capitol. A report industriously raised by the enemies of Cicero was propagated, to make it be believed that the distress arose from his engrossing for some time the attention of the State; and it was represented, in opposition to this clamour, that the late corn act of Clodius, and the misconduct of one of his relations, intrusted by him with the care of the public granaries, was the cause of this distress. It was insinuated by the adherents of Pompey, that no man was fit to relieve the People besides himself; that the business should be committed to him alone; and Cicero was called upon, as he entered the Senate, to make a motion to this purpose, as bound to procure some relief to the People, in return to their late cordiality in his cause.

Cicero had probably owed his recal to the declarations of Pompey in his favour; and, however little reason he had to rely on his friendship, it was convenient to appear on good terms with him. He suffered himself, therefore, to be carried by the stream that seemed to run in favour of this fashionable leader. As if the necessity of the case had suggested the measure, he moved the Senate that a commission, with proconsular power over all the provinces, should be granted.

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granted to Pompey to superintend the supplies of corn for the city. The Senate, either of themselves disposed to grant this request, or won by the eloquence of their newly recovered member, instructed the Consuls to frame a resolution to this purpose, and carry it to the assembly of the People for their assent.

Here C. Messius, one of the Tribunes, proposed to enlarge the commission, and to comprehend the superintendency of the revenue, with an allotment of fleets and armies suited to the extent of this unprecedented trust. Pompey, observing that this additional clause was ill received, denied his having any share in proposing it, and affected to prefer the appointment intended for him in terms of the act which had been proposed to be drawn up by the Consuls. His partizans, however, still pleaded for the extension of the commission as proposed by Messius, but in vain. The extravagance of the proposal gave a general alarm, not only to the Senate, but even to the party of Cæsar, who wished to employ Pompey against the Senate; but not to arm him with a military force, or to give him in reality that sovereignty of which he so much affected the appearances.

The extraordinary commission, now actually granted to Pompey, although it was exorbitant in respect to the influence it gave him over all the producers, venders, buyers, and consumers of corn throughout the whole empire; yet, as it did not bestow the command of an army, fell short of the consequences which Cæsar principally dreaded in his rival; and though probably the cause of some jealousy, did not produce any immediate breach between them.

Pompey, being intitled by this commission to appoint fifteen lieutenants, put Cicero at the head of the list; and this place was accepted of by him, on this express condition, that it should not prevent his standing for the office of Censor, in case an election took place on the following year<sup>24</sup>. He was now in the way of recovering his

<sup>24</sup> Cicero Orat. in Senat. post Redit. c. 13. ad Att.

consideration

consideration and his dignity, but was likely to meet with more difficulty in respect to his property, which Clodius had taken care to have forfeited, having even demolished his house, and consecrated the ground to pious uses. This last circumstance had placed a bar in his way, which could not be removed without a formal decree of the pontiffs.

The college met on the last of September to hear parties in this cause. A violent invective having been pronounced by Clodius against his antagonist, Cicero replied in that oration, which is still extant among his works on the subject of his house<sup>25</sup>. The question was, Whether the ground on which Cicero's house had formerly stood, being formally consecrated, could be again restored to a profane or common use? The Pontiffs appear to have been unwilling to give any explicit decision. They gave a conditional judgment, declaring, that the consecration of Cicero's ground was void, unless it should be found that this act had been properly authorised by the People. Both parties interpreted this judgment in their own favour; and the Senate was to determine, whether, in the act of consecration, the consent of the People had been properly obtained.

The Senate being met on the first of October, and all the parties who were members of it being present, Lucullus, in the name of the Pontiffs, his colleagues, reported, That they had been unanimous in their judgment to revoke the act of consecration, unless it should be found, that the magistrate, who had performed that ceremony, had been properly authorised by the People; but that this was a question of law now before the Senate. A debate ensued, in which Lentulus Marcellinus, Consul-elect for the following year, gave his opinion against the legality of the consecration: he was followed by numbers, and the judgment of the Senate was likely to be on that side.

<sup>25</sup> Pro Domo sua.



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Clodius, to put off the question, spoke for three hours, and would have prevented the Senate's coming to any resolution, if the members, becoming impatient, had not silenced him by their interruptions and clamours. A resolution being moved for in the terms that had been proposed by Marcellinus: the Tribune Serranus, who had formerly suspended the decree for the recal of Cicero, now again interposed with his negative. The Senate, nevertheless, proceeded to engross the decree, in which it was resolved, that the ground on which Cicero's house had formerly stood, should be again restored to him in property; that no magistrate should presume to contest the authority of the Senate in this matter; and if any interruption were given in the execution of this decree, that the Tribune, who now interposed with his negative, should be accountable for the consequences. Serranus was alarmed. His relation, Cornicinus, to give him the appearance of greater importance, and an opportunity to recede with dignity, laid himself on the ground at his feet, and besought him, by his intreaties, to say, that he would not insist for the present on the negative he had given; but he begged the delay of a night to consider of the matter. The Senate, recollecting the use which he formerly made of such a delay on the first of January, was disposed to refuse it, when, upon the interposition of Cicero himself, it was granted; and he having thought proper to withdraw his negative intirely, the act accordingly passed on the second of October. Cicero was allowed two millions Roman money<sup>26</sup> to rebuild his house in town; five hundred thousand<sup>27</sup> to rebuild his villa at Tusculum, and two hundred and fifty thousand<sup>28</sup> to rebuild that at Formiæ. The first sum he seems to have considered as adequate to his loss, but complains of the other two<sup>29</sup>. He proceeded, without delay, to take possession of his ground, and to employ workmen in

<sup>26</sup> About 16,145 l. 16 s. 8 d.

<sup>27</sup> About 4,036 l. 5 s.

<sup>28</sup> About 2,018 l. 4 s. 6 d.

<sup>29</sup> Ad Atticum, lib. iv. epist. 2.

rebuilding

rebuilding his house. He had made some progress, when Clodius, on the the third of November, came with an armed force, dispersed the workmen, and attacked the house of Quintus Cicero that was adjoining, set it on fire, and kept a guard of his retainers in the streets till it was burnt to the ground.

By this act of violence, Clodius had rendered his cause, in the criminal prosecution which still hung over him, in a great measure desperate. His safety required the actual destruction of his enemies, and he had no scruple to restrain him from the most violent extremes. He accordingly attacked Cicero as he passed in the streets on the eleventh of November, attended by a company of his friends, forced them into a walled court, where they with difficulty defended themselves. Clodius, in this attack, had frequently exposed his own person, and might have been killed; but Cicero was now become too cautious for so bold a measure. "I have put my affairs," he writes to Atticus, "under a gentle regimen; and, in all the cures I am to apply for the future, have renounced the use of the surgeon's knife."

Clodius, upon this occasion, being disappointed of his design upon Cicero's life, came into the streets on the following day, which was the twelfth of November, with a number of slaves provided with lighted torches, and escorted by a party armed in form with shields and swords. They made directly for a house belonging to Milo, with intention to set it on fire; took possession of that of P. Sylla, in its neighbourhood, as a fortress in which to defend themselves, and to keep off all assistance, till the house they were to set on fire should be burnt to the ground.

While they were about to execute this purpose, a number of Milo's servants, led by one Flaccus, sallied forth against the incendiaries, killed several of the most forward, put the rest to flight, and would not have spared Clodius himself, if he had not availed himself of the

retreat, which, in entering on this design, he had prepared for his party.

On the following day, Sylla made his appearance in the Senate, in order to exculpate himself; but Clodius still remained shut up in his own house. It appears scarcely credible, that a state could subsist under such extreme disorders; yet the author of them had been long under prosecution for crimes of the same nature; and it was still a question, whether the charge against him should be heard, or whether he should not be allowed to take refuge in one of the offices of State, to which he was sure of being named by the People, provided the elections were allowed to precede his trial.

Marcellinus, the intended Consul of next year, moved the Senate to hasten the prosecution, and to join the late disorders committed by the criminal to the former articles of the charge which lay against him. But Metellus Nepos, one of the present Consuls, and the relation of Clodius, having formerly found means to put off the trial, was now determined to prevent it altogether, by hastening the election of *Ædiles*, in which Clodius was candidate. He endeavoured to prevent any immediate determination of the Senate by prolonging the debate. But the majority of the members were greatly exasperated, and resolved, that the trial of Clodius for these repeated acts of violence and outrage should precede the elections. The Consul Metellus, notwithstanding, was determined to give him a chance to have refuge from this prosecution in the public office to which he aspired, and would have brought on the elections on the nineteenth of November, if he had not been prevented by Milo, who, in the middle of the preceding night, had, with an armed force, occupied the place of assembly, and was prepared to observe the heavens, and to announce some of the celestial presages of unfavourable events, in case other methods to suspend the elections should not have prevailed.

Metellus, and the two brothers, Appius the Prætor, and Publius Clodius, being apprised of this intention, and of the power with which it was supported, did not make their appearance in the field, and Milo kept his station till noon, when he withdrew with the general applause of the Senate, and of the more orderly citizens.

The meeting, or assembly of the People, being adjourned to next day, Metellus, in order to lull the vigilance of Milo, assured him, that there was no occasion to occupy posts in the dead of the night; that he meant to do nothing before it was day; that if any one meant to suspend the election, he should, in the morning, be found in the market-place, and there submit to the forms which any one was legally intitled to plead against his proceeding. Milo, accordingly, at break of day, repaired to the market-place, where he expected to be joined by the Consul; but soon afterwards was told, that Metellus had deceived him, was hastening to the field of Mars, where the elections were commonly held, and would instantly begin to call the votes, when it would be too late to interpose even under the pretence of religion. Upon this information, he immediately pursued and overtook him before the election began; and, by declaring his intention to observe the heavens, once more frustrated the designs of the faction.

On the twenty-first, the People could not assemble by reason of the public market; and their meeting being called for the twenty-third, Milo again took possession of the field with an armed force; and Cicero, who concludes a letter to Atticus with describing this state of affairs, made no doubt of Milo's success<sup>30</sup>. What passed on this day is uncertain; but it is known, that Clodius at last prevailed; that, being elected Ædile, he was, by the privilege of his office, screened from the prosecution that was intended against him; and being him-

<sup>30</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. epist. 3.



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Lentulus  
Marcellinus,  
L. Marc. Phil-  
ippus.

self safe, did not fail, upon the expiration of Milo's Tribunate, to retort the charge upon his prosecutor; and accordingly brought him to trial on the second of February, for acts of violence and breach of the peace.

Pompey, as well as Cicero, appeared in defence of Milo; and they succeeded in having him acquitted, while they incurred a torrent of reproach and invective on the part of the prosecutor. The market-place was crowded with the partizans and retainers of Clodius: he had instructed them to reply to his interrogations, and to direct all their abuse on Pompey. "Who starves the People for want of corn? Pompey. Who wants to be sent to Alexandria? Pompey." This farce greatly disturbed the concerted dignity of this politician. His principal object was consideration; and he could not endure contempt. He was on bad terms with the Senate; and they listened to the invective of his personal enemies with apparent satisfaction. He complained to Cicero that the People were alienated from him; that the Nobility were his enemies; that the Senate was adverse, and the youth in general ill disposed to him<sup>34</sup>. He had indeed submitted to become the agent of Cæsar at Rome; and, with the friends of the republic, incurred the odium of their joint measures, while the other was rising every day in military reputation, and was forming an army almost at the gates of Rome, with which he held every party in the republic in awe. Pompey, on this occasion, really did, or affected to believe, that a design was formed against his own life; he assembled a numerous party of his retainers from the country, and absented himself, during some time, from the Senate and from the assemblies of the People.

<sup>34</sup> Cicero, ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. epist. 3.

## C H A P. VII.

*Return of Cato from Cyprus.—His Repulse at the Election of Prætors.—Arrival of Ptolomy Auletes at Rome.—Visit of Pompey and Crassus to Cæsar's Quarters at Lucca.—Renewal of their Association.—Military Operations in Cæsar's Province.—Violent Election of Crassus and Pompey.—Provinces.—Of Crassus in Syria.—Of Pompey in Spain for five Years.—Crassus departs for Syria.*

THE particulars we have related in the last chapter have led us on to the middle of February, in the Consulate of Lentulus Marcellinus and L. Marcius Philippus. The first was attached to the forms of the republic, and was a strenuous partizan of the Senate. His election was probably a continuation of the victory which this party had obtained in the restoration of Cicero. Philippus was now nearly related to Cæsar, having married his niece, the widow of Octavius; and possibly owed his preferment in part to that connection. He was, by this alliance, become the step-father of young Octavius, now a boy of ten years of age, brought up by his mother in the house of her second husband. This appears to have been a man of great moderation, no way qualified to be a party in the designs or usurpations of the family with which he was now connected.

Some time before these Consuls entered on office, in the end of the preceding year, Marcus Cato arrived from having executed his commission to Byzantium and Cyprus. The business upon which he had been sent to the first of these places, was to restore some exiles who had been driven from their country in the violence of faction.

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At the second he was to seize the treasure and the other effects of Ptolomy, and to reduce his kingdom to the form of a Roman province. This measure, by all accounts, was unjust, and the office highly disagreeable to Cato; but he was determined to perform it with the punctuality and respect due to all the orders of the State. While he himself went to Byzantium, he sent forward Canidius to Cyprus, to intimate the commands of the Roman People, and to exhort the king to submission. Upon his return to Rhodes, in his way to Cyprus, he had intelligence, that this prince, unable to bear the ruin of his fortunes, had, in despair, killed himself. His treasure was seized, and his effects sold: the whole yielded to the treasury about seven thousand talents of silver. Upon the approach of Cato to Rome, the magistrates, the Senate, and multitudes of the People went forth to receive him. The Senate thought proper in this manner to distinguish their friends, and to favour them with some marks of consideration, in order to balance, if possible, the public honours that were frequently lavished on their enemies. For the same purpose likewise they resolved to insert the name of Cato among the Prætors of this year; but this honour he himself rejected as unprecedented and illegal. The year following, however, when he stood candidate for this office in the ordinary form, he was rejected; and Vatinius, the well-known tool of Cæsar, who had been employed by him in all measures that were too mean for himself to acknowledge, was chosen<sup>1</sup>.

Cæsar, as has been observed on different occasions, had a serious antipathy to Cato, considered him as a determined and resolute opponent; and accordingly employed all his influence to exclude him from the offices of State, and probably had a particular pleasure in procuring him a repulse, by the preference of so mean an antagonist

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch. in Vit. Catonis, & Cicero in Vatinius.

as Vatinius, who had the present majority of votes against him. But, in mentioning this event, Valerius Maximus is pleased to reverse the form of expression, usual in speaking of disappointed candidates, saying, "That the list of Prætors for this year had not the honour of Cato's name <sup>a</sup>."

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Cato, in the execution of his late commission, had taken exact inventories of all the effects sold at Cyprus; but his books being lost, or burnt in a vessel that took fire on the voyage, Clodius frequently threatened him with a prosecution to account for the sums he had received; and in this he was seriously instigated by Cæsar, who, from his winter quarters at Lucca, watched all the proceedings at Rome.

From this station, the Proconsul of Gaul, although he could not attend in person, sent his agents to the city, took part in every transaction of moment that related to his adherents or to his enemies. It appeared to be his maxim, that no man should be his friend or his enemy without feeling the suitable effects. Memmius, who had been Prætor with Domitius Ahenobarbus, and who had joined his colleague in the prosecution that was commenced against Cæsar at the expiration of his Consulship, having since been Prætor of Bithynia, and accused of misconduct in his province, was attacked by him in a memorial which he drew up to be employed in support of the charge. Memmius, in defending himself, recriminated, and spared no kind of invective; and in the issue of this matter had the good fortune to escape from the resentment of his enemy.

The power of Cæsar, aided by his influence in so important a station, was daily increasing; and as he spared no pains to crush those whom he despaired of gaining, so he declined no artifice to gain every one else. All the spoils of his province were distributed in gratuities at Rome. He knew the state of every man's family, and where he could not reach the master, paid his court to the

<sup>a</sup> Val. Max. lib. vii. c. 5.



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mistress, or to the favourite slave. While in his winter quarters at Lucca, many Senators resorted from Rome to pay their court, of these no less than two hundred were said to have been present at one time; and so many of them in public characters, that the Licitors, who paraded at the entrance of his quarters with the badges of office, amounted to one hundred and twenty<sup>3</sup>.

During this winter, a question relating to the restoration of Ptolemy Auletes to the throne of Egypt, gave rise to warm debates in the Senate. This prince had been dethroned by his subjects; and, conceiving that he had sufficient credit with many persons at Rome, who had experienced his bounty, he repaired thither to solicit his own restoration. In his way he had an interview with Marcus Cato at Cyprus, and was advised by him to return to Egypt, and to accept of any terms from his own People, rather than to enter on such a scene of anxiety and mortification, as he should find every suitor for public favour engaged in at Rome. The giddiness of the multitude, the violence of the parties of which one was sure to oppose what the other embraced, the avarice of those who might pretend to be his friends, and whose rapacity the treasures of his kingdom could not assuage, were sufficient to deter the king from proceeding on his voyage. But the importunity of his attendants, who wished to have him restored without any concessions to his subjects, confirmed him in his former resolution. He accordingly proceeded to Rome; and, to the great encouragement of his hopes, was favourably received by Pompey, who was then possessed of the reigning influence in the city, and who considered this as a proper opportunity to have a military commission joined to the civil one of which he was already possessed.

In the mean while the people of Alexandria, not knowing to what place their king had withdrawn, imagined that he was dead, and

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch. in Cæsare.

put his daughter Berenice in possession of the kingdom. Being afterwards informed, that he had steered for Italy, and was likely to engage the Romans against them, they sent a deputation to counteract his solicitations in the Roman Senate. But these deputies being intercepted, and murdered by his order, he proceeded, without opposition, in his application at Rome, and obtained a decree for his restoration to the crown.

The king of Egypt, by having procured an act in his own favour, yet made but a small progress in the business on which he was come. New difficulties arose in the choice of a person to carry the decree of the Senate into execution, which greatly retarded its effect.

Soon after this decree had passed, Lentulus Spinther, Consul of the present year, being destined at the expiration of his magistracy in the city to command in Cilicia and Cyprus, had inserted the business of restoring the king of Egypt as a part of his own commission. But after Lentulus was gone for his province, this part of the commission, probably by the influence of Pompey, who had views on that expedition, as the object of a military command for himself, was recalled. A strong party of the Nobles, however, being jealous of the state which Pompey affected, and of his continual aim at extraordinary powers, conceived an expedient to disappoint him on this occasion, or to render the commission unworthy of his acceptance. In visiting the books of the Sybils, verses were said to be found, containing an injunction to the Romans, not indeed to withhold their friendship from a king of Egypt soliciting their protection, but "to beware how they attempted to restore him with a military force." The authenticity of this oracle was acknowledged, or declared by the Augurs; and the Tribune Caius Cato, who was averse to the cause of Ptolemy, availed himself of it, to suspend the effect of the resolution which had been already taken in favour of that prince.

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The Senate and People were divided in their opinions. One party urged, that Pompey should be appointed to restore the king of Egypt to his throne; others agreed, that he might be appointed, provided that he undertook the commission, as Proconsul, attended by two Licors, and, in the terms of the oracle, without any military force<sup>4</sup>. Pompey himself affected to think, that the business should have been left as it was in the department of Lentulus the Proconsul of Cilicia and Cyprus; but his retainers, so long as they had any hopes of rendering this a military commission, or of making it a pretence for placing their patron again at the head of an army, never ceased to urge that he should be employed in it.

Ptolomy himself likewise wished to have this business devolve upon Pompey, as the most likely person to command the force of the commonwealth, and to employ it effectually in his favour. But both despairing at last of success, Ptolomy retired to Ephesus; and, fearing the resentments he had provoked in the contest with his own people, and in the late murder of their deputies, he took refuge in the temple of Diana; a retreat from which he was conducted, about two years afterwards, by Gabinus, and replaced on his throne<sup>5</sup>.

Pompey was disgusted with his disappointment in not being named to this service, and probably more by the little respect that was paid to him by all parties while he lay under the lash of continual invectives from Clodius, and from Caius Cato. Having obtained, on the fifth of April, a grant of some money towards executing his office of general purveyor of corn for the People; and having heard his own and Cæsar's embezzlement of the public treasure, especially in the alienation of the revenues of Campania, severely censured in the Senate<sup>6</sup>, he left Rome on pretence of applying the sums with which he was now entrusted for the purchase of corn in Sar-

<sup>4</sup> Dio, lib. xxxix. c. 12—16. Cicero ad Lentulum. Epist. ad Familiares, lib. vii.

<sup>5</sup> Liv. Epitom. Decad. xi. lib. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Cicero ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. ep. 5 & 6.

dinia and Sicily. In his way he passed by Lucca, and, together with Crassus, augmented the number of attendants who paid their court at the quarters of Cæsar.

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At an interview of these three leaders they renewed their former confederacy; and it being known, that Domitius Ahenobarbus was to stand for the next election of Consuls, Cæsar, considering how much a citizen so determined in opposition to himself, instigated by Cato, and supported by the party of the Senate, might attempt or execute against him in his absence, proposed, that the opposition to this candidate should not be committed to any person of inferior consideration in their party; but that Pompey and Crassus should themselves enter the lists, in order to exclude Domitius from the Consulship.

It was agreed likewise, at this conference, that, upon the expiration of the term for which they were to hold this office, Pompey should have the province of Spain, Crassus that of Syria, each with a great army: that Cæsar should be continued in his present command, and have such additions to the establishment of his province as might enable him to support an army of eight Roman legions, with the usual accompaniments of auxiliaries and irregular troops. Such was already the state of his forces<sup>7</sup>, including a legion of native Gauls; he having, contrary to the express limitations of his commission, by which he was restricted to three legions, made this enormous augmentation. This convention, like the former, was, for some time, kept a secret, and only began to be surmised about the usual time of the elections.

Soon after these matters were settled, Crassus being to remain in Italy, Pompey proceeded on his voyage to Sardinia, and Cæsar repaired to his army in Gaul, where the war in different places had

<sup>7</sup> Suet. in Cæsare, c. 24.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.



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been renewed in his absence. Among the dispositions he had made for the winter, the young Crassus was left to command on the coasts of the British Channel; and Galba, another of his lieutenants, was posted among the Alps to protect the traders of Italy at a principal pass of these mountains. This officer had dislodged the natives from many of their strong holds, whence they were accustomed to infest the highways, and to lay such as passed into Italy under contributions; and he took hostages for their good behaviour for the future. He fixed his quarters, during the winter, at Octodurus, now supposed to be the village of Martinach in the Vallé, situated at the foot of the mountains over which travellers pass in the route of the greater abbey of St. Bernard. Here he remained for some time in quiet possession of his post; but the natives observing, that the legions under his command had been greatly reduced by the services of the preceding campaign, and by the detachments which he had recently made from his quarters, formed a design to surprise and to cut him off. For this purpose, the inhabitants of the village in which he was quartered, suddenly withdrew from him, and soon after appeared with multitudes of their countrymen on the neighbouring mountains. From thence they made a furious attack on the Roman entrenchment, continually sending fresh numbers to relieve those who became fatigued, or who had exhausted their weapons.

The Romans, on the first prospect of this attack, had deliberated, whether they should not abandon their post; but had resolved to maintain it, and were now become sensible that they must perish, if they could not, by some impetuous sally, disperse the numbers that were assembled against them. For this purpose, they determined to break from their lines, and to mix with the enemy sword in hand; a manner of fighting, in which, by the superiority of the Roman shield and sword, they always had a great advantage. They accordingly sallied from their entrenchment, and, with the slaughter of

ten thousand of the enemy, who began the attack with thirty thousand, obliged them to retire. Galba, nevertheless, not thinking it prudent to remain in a situation in which he had been exposed to so much danger, retired, for the remainder of the winter, to the neighbourhood of Geneva.

The war had broke out at the same time in the quarters of Crassus, at the other extremity of the province. Some nations, who had made their submission, and given hostages at the end of the preceding campaign, repented of this step, and entered into a concert to recover their liberties. They began with seizing the Roman officers who had been stationed among them as commissaries to provide for the subsistence of the army, and they detained them as pledges for the recovery of their own hostages.

The principal authors of this revolt were the inhabitants of what is now termed the coast of Brittany, between the rivers Vilaine and Blavet. They trusted to the strength of their situation on small islands, or peninsulas, that were joined to the continent only by some narrow beach or isthmus, which the sea, at high water, overflowed. They depended likewise on the strength of their shipping, in the use of which, by the practice of navigation on that stormy sea, and by their frequent voyages even to Britain, they were extremely expert. They supplied the want of canvas and hempen cordage with hides and thongs of leather, and the want of cables with iron chains, to which they fastened their anchors.

Cæsar, having received intelligence of this enemy while he remained in his quarters at Lucca, sent orders to build as many ships as possible upon the Loire, and to assemble mariners from the neighbouring coasts. Apprehending, at the same time, a general defection of the province, and perhaps a descent from the Germans, that were ever ready to profit by the distress or divisions of their neighbours, he sent Labienus with a large body of horse to the

Mofelle, at once to awe the Belgic nations, and to guard the paf-  
fage of the Rhine. He fent alfo Titurius Sabinus with a proper force  
into Normandy, where the natives were already in arms; and the  
young Craffus to the Garonne, to give the natives of Gascony fuf-  
ficient occupation in their own country, and to prevent their junction  
with the authors of this revolt.

He himfelf made hafte to join the troops that were ftationed in  
Britanny, and ordered Decimus Brutus to afsemble his fleet, and to  
make fail without lofs of time for the bay of Vannes. After his  
arrival on the coaft, he met with all the difficulties which he had  
reafon to expect from the nature of the country, and from the dif-  
pofition and skill of its inhabitants. The enemy had retired from  
the continent to their ftrong holds on the promontories or head-lands,  
in which they were periodically furrounded by the fea. Being at-  
tacked at one ftation, they withdrew in their boats to another; and  
by their fituation feemed to be fecure from any enemy, who was  
not in a condition to make his attack, at once, both by fea and by land.  
They eluded a land attack by embarking on board of their veffels;  
and an attack from the fea, by landing from their boats, which they  
drew up on the beach.

Cæfar, to decide the event of this fingular conteft, was obliged to  
wait the arrival of his fhipping. As foon as it appeared, the natives,  
fenfible that their fate depended on the event of a fea-fight, embarked  
the moft expert of their warriors, got under fail with all their force,  
amounting to two hundred and twenty veffels, and fteered directly  
for their enemy. While the fleets drew near to each other, the fhores  
were crowded with fpectators; and the army with Cæfar himfelf  
came forth on the heights, from which they could behold the fcene.

The Romans being inferior to their enemy in the ufe of their fails,  
as well as in the ftrength of their veffels, endeavoured to fupply their  
defect, as ufual, by an effort of addrefs and unexpected contrivance.

They

They had provided themselves with scythes, fastened to shafts of a proper length, in order to cut the enemy's rigging, and let loose or discompose their sails; and having thus, in the first encounter, disabled many of their ships, they grappled with them, and boarded them sword in hand.

The Gauls, seeing a great part of their fleet thus irrecoverably lost, would have escaped with the remainder; but were suddenly becalmed, and being, from ten in the morning till night, continually exposed to the attack of the Romans, were all either taken or destroyed; and the nation, thus bereft of its principal strength and the flower of its people, surrendered again at discretion.

Under pretence that they had violated the law of nations, in seizing the persons of officers who were stationed among them in a public character, their leaders were put to death, and their people sold for slaves.

The inhabitants of the lower banks of the Seine, at the same time, having been defeated by Titurius, returned, agreeably to what was said to be the character of Gaulish nations, to their former submission, with the same levity with which they had thrown it aside.

The nations inhabiting the banks of the Garonne were still inclined to resist the approaches of Crassus to their country. To the advantage of numbers, they joined a lively courage, of which the Romans themselves had frequently felt the effects. Every chief was attended by a number of followers, whom he called his Soldurii, and who had devoted themselves to his service. While the chieftain lived, the Soldurii fared in every thing alike with himself; but if he perished by violence, they too must die, and there was no instance of their failing in this part of their engagement.

Crassus being arrived on the Garonne, and warned by the example of other Roman officers, who had fallen or miscarried in this service, deferred passing the river till he had augmented his force by the



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junction of some troops from Toulouse, and other parts of the Roman province. Being thus reinforced, he proceeded against the natives who were divided into many little hordes, of which Cæsar has, on this occasion, enumerated twelve, jealous of each other, and unwilling to join even in their common defence. They accordingly, notwithstanding their valour, fell separately into the hands of the Romans, and in the end were vanquished, or made their submission.

By these conquests, the former acquisitions of Cæsar on the Seine and the Marne, had a direct communication with the districts of Toulouse and Narbonne, or what was already called the Roman province of Gaul. Cæsar himself, having re-established peace in those tracts which are now termed Brittany and Normandy, closed the campaign with a march to the northward, where he penetrated through the marshes and woods into Brabant; but being stopped by heavy rains, and the approach of winter, he returned on his route, without making any settlement; and having put his army into winter quarters among the nations who had lately revolted, he set out as usual for Italy. There his presence was greatly wanted by Pompey and Crassus, who, on the approach of the elections, were likely to meet with unexpected difficulties in executing the plan lately concerted between them.

At Rome, the spring and part of the summer had passed in disputes between persons connected with the opposite parties. Clodius had attacked Cicero in his own person, in his effects, and in the persons of his friends. P. Sextius, who, in the character of Tribune, had been so active in the recall of this injured exile, and who had exposed his life in the riots to which that question gave rise, was now accused, and brought to trial for supposed acts of violence committed by him in the course of those contests. He was defended with great zeal by Hortensius, and with a proper gratitude by Cicero; and by their

joint endeavours was, on the twelfth of March, acquitted by the unanimous verdict of his judges.

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After this trial was over, a piece of superstition, curious as it forms a picture of the age, gave occasion to a fresh dispute between Cicero and his enemy Clodius. Upon a report, that horrid noises and clashing of arms had been heard under ground in one of the suburbs, the Senate thought proper to take the subject under consideration, and they referred it for interpretation to the college of Aruspices. This body delivered in judgment, that the gods were offended, among other things, by the neglect and profanation of the holy rites, and by the prostitution of sacred places to profane uses. This response Clodius endeavoured to apply to the case of Cicero's house, once consecrated and set apart for religion, and now again profaned by being restored to its former owner. Cicero endeavoured to remove the charge of profanation from himself to Clodius, by reviving the memory of his famous adventure in Cæsar's house. "If I quote any more recent act of impiety," says he, "this citizen will recall me to the former instance, in which he intended no more than adultery." He proceeded, however, to apply the response of the Augurs to a late intrusion of Clodius in rushing into the theatre with an armed rabble, while the games were celebrating in honour of the great Goddess.

The Senate for two days together listened to the mutual invectives of both parties, and were entertained with their endeavours to surpass each other in declarations of zeal for religion. Cicero, however, by the goodness of his cause, the force of his admirable talents, and perhaps still more by the aid of the Triumvirate, whose favour he earnestly cultivated, prevailed in the contest.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. epist. 4. Orat. pro Sext.

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This martyr in the cause of the Senate, ever since his return from banishment, courted the formidable parties, whose power, at least to hurt, he had experienced. He committed, or affected to commit, himself intirely into the hands of Pompey; and, with a declaration of much attachment also to Cæsar, composed a flattering panegyric, which this leader received with great pleasure<sup>10</sup>, probably more on account of the breach it was likely to make among his opponents in the Senate, than on account of the satisfaction he received from it, or of any real accession of strength it gave him in the pursuit of his designs. By this conduct Cicero disgusted his former friends, and felt his situation in the city so painful, that he absented himself, during great part of the summer, from Rome; a circumstance which interrupted the course, or changed the subject of those letters to which we are indebted for the best record of the times.

We have indeed great reason to regret any interruption of materials from which the history of this Consulate might be collected. The republic seems in part to have recovered its dignity by the able and resolute conduct of Marcellinus, and by the tacit concurrence of his colleague Philippus, who, though connected with Cæsar, did not co-operate in the execution of his designs<sup>11</sup>. By the influence of these Consuls the applications made to the Senate by Gabinius, now commanding in Syria, for certain customary honours were rejected<sup>12</sup>. This refusal was intended to mortify Pompey, who protected Gabinius, and who himself was commonly treated by Marcellinus with great freedom and severity. The aristocratical party recovered their courage, and Domitius Ahenobarbus, by their influence, was in a fair way to succeed in his election for Consul of the following year.

<sup>10</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 5.<sup>11</sup> Cic. ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. ep. 6.<sup>12</sup> Ibid. ep. 7.

The Tribunes, excited chiefly by Caius Cato, espoused the opposite interest, and proposed many resolutions to the People, in order to favour their designs. The Consul Marcellinus endeavoured to interrupt them by the appointment of fasts and holidays, in which it was not lawful to transact affairs in the assembly of the People. The Tribunes, in their turn, suspended the election of Consuls, and in this were encouraged by Pompey and Crassus, who feared the effect of a choice to be made under the direction of Marcellinus, and had not even openly declared their own intentions to offer themselves. Their late interview with Cæsar, and the part they since took, had created suspicion of their views. Marcellinus put the question to Pompey in the Senate, whether he desired the Consulship for himself? And this politician, long unaccustomed to make plain declarations, answered indirectly, That if there were no ill-disposed citizens in the commonwealth, he should have no such desire. Crassus, to the same question, made a like evasive reply, That he should be governed by what he judged best for the State. Both appear to have perceived that they were to rely for success chiefly on popular tumults; and as these would come to be employed with great disadvantage against such an able and resolute magistrate as Marcellinus, they took measures to defer the elections until the term of the present Consuls in office should expire<sup>13</sup>.

They found the Tribune Caius Cato a proper instrument for their purpose, secured his negative, and employed it repeatedly to suspend the elections. The republic, upon the approach of the new year, being to lose its former magistrates, without any succession of new ones, was likely to fall into a state of great confusion. The Senate went into mourning, and discharged every member from assisting at any of the public diversions. In this state of suspense and

<sup>13</sup> Dio. lib. xxxix. c. 37.



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public alarm, Publius Clodius, who had for some time been at variance with Pompey, as if gained by the sympathy of measures on this occasion, was reconciled to him, and attacked Marcellinus with continual invectives.

In this manner the year was suffered to elapse without any election of Consuls. The fasces dropped from the hands of Marcellinus and Philippus, and an interregnum ensued. Pompey and Crassus then openly appeared as candidates for the vacant offices of State. Young Crassus came from the army in Gaul, attended by a numerous body of citizens then serving under Cæsar: they brought a considerable accession of votes to the party of their general, and were themselves not likely to be outstripped by their opponents in acts of sedition and the use of force. Domitius Ahenobarbus alone, supported by the councils of his kinsman Marcus Cato, had the courage to persist in a contest with these powerful and dangerous antagonists. The time of election being fixed, he went before break of day to occupy his place in the field of Mars, but found his way already obstructed by a disorderly populace, and even by men in arms. The slave who carried a light before him was killed. Some of his friends, particularly Marcus Cato, was wounded<sup>24</sup>; and his adherents, not being in condition to dispute the ground with the force that was assembled against them, retired to their own houses, leaving Pompey and Crassus to be named without opposition.

In the same manner the faction of the Triumvirate over-ruled every other election, procured the preference, which has already been mentioned, of Vatinius to Cato, and filled every office with their own creatures. They carried the appointment of Ædiles by actual force, and at the expence of the lives of some of those who opposed them. Pompey himself having been entangled in one of these tumults,

<sup>24</sup> Plutarch. in Crass. Pompeio, &c.

retired to change his clothes, which were stained with blood. They were disappointed in the nomination only of two of the Tribunes, Publius Acquilius Gallus and Ateius Capito, who were of the opposite party.

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These events however were, by the contest which arose on every question, deferred for all the months of winter and spring. The offices of Prætor were not filled up by the middle of May<sup>15</sup>. The elections had begun for this purpose some time before; but it being observed that Marcus Cato had the first Centuries, Pompey, under a pretence, allowed by the Roman superstition, that he was to observe the heavens, interposed to suspend the ballot. The faction employed the time which they obtained by this delay in procuring votes, and were so unguarded in giving money, that they laid themselves open to a criminal prosecution, and had reason to apprehend that whatever election they made would be disputed at law. To prevent this consequence, Afranius, a person intirely under the direction of Pompey, moved in the assembly of the People for a dispensation from the statute of bribery in the case of elections then depending for the office of Prætor; and having obtained this extraordinary indulgence, secured to the party the fruits of their influence and of their money<sup>16</sup>.

U. C. 698.  
Cn. Pompeius Magnus, 2do;  
M. Licinius Crassus.

Among the acts of Pompey and Crassus, in their second Consulate, are mentioned some regulations respecting the courts of justice by which the juries, though taken in equal numbers from the Senate, the Equestrian order, and the mass of the People, were nevertheless limited to persons of considerable property. There are likewise mentioned some resolutions then passed to enforce the laws against murder, and to amend those against bribery by additional penalties, together with a sumptuary law to check the extravagance and prodigality of the age. "So willing were these magistrates," said Hor-

<sup>15</sup> Cicer. ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. ep. 9.

<sup>16</sup> Cicero ad Quint. Frat.

tensius,

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tenfius, "to compensate by their acts for the defects of their practice, " that they made laws even to limit the expence of the table." Such professions to reform the age were probably intended to retrieve the character which the popular leaders had loft by the violence and barefaced corruption of their recent canvafs, and to mark their administration with fome measures that might feem to difprove the imputations commonly laid to their charge.

Pompey, at the fame time, had an opportunity to fignalize his Confulate, by opening, during the prefent year, the magnificent theatre which he himfelf, or his freedman Demetrius, had erected for the accommodation of the People at their public fhow. At this folemnity were exhibited many dramatic performances and entertainments of every fort. Among thefe, in the courfe of five days, no lefs than five hundred lions were let loofe and killed by African huntfmen; and the whole concluded with the baiting of eighteen elephants, animals that feemed to have fagacity enough to be confcious of the indignity and the wrong which they fuffered. By their piteous cries they moved compaffion in the breasts even of that barbarous rabble, for whole entertainment they were flain<sup>17</sup>.

The allotment of provinces, which was the principal object of this Confulate, was for fome time kept from the view of the People. Pompey continued to profefs that he did not intend to accept of any province whatever. But the public gave no credit to fuch declarations on his part; and his own partizans were accuftomed to prefs upon him what he affected to decline<sup>18</sup>. Every one, therefore, in all converfations, endeavoured to accommodate him in a province, fome with Syria, others with Spain and Africa; to all which fuggeftions, or officious projects, he affected indifference, or even averfion. Trebonius, however, at this time Tribune of the People,

<sup>17</sup> Dio, lib. xxxix. Cicero ad Familiar. lib. vii. Plin. lib. viii. c. 7.

<sup>18</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 9.

made a motion, which was soon understood to be the real mind of Pompey, and the actual result of his counsels: that the province of Syria should be assigned to Crassus; that of Spain, together with Africa, to himself; each in imitation of Cæsar's appointment in Gaul, to continue for five years, with such establishments of men and of money as the necessity of the service during that period might require. This motion was made in execution of the original plan concerted with Cæsar, and it served to bring to light the object of their late conference at Lucca, which had so much alarmed the friends of the republic.

On the day that this motion was made in the assembly, Marcus Cato, by means of the Tribunes Atteius Capito and Acquilius Gallus, obtained leave to address the People. He endeavoured to disappoint the purpose of the meeting, by occupying so much of their time as to prevent their coming to any decision. Being commanded silence, and persisting to speak, he was ordered by Trebonius into custody. In this manner however, the first day was spent, and the assembly adjourned to the next morning.

The Tribunes Atteius and Gallus, suspecting that means might be used to exclude them from the assembly which was then to be held, took measures to secure their admission. For this purpose Gallus remained all night in the senate-house, which fronted the Comitia or place of assembly. But this device was turned against himself; the opposite party having placed a guard to confine him in that place during the greater part of the following day. His colleague Atteius, with Cato, Favonius, and some others, eluded the parties that were placed to intercept them, and found their way to the place of assembly. When the question was put, Cato, being lifted up into view by those of his friends who were about him, gave an alarm that it thundered; an intimation ever held by the religious customs of the Romans to



be ominous, and sufficient to suspend their procedure in any business of State. He was, however, on this occasion forced from the Comitium with the slaughter of some of his friends, who resisted the force that was employed against them. About the same time the Tribune Acquilius was wounded in forcing his way from the Senate-house, and a great concourse of people was forming round him as he stood bleeding in the streets. Violence to the person of a Tribune was still considered with religious horror, and the Consuls, in whose behalf this tumult had been raised, fearing the consequence of suffering such a spectacle to remain in the view of the People, ordered the multitude to withdraw, and removed the Tribune, still bleeding of his wounds, from the public view.

In the sequel of these operations, Pompey and Crassus obtained the provinces in question, and in the terms proposed; they proceeded to fulfil their part of the late engagement to Cæsar, by moving that his command should be continued during an additional term of five years more. "Now, indeed," said Cato (addressing himself to Pompey), "the burden is preparing for your own shoulders. It will one day fall on the republic, but not till after it has crushed you to the ground."

These arrangements being made, the officers thus appointed proceeded to take charge of their trust. Pompey, the newly named Proconsul of Spain, under pretence of a war subsisting with the Vaccei, raised the establishment of his province to four legions, two of which Cæsar soon after, under pretence of more urgent service in Gaul, had the address to borrow from him.

Pompey either had not yet begun to perceive what Cato suggested to him, That the greatest difficulty he had to fear, in preserving the eminence to which he aspired, was the emulation of Cæsar; and that the sword must determine the contest between them; or he flattered himself

himself that, like the person who stays at the helm, he was to command the vessel; and by remaining at the seat of government, while his associates and rivals accepted of appointments at a distance, that he continued to preside as sovereign, and supreme dictator of the whole. Under the influence of these conceptions, although his proper station was Spain, he either procured, or at least availed himself of, a motion that was made by some of the Tribunes to detain him in Italy; and fancied, while he sent his own lieutenants, Afranius and Petreius, as private agents for himself into that province, that even Cæsar and Crassus, though in a more publick character, were however to act in a subordinate station to himself.

Crassus ever considered riches as the chief constituents of power, and he expected, with the spoils of Asia, to equal the military or political advantages that were likely to be acquired by his rivals in Europe. From the levies and other preparations which he made for his province, it soon appeared that he intended a war with the Parthians, the only antagonists which the Romans had left on the frontier of Syria. Observing that he was likely to meet with an opposition to this design from the Senate and from the Tribunes, who exerted their powers to interrupt his preparations, and took measures to detain him at home, he became the more impatient to set out for his province, and left Rome before the expiration of the year for which he was elected into the office of Consul. The Tribune Atteius endeavoured to stop him, first by his tribunitian negative, next by actual force, and last of all by solemn imprecations, devoting the Consul himself, and all who should follow him on that service, to destruction.

While Crassus passed through the gates of Rome, on his intended departure for Asia, this Tribune, with a lighted fire, the usual form of devoting a victim to the infernal gods, denounced a curse, which greatly alarmed many of the followers of Crassus. This piece of superstition he might, in his own mind, have justly condemned: but it

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was imprudent to slight the effects of it on the minds of the People, and on the minds of his own army. In the apprehension of both he was by this form doomed to destruction, and proceeded in the war at the head of troops ill prepared to ward off calamities, which they were thus made to believe hung over them, in consequence of imprecations of which they did not question the efficacy.

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THE  
HISTORY  
OF THE  
PROGRESS AND TERMINATION  
OF THE  
ROMAN REPUBLIC.

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BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

*State of the Commonwealth.—Administration of the Provinces.—  
Operations of Cæsar in Gaul, Germany, and Britain.—State of  
Pompey at Rome.—Progress of Crassus into Syria.—Kingdom  
of Parthia.—Invasion of Crassus beyond the Euphrates.—Se-  
cond Invasion of Cæsar in Britain.*

THE provincial appointments of Pompey and Crassus, with that which was at the same time prolonged to Cæsar, seemed to dismember the empire, if not to expose the republic itself to great danger.

Of these three adventurers, Pompey and Cæsar, apart from the evil particularly apprehended in any of their measures, were in themselves

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felves subjects of a very dangerous character: neither possessed that dignity of mind which fits the citizen for the equality of persons in a republican State; neither could acquiesce in the same measures of consideration or power which other Senators had enjoyed before him; neither could be at ease where he did not command as master, or appear at least as the principal object in every scene in which he was employed.

This paltry ambition, some ages before, might have been held in contempt by the meanest of the People, or must have shrunk before that noble elevation of mind by which the statesman conceived no eminence besides that of high personal qualities employed in public services, or before that austere virtue which confined the public esteem to acts of public utility, supported by unblemished reputation in private life. But in the present age, there was a fashion which set such antiquated notions at defiance, controuled the authority of the State itself, and bestowed on private adventurers the attachment which belonged to the commonwealth, and the deference which was due to its legal head.

In the progress of this republic the character of parties has already repeatedly changed, and the danger to be apprehended from them accordingly varied.

In the first periods of its history, citizens were divided on the supposed distinctions of birth; and, in the capacities of Patrician or Plebeian, strove for prerogative or privilege with much emulation, as separate orders of men in the commonwealth, but with little jealousy of personal interests.

In a subsequent period, when the invidious part of the former distinction was removed, citizens having no longer the same subject of animosity, as being born to different pretensions, they entered more fully on the competition of individuals, and the formation of separate factions. They strove for the ascendant of aristocratical or

democratical

democratical government, according to the interest they had formed to themselves in the prevalence of either. They were ready to sacrifice the peace and honour of the Public to their own passions, and entered into disputes accordingly, which were in the highest degree dangerous to the commonwealth. They thought personal provocations were sufficient to justify public disorders; or, actuated by vehement animosities, they signalized their victories with the blood of their antagonists. But, though sanguinary and cruel in their immediate executions, they formed no deliberate plans of usurpation to enslave their country, nor formed a system of evils to continue beyond the outrage into which they themselves were led by their supposed personal wrongs or factious resentments.

We are now again once more to change the scene, and to have under our consideration the conduct of men who were in reality as indifferent to any interest of party as they were to that of the republic, or to any object of State; who had no resentments to gratify; or who easily sacrificed those which they felt to the purposes of a cool and deliberate design on the sovereignty of their country. Though rivals, they could occasionally enter into combinations for mutual support, frequently changed their partizans, and had no permanent quarrel but with those who uniformly wished to preserve the republic. They were surrounded by persons who admired the advantages of wealth or of power which were gained at the expence of their country, and who indeed were ready to extol the virtues of any adventurer who led a numerous list of retainers to share in the spoils of the commonwealth.

Peace had now, for some years, except in that part where Cæsar commanded, been established throughout the empire. Instead of military operations, the State was occupied in directing the farms of the revenue, in hearing complaints of oppression from the provinces, and in appointing the succession of military governors. Besides the  
disputes

disputes which have been mentioned relating to the provincial appointments of Crassus and Cæsar, there arose a question on the subject of provinces to be assigned to their immediate predecessors in the Consulate, Marcellinus and Philippus. It was strongly urged that Piso, Gabinius, and even Cæsar, should be recalled to make way for officers who were intitled to similar command in their turns. This measure was supported in part by Cicero, who vehemently contended, that Piso and Gabinius should be superseded; but urged the continuance of Cæsar in his station, a circumstance for which this able adventurer had taken sufficient precaution not to leave it in hazard from the issue of this debate.

Piso, the near relation of Cæsar, in the event of these deliberations, was actually recalled, and, upon his return to the city, complained to the Senate, in terms of great asperity, of the injury done to his character. Cicero had ever treated Piso and Gabinius, though in reality but the instruments of Pompey and Cæsar, as the principal authors of his late calamities; and, upon the present occasion, had pronounced against Piso that violent invective which still remains among his works, and which the subsequent conduct of the person against whom it was directed in a great measure disproved.

Gabinius had for some years enjoyed the government of Syria, and during this time had ventured to employ the force of his province in a manner, which, together with some other offences, drew upon him, at his return to Rome, the animadversion of the Senate.

It has been mentioned that Ptolemy Auletes, king of Egypt, in exile from his kingdom, had applied to the Romans for aid in recovering his crown; that his suit had been granted, but rendered ineffectual by the regard which was paid to a supposed oracle, which forbade his being reinstated with a military force; that he had withdrawn to Ephesus, and taken sanctuary in the temple, where he waited for some change of fortune in his favour. Lentulus, the

governor of Cilicia, to whom the business of restoring him, though without military force, had been committed by the Senate, deliberated whether he should not venture to disregard the restriction imposed upon him; march with an army to restore the king of Egypt; possess himself of the wealth which was to be found in effecting such a revolution, and trust to the influence of his friends at Rome in procuring his pardon from the Senate, and even their approbation of what he should have done.

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Upon this question Cicero advised Lentulus, if he had a force sufficient to undertake the enterprize, not to lose an opportunity of performing a service which, though not authorised, could be afterwards vindicated. But the business still remained in suspense, when Gabinius arrived in Syria, and probably, by an advice from Pompey to the same purpose with that of Cicero to Lentulus, undertook, in opposition to a decree of the Senate and of the Augurs, the restoration of this exile to his throne. Having received or bargained for a great sum of money in return for this service, he advanced with a fleet and an army towards Egypt, passed through Palestine, and on his way raised a contribution in that country.

Berenicé, the daughter of Ptolomy, now in possession of the crown, had married Archelaus; and, in order to strengthen her hands against her father, had assumed her husband as a partner in the throne. But the forces of these associated sovereigns were defeated by Gabinius, and Ptolomy was restored to his kingdom. Gabinius, with the treasure amassed on this occasion, hoped to be secure against the attacks which, at his return to Rome, were likely to be made upon him, for his contempt of the Senate, and of the oracle, and for the extortion of which he was accused at the same time in Palestine, a part of his own province.

In this busy time of Cæsar's faction at Rome, he himself, upon an alarm of an invasion from Germany, had been called to defend



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the northern extremity of Gaul. Two separate hordes, the *Tencheri* and *Ufipetes*, pretending to be driven by superior force from the usual tract of their migrations, had united together, and presented themselves on the banks of the Rhine. The native inhabitants of the right of that river instantly abandoned their habitations, and collecting all the boats that could be found on it to the opposite side, made a disposition to stop the passage of these invaders.

The Germans, observing the precautions which were taking against them, affected to lay aside the design of passing the Rhine; and, by changing their course, made a feint to divert the attention of their antagonists. In execution of this purpose, they continued for three days to retire from the river. At the end of this time, supposing that their opponents would be off their guard, and returned to their ordinary way of life, they suddenly turned their whole cavalry, and in one night repassed the ground over which they had marched on the three preceding days, surpris'd a sufficient number of boats with which to accomplish their passage, dislodged the natives of the country on the left of the river before them, and from thence continued their migrations betwixt the Rhine and the Meuse, over what is now called the dutchies of Juliers, of Limburg and Luxembourg.

These invaders amounted, by Cæsar's account, to upwards of four hundred thousand souls<sup>1</sup>; a number which exceeds that of the inhabitants of any city in Europe, besides London and Paris, and which may perhaps raise some suspicion of error in copying the text, or of exaggeration in the commentary, which was itself intended to raise the character of Cæsar at Rome. On the question relating to the probability of so great a number, it may be observed, that those migrating nations, certainly unacquainted with many of the arts which are practis'd to supply and accommodate populous cities, were

<sup>1</sup> Cæsar de Bell. Gall. lib. iv. c. 15.

likewise exempt from the want of such supplies, and acquiesced in what was necessary to mere subsistence. Such nations have less skill and industry than the manufacturer and the trader in a settled and well regulated city; but they have less waste and less misapplication of labour to superfluous and unprofitable purposes than take place in great cities.

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The German nations of this age, although they had opportunities to observe among their neighbours the advantages of land-property, and of agriculture supported by skill and industry, yet frequently preferred the state of migration, and from policy declined making any permanent settlement, lest the care of property, and the study of unnecessary accommodation, should corrupt or enervate their people. Their favourite occupation was hunting, which they considered as a preparation for war. They traversed the woods and pasture lands, with numerous herds, and subsisted chiefly by milk, flesh, and game. They likewise knew the use of corn, of which they sometimes took a crop from favourable lands; but without remaining any longer than one season to cultivate any particular portion of ground.

They moved in great and numerous bodies, that must to a great extent have covered the face of the country over which they passed; but the body thus moving together were distinguished into separate clans and fraternities, led by their headmen or chiefs, who kept order in their several divisions. They allowed private parties to make war beyond the limits of their own country, and to chuse their leaders for this purpose. In peace, the separate clans had no band of connection. If they had at any time a general government which comprehended the whole of their tribes, it was but a temporary expedient, to which they had recourse in war, and on other pressing occasions.

Under such equality of conditions, every individual, who was of a proper age, was obliged to labour for himself, and to subsist by

what he procured; and he employed his labour only in procuring what was necessary. In these circumstances, it was not likely that commodities should accumulate; but the numbers of the people, if we may rely on the testimony of Cæsar in this place, or on the evidence of ancient history in general, was certainly great<sup>2</sup>.

The Suevi, before whom the present invaders of Gaul had retired, were said to consist of a hundred cantons, each furnishing annually a thousand men for war, and a like number for the care of their herds and domestic concerns. Such clouds gathering on the frontier of Cæsar's province, required his presence. He accordingly assembled his army, and advanced between the Rhine and the Meuse.

The Germans, in general, were accustomed to despise the Gauls, and the present invaders expected no formidable opposition on this side of the Rhine; they had ventured to divide their forces, and had sent the great body of their horse upon an excursion beyond the Meuse to scour the lower parts of the country, and upon Cæsar's approach, they offered to treat with him. "They neither fought (they said) nor would they decline a war with the Romans. It was their way to repel injuries with the sword, not to elude them by negotiation. But in the present case, they should nevertheless condescend so far as to assure the Roman general, that they had passed the Rhine from necessity, and not with any intention to invade his province. That if he were pleased to receive them as friends, they were in condition to merit this title, should be content with the ground they had gained, or accept of any other which he might chuse to assign them." Cæsar replied, "That while they remained in Gaul, he could not consider them as friends. That if they repassed the Rhine, he had allies in Germany, with whom he should endeavour to join them in a league of defence

<sup>2</sup> Cæsar de Bell. Gal. lib. iv. vi.

“ against the common enemy, by whom they had been thus forced  
 “ to relinquish their usual bounds.”

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Having received this answer, the German deputies, to make their report, and to receive the command of their nations, desired a cessation of arms for three days. But Cæsar, suspecting that they only meant to amuse him, and to gain time for the junction of all their forces, refused to comply with this request, and continued his march. Being arrived within twelve miles of their camp, he was again met by their deputies, with fresh intreaties that he would advance no farther, or at least, that he would give to the cavalry, who made the vanguard of his army, orders to abstain from hostilities for three days: that in this time, they might have an answer from the German nations mentioned in their last conference, and know whether such a league could be formed, as was then proposed, to give them some prospect of safety in returning to their usual haunts.

Cæsar, upon this occasion, seems to have granted a cessation of arms; though on account of what afterwards happened, he is willing to diminish the extent of his own engagement, and to impute the breach of faith which followed to his enemies. He agreed to advance no farther than four miles for the convenience of water, and sent an order to his van-guard to abstain from hostilities. This order, however, had no effect. His advanced guard, consisting of five thousand horse, had an encounter with eight hundred of the enemy.

When this encounter happened, the Germans were not yet joined by the great body of their horse. They had earnestly sued for a cessation of hostilities; it was not likely that they would have begun the attack. Yet Cæsar accused them of a design, with this small party, to surprize the whole of his cavalry.

On the day which followed this skirmish of the cavalry, the leaders and principal men of the Germans leaving their own camp,  
 unfurnished.



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unfurnished with officers, in perfect security, came in great numbers to that of Cæsar to exculpate themselves, to convince him of their pacific dispositions, and to prevent the farther progress of his army. This he thought a favourable opportunity to cut off, by a complete surprise, this enemy entirely, and to finish the war. Having accordingly secured the persons of their leaders, who had thus put themselves in his hands, he advanced with his whole army directly to their camp, easily overcame the few that took arms to oppose him, and without distinction of sex or age, put the whole to the sword. The country, over all the ways by which they endeavoured to escape from the camp, at which the slaughter began, to the confluence of the Rhine and the Meuse, was strowed with the slain<sup>3</sup>.

The Roman people, though seldom sparing of the blood of their enemies, were shocked at the recital of this extraordinary massacre; and when Cæsar, on account of this victory, applied for a thanksgiving, and for the usual honorary decrees of the senate, he was charged with having wantonly invaded the nations of Gaul, and of having dishonoured, by an act of treachery, the arms of the Republic. It was proposed to deliver up his person to those injured nations, that he might expiate, by his own sufferings, so many acts of injustice and impiety, which the Gods might otherwise avenge on his country.

The German horse, that by their absence had escaped this calamity which befel their countrymen, appear soon after to have repassed the Rhine, and to have taken refuge with some of the Hordes who lived near the sources of the Roer and the Lippe. Thither Cæsar, to spread the terror of his arms, soon afterwards pursued them; and passed the river, not in boats and by surprise, as the Germans were accustomed to do, but in a manner which he seems to

<sup>3</sup> That branch of the Rhine which falls into the Meuse, changes its name for that of Wall.

have chosen, as better suited to the dignity of the Roman state; he projected a bridge, which was executed in ten days, with much ingenuity, and some ostentation of his power and skill. This work being finished, he placed proper guards at both its extremities, and advanced with the main body of his army into the contiguous parts of Germany, where, on account of the reception given in that quarter to the cavalry who had escaped the late massacre on the Meuse, he laid the country under military execution.

Cæsar, from the place at which he had passed the Rhine, appears to have gone up the eastern side of the river, where he visited the Ubii, a nation inhabiting over against what are now the cities of Bonne and Cologn. Here he had intelligence, that the Suevi, a nation consisting, as has been observed, of a hundred cantons, and mustering two hundred thousand warriors, who were divided into two squadrons that took the field, and conducted the domestic affairs of the nation by turns, were preparing to oppose him; that they had actually sent their wives, children, and superannuated men into places of safety, and had assembled their warriors to meet him. This nation having an ascendant over all the cantons of Germany, considered it as a proof of their valour, that no nation could pretend to settle on the tract of their migrations, or within reach of their excursions; and that the country, to a great distance around them, was accordingly waste. In their own movements, they never halted above a year to raise a single crop from fields, which, to keep up the martial spirit of their nation, and to preclude the desire of property, with the other passions that accompany settlement, they successively abandoned.

Cæsar, not being prepared to enter on a war with such an enemy, and being sensible that a defeat might expose his army to ruin, while even a victory could procure him no adequate advantage, having remained eighteen days on that side of the Rhine, and employed no more than twenty-eight days in the whole service, chose, while he

still

still had the reputation of victory unimpaired, to repass that river, and to break down his bridge.

This singular man, whose abilities were equal to any task, and who had no occasion to court the publick admiration by measures concerted on purpose to obtain it, was, nevertheless, not above ostentation, and gave way to it not only where it might contribute to impose on an enemy, but even where it would do no more than gratify his own vanity, or increase the fame of his actions at Rome. To this motive we may venture to impute the design, which, at an advanced season of the year, and at the end of the same summer in which he had, between the Meuse and the Rhine, vanquished the numerous army of the Tenchteri and Usepetes, in which he had passed the Rhine, and insulted the warlike nations of Germany, even on their own ground, he now projected the invasion of Britain, though surrounded by the ocean, and untouched by the arms of any foreign invader. To carry this design into immediate execution, as soon as he had repassed the Rhine, he continued his march through the low countries, and collected his forces in the neighbourhood of the Portus Itius and Geforiacum<sup>4</sup>. While we perceive the features of vanity in the leader, we must admire the hardiness and vigour of the troops who could accomplish these services.

The extent of this island, the numbers and character of its people, were then unknown on the continent. Cæsar having in vain endeavoured to procure information in these particulars, sent a galley with orders to explore the coast, and to observe the countenance of the natives. He ordered all his shipping, and even those vessels which he had employed the preceding year against the Veneti<sup>5</sup>, to sail round the Cape of Brittany into the British channel, and repair to the straits which separate this island from the continent.

<sup>4</sup> Calais and Boulogne.

<sup>5</sup> In the Bay of Biscay, about Vannes.

On the report of these preparations, which evidently pointed at Britain, some of the natives, willing to avert by negociation the storm which threatened them, sent to the Roman Proconsul a submissive message, and offered to come under his protection.

Cæsar, founding a claim to the possession of the island on these advances which were made to him, proceeded with more boldness to the execution of his enterprize. That the natives of the country he was leaving might not create any trouble in his absence, he obliged them to give hostages, and made a proper disposition of his army to keep them in awe. He had assembled at the most convenient haven on the Gaulish side, now supposed to be the Wissan, between Calais and Boulogne<sup>6</sup>, eighty transports or ships of burden, with a number of galleys to accommodate the officers of rank, and their equipage. The remainder of his shipping was yet detained, by contrary winds, in a creek at some miles distance, supposed to be Boulogne; thither he sent his cavalry, with orders to embark on board the ships where they lay. He himself went on board, with the infantry of two legions, at the former haven, and having found a favourable wind and moderate weather, weighed about ten at night, and reached the coast of Britain, on the following day, at ten in the morning. The cliffs, where he first came near to the shore, were high and steep, and the hills were covered with numerous bodies of foot, of men on horseback, and even in wheel carriages, from which the natives of this country were accustomed to make war. It being impossible to land under such difficulties; and in the face of this opposition he bore away, as is probable, to the northward about eight miles, with a favourable wind to some part of the flat shore<sup>7</sup> which surrounds the Downs; and here, in the manner of ancient debarkations, for which

<sup>6</sup> See Danville's Geography of ancient Gaul.

<sup>7</sup> Planum & apertum litus. See Cæsar's Commentaries.



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the shipping of those times was built, ran his transports aground, and prepared to land.

In the mean time the Britons, who in their march on the hills had kept pace with the Roman galleys, came down to the strand, and advanced even some way into the water to oppose the descent. As the surf on that shore usually runs high, and the Romans, from where their vessels struck, had some way to wade in water that was too deep to allow them the free use of their weapons, they remained on board, and durst not meet the enemy under such disadvantages. Cæsar seeing his men unusually backward, did not think proper in these circumstances to urge them farther; but ordered some of the lightest vessels, which were mounted with missile engines, or manned with archers and slingers, to row as near to the shore as they could on the right and the left of the landing place, and from thence to gall the enemy. This disposition succeeded so well, that the beach close to the water was presently cleared, and the Romans were left to descend from their ships, and to wade undisturbed to the land.

The Britons, seeing their enemy in possession of the shore, offered to surrender, and were about to deliver their hostages, when an accident happened, which encouraged them again to take arms. On the fourth day after the Roman infantry had landed, a second division of ships, with the cavalry, appeared in sight; but before they could reach the land, were dispersed by a violent storm; part was driven back on the coast of Gaul, part carried down the British channel, and cast in distress on the contiguous shores. Even the shipping, from which the legions had disembarked, lying aground in the surf, or at anchor in a high sea and spring-tide, with which the Italians were unacquainted, were set adrift, or filled with water, many of them beat to pieces or greatly shattered, and rendered unseviceable.

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By these misfortunes, Cæsar, although he had made no provision to subsist for the winter in Britain, was in danger of being obliged to remain in it for want of shipping. The natives retracted their late submission, began to drive away the cattle, and to lay waste the country within reach of the Roman camp. They flattered themselves that the enemy would be obliged to depart, or must perish for want of provisions; and that they would, by the example of so vain and calamitous an attempt, deter every stranger for the future from invading their island.

Cæsar, in the mean time, while he employed all his workmen with the greatest diligence in repairing his ships, endeavoured to collect some provisions, and to form a magazine. The natives assembled in great bodies to intercept his foragers, and obliged him to cover them with the whole force of his army. The legions were at first greatly disconcerted by the unusual effect of the British chariots, and by the want of their own cavalry; but as they prevailed in every close fight, the Britons were soon obliged to renew their former submission, and became bound to deliver double the number of hostages they had formerly stipulated. But Cæsar not thinking it proper, with shattered vessels, at the mercy of autumnal winds and stormy seas, to await the performance of this article, ordered the hostages to be sent after him into Gaul, reembarked with his army, and with the first favourable wind repassed to the continent. At his arrival, he found that the Gauls, upon the report of his late misfortunes, had revolted; that one of his transports, with three hundred men on board, having parted with the fleet, and landing at a separate place, were attacked; and that it was necessary to send the remains of his cavalry to their relief. The Morini, inhabiting what are now the districts of Calais and Dunkirk, with other nations of the low countries, had taken arms against the officers he had stationed to keep them in awe. The campaign therefore concluded

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with the operations, which were necessary to quell this revolt. Labienus subdued the Morini. Quintus, Titurius, Sabinus, and Lucius Cotta having laid waste great part of the low countries, fell back to the coast.

The Roman army was soon after put into winter quarters; and Cæsar, as if sensible that he had made his attempt on Britain with too small a force, and whatever representation he might give of particulars, had incurred the imputation of a miscarriage, gave orders to refit his fleet, and to add, during the winter, as many more ships as possible, built upon a construction more fit for that service, broader, and more capacious in the hull, for the reception of men and horses, and lower in the gunwale, for the convenience of landing. The timber was probably taken from the neighbouring forests; but the materials of his rigging, it is said, were brought from Spain. Having taken these measures to enable him at a more convenient season to renew his expedition into Britain, he set out as usual for Italy, and for the neighbourhood of Rome.

Here he found Pompey and Crassus employed, as has been already related, in obtaining for themselves, and for him, the objects which they had severally in view. Crassus had fixed his thoughts on the treasures of the east, and projected the sale of kingdoms, of which he hoped to have the disposal in that part of the world. Pompey too was gratified in his wishes, had got the command of an army, and the patronage of a great province, while he continued at Rome to enjoy his consideration, and was vested with a species of monarchy, in wielding the united powers of the party. Cæsar had provided, what he knew in the end was to decide every controversy, a great army, inured to service, and in a station which gave an easy access to Italy, and the command of Rome. As if secure of their interests, they permitted the election of Consuls to proceed without disturbance; and suffered Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, a professed partizan

partizan of the senate, together with Appius Claudius, to be elected consuls; Marcus, Cato, and Milo, to be placed in the list of Prætors; and several citizens, well affected to the Senate, to be admitted into the college of Tribunes.

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U. C. 699.  
L. Dom.  
Ahenobar-  
bus, App.  
Claud. Pul-  
cher.

The winter and spring, however, were inactive on the part of the aristocracy. Cato, probably did not see any publick object in which to engage with advantage beyond the duties of his office, in which he endeavoured to restrain by his authority, and by his example, the extravagance and luxury of the age. The dangerous powers which had been recently granted to persons, from whose ambition the republic had much to fear, no doubt greatly alarmed the senate; but this body, though led by Domitius, one of the Consuls, by Cato and Milo, two of the Prætors, and supported by many of the Tribunes, did not think themselves entitled to dispute the validity of those grants, nor to attempt the revocation of what had been so recently confirmed by the people.

Pompey, now master of Spain and part of Africa, with an adequate army, still under the pretence, as has been mentioned, of his commission to furnish the public granaries with corn, remained in Italy, and passed the greater part of his time among his country villas, executing the duties of general purveyor with the assistance of his lieutenants, and managing his intrigues in the city by means of his agents and friends. He was attended by numbers of every rank and condition, who resorted to him with the assiduity of real courtiers, and with a fervility, which, in a republic, implied the utmost corruption of manners. He even maintained the appearances of royalty in the state which he assumed, as well as in the influence he acquired. While he himself affected reserve and moderation, in order to appear worthy of his rank, his retainers ever treated him as a great prince, and with his connivance fomented disorders tending to shake the government of the Senate; to the end that the republic might



might be forced to rely on him for support, while he himself affected to decline the burden.

In the management of these intrigues, and in the full hopes of their success, Pompey was now left by Crassus, as well as by Caesar. The first, in his impatience to take possession of his government, had broken through all the impediments that were placed to hinder his departure from Rome, made haste to Brundisium with his army, embarked, notwithstanding the unfavourableness of the season, and, with considerable loss, both of men and of shipping in a storm, made his passage into Macedonia. The prohibition of the Prætor still sounded in his ears. He dreaded a vote of the Senate or People to recal his commission. It appears, that soon after his departure, a motion had been actually made for this purpose; and that Cicero, though formerly on ill terms with Crassus, being taught by his late sufferings to court the favour of those who could either hurt or protect him, appeared on this question in his favour, and claimed a share in the merit of obtaining the decision that was given to confirm his commission<sup>3</sup>.

But without attending to the state of these deliberations at Rome, Crassus continued his march by Macedonia and the Hellespont into Asia. In passing through Galatia, finding Dejotarus, sovereign of that principality, then of an advanced age, occupied in a work that is becoming at every age, building a new city, and making a settlement for more people; he is said to have observed to the prince, that it was somewhat too late, at his age, to form projects of new settlements; "nor are you very early," replied the other, "in your undertaking the conquest in Parthia."

Crassus was turned of sixty, and having ever considered riches as the surest means of arriving at eminence and power, now joined, to the rapacity of a youthful ambition, the avarice of age. Upon

<sup>3</sup> Cicero ad Famil. lib. v. ep. 3. ad Crassum.

his arrival in Syria, he pillaged the temple of the Jews, and laid hold of treasure wherever else he could find it. He made a pretence of the military levies to be made in the provinces for extorting money; and afterwards, reserving the money he had raised for his own use, neglected the levies. He required of the different districts of his province, and of the neighbouring allies, large quotas of men and military stores, merely that they might buy exemptions with proportional sums of money<sup>9</sup>. In the same spirit of avarice and rapacity, he invaded the Parthians without any authority from the State, and even without the pretence of a quarrel.

The Parthians, like other dynasties which before or since have arisen in that part of the world, or in the neighbourhood of the Euphrates and the Tigris, were of Scythian extraction. On the decline of the Macedonian power, about two hundred years before the present date, a swarm from the north had migrated to the lower banks of the Tigris, over-ran the country round Ctesiphon, continued to harass the neighbourhood by their depredations; and, at last, being commanded by Arsaces, the founder of this new kingdom, took possession of an extensive country, and though under a new name, in fact restored the monarchy of Persia<sup>10</sup>.

The Parthian, or new Persian monarchy, being yet in its vigour, was the most formidable power that now any where appeared within reach of the Roman arms. Its forces consisted almost intirely of horse. Part intended for regular charges, cased in heavy armour, and using the lance; part mounted in a lighter manner for expedition and swiftness, and using the bow. While in the field they were attended by herds of spare horses, which they pastured, or drove in the rear of their armies. With this supply, upon any occasional loss, they new-mounted their cavalry, or, having reliefs of fresh

<sup>9</sup> Plut. in Crasso, 11. Dio. Cass. lib. iv. c. 13. <sup>10</sup> Justin. lib. lxi. Dio. Cass. lib. xl, xli.

horses, performed amazing marches, and frequently presented themselves to their enemies, where it was not expected they could appear. They had different notions of victory and defeat from other nations; they always counted it a victory, when, by their flights, they drew an enemy into straits by hasty and unguarded pursuits<sup>11</sup>, and often enjoyed the greatest advantage when they seemed to be routed and to fly.

When Crassus advanced to the Euphrates, Orodes king of Parthia, then engaged in a war with Artabazes, on the side of Armenia, sent a deputation to expostulate with the Roman general on the cause of his hostile approach, Crassus made answer, That he would give the reasons of his coming when he arrived at Seleucia, "Here," said one of the Parthian messengers (showing the palm of his hand) "hair will grow before you shall arrive at Seleucia." Crassus proceeded in his march, passed the Euphrates, and ravaged Mesopotamia without any resistance. Having continued his operations until the end of the season, he returned for the winter into Syria<sup>12</sup>. Upon his arrival in this province, he was joined by his son Publius, who had served some years in a considerable rank in the army in Gaul, and was now detached by Cæsar with a thousand horse, and many marks of honour, to act under his father in Syria.

This invasion of Mesopotamia, after the season had become far spent, served only to alarm and provoke the enemy, without procuring any advantage to the arms of the Romans; and hostilities were likely to proceed in the spring with great animosity, when Crassus was to prosecute the war which he had thus commenced on such dangerous ground.

Cæsar, in the mean time, found continual occupation for his troops in Gaul, or in the neighbourhood of that province. He himself,

<sup>11</sup> Dio, Cass. lib. xl. c. 25.

<sup>12</sup> Dio, lib. xl. Plut. in Crasso.

with his usual activity, having been in Italy in the beginning of winter, and having conferred with the persons with whom he entrusted the management of his affairs at Rome, proceeded to Illyricum, upon a report, that this part of his province was infested by the incursions of the Pyrustæ, a warlike tribe on the frontier. Upon his arrival, the invaders withdrew, and were disowned by their nation. The State denied, that they had ever given a commission to make war on the Roman province, became bound for the future to restrain the depredations of private adventurers, and gave hostages for the observance of this article.

Early in the spring, Cæsar returned from this expedition to the quarters of his army in the Low Countries, and found, that in consequence of the orders he had given at the end of the preceding campaign, no less than six hundred transport vessels, and twenty-eight galleys, were actually built in different harbours from Ostend to Bologne, and in a few days might be ready for sea. He accordingly ordered them to be launched, and directed the whole to assemble at the same port from which he sailed on the preceding year, in order to receive the army on their intended invasion of Britain. But, before his departure, being informed that certain nations on the Moselle were meditating a revolt, and were soliciting the Germans to come over the Rhine to their assistance, to the end that he might not leave any enemy on foot in his rear, and that he might secure the peace of Gaul in his absence, he marched to the Moselle with four legions and eight hundred horse. Upon his arrival he had the good fortune to find the people divided between two leaders, who, being jealous of each other, made their submissions separately, and gave the necessary hostages as a pledge for their future behaviour.

With these securities, Cæsar returned to the coast, found all his armed galleys and five hundred and sixty of his transports actually assembled; the other forty transports had been put back by contrary



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winds, and were still retained at the port at which they had been built. The force intended for this expedition to Britain consisted of five legions, amounting possibly, on the probable supposition that they were not complete, to about twenty thousand men<sup>13</sup>, together with a body of Gauls, including many of their chiefs, whom Cæsar chose to retain with his army, rather as hostages for the fidelity of their countrymen, than as auxiliaries in the war. The fleet consisted of five hundred and sixty transport vessels, twenty-eight armed galleys, with many tenders and small craft, provided by officers for their own convenience, and for the reception of their equipages; in all eight hundred sail.

The wind being northerly for five-and-twenty days<sup>14</sup> after the fleet was assembled, the troops still remained on shore. At the expiration of this time the wind changed, and the troops began to embark, but were suddenly interrupted by the desertion of a Gaulish chief, who, being averse to the service, thought this a favourable opportunity to disengage himself with his followers. Cæsar considered this desertion as a declaration of war, and being sensible of the danger he might incur in case of any disaster by having such enemies in his rear, suspended the embarkation, and sent a party of horse in pursuit of the fugitive, who, being overtaken, was killed in attempting to defend himself. His followers were brought back and obliged to embark for Britain.

On the return of the party employed in this service the embarkation proceeded, and being completed at sunset of the same day, the wind being still fair, the fleet weighed, and got into the Channel; but the wind soon after having failed, or shifted more to the west, and the tide being set to the northward, they were carried a considerable way in that direction past the port for which they had

<sup>13</sup> The legions, at the end of this campaign, were reduced to 3,500 l.

<sup>14</sup> See Cæsar's Commentaries.

steered. At day-break, they saw the land of Britain on their left, and seemed to leave some conspicuous part of the island, probably the South Foreland, astern: but with the turn of the tide, and the help of their oars, they arrived at noon at a convenient part of the coast not far distant from the landing-place of the former year, but less exposed to the sea. This place we may suppose to have been *Pigwell Bay*, beyond the mouth of the *Stour*, or the entry to *Sandwich Haven* <sup>15</sup>.

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The Britons had assembled as formerly to oppose the descent of the Romans; but, on the appearance of so great a fleet, were intimidated, and withdrew from the coast.

Cæsar, flattering himself that he had found a safer road for his ships than that at which he had stationed them in the preceding year, left his fleet at anchor, and guarded against any attempts of the natives by a body of ten cohorts and three hundred horse, that were properly entrenched on the shore. Being informed that the Britons had their forces assembled on a small river (probably the *Stour*), at the distance of ten or twelve miles from his landing-place, he put his army in motion in the night, and at break of day came up with them, dislodged them from their post, and obliged them to withdraw to a place of retreat in that neighbourhood, which, on occasion of their own wars, had been fortified in their manner with a mote, and ramparts of wood. To reduce them in this stronghold, he erected some works, and made regular approaches; but as he had not invested the place, the only effect of his attack was, to force the enemy

<sup>15</sup> Mr. d'Anville, on a supposition that Cæsar must have passed into Britain by the shortest possible line, fixes upon Hith, about eight miles west of Dover, as the place of his landing in his first invasion of Britain; and, consequently, on some other contiguous part as the place of his landing in the second invasion: but this does not agree, either with the description of the coast, being pla-

num et apertum litus, or with the sequel of the story, which places some such river as the *Stour* to be passed in his march, about twelve miles from the shore. The coast at Hith, though not altogether inaccessible, is steep and hilly, and would have exposed Cæsar to difficulties in his first operations on shore, which he could not possibly have omitted to mention.

to abandon it, and to continue their retreat. He had taken his resolution to pursue them on the following day, and had begun his march in three divisions, when it appeared, that the element which is the safeguard of Britain, though not always sufficient to keep its enemies at a distance, yet is subject to accidents which render the attempt of invaders very difficult, and their condition, even when on shore, sufficiently hazardous. To this purpose a messenger overtook Cæsar on his march with tidings, that all his ships, in a storm which arose in the preceding night, had been driven from their anchors, had run foul of each other, that many of them were stranded and wrecked, and all of them greatly damaged.

Cæsar, on this report, suspended his march, and, having fixed the main body of his army in a well-fortified camp; he himself, with a proper escort, returned to the coast. At his arrival, he found that forty of his ships were irrecoverably lost; but that the remainder, though greatly damaged, might be refitted. For this purpose he gave orders in the army, that all who had been instructed in the trade of a carpenter, should repair to the sea-port to be employed in refitting the fleet; he called many workmen likewise from Gaul, and gave directions for building a number of new vessels on different parts of that coast; and to guard, for the future, against such accidents as had lately befallen his ships, he ordered that they should be drawn on shore. In this work the army was incessantly employed for ten days, and without intermission even in the night. The fleet, at length, being in this manner secured from the dangers of the sea, and covered by an entrenchment on the side of the land, he returned to his camp, and resumed the operations of his army.

It appears that the natives of Britain, being divided into many small cantons or separate principalities, and, as usual in such cases, frequently at war among themselves, had been actually at variance when Cæsar arrived; but, during the short respite which the  
disaster

disaster that had befallen his fleet had given them, that they had agreed to suspend their own quarrels, and were assembled in greater numbers than formerly, under Cassivelaunus, a chieftain of Middlesex, or, as Cæsar describes him, a prince residing on the northern banks of the Thames, and at about seventy or eighty miles from the sea.

This chieftain brought into the field a numerous army of infantry, of horsemen, and armed chariots. His knowledge of the woods enabled him to harass the Romans on their march, and, following the tracts that were clear of underwood, not only to gall them with missiles from the thickets, but to charge them likewise with his horsemen and chariots, even in places where the ground seemed least fitted to the movement of such bodies. Encouraged with his success in this species of warfare, he ventured to attack the whole cavalry of the Roman army, which, being on a foraging party, were supported by an intire legion. But the Britons being, in this attempt, defeated with great slaughter, their chief lost courage, or was deserted by his followers, and never more attempted to face the Romans.

Cæsar, finding this enemy remit his ardour, advanced with a quicker pace. From his silence on the subject of any difficulty in passing the Medway, we must suppose him to have followed the vale of the Stour to Ashford, and from thence to have kept on the plains to Maidstone, near to which place the river Medway is every where naturally fordable; and from the length of his march, being about eighty miles from the sea, when he came upon the banks of the Thames, we may suppose him to have arrived on that river at the reach which runs from south to north, somewhere between Kingstone and Brentford. There he observes, that the only ford in the river was fenced and guarded; that a row of sharp stakes was driven under water; that the opposite bank was lined with a palisade, and manned by a numerous body of the natives. He nevertheless proceeded to force his way, and by the impetuosity of his attack, drove the enemy

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from their post, and, without any loss, effected his passage, although his men were obliged to wade up to the chin.

Cassivelaunus had, for some time, made no attempt to resist the Roman army; he had contented himself with observing their motions, and with endeavouring to strip the country before them of every particular by which they could profit on their march. Cæsar, on his part, advanced with the precautions necessary against such an enemy, and, as they had destroyed what could be of immediate use to his army, he destroyed what was left, in order to force the natives to submission. In this state of the war, having leisure and opportunity to observe the condition of the country and the manners of the people, he gives the following account of both: "That on the coast there were colonies from the neighbouring continent, still distinguished by the names of the countries from whence they had come; that these colonies, being possessed of agriculture, and well stocked with cattle, were extremely populous; that they had money made of iron or brass; the first of which metals, with great quantities of tin, were found in their own island; the other metal was imported from abroad; that the winter was milder here than in Gaul; that the woods of Britain furnished the same timber with those of Gaul, except the fir and the beech; and that the houses were built in the same manner in both countries." From this account of the coast he proceeds to observe, "That the inland parts were occupied by the original natives, who, with little corn, subsisted chiefly by milk and the other produce of their herds; that, by a particular superstition, although possessed of hares, of geese, and other fowls, they were forbid to eat of these animals; that they were curious in the ornaments of the person, affected to have bushy whiskers, and long hair; that they stained or painted their bodies of a blue colour, and had no clothes besides the skins of beasts; that they associated in small clubs or fraternities of ten or a dozen in number." And adds a circumstance,

cumstance, in which, if he were not deceived, as is common enough to foreigners, by some appearances which were not sufficiently explained to him, he gives a striking example of the diversity which takes place among mankind in settling the canon of external actions. The brothers, the father, and the son, though separately married, and reputed the parents of children, brought forth by their respective wives, yet, without jealousy or imputation of evil, lived with those wives in common <sup>16</sup>.

Cæsar, being on the left of the Thames, made an alliance with the Trinobantes, supposed to have been inhabitants of Essex and Suffolk. The sovereign of this canton having, in some quarrel with his own people, been expelled from his kingdom, had taken refuge with Cæsar in Gaul, and was now, by force of the Roman arms, restored to his kingdom. Five other principalities made their submission at the same time. Cassivelaunus retired to his principal fortress, which, consisting of a palisade and a ditch situated in the least accessible part of the woods, was by the natives, as Cæsar is pleased to express himself, called a town, and was in reality, in case of alarm, a place of retreat for themselves and their cattle. On the approach and attack of Cæsar on one side, Cassivelaunus retired by an outlet on the other, leaving some herds of cattle, and many of his men, to fall into the enemy's hand.

After this defeat, the British prince endeavoured, as a last resource, to give Cæsar some trouble in his rear; and for this purpose sent an order to the four princes of Kent, to assemble their people, and endeavour to force the Roman station, and destroy the Roman shipping, where they lay on the coast. They accordingly attacked the intrenchment, but were repulsed; and Cassivelaunus himself, reduced to despair by the defection of so many of his countrymen, and by his

<sup>16</sup> See Cæsar's Commentaries on his last expedition to Britain.

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repeated defeats, determined to make his submission. The season of the year being far advanced, and Cæsar, desirous to retire with honour from a country in which he was not prepared to make any settlements, accepted this on easy terms.

A certain tribute was imposed on the nations inhabiting the banks of the Thames, hostages taken for the payment of it, and the invaders, with a numerous assemblage of prisoners, then the only or principal spoils of this island, retired to their ships, which, not being sufficient to receive them at one embarkation, were obliged to return for a second; and in this way successively, without any material accident, transported the whole of the Roman army into Gaul.

## C H A P. II.

*Death of Julia the Daughter of Cæsar and the Wife of Pompey.——Trial of Gabinus.——Detection of an infamous Transaction of Memmius and Abenobarbus.——Revolt of the Low Countries.——Military Execution against the Inhabitants of the Country between the Rhine and the Meuse.——Operations of Crassus in Mesopotamia.——His Death.——Competition for the Consulate.——Death of Clodius.——Riot in the City.——Pompey sole Consul.——Trial of Milo.*

WHILE the Roman army was in Britain, there happened, by the death of Julia, the daughter of Cæsar and the wife of Pompey, a great change in the discontinuance of the relation which subsisted between them, and in the separation of their supposed political interests. The connection which then came to be dissolved, had been devised as a bond of confederacy between parties whose interfering objects of ambition must have otherwise, on many occasions, excited their mutual jealousy. Neither the father-in-law, nor the son was likely to sacrifice his ambition to mere affection, but each may have expected, that the other should be, in some degree, the dupe of his relation, and should abate a little of the jealousy to which he was, by his situation and his objects, so naturally inclined. This passion, however, we may believe was far from having been extinguished in the mind of either. The choice which Pompey made of Spain for his province, with a military command for a term of five years, probably proceeded from a desire to retain his superiority over Cæsar, and to have in his power, in case of a breach between them, a province, though less contiguous to Italy than that which was held by Cæsar,

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not less fitted to furnish formidable armies and the resources of war.

Notwithstanding these effects of jealousy, while the familiar relation of father-in-law and son subsisted between Cæsar and Pompey, and while Crassus continued to hold a species of balance in their councils, they seemed to acquiesce in a participation of consequence and power. But the death of Julia, and that likewise of the child of which she had been delivered only a few days before her death, put an end, not only to any real cordiality in this connection, but even to any semblance of friendship, and rendered them, from this time forward, mutually jealous of the advantages they severally gained, whether in respect to force in the provinces, or to state and popularity at Rome.

It is observed, that, from this date, Cæsar became more than formerly attentive to reports from the city, and more careful of his intelligence from thence<sup>1</sup>; and that he endeavoured to gain every person who might be of consequence in deciding the contest which he perceived must arise. Among these he paid his court in particular to Cicero, who was likely, about this time, to devote himself to Pompey, and whom he wished, at least, to keep in suspense between them: for this purpose, as appears from their correspondence, he applied, as usual, to his vanity, and, while he was piercing the woods of Britain in pursuit of Cassivelaunus and his painted followers<sup>2</sup>, affected to read and to admire verses which were sent to him by a person much more esteemed for his prose than his poetry.

The Roman army had been tempted into Britain by the hopes of finding mines of silver, but were disappointed; for, besides slaves, they found no booty in that island. Such probably likewise were the principal spoils of Gaul; yet we find their general, in consequence of

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. ep. 15. & lib. iii. ep. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. lib. ii. ep. ult. Ad Atticum, lib. iv. ep. 16.

his conquests in that country, enabled to expend great sums in supporting his influence at Rome. While Pompey procured his own appointment to the command of an army, in order to keep pace with Cæsar in the provinces, Cæsar, in his turn, projected public works at Rome to vie with the magnificence of Pompey, and with that of other citizens, who made such works a part of their policy to gain the People. For this purpose Cæsar proposed to build a Basilica<sup>3</sup>, and to enlarge the Forum, at an expence of six millions Roman money, or about fifty thousand pounds; to rail in the field of Mars with marble ballisters, and to surround the whole with a colonade or portico extending a thousand paces, or about a mile.

In these several works Cæsar affected to consult or to employ Cicero in a manner which flattered his vanity, and renewed his hopes of being able also to direct his councils<sup>4</sup> in what related to matters of State.

In the mean time, parties in the city, though engaged on the side of different competitors for office at the approaching elections, were likewise intent on the cause of Gabinus. This officer, while yet in his province, had been impeached for disobeying the orders of the Senate, and for contempt of religion in his expedition to Egypt. But having, by the influence of Pompey and of Cæsar, eluded this first attack, he set out for Rome in great confidence, and, on his journey, gave out, that he was to demand a triumph. But, upon his approach to the city, hearing in what manner the Senate and People were affected towards him, he thought proper to make his entry in the night; and being arrived, on the eighteenth of September, did not even venture to appear in the Senate for ten days. No less than three prosecutions were preparing against him: for treason, for ex-

<sup>3</sup> What the Romans called a Basilica or palace, was a kind of exchange, containing porticoes for merchants, and other public accommodations.

<sup>4</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. iv. ep. 16.

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tortion in his province, and for other crimes. The first day on which he presented himself in the Senate, the Consuls, when he would have withdrawn, commanded him to stay. And, having called the farmers of the revenue from Syria, who attended with a complaint from the province, bid them state their charge.

An altercation ensued, in which Cicero, mindful of the injuries he had received from Gabinius, took a principal part against him, and pronounced an invective, which the other returned with the abusive appellation of *fugitive*, in allusion to his late exile<sup>5</sup>. Yet, soon after, when this criminal was brought to trial for extortion in his province, Cicero, as will afterwards be mentioned, undertook, at the solicitation of Pompey, to appear in his defence.

Before this trial for extortion took place, C. Memmius, one of the Tribunes, on the ninth of October delivered to the People, with great force, a charge of treason against Gabinius<sup>6</sup>. The judgment of the Tribes being called, and sentence of condemnation likely to pass, while the Lictors were preparing to seize their prisoner, his son, a young man, with much filial piety, a virtue highly esteemed by the Romans, threw himself at the feet of the Tribune, and, being rudely spurned on the ground, happened to drop his ring, the badge of Roman nobility; the spectators were moved; Lelius Balbus, another of the Tribunes, interposed, and, with the general approbation of the People, commanded the process to stop<sup>7</sup>.

The other prosecutions nevertheless were continued against Gabinius. One before the Prætor Albius, in which, though the majority of the judges voted to acquit, there were twenty-two, out of seventy, who voted guilty<sup>8</sup>. Another before Cato, on a charge of depredation in his province, to the amount of quater millies, four hundred millions Roman money, or about three millions sterling; in

<sup>5</sup> Cicero ad Quint. frat. lib. iii.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. lib. iii.

<sup>7</sup> Val. Max. lib. viii. c. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.

this last was condemned, and forced into exile. At this trial, Pompey and Cæsar continued to employ their influence in his favour. And Cicero, although he had hitherto treated Gabinius as the author of his own exile, being reconciled to Pompey and Cæsar, no longer continued at variance with a person, who had been no more than their tool or instrument in procuring his misfortunes, and condescended, on this occasion, though ineffectually, to plead his cause<sup>9</sup>.

The approaching elections gave rise to competitions and intrigues more connected with the state of the republic, and more an indication of the manners which then prevailed. The poorer citizens came to depend for their subsistence on the distributions of corn and other gratuities, which were made or procured by those who courted popularity, or who aspired to the offices of State. Corruption became every day more flagrant and less disguised; and the laws against bribery were losing their force for want of persons to prosecute a crime, of which so many either wished to reap the benefit, or which many were so strongly tempted to commit. To supply this defect, Cato moved in the Senate, That every one elected into office should be subjected to an inquest, even if no one should prosecute<sup>10</sup>; and actually obtained an edict, requiring the ordinary judges, that were named for trials within the year, to take cognizance of the means by which candidates succeeded to office; and to set those aside who were found to have incurred the penalties of corruption<sup>11</sup>. The Tribunes interposed their negative, or suspended the effect of this resolution, until an act of the People should be obtained to confirm it. The proposal gave great offence to the parties concerned; and Cato, being attacked by the populace, narrowly escaped with his life. He afterwards, in a full assembly of the more respectable citizens, was favourably heard on this subject. But Terentius, one of the Tribunes,

<sup>9</sup> Dio. lib. xxxix. c. 63. Cicero ad Quint. frat. lib. iii. ep. 1 & 3.

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch. Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.

<sup>11</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.



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still persisting in his negative, this attempt to restrain the corrupt practices of those who canvassed for office had no effect.

The candidates themselves, in the mean time, if each could have trusted the laws for restraining others, as well as himself, from the practice of giving money; or if any number of them could have relied upon an agreement to be entered into among themselves to refrain from it, would, it is probable, have been glad to be relieved from an abuse which rendered their pretensions so expensive and so precarious. Moved by these considerations, candidates for the office of the Tribune entered into an agreement not to bribe, and deposited each a sum of money<sup>10</sup> in the hands of Cato, to be forfeited by any person who should be found acting in contravention to their treaty<sup>11</sup>. One of them, however, was detected in giving money, and accordingly forfeited his pledge.

In the competition for the Consulate, corruption was carried to the greatest excess. An office was opened, at which the candidates dealt out money to the People, who came in the order of their Tribes to receive it<sup>12</sup>. A gratuity of ten millions of sesterces<sup>13</sup>, was offered to any person who should secure the vote of the first Century, or, as it was called, the *Prerogativa*. The demand for money to be employed in this species of traffic became so great, that by the first of July interest rose from four to eight per cent.<sup>14</sup>. All the four candidates, Memmius, M. Scaurus, Cn. Domitius, and M. Messala, mutually raised prosecutions for bribery against each other; and in the course of these transactions, it appeared that Caius Memmius, once a vehement partizan of the Senate, had made his peace with Cæsar, and was now supported by his party at Rome.

<sup>10</sup> Quingena, 500,000 Roman money about 4000 l.

<sup>11</sup> Plutarch. Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 15. ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. c. 12.

<sup>12</sup> Ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 17.

<sup>13</sup> About 80,000 l.

<sup>14</sup> Ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. ep. 15. Idibus quintilibus scenus fuit besibus ex triente.

Memmius, it may be remembered, having been Prætor at the expiration of Cæsar's Consulship, brought a charge of high misdemeanour in office against him. And Cæsar appeared for some time to resent this attack; but was in reality as little to be diverted from his purpose by resentment, as he was by affection, and knew how to choose his friends from among those who had the resolution to provoke, as well as from among those who inclined to serve him. Cæsar accordingly made use of this opportunity to separate Memmius from the rest of his enemies, and by his means brought to light a scene of corruption, in which Memmius himself, with other professed supporters of the Senate, had been concerned, and which furnished Cæsar, and the supposed popular party, with a great triumph against these pretenders to purity and public virtue.

It appeared that, among other irregularities at Rome in the administration of government, even laws, and supposed acts of the Senate or People, could be forged or surreptitiously obtained. The present Consuls, Cn. Domitius, Ahenobarbus, and Ap. Claud. Pulcher, entered into a compact with two of those who were candidates to succeed them, Caius Memmius and C. Domitius Calvinus: the two first, to secure their own nomination to lucrative provinces at the expiration of their Consulship; the two others now standing for this office, to secure their elections. The parties agreed to forge an edict of the Senate and of the People, fixing the consular provinces. And a sum of money was deposited by the candidates in the hands of the Consuls, to be forfeited, if they did not support this forgery, with the evidence of three Augurs, who should vouch for the passing of the law in the assembly of the People, and two Senators of consular dignity, who should swear they were present when this allotment of provinces was confirmed by the Senate, although it was notorious that no meeting of the Senate had been held for this purpose.

Memmius.

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Memmius being gained by the parties of Cæsar and Pompey, was persuaded to sacrifice his own reputation, in order to ruin that of Domitius Ahenobarbus. He laid this strange agreement, which had been drawn up in writing, together with the bonds which had been granted upon it, before the Senate. Appius Claudius braved the detection; but Ahenobarbus, professing himself to be of a party which contended for purity and reformation of manners, incurred much disgrace and reproach.

From this transaction it should appear, not only that the assemblies of the People were extremely irregular and tumultuary, and might be made up of such persons as were by any party purposely brought to the Comitium; but that even the meetings of the Senate might be packed; that their proceedings were carelessly recorded, and might be easily forged. The numbers required to form a Comitium or assembly of the People not being fixed, any convention of persons brought from any part of Italy, occupying the usual place of assembly, might take upon them the designation and powers of the Roman People; and as the fluctuating sovereignty of the People by this means passed from one party to another, its orders were often surreptitious and contradictory, and every law might be considered as the mandate of a party or faction, not as the will of the community<sup>14</sup>. Great as these disorders were, there were at all times numerous parties who had an interest in the continuance of them; and the age, though suffering under the most grievous abuses, was still more averse to the necessary reformatations.

The infamy of this recent transaction produced a delay of the elections, until the term of the present Consuls in office was expired. An interregnum accordingly ensued. The partizans of Pompey hinted the necessity of naming a Dictator. He himself

<sup>14</sup> Dion Cassius, lib. xxxix. c. 65.

affected great reserve, in expectation that when the present troubles came to their height, the powers necessary to suppress them would, by general consent, be pressed into his hands.

In the mean time Cæsar, whose councils had so great a share in determining these events, was detained in the northern parts of Gaul, and was obliged, contrary to his usual practice, to pass the whole winter on this side of the Alps. On his return from Britain, finding that the harvest in Gaul had been unfavourable, he was tempted, in order to facilitate the subsistence of his army, to extend his quarters much farther than had been his ordinary practice. Labienus, with one division, was sent to the Moselle; Titurius Sabinus, with another, to the neighbourhood of the Meuse, near to what are now the districts of Liege and Maëstricht. Quintus Cicero was posted on some of the branches of the Scheld or the Sambre, in the county of Hainault. And the whole army, by this disposition, extended from the Seine to the Meuse about Maëstricht, and from the sea to the neighbourhood of Treves. The distance at which the posts were placed from each other being observed by the natives, who still bore with impatience the intrusion and usurpation of these strangers, tempted them to form a design against each of the quarters apart, and by cutting them off, to rid their country for ever of these imperious and insatiable guests, who acted as proprietors in every territory on which they were received, and branded every act of resistance to their unjust usurpation with the name of defection and rebellion.

In execution of this design, Ambiorix, leader of the nations which were situated in the angle, above the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine, and round the quarters of Sabinus, which are supposed to have been at a place which is now called Tongres, suddenly presented himself with a numerous body before the Roman station, and endeavoured to force the intrenchment; but being repulsed, had recourse to an artifice in which he succeeded. Affecting a great



regard for the Romans, he desired that he might have an opportunity to communicate to their general a matter of the most serious importance. An officer being sent to him upon this request, he pretended to disclose, with the utmost regret, a secret design formed by the Gauls to cut off the Roman army; gave notice that a great body of Germans had already passed the Rhine to join in the execution of this design; that he himself had been very much averse to the project; but had been obliged to give way to the popular impetuosity of his countrymen, which he could not resist; that all he could do was to warn the Romans of their danger, to the end that they might, in the most effectual manner, consult their own safety. If they chose, while it was in their power, to withdraw, and to gain the nearest station of their own people, he had influence enough to hinder their being molested on the march: but if they should hesitate for any time, or wait till the Germans arrived, it would no longer be in his power to avert the storm with which they were threatened.

This admonition, even from an enemy, after a long debate in the council of war, determined Sabinus to quit his present situation. He accordingly began a march of fifty miles towards the quarters of Quintus Cicero. And falling into a snare, which the treacherous chieftain had laid for him, perished, with an intire legion and five cohorts, of whom the greater part were put to the sword. Some got back to the station they had left, but finding no security in that place, killed themselves in despair. A very few escaped, by the woods, to Labienus on the Moselle.

The natives, thus encouraged by the success of their first operation, pushed on to the quarters of Quintus Cicero, armed and assembled the country as they passed, and arrived with such expedition, that they intercepted all the parties which were abroad in search of wood, provisions, or forage, and made so unexpected an attack on the  
Roman

Roman station, as left Cicero scarcely time sufficient to man his intrenchments. They renewed the artifice which they had practised with so much success against Sabinus. But Cicero, though unacquainted with the manner in which that officer had been betrayed, determined to remain in his camp, and as soon as possible to give intimation of his danger to Cæsar. For this purpose he strengthened his post with additional works, and published a reward to the first person who should succeed in carrying intelligence to the nearest quarter of the Roman army.

The enemy being about sixty thousand men, formed a circle, facing to the centre, quite round the Roman intrenchment; and, the more effectually to cut off all communication of supplies or intelligence from without, effected a line of circumvallation, consisting of a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a breastwork eleven feet high, extending over a circumference of fifteen miles<sup>15</sup>. In this work, being unprovided with intrenching tools, they were obliged to cut the turf with their swords. But having begun it by a sufficient number of hands in all its parts at once, they, according to Cæsar's account, completed the whole in three hours.

From this line, which they formed by the direction of some Italian deserters, they made regular approaches to the Roman intrenchment; and having pushed their turrets quite up to the ditch, threw, by means of their slings, red hot bullets and burning darts into the thatch with which the huts of the camp were covered; set them on fire; and, in the midst of the confusion which arose from this circumstance, endeavoured to scale the palisade and the parapet.

While Cicero continued, with great ability and courage, to withstand these attacks, the persons who endeavoured to carry the tidings of his situation to Cæsar were repeatedly intercepted, and cruelly tortured, to deter others from renewing the same attempt. The in-

<sup>15</sup> Cæsar de Bell. Galico, lib. v. c. 42.

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telligence, however, by means of a native Gaul, who, availing himself of the dress, manners, and language of his country, passed unobserved through the lines of the enemy, was at last carried to the head-quarters of the Roman army.

Cæsar, as usual, trusting more to dispatch and rapid execution than to the numbers of his men, left a legion at Samarobriwa<sup>16</sup> to guard his stores, magazines, and baggage, and with two other legions, not exceeding seven thousand men, being all that, without hazarding an improper delay, he could assemble, hastened his march to the quarters of Cicero. He dispatched two messengers, one to Labienus, with orders, if possible, to put the troops under his command in motion towards the Meuse, and another to Quintus Cicero himself, with hopes or assurances of immediate relief. The first messenger found Labienus beset with a numerous army of Gauls, and therefore unable to move; the other, having come to the foot of Cicero's intrenchment, cast the billet which contained the intelligence, wound up on the shaft of a dart, against one of the towers, where it stuck, and hung for some days unobserved; but being found at last, it was carried to Cicero, and gave notice of Cæsar's approach. At the same time the fire and the smoke of his camp began to appear on the plain, and gave both parties equal intimation of his coming.

The Gauls, without delay, got in motion with all their force, and having abandoned their lines of circumvallation, advanced to meet Cæsar. Cicero sent him intelligence of this movement of the enemy. The armies arrived nearly at the same time on the opposite sides of a brook running in a hollow tract between steep banks, which neither party in the presence of the other could venture to pass.

Cæsar, supposing that the great inequality of his numbers might inspire the Gauls with contempt, endeavoured, by exceeding his usual caution, to feed their presumption. He affected to chuse a ground

<sup>16</sup> Amiens.

that was fit to secure his camp; and contracting its limits, crowded both his legions within the dimensions which were usually occupied by one. In this posture he meant to await the effects of the enemy's temerity, or, if they declined passing the brook, to avail himself of the security they were likely to feel, and to attack them in their own camp by surprize.

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The event justified Cæsar in his first expectation. The Gauls, trusting to the superiority of their numbers, thought they had nothing to dread but the escape of their enemy; and they accordingly passed the rivulet, with intention to force his lines. Instead of defending his camp, he poured forth his army at once from all its avenues, and, with the advantage of a surprize upon those who came to attack him, and by the great superiority of the Romans, when mixed sword in hand with an enemy, routed, dispersed, or forced to lay down their arms, the greater part of this multitude which came to attack him with so much ferocity and confidence.

By this victory Cæsar not only relieved Quintus Cicero, whom he joined the same evening, but likewise dispelled the cloud which hung over the other quarters of his army, of which many had been at the same time invested by the natives. These insurrections, however, which kept all the inhabitants of the low countries in motion, even in the most unfavourable season, gave him the prospect of an early and a busy campaign, and so much disconcerted the plan which he had formed for the winter, that he was hindered from making his usual journey across the Alps.

During this necessary stay in Gaul, it does not appear that the interests which Cæsar commonly studied were suffering in any considerable degree at Rome. The civil government in the city was hastening fast to its ruin, and the longest sword was soon likely to decide the sovereignty of the empire. The office of Consul was unoccupied, and continued to be so from the beginning of January to the  
middle



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middle of July. In all this time there was no administration of justice<sup>17</sup>, nor any exercise of magistracy, besides that of the interrex, who, during the five days of his appointment, was supposed to have no other object besides the elections of Consuls. This object was vainly attempted by every successive interrex. The popular tumults were fomented by the Tribunes who were in the interest of Pompey; and some prodigy, or unfortunate presage, was continually alleged, to prevent the elections. The Senate striving to put an end to these disorders, even ventured to commit to prison Q. Pompeius Rufus, a Tribune, who seemed to be most active in disturbing the public peace. The occasion seemed ripe for the execution of Pompey's design; and accordingly another Tribune, Lucceius Hirrus, known to be in the secret of Pompey's intrigues, moved that he should be named Dictator<sup>18</sup>. He himself, as usual on such occasions, absented himself from the assembly, and still kept it in his power to avow or disown the measures of his creatures.

This motion was strongly opposed by Cato, and appeared to be extremely disagreeable to all the principal members of the Senate<sup>19</sup>. Pompey therefore thought proper to disclaim it, denied his having encouraged the Tribune to make it, and even refused to accept of the Dictatorship; adding, That he had been called to the exercise of great powers earlier than he himself had expected; and that he had always resigned his powers earlier than had been expected by any one else<sup>20</sup>. In this was expressed the great object of Pompey's ambition; he preferred this point of estimation to the possession of power. The odium of the proposed measure fell upon Lucceius Hirrus, the Tribune who moved it, and had nearly brought upon him a deposition or degradation from his office. Cato, willing to gain

<sup>17</sup> Plutarch. in Pompeio, p. 483.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Plutarch. in Pompeio. D. Con. Cicero  
epist. ad Quint. frat. lib. iii. ep. 9.

<sup>20</sup> Plutarch. in Vit. Pompeii.

Pompey,

Pompey, or to confirm him in the virtue he assumed, pronounced an encomium on this act of moderation, recommended the republic to his care, and encouraged him in the resolution he had taken, to prefer the esteem of his fellow-citizens even to the power of disposing of their lives and fortunes at his pleasure. Pompey from thenceforward joined with the Senate in bringing on the elections; and accordingly, after seven months interval of confusion and anxiety, Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messala were chosen and entered on office in the month of July.

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U. C. 700.  
Cn. Dom.  
Calvinus,  
M. Val.  
Messala, Coss.

While Pompey was endeavouring, by his intrigues in the city, to make a species of monarchy in his own person appear to be necessary, Cæsar was in fact providing himself with the only means which, in so distracted a state, can either acquire or preserve such a power. He was joining three additional legions to the establishment of his province; and, under pretence of his late loss on the Meuse, or of his fears of a general defection in Gaul, he had the address to bring into his own service a legion which had been recently formed in Italy under the commission of Pompey. These he now borrowed, and either actually debauched, or rendered of doubtful fidelity, if ever it should be proposed to recall or employ them against himself.

While he took these measures for the augmentation of his forces, and before the end of winter, having intelligence that the Nervii, or the inhabitants of the county of Hainault, held frequent consultations together, and were about to take arms, he determined to prevent them; and for this purpose, with four legions drawn from the nearest quarters, he marched into their country, and, without meeting with any opposition, destroyed their habitations, moved away their cattle, and made many prisoners. He continued these severities until the natives, reduced to great distress, implored his mercy, and gave hostages for their future submission.

Having,

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Having, in the course of this winter, called the nations of Gaul to a general convention at an island in the Seine<sup>21</sup>, he began the operations of the following summer by punishing some of the cantons<sup>22</sup>, who had absented themselves from that assembly, and who, by this act of disrespect, had incurred his resentment, or given him suspicion of hostile intentions. The principal object of the campaign, however, was the punishment of Ambiorix and his countrymen, by whom, as has been related, Sabinus, with a legion and five cohorts, had been circumvented and cut off in the beginning of the preceding winter.

As the Romans scarcely appear to have conceived that any people had a right to withstand their invasions, and treated as rebellion every attempt a nation once vanquished made to recover its liberties, Cæsar states it as necessary for the credit of the Roman army, for the security of their quarters, and for preventing such acts of supposed perfidy for the future, that the subjects of Ambiorix should suffer an exemplary punishment. To secure this effect, he projected two expeditions; one to the right and the other to the left of this enemy's country, with intention to preclude them from any retreat or assistance on either side. He penetrated into the woods and marshes of Brabant, or on the left of the Meuse, and obliged the inhabitants to come under engagements not to assist or harbour his enemies.

From thence, still avoiding to give any alarm to the nation which was the principal object of these operations, and having formerly sent his baggage under an escort of two legions to the Moselle, he now followed in the same direction with the whole army; and finding that Labienus had, by a recent victory, vanquished all his enemies in that quarter, he continued his march to the Rhine, constructed a bridge on that river a little way higher up than the place at which

<sup>21</sup> Now Paris.<sup>22</sup> The Senones and Carnutes.

he had formerly passed it, and once more set foot upon German ground.

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The Suevi, and other great migrating nations of that continent, having moved to the eastward, leaving nothing behind them but deserts, on which no army could subsist, he contented himself with exacting hostages from the Ubii and other contiguous nations, to secure their neutrality, or rather to make sure of their concurrence in the future operations of the war. And with these pledges he re-passed the Rhine, broke down part of his bridge, and left a guard of twelve cohorts properly intrenched to secure the remainder.

From thence he sent forward his cavalry, with orders to make quick and silent marches into the countries between the Rhine and the Meuse, and himself followed with the infantry. Hitherto Ambiorix and his countrymen, who were the principal objects of all these operations, had taken no alarm, and had enjoyed such perfect security, that the leader himself, upon the arrival of Cæsar's horse, narrowly escaped, and had no more than time, by a general intimation, to warn his people to consult their own safety. They accordingly separated, part hid themselves in the contiguous marshes, others endeavoured to find refuge with some neighbouring nations, or fled to the islands that were formed at the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine.

Cæsar, as if he had been forming a party of hunters, separated his army into three divisions; sent Labienus with one division to pursue those who fled to the confluence of the two rivers; Tribonius with the second up the course of the Meuse; and he himself, in pursuit of Ambiorix, directed his march to the Scheld. His orders were, that each division should put all they met to the sword, and calculate their time so as to return to the place of general rendezvous in seven days.



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To render this execution the more complete, all the neighbouring nations were invited to partake in the spoils of a country that was doomed to destruction. Among the parties who were allured by this invitation, two thousand German horse had passed the Rhine, and continued to ravage all before them in a body. Cæsar, in making a disposition for his present march, had lodged the whole baggage of his army at the station (supposed to be Tongres), which in the preceding winter had been fortified for the quarters of Sabinus. Here the works being still intire, he left a guard with his baggage under the command of Quintus Tullius Cicero.

The Germans, in the present instance, knowing no distinction of friend or enemy, ceased to plunder the natives of the country, and turned all their thoughts on seizing the baggage of the Roman army. Their coming was so little expected, that the traders and sutlers who had erected their stalls and displayed their merchandise, as usual, without the intrenchment, had no time to save their effects. Numbers of Cicero's baggage-guard were abroad in search of forage. The remainder with difficulty manned the avenues of their post, and must have been forced, if the foragers, upon hearing the noise with which the Germans began the attack, had not returned to their relief, and forced their way through the enemy, who, mistaking them for the vanguard of Cæsar's army, thought proper to consult their own safety by an immediate flight.

Cæsar, upon his return to the post at which he had left his baggage, censured the officer commanding the guard for having divided his party, and for having omitted, on the supposition of any degree of security whatever, any part of the precautions usual upon such a duty. He proceeded to complete the revenge he had projected against the unhappy followers of Ambiorix, with sending parties in every direction to burn every house, and lay waste every field that had been formerly spared or overlooked; and this being done on the approach  
of

of winter, made the destruction complete, as the few who escaped the sword were certain to perish by famine, or by the asperity of the season. C H A P.  
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Cæsar having in this manner made an example, which he supposed was to overawe all the nations of that neighbourhood, he withdrew with his army from a country in which he had made it impossible for any numbers of men to subsist; and having stationed two of his legions on the Moselle, and the remainder on the Marne, on the Seine, and the Loire, he himself hastened into Italy, where all his views and preparations ultimately centred. The scene of political intrigue, in which Crassus had hitherto bore a part with Pompey and himself, was now, in consequence of recent events on the other extremity of the empire, about to undergo a great change, that was likely to affect the conduct of all the parties concerned.

In the spring, Crassus had taken the field on the frontier of Syria, with seven legions, four thousand horse, and an equal number of light or irregular troops. With this force he passed the Euphrates, was joined by an Arabian chieftain, who is mentioned by historians under different names, of Acbarus<sup>23</sup> or Ariamnes, in whom, on account of his supposed knowledge of the country, the Roman general had placed great confidence. Here he expected likewise to have been joined by Artabazes, King of Armenia; but Orodes, now on the throne of the Parthians, prevented this junction, by invading the kingdom of Armenia in person, while he left Surena, a young warrior of great reputation, in Mesopotamia, to oppose the Romans.

Crassus intended to have followed the course of the Euphrates to where it approaches nearest to Seleucia and Ctesiphon, the capital of the Parthian kingdom; but was dissuaded by Ariamnes, who prevailed on him to direct his march eastward on the plains to meet

<sup>23</sup> Plutarch & Dion Cass.

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Surena, as not in a condition to oppose him. Some parties too, that were advanced to examine the country, reported that they had been on the tract of departing cavalry, but that no enemy was any where to be seen. Thus Crassus was induced to quit the Euphrates, and, agreeably to the directions of his guide, took the route of Carræ eastward. This place he fortified in his way, and occupied with a garrison. From thence, in a few marches, he arrived in sandy and barren plains, without trees, herbage, or water. While the army, though discouraged by these appearances, still continued its march, a few horsemen belonging to the advanced guard returned to the main body with signs of terror, and brought an account that their division had been furrounded by numerous bodies of horse, and to a few cut off. That the enemy were advancing apace, and must soon appear. Crassus at first fearing to be outlined by the enemy, extended his front as far as he possibly could; but recollecting that the Parthians were all on horseback, and by the rapidity of their motions might easily gain either or both his flanks, so that it was proper to present a front in every direction, he changed his disposition from a line to a square, having his cavalry on the angles.

The Roman army being thus compacted, the Parthians appeared on every side, came within reach of an arrow shot, and galled them without intermission. The weapons of the Romans, in this situation, availed them nothing; even the shield could not cover them from arrows, that showered from every quarter, and in many different directions. They stood however in their place with some degree of courage, in hopes that the quivers of the Parthians must soon be exhausted, and that this enemy would be obliged either to join them in close fight, or to retire. But they found themselves deceived in this expectation, observing that the enemy had a herd of camels in their rear, loaded with arrows, and that the quivers of those in the front were continually replenished from thence. At the same time Ari-

annes,

amnes, the Arabian, deserted, and was perceived to go over to the enemy. The desertion of this traitor, by discovering that his pretended attachment, and his council, which had been unhappily followed, was only a piece of barbarous treachery to draw the army into its present situation, completed the general discouragement which the Romans had already begun to feel. They crowded together in despair, and oppressed with heat and thirst, or stifled with dust, they continued for a while, like beasts caught in a snare, to present an easy prey to their enemies.

In this extremity, Crassus determined to make an effort with his cavalry to drive the enemy so far off, as not to be able to reach his infantry with their arrows. His son Publius accordingly formed the Roman horse into one body, and made a general charge. The Parthians gave way in seeming disorder. The young man advanced with great impetuosity as against a flying enemy, and in hopes of completing his victory: but the Parthians, under cover of the dust which every where arose, instead of flying before him, as he supposed, were actually turning on his flanks, and even falling behind him to encompass his rear. The legions at the same time, happy to be relieved from the attack of the enemy, quitted their ground, and for a little resumed their march, which enabled the Parthians the more effectually to surround the horse; but the father, recollecting the danger to which he exposed his son, again prevailed on them to halt. In this situation, a few of the horse arrived, with accounts that they had been surrounded, that Crassus, the son, was slain, and the whole cavalry cut off, except a few who escaped to the father with these melancholy tidings.

Night, however, was fast approaching, and the Parthians, on a sudden, withdrew, sensible that their way of fighting would expose them to many disadvantages in the dark. It was always their practice to retire at night to a considerable distance from the enemy  
whom



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whom they had harassed by day, and upon these occasions they generally fled like an army defeated, until they had removed so far, as to make it safe for them to pasture their horses, and to store up their arms. Crassus apprised of this practice, took the benefit of the night to continue his retreat, and abandoning the sick and wounded of his army, made a considerable march before it was day. But the advance he had gained, was not sufficient to hinder his being overtaken by the same enemy, and again involved in the same distress. Having his defeats and his flights renewed on every succeeding day, he arrived at last at the post which he had fortified at Carræ, and there found some respite from the attacks of the enemy. At this place, however, it was not possible to make any considerable stay, as the whole provisions of the army were lost or consumed, and such supplies as the country around might have furnished, were entirely in the power of the enemy. Nor was it convenient to depart immediately. The moon was then at the full, and night was almost as favourable to the Parthians as day. In these circumstances, it was determined to wait for the wain of the moon, and then, if possible, to elude the enemy again by marches in the night.

In this interval, the army mutinied against Crassus, and offered the command to Caius Cassius; but he, although desired even by Crassus himself, declined to accept of it<sup>22</sup>. The troops of consequence no longer obeyed any command, and separated into two bodies. The first went off by the plains on the nearest way into Syria: the other took the route of the mountains; and if they could reach them before the enemy, hoped to cleave into Cappadocia or Armenia. The first division was accompanied or commanded by Cassius, who, though with considerable loss, led them back into Syria. The other, with Crassus himself, was pursued by Surena, and harassed on every

<sup>22</sup> Dio. lib. iv. c. 22.

ground where the Parthian horse could ply on their flank or their rear. Being exposed to frequent losses, they suffered a continual diminution of their numbers, and were not likely to be long in condition to avoid the enemy, or make any resistance.

Surena, apprehending that these remains of the Roman army might gain the mountains before he could force them to surrender, sent a deputation to Crassus, proposing at some intermediate place, between the two armies, a conference, to which each should bring a stipulated number of attendants. While this message was delivering, Surena himself appeared at a little distance on an eminence, waved with his hand, and in token of peace, unbent his bow. Crassus distrusting the faith of this barbarous enemy, who was supposed to hold perfidy lawful, as a stratagem of war, declined the conference; but his troops, weary of continual fatigue and danger, and flattering themselves that by an accommodation an end might be speedily put to their sufferings, expressed such a desire of the conference, as their general, in this situation, could not safely withstand. He put himself therefore, with a few friends, under the direction of Surena's messengers, and submitted to be led to their general; but on the way, finding himself treated as a prisoner, he refused to proceed, and having made some resistance, was slain. The army separated into sundry divisions, a few escaped into Armenia or Syria, the greater part fell into the enemy's hands<sup>25</sup>.

Thus died Crassus, commonly reputed a rare instance of ambition, joined with avarice, and a mean capacity. It is not to be doubted, that in point of ambition he even rivaled Pompey and Cæsar; and it is probable, therefore, that his avarice was merely subservient to this passion. It is quoted, as a saying of his, that no man who aspired to a principal place in the republic should be reputed rich,

<sup>25</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xl. Plutarch in Crass.

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unless he could maintain an army at his own expence<sup>26</sup>. Such was the use of wealth, which, in place of equipages, horses, and dogs, occurred to a rich man of that age at Rome. Of his capacity we cannot form a high opinion, either from the judgment of his contemporaries, or from his own conduct<sup>27</sup>. It appears indeed, that he owed his consequence more to his wealth, than to his genius or personal qualities of any kind. On account of his wealth, probably, he was considered by Cæsar and Pompey as a person, who, if neglected by them, might throw a weight into the scale of their enemies; and he was admitted into their councils, as a person fit to witness their transactions, and on occasion to hold the balance in suspense between them. These circumstances placed him among the competitors for the principal influence at Rome, and makes his death an æra in the history of those factions which were hastening to overwhelm the republic. By this event, his associates Cæsar and Pompey, already disjoined by the dissolution of their family connection, were left to contend for the superiority, without any third person to hold this species of balance between them.

The calm which had succeeded the late election of Consuls was but of short duration. The time of electing their successors was fast approaching, and the candidates Scipio, Milo, and Hipsæus, were already declared. Clodius, at the same time, stood for the office of Prætor. Scipio was by birth the son of Metellus Pius, adopted into the Cornelian family by Scipio Nasica. His daughter, in consequence of this adoption, bearing the name of Cornelia, the widow of young Crassus, was recently married to Pompey, who, upon this connection, supported Scipio, his father-in-law, in his pretensions

<sup>26</sup> Cicero de officiis, lib. i. c. 8.

<sup>27</sup> Is igitur mediocriter a doctrina instructus; angustius etiam a natura, &c. Cicero de claris oratoribus, c. 66. Ad Atticum, lib. iv. ep. 13.

to the Consulate. Milo had a powerful support from the senate, in whose cause he had retorted the arts and violences of the seditious demagogues against themselves. Clodius had great interest with the populace, and from inveterate animosity to Milo and to his party, joined all his interest with Scipio and Hypsæus against him.

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It is in the nature of human things to advance, in accumulating the good or evil to which they tend. These competitors, in contending for the streets and the usual places of canvassing the people, joined to the former arts of distributing money, and of exciting popular tumults, the use of an armed force, and a species of military operations in the city. Three parties in arms every day paraded in different quarters of the town, and wherever they encountered, violence and bloodshed generally followed. The opposite parties of Hypsæus and Milo had fought a battle in the *Via Sacra*; many of both sides were killed, and the Consul Calvinus was wounded in attempting to quell the riot.

These disorders so long obstructed the elections, that the term of the present Consuls in office expired, before the nomination of any successors; and every legal power in the commonwealth being suspended, the former state of anarchy, with accumulating distractions, again ensued. The Senate, and the other friends of Milo, would gladly have hastened the elections, but were hindered by the partizans of the other candidates. The populace too enjoying this season of gratuities, of entertainments, and of publick shews, in which the competitors continued to waste their fortunes, were glad to have the canvas prolonged<sup>28</sup>.

U. C. 701.

When the Senate proposed to have recourse to the remedy usual in such disorders of the state, by naming an Interrex, the only title under which any person could preside in restoring the magistracy by an

<sup>28</sup> Pædianus in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.



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election of Consuls, they were forbid by the Tribune Munatius Plancus, who was supposed to co-operate with Pompey in some design, to be favoured by deferring every measure that was proposed for the restoration of order.

In the midst of this scene, which kept the minds of men in fear of some general calamity, an accident happened, which brought the disorder to a height, and forced every party to accept of a remedy. On the 13th of the kalends of February, or the 20th of January, Milo going to Lanuvium, a town about fifteen miles from Rome, of which he was chief magistrate, about three o'clock in the afternoon, met with Clodius returning from his country seat at Aricia. Milo was in a carriage with his wife Fausta, the daughter of Sylla, and a friend Fufius. He had a numerous escort, amounting to some hundreds of servants in arms, and, in particular, was attended by two noted gladiators, Eudamus and Birria. Clodius was on horseback, with a retinue of thirty servants likewise in arms. It is likely that this encounter was altogether accidental; for the companies continued on their way without any disturbance, till Birria, the gladiator, unwilling to pass without giving some specimen of his calling, as he straggled a little behind his party, quarrelled with some of the followers of Clodius. A fray ensued: Clodius himself returned to quell it, or to punish the authors of it; but meeting with little respect among the gladiators, received a wound in the shoulder, and was carried to be dressed in the inn at Bovillæ, near to which place the disturbance began. Milo being told of what had passed, likewise returned to the place; and thinking it safer to end their quarrels there, than await the revenge of an enemy thus provoked, who would not fail, at the head of his faction in the city, to rouse the fury of the populace against him, encouraged his people to pursue their advantage: they accordingly forced their way into the inn, dragged Clodius

dious from thence, and having killed him, and dispersed all his followers, left him dead of many wounds in the highway.

Sextus Tedijs, a Senator, happening to pass, put the body into his own carriage, and sent his servants with it to Rome. They arrived before six at night, and proceeding directly to the house of the deceased, which stood on the Palatine hill over the Forum, laid the corpse in the vestibule.

The servants of the family, and multitudes from the streets immediately crowded to see this spectacle. Fulvia, the wife of Clodius, stood over the body, and with loud lamentations uncovered and pointed out the wounds of her deceased husband. The crowd continued to encrease all night, and until break of day, when Q. Munatius Plancus, and Q. Pompeius Rufus, Tribunes of the People, likewise repaired to the same place, and gave orders to carry the dead body naked to the market place, and there to leave it exposed to publick view on the Rostra; and at the same time accompanied this spectacle with inflammatory harangues to the people.

Sextus Claudius, kinsman of the deceased, soon after removed the body from the market-place to the Senate house, meaning to reproach the order of Senators as accessory to the murder. The populace, who still followed in great numbers, burst into the place, tore up the benches, and brought into a heap the materials, with the tables and desks of the clerks, the journals and records of the Senate, and having set the whole on fire, consumed the corpse on this extraordinary pile. The fire soon reached the roof, and spread to the contiguous buildings. The Tribunes, Plancus and Rufus, who were all this while exhorting the people to vengeance, were driven from the Rostra by the flames which burst from the buildings around them. The Senate-house, the Porcia Basilica, and other edifices were reduced to ashes.

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The same persons, by whom this fire had been kindled, repaired to the house of M. Lepidus, who, upon the first alarm of an insurrection, had been named Interrex, forced into the hall, broke down the images of the family ancestors, tore from the looms the webs, in weaving of which the industry of Roman matrons was still employed, and destroyed what else they could reach. From thence, they proceeded to attack the house of Milo, but there met with a more proper reception. This house, during the riots, in which the master of it had borne so great a part, was become a kind of fortress, and, among the other provisions made for its defence, was manned with archers, who plied those who attacked it with arrows from the windows and terrace, in such manner as soon obliged them to withdraw.

The rioters being repelled from the house of Milo, crowded to the Temple, in which the Consular Fasces, during the Interregnum, were kept, seized them by force, and carried them to the houses of Scipio and Hypæus, the present popular candidates for the Consulate; these, without any other form of election, they pressed to assume the ensigns of Consular power. But not having prevailed in this proposal, they proceeded to the house of Pompey, saluting him, with mixed shouts of Consul or Dictator, according as they wished him to assume the one or the other of these titles or dignities.

From this time, for some days, an armed populace, mixed with slaves, continued, under pretence of searching for Milo and his adherents, to pillage every place they could enter<sup>29</sup>. And the partizans of the candidates, Hypæus and Scipio, thinking they had Milo at a disadvantage, beset the house of the Interrex; and, though it was not customary for the first in this nomination to proceed to the elections, they clamoured for an immediate assembly of the people for

<sup>29</sup> Appian de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

this purpose. The party of Milo, though professing likewise to join the same clamour for an immediate election, came to blows with their opponents, and protected the house and the person of the Interrex from farther violence.

Milo himself, who was at first supposed to have fled or gone into exile, hearing of the excesses committed by the opposite party, and of the general inclination of the more sober part of the citizens to check and disappoint their violence, ventured again to appear in the city, and at the head of his friends, renewed his canvass. A succession of officers, with the title of Interrex, continued to be named at the expiration of every usual term of five days; but such was the confusion and distraction of the scene, that no election could be made. The Senate, under the greatest alarm, gave to the Interrex, and to the Tribunes of the People, to whom they joined Pompey, who by virtue of his proconsular commission as Purveyor of Corn for the People, held a public character in the State, the usual charge given to the Consuls, to watch over the safety of the republic. They even recommended to Pompey to make the necessary levies throughout Italy, and to provide a military force to act for the commonwealth, in repressing the disorders which were committed by the candidates for office.

Under the protection of such temporary expedients, to restrain the violence with which all parties endeavoured to do themselves justice, some applied for redress, in the way of prosecution and civil suit. The two Claudii, nephews of the deceased Publius Clodius, demanded that the slaves of Milo, or those of his wife Faufta, should be put to the torture, in order to force a discovery of the manner in which their uncle was killed. The two Valerii, Nepos and Leo, with Lucius Hereinius Balbus, joined in the same demand. On the opposite party, a like demand against the slaves of the deceased Publius Clodius was made by Cælius, one of the Tribunes; and a  
prosecution



prosecution for violence and corruption was entered by Manlius Cænianus against Hypsæus and Scipio, the competitors of Milo, for the office of Consul.

Milo, in answer to the demand that was made to have his slaves put to the torture, pleaded that the persons, now demanded as slaves, were actually freemen, he having manumitted them as a reward for their faithful services in defending his person against a late attempt made by Clodius on his life. It was alleged, on the other hand, that they were manumitted to evade the law, to preserve them from the torture, and to screen himself from the evidence which they might in that manner be obliged to give. M. Cælius and Manlius Cænianus being Tribunes, and disposed to favour Milo, had ventured to vindicate him to the People, and to load Clodius as the aggressor, and the intended assassin in the fray which cost him his life. Cicero too, with great zeal and courage, while the friends of Milo were yet unsafe in the streets, maintained the same argument in the Senate, and before the people<sup>30</sup>. Milo, however, would have been glad to make a composition; and as Pompey had all along, in the competition for the Consulship, favoured not only Scipio but likewise Hypsæus against him, he offered to drop his pretension in favour of those candidates, if Pompey would agree to suppress the prosecutions that were commencing against him. To these proposals Pompey refused to listen. He probably thought the election secure for his friends, and by affecting a zeal for justice, hoped to increase his authority with the people.

The partizans of Pompey, in the midst of this wild and disorderly state of affairs, were busy in renewing the cry which they had raised in the former interregnum, that he should be named Dictator, for the re-establishment of order, and the restoration of the public peace.

<sup>30</sup> Afcon. Padian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

Such an extraordinary power had never been at any time more wanted in the republic; but the times, in which it might be safely applied, were no more. The name of Dictator recalled the memory of Sylla's executions, and it appeared to be uncertain against whom they might now be directed. To avoid the title more than the power of Dictator, Bibulus moved in the Senate, that all the present candidates for the Consulate should be set aside, and that the Interrex should assemble the people for the election of Pompey sole Consul. Cato, to the surprize of every body, seconded this motion. He observed, that any magistracy was preferable to none, and that if the republic must be governed by a single person, none was so fit for the charge as the person now proposed. Pompey being present, thanked Cato for this declaration of his esteem, and said he would accept of the charge, in hopes of being aided by his council. Cato made answer, in terms, meant to be literally interpreted, but which, in other instances of the same kind, under an aspect of fullness, have been intended to flatter, That he meant no favour to Pompey, and deserved no thanks from him: that his intention was to serve the republic.

It was resolved, in terms of this motion, that Pompey should be presented to the people as sole candidate for the office of Consul, and that after two months were elapsed, he might propose any other candidate to be joined in this office <sup>31</sup> with himself. The election was accordingly brought on by the Interrex Servius Sulpitius, on the twenty-fourth of February, and Pompey declared sole Consul <sup>32</sup>, with a commission from the Senate to arm, if necessary, the inhabitants of Italy, for the better establishment of order in the city.

Pompey sole  
Consul.

The first object of Pompey, in the high and unprecedented dignity which was now conferred upon him, appears to have been the fram-

<sup>31</sup> Plutarch, in Vit. Pomp. & Catonis, Dio. lib. xl.

<sup>32</sup> Acon. Pædian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

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ing of some laws to restrain for the future such disorders as had lately prevailed, and to bring criminals to justice. For this purpose, he obtained an act to enforce the laws which already subsisted against violence and corruption; and to regulate the form of proceeding in trials on such criminal accusations.

By the regulations now suggested by Pompey, every trial was to end in four days. The examination of evidence might occupy the three first; the hearing of parties, and the judgment, the fourth. The prosecutor was allowed two hours to support his charge, and the defendant three hours to make his defence. The number of advocates was restricted, and the use of commendatory characters prohibited<sup>31</sup>. The *Quesitor*, or Judge Criminal, was to be chosen from among those who had held the office of Consul, and eighty judges or jurors were to be impannelled, and obliged to attend the trial. After the evidence and pleadings were heard, the parties were then allowed each to challenge or reject fifteen of the jury or judges, or five from each of the orders of which they were composed; and the court being thus reduced to fifty one, they were to be inclosed and to give judgment<sup>32</sup>.

Corruption was become so frequent, and so much a necessary art in conducting elections, that it was difficult to find any one willing to prosecute this crime. To remedy this defect, a clause was enacted in the law of Pompey, by which any person formerly convicted of bribery, might obtain a remission of the penalties he had incurred by convicting any one other person of a crime equal, or by convicting two persons, though of a crime less heinous than his own. By these means, it was proposed that one conviction should produce still more in succession. That conviction, in every instance, should be attended with infamy; but that the pains of law should ultimately

<sup>31</sup> Dio, Cass. lib. xl. c. 53.<sup>32</sup> Acon. Pæd. *ibid*.

rest only on such person as could not find another on whom to shift the burden from himself<sup>35</sup>.

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These regulations were made with a particular view to the trial of Milo, now arraigned on the statutes both of corruption, and of violence or assassination. The passing of these laws was opposed on this account by the friends of the accused, who alleged, that they were not acts of legislation, but acts of attainder, having a retrospect to the case of a party concerned in a past transaction. Cælius the Tribune, and Cicero, maintained this argument. Pompey replied with impatience, That if he were hindered to proceed in a legal way, he should employ force<sup>36</sup>. He appeared to entertain some animosity against Milo, such at least as they who love to govern, have to others who appear not to be easily governed. He either had, or affected to have, apprehensions of danger to his own person, confessed or affected this apprehension in the Senate, and retired, as for safety, to his own house in the suburbs: there he retained, for the guard of his person, a party of armed men; and there too, under the same affectation of withdrawing from violence, he caused the assemblies of the Senate to be held.

The Aristocratical or Senatorian party was much interested in the preservation of Milo: they had been frequently assailed by the popular rioters, who set the laws at defiance; and as the laws had not always been of sufficient force to protect their persons, it was their interest to protect those who, on occasion, had set aside the laws in their defence. The argument, in equity, indeed was strong on the side of Milo. During the late suspension of government, the factions were rather separate parties at war, than subjects enjoying the protection, and amenable to the jurisdiction of any civil power whatever. They who procured or prolonged this state of anarchy, were alone chargeable with the consequences. In this contest, which could

<sup>35</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xl. c. 52.

<sup>36</sup> *Ascon. Pædian, in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.*



not be maintained without force or violent measures, the friends of the republic and of the Senate were badly circumstanced. They contended for laws, and a constitution which might be turned against the very irregularities which had been necessary to their own preservation; while the opposite faction, if defeated, might claim the protection of forms, which they had endeavoured to subvert.

It would have been just, perhaps, to have closed the late scene of confusion with a general indemnity, and to have taken precautions for the regular uninterrupted exercise of government in future. This, however, would not have calmed the resentments of those who were aggrieved, and Pompey determined to signalize his government by a more specious appearance of justice. Domitius Ahenobarbus was chosen commissioner for the trial of Milo, on the charge of murder; and the other judges, taken from among the most respectable of each order in the commonwealth, were impanelled in terms of the late statute. The criminal was cited to answer this charge on the fourth of April; and on the same day, to answer a charge of corruption brought against him in the ordinary court of the Prætor Manlius. Marcellus appeared for him at the bar of the Prætor, and procured a delay until the other trial should be ended.

The court, it appears, was assembled in the Forum or open market place. There was a tribunal or bench raised in for the judges. The whole space was crowded with multitudes of people. The prosecutors began with examining Cassinius Schola, who had been in company with Clodius when he was killed. This witness gave direct evidence to the fact, and exaggerated the atrocity of the crime. Marcellus would have cross-questioned him; but the populace, and many others who assembled in the crowd who favoured the prosecution, raised a menacing cry, which alarmed the accused and his counsel so much, that they claimed the protection of the court. They were accordingly received within the rails, and the judge ap-

plied to the Consul, who had taken his station near to the place of assembly, in order to restrain, by his presence, any disorders that might arise at the trial. Pompey, who was then attended only by his lictors, was himself likewise alarmed by that disorderly shout, and said, that, for the future, a proper force should be provided to keep the peace. He accordingly, on the following day, filled every avenue, which led to the Forum, with men under arms; and, upon some tumult among the populace, gave an order that the place should be cleared. In the execution of this order numbers were killed.

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Under the impression made by this vigorous exertion of power, the witnesses continued to be examined for two days without any disturbance. Among these the inhabitants of Bovillæ, the family and relations of Clodius, and his wife Fulvia, were examined on the several circumstances that fell within their knowledge, and left no doubt remaining with respect to the fact. The minds of men every day became more intent on the issue: so that, on the fourth day, when the parties were to plead, all other business was suspended in the city; the shops and offices were shut.

There appeared for the prosecutors Appius Claudius, M. Antonius, and Valerius Nepos. They began at eight, and spoke till ten. For the defender appeared Q. Hortensius, M. Marcellus, M. Calidius, Faustus Sylla, M. Cato, and M. T. Cicero, of whom the last only attempted to speak. Some were of opinion, that, as the fact was undeniable, it ought to be justified on the plea of necessity and public expedience. Cicero himself thought this too bold a plea, and therefore chose that of self-defence, alleging that Clodius was the aggressor, and intended to assassinate Milo. It is remarked of this celebrated orator, that he began all his orations under considerable solicitude and awe of his audience. On this occasion, when he stood up to speak, the partizans of Clodius, who were likewise inveterate ene-

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mies to himself, endeavoured to disconcert him with clamours and menacing cries. The unusual sight of military guards, commanded by an officer, who was supposed to be prejudiced against his client, it is said, so far overcame and sunk his spirit, that he spoke feebly, and concluded abruptly; and that what he actually delivered was far short of that masterly oration which he composed, and afterwards published under the title of Milo's defence.

The accused however, even in this alarming scene, stood at the bar with an undaunted countenance; and while every one else, in imitation of the Senators, appeared in mourning, he alone appeared in an ordinary dress. When judgment was given, and the ballots inspected, it appeared that, of the Senators, twelve condemned, and six, or perhaps rather five, acquitted; of the knights, thirteen condemned, and four acquitted; of the Tribuni *Ærarii*, or representatives of the Plebeian order, thirteen condemned, and three or four acquitted. And Milo, upon the whole, was condemned by thirty-eight, against thirteen.

Before sentence was pronounced, being still at liberty to withdraw, he retired into exile, and fixed his residence at Marseilles. Thither Cicero sent him a copy of an oration in his defence, composed at leisure, as an effort of his eloquence, and a specimen of what could be urged in the cause. The packet containing this writing, it seems, was delivered or read to Milo while he sat at dinner. "How lucky it was," he said, "that this oration was not actually spoken, I should not now have been eating these excellent fish at Marseilles!" These marks of indifference make a striking contrast to the figure which Cicero himself had exhibited in his exile. If he could have thus trifled with apparent or unmerited disgrace, that single addition of constancy and force to his character would have undoubtedly placed

<sup>27</sup> Aconius Pædianus et Argument. et Notis in Orat. pro Mil. Dio. Cass. lib. xl. Plut. in Pompeio, Catone, &c.

him as high in the order of statesmen, as, by the other parts of his character, he stands in the list of ingenious men and virtuous citizens.

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Milo was likewise soon after condemned, in absence, by the Prætor, upon a charge of bribery and corruption. Some of his competitors, particularly Hypsæus and Scipio, were brought to trial for the same offence. The Tribune Munatius Plancus and Pompeius Rufus were, at the expiration of their office, tried and condemned for the share they had in the fire which consumed the Senate-house, and in the assault which was committed on the house of M. Lepidus the Interrex.



## C H A P. III.

*Character of Pompey in Capacity of sole Consul.—Privilege of Cæsar to be admitted as Candidate for the Office of Consul, without resigning his Province.—General Revolt of the Gauls.—Operations in that Country.—Blockade and Reduction of Alesia.—Distribution of Cæsar's Army in Gaul.*

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POMPEY, in his dignity of sole Consul, having joined a legal authority to the personal elevation which he always affected, possessed much of the influence and consideration of a real monarch; and it would have been happy, perhaps, for the State, if he could have made such a dignity hereditary, and a permanent part of the constitution, or given to the commonwealth that reasonable mixture of kingly government, of which it appears to have stood so greatly in need. In his present elevation he rose for a while above the partialities of a factious leader, and appeared to adopt that interest which the sovereign ever has in the support of justice. He even seems to have personated the character of a prince, or to have considered himself as above the rank of a citizen. Among other instances to this purpose, is mentioned his haughty saying to Hypsæus, late candidate for the Consulship, now under prosecution for bribery, who, as Pompey passed from the bath to supper, put himself in his way to implore his protection, "Detain me not," he said, "you only make "supper to cool for no purpose'." In the midst of the solicitations of his courtiers and flatterers, he even ventured to dispense with his own regulations. Contrary to the rule he himself had laid down for the

<sup>1</sup> Val. Max. lib. ix. c. 5.

direction of criminal trials, he furnished Munatius Plancus, when brought to the bar, with a commendatory testimony, "I cannot prefer this writing of Pompey," said Cato, "to the law of which he himself is the author." On account of this saying, Plancus, when the Judges came to be inclosed, thought proper to reject Cato: the accused was nevertheless condemned<sup>2</sup>.

Besides the measures taken to punish past offences, it was thought necessary to devise some laws to prevent for the future, or to lessen the temptation to the commission of such dangerous crimes. The principal source of the late disorders appeared to be the avidity of candidates for those offices of State, which led immediately to the government of lucrative provinces. To remove this temptation, it was ordained, at the suggestion of Pompey, that no man could be appointed to a province till five years after the expiration of that office, whether of Consul, Prætor, or Quæstor, in virtue of which he claimed a proportionate station in the provinces.

Before the enacting of this law, however, Pompey had the address to procure for himself a prolongation of his government in Spain for five years. This circumstance, which continued to give him the command of an army abroad, while he likewise bore the highest civil office in the State at home, set a very dangerous precedent for the commonwealth.

Cæsar's command in Gaul was soon to expire; and, according to the laws then in force, he must even resign it before he could aspire to the Consulship, or pretend to cope with his rival in civil preferments. It had been wisely ordained by the laws, that the persons offering themselves as candidates for the office of Consul, should appear in person to sue for it; and that no man, without resigning his command and dismissing his army, could enter the city, or even go beyond the limits of the province in which he had governed. By

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio, p. 484.

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this regulation it was intended to prevent the conjunction of civil power in the State with the command of an army. Pompey, however, though vested with such a command in Spain, had contrived to be exempted from the observance of this law; and, under pretence that his office of general purveyor of corn for the Roman People did not confine him to any station, and in reality extended to the whole empire, or had a particular reference to Italy, still continued to reside in the city of Rome.

Cæsar, to keep pace with his rival, openly aspired to the same privilege with Pompey, and claimed, as a mere instance of equal treatment, what the other had obtained; but what, if bestowed on himself, with his other advantages, must give him a great and immediate superiority. The army he commanded was already in the most advantageous situation. The addition of Consular power at Rome, to that of general in both the Gauls, was joining Italy itself to his provinces, and putting him at once in possession of the empire. Any opposition made to his authority as Consul would be construed as rebellion against the State itself. Pompey would be driven at once from the helm of affairs to the command of a distant province, in which he, at most, could only defend himself; but not entertain any designs on the sovereignty of Italy, which would be covered from his attempts by the Pyrennees and the Alps, and the great armies of Gaul.

With these objects in his view, Cæsar instructed his partizans among the Tribunes to move, That, being continually engaged in a hazardous war, which required his presence, and being necessarily detained abroad in the service of his country, he might be exempted from the law, which required the candidates for office to attend their canvass in person, and might therefore be elected into the Consulate without presenting himself to the People for that purpose.

This proposition was sufficiently understood by the leading men of the Senate, and by the few who joined with them in support of the

commonwealth. It was known to be intended that Cæsar should have a privilege of being elected Consul, without resigning his province, or dismissing his army; and they withstood the motion as of the most dangerous consequence. But Pompey, who ought likewise, for his own sake, to have been alarmed at the progress of Cæsar, and at the uncommon advantage at which he now aimed, was either lulled into security by the artifices of his rival, or thought himself sufficiently raised above any danger from this or any other quarter. He had accepted, in his own person, many unprecedented honours, and was possibly unwilling to contend for forms which, at some future period, might limit his own pretensions. Cato loudly renewed his suspicion of Cæsar's designs. Cicero could not be neutral in any dispute that should arise between Cæsar and Pompey. He had been banished by the one, and restored by the other. Besides the personal consideration he owed to Pompey on this occasion, his natural bias was on the side of the Senate, and for the support of the forms which were provided for the safety of the commonwealth. He nevertheless suffered himself to be dazzled with the court which Cæsar had paid to him for some time, with a view to this very question; he condemned the indiscreet zeal of Cato, who, in his opinion, was ruining the cause of the republic by setting both Cæsar and Pompey at defiance, while he himself, by temporising, and by managing the inclinations of these parties, had secured them both in its interests. He stated the danger of a quarrel with Cæsar at this time, supported as he was by a powerful army, and in the bowels of Italy; but did not consider that he was then giving up, without a quarrel, all that any quarrel could extort.

The army of Cæsar was not then so well prepared to follow him against his country, nor he himself furnished with the same colours of justice, under which he afterwards made war on the commonwealth. If a civil war were to be dreaded, to temporise, in this instance, was to give a delay which proved favourable to the enemy, or rather, in



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effect, to deliver up the republic, without a contest to that fate which the prudent councils in question were intended to remove. Under colour of this prudence, nevertheless, Cicero, as well as Pompey, supported the Tribunes in their motion, and obtained for the Proconsul of Gaul the dispensation he desired, to retain his army, while he offered himself a candidate for the highest office of the state at Rome.

Cæsar, immediately upon his arrival on that side of the Alps in the beginning of winter, observing the distractions which took place in the city upon the murder of Clodius, affected much zeal for the laws which had been so grossly violated in that instance; and, under pretence of furnishing himself with the means of supporting the state against those who were inclined to disturb it, ordered new levies in every part of his provinces, and made a considerable addition to his army; but, contented for the present with the privilege he had obtained of suing for the Consulate, without quitting his province, or resigning his military power, he left the State, as before, apparently in the hands of Pompey; and, in the middle of winter, on the report of a general defection of all the Gaulish nations, re-passed the Alps.

Most of the nations that lay beyond the mountains of Auvergne, the original limits of the Roman province, roused by the sense of their present condition, or by the cruel massacre lately executed in a part of their country, were actually in arms. They had submitted to Cæsar, or were separately gained by him, under the specious pretence of alliance or protection against their enemies; and with the title of ally, suffered him to become their master. But the violence with which he had threatened the canton of the Carnutes<sup>3</sup>, for absenting themselves from the convention which he had assembled on the Seine, and the merciless severities executed by

<sup>3</sup> Now Chartres,

him against the unfortunate natives of the tract between the Rhine and the Meuse<sup>4</sup>, convinced all the nations of Gaul that they were reduced to the condition of slaves; and that every exertion they made for liberty was to be punished as a crime. They saw the folly of their former dissensions, and suspended all their animosities to enter into a general concert for their common safety. The occasion, they said, was favourable for the recovery of their country. The Romans were distracted at home, and Cæsar had sufficient occupation in Italy. His army could not act in his absence. The present time, they concluded, was the favourable opportunity to shut out the Romans for ever beyond the Cevennes, or even to force them to retire within the Alps.

All the nations on the Seine, the Loire, and the Garonne, quite round to the sea-coast, received these representations with joy. They held private meetings, and instead of exchanging hostages, which would have been too public a measure, and have led to a discovery of their designs, they plighted their faith by a more secret form, commonly practised among them on great occasions, that of pressing their banners together.

The people of the Carnutes<sup>5</sup> undertook to begin hostilities; and accordingly, on a day fixed, surprised the town of Genabum<sup>6</sup>, where they put many Roman traders, together with the commissary general of the army, to death.

It was the custom of the Gauls to convey intimation of such events by means of a cry which they raised at the place of action, and repeated wherever the voice was heard, till passing almost with the velocity of sound itself, it gave the speediest information of what was done. In this manner intelligence of what had been transacted at Genabum at the rising of the sun, was, before night, propagated in

<sup>4</sup> Now chiefly Liege and Guelderland.

<sup>5</sup> Chartres.

<sup>6</sup> Orleans.

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every direction to the distance of a hundred and sixty miles, and put all the nations within this compass in a ferment. Its first and principal effects, however, were produced in the country of the Arverni<sup>7</sup>. Here Vercingetorix, a youth of heroic spirit and great capacity, assembled his retainers, took possession of Gergovia, now Clermont, the capital of his country, and from thence sent messengers in every direction to urge the execution of the measures lately concerted for the general freedom of Gaul. He himself, in return for his zeal, being chosen the common head of the confederacy, in this capacity, fixed the quota of men and of arms to be furnished by each separate canton, and took hostages for the regular observance of the conditions to which the several parties had agreed.

Vercingetorix having assembled a considerable army, sent a part of his force to act on the Garonne, and to harass the frontiers of the Roman province, while he himself moved to the Loire, in order to rouse the nations of that quarter, who appeared to be too secure; and he accordingly brought to his standard all the warriors of those cantons that lay on the left of that river. His party on the Garonne, at the same time, were joined by all the nations of Aquitania, and, in formidable numbers, threatened with immediate destruction the cities of Thoulouse and Narbonne, or such parts of their districts at least as were open to invasion.

Thither Caesar, with all the forces he could assemble upon his arrival from Italy, immediately repaired; and, having put the province of Narbonne in a condition not to be insulted, proceeded to give the enemy an alarm in their own country. His object was, if possible, to put himself at the head of the legions which he had left on the northern frontiers of his new acquisitions. He did not chuse that those legions should move in his absence so far as to expose

<sup>7</sup> Auvergne.

themselves to be cut off by the natives. Nor was it easy for himself, with the force under his command, to penetrate through so many enemies as lay in his way to join them. It was yet winter, and the mountains were deeply covered with snow. This circumstance, which increased his difficulties, as it was likely to render the enemy secure, still encouraged him to make his attempt. He accordingly passed the mountains<sup>9</sup> which lay in his way, at a time when the snow, in many places, being six feet deep, must be removed with shovels, and when that passage was supposed to be intirely impracticable. After he had surmounted this difficulty, his object being to draw the attention of the prince of the Arverni to his own country, he sent his cavalry abroad in numerous parties to destroy with fire and sword the people with their habitations and possessions. When he thought the alarm was sufficiently spread, and must have reached the Gaulish army on the Loire, he pretended, that his presence was required in the province behind him, gave the command of the troops in Auvergne to Decimus Brutus, then a young man; giving him orders at the same time to keep his parties abroad, and to continue to harass the country as he himself had done.

Having taken these measures to fix the attention of the enemy in one quarter, Cæsar, with a few attendants, made haste to pass in a different direction to Vienna on the Rhône, where he was received by a party of horse, which he had appointed at that place to wait his orders; and, under this escort, without halting by day or by night, he passed by Bibracte<sup>10</sup> and the country of the Lingones<sup>11</sup>, to the nearest quarter of his army on the Seine; and while he was yet supposed to be in Auvergne, had actually assembled his legions which had been distributed on the course of that river.

<sup>9</sup> The Cevennes.

<sup>10</sup> Afterwards Auguslodunum, now Autun.

<sup>11</sup> Langres.



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Vercingetorix having notice that Cæsar, in this manner, had passed him, and that the Roman army on the Seine was in motion, perceived that the invasion of his own country had been no more than a feint, and that the chief force of the enemy was to be expected from a different quarter, he resumed the operations which he had intermitted on the Loire, and endeavoured to possess himself of a post in the territory of Bibracte, where the people still professed themselves to be in the alliance of the Romans.

Cæsar, notwithstanding the difficulty of procuring provisions and forage so early in the season, thought himself under a necessity of opposing the progress of the enemy. For this purpose he left his baggage, under the guard of two legions, at Agendicum<sup>12</sup>; and from thence, with the remainder of the army, proceeded to Genabum<sup>13</sup>, leaving Trebonius by the way to take possession of a town which the natives, after a little show of resistance, had surrendered.

Upon his arrival before Genabum, the Gauls, who were in arms at that place, resolved to abandon the town; and shutting the gates against the Romans on one side, endeavoured to escape by the bridge of the Loire on the other. But Cæsar, having notice of their design, forced open their gates, and overtook them, while crowded together in the entrance of the bridge, and in the narrow streets which led to it, put the greater part to the sword, and, under pretence of revenging the massacre of the Roman traders, who had been cut off at this place, ordered that the town should be destroyed. From thence he penetrated into the country of the Bituriges<sup>14</sup>, on the left of the Loire; and, on his way towards Avaricum<sup>15</sup>, the capital of that district, forced every place that opposed his passage.

Vercingetorix, observing the rapid progress of the Romans, and knowing that the Gauls, being without order or discipline, could not

<sup>12</sup> Sens.<sup>13</sup> Orleans.<sup>14</sup> Now Berri.<sup>15</sup> Bourges.

withstand

withstand them in battle, declined an engagement, but endeavoured to distress the enemy by delays and want of provisions. He had authority enough with his own people to persuade them to lay their country waste every where within many miles of Cæsar's route. Twenty towns of the Bituriges were burnt in one day. Avaricum alone, contrary to the opinion of Vercingetorix, and at the earnest request of its inhabitants, who undertook to defend it to the last extremity, was spared.

Thither, accordingly, Cæsar advanced as to the only prize that was left. He attacked the place, under great disadvantages, in the midst of a country that was intirely laid waste, and trusting for the daily subsistence of his army to the Ædui beyond the Loire, who, notwithstanding their professions, were far from being hearty in his cause, or diligent in sending their supplies of provisions to his camp. Such as they sent were intercepted by Vercingetorix, who had occupied a strong post with his army, and infested the highways with his parties. In these circumstances, Cæsar's army was sometimes reduced to great distress; he himself, to pique the resolution of his soldiers, affected a willingness to raise the siege, whenever they were pleased to intimate, that they could endure it no longer: "We are got into a difficult situation," he used to observe; "if the troops are discouraged, I shall withdraw." To this affected tenderness for the sufferings of his men, he was every where answered, with intreaties that he would not dishonour them, by supposing that any hardships could oblige them to forfeit the character they had acquired by the labour of so many successful campaigns. He accordingly continued the attack of Avaricum under all his discouragements.

The place was covered on two sides by a river and a morass, and was accessible only on the third. The walls of the town were ingeniously constructed with double frames of wood, having compartments or pannels filled up with masonry and large blocks of stone.

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The masonry secured the timber from fire, and the frames preserved the masonry against the effects of the battering ram, which could act only on the stones contained within a single pannel or division of the frame, without ruining at once any considerable part of the wall, or effecting a breach. The Roman army approached to this wall by the most laborious and difficult methods which were practised. They began, in the ancient form of attack, at a proper distance, and on a breadth of eighty-three feet, to lay a sloping mound<sup>16</sup>, which rising by degrees on the plain, formed, as it advanced, an easy ascent to the level of the battlements. The earth on the sides of this mound was supported by timbers, hurdles, and faggots, and the workmen in front were covered with mantlets and moveable pent-houses. The besieged, that they might still overtop the besiegers, raised their walls by additional frames of wood, which they covered with raw hides, as a security against the burning arrows and shafts which were darted against them.

In this contest the works on both sides were raised about eighty feet, and the besieged endeavoured to keep the advantage of superior height, not only by raising their own walls, but likewise by undermining and sinking the mound of the besiegers. They made galleries under the foundation of their own wall to the bottom of the enemy's mound, by which they endeavoured to remove the earth and other materials from below, as fast as they were accumulated above. They came from their sally-ports on different sides of the mound, and endeavoured to set fire to the wood by which the earth was supported. In all these particulars showing that they possessed the arts of defence in common with antient nations<sup>17</sup>. Vercingetorix, in the mean time, continued to harass the Roman army from without, intercepted their supply of provisions, and, by means of the

<sup>16</sup> The Agger.  
lib. ii. in the siege of Platæa.

<sup>17</sup> Cæsar de Bell. Gall. lib. vii. c. 22, &c. Vid. Thucyd.

river and the morafs, maintained his communication with the town, and fent in frequent relief.

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Notwithftanding all thefe difficulties, Cæfar by degrees brought forward and raifed his mound of approach to the height of the battlements; fo that by a fingle affault he might determine the fate of the town. And while both parties were preparing for a laft effort, he took the opportunity, as he frequently did, of a heavy rain to make his attack. The befieged, as he fuppofed, had taken fhelter from the weather, and were in that instant put off their guard. He got poffeffion of the battlements with little refiftance, and drove the parties who manned them before him from the walls. The inhabitants formed in the ftreets, and the Romans who had entered, extending their line to right and left along the ramparts, were about to occupy the battlements over the whole circumference of the place, when the garrifon, obferving their danger, began to efcape by the gates. In the confufion that followed, the town was sacked, and could make no refiftance. Of forty thoufand perfons who had taken fhelter in it, no more than eight hundred efaped. This mafacre was joined to that lately performed at Genabum, under the pretence of completing the vengeance which was due for the murder of the Roman traders who were put to death at the breaking out of the prefent revolt.

The Gauls, as ufual on every calamitous event, were greatly difheartened, and were about to defpair of their caufe, when their leader reminded them, that, contrary to his judgment, they had referved this place from the general devaftation, and had themfelves undertaken to defend it; that what they fuffered was the confequence of a miftake, and might be retrieved by abler conduct. His authority as ufual rofe on the ill fuccefs of councils which he had not approved, and brought an acceffion of numbers to his ftandard.



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Cæsar, finding a considerable supply of stores and provisions at Avaricum, remained some days to relieve and to refresh his army. The country around him, however, being intirely laid waste, or occupied by parties of the enemy, it became necessary for him to repass the Loire, and to open his communication with a country of which the inhabitants still professed to be in alliance with the Romans, and having had their possessions covered by the river from the incursions of the enemy in their late devastations, were still in condition to supply his camp. As in this movement he seemed to retire and to give up the ground he had disputed with the prince of the Arverni, he pretended that he was called to settle a dispute which had arisen among the Ædui, relating to the succession of the chief magistrate, or head of their canton. Having repassed to the right of the Loire without any loss, he made a demand on his allies of that side for ten thousand men on foot, and all the horses they could furnish.

He now had enemies on every quarter, and it was good policy to keep them divided, and to occupy them separately. For this purpose he sent four legions towards the Seine; while he himself took the route of Noviodunum<sup>19</sup>, at the confluence of the Loire and Allier; and there leaving his money, spare horses, and unnecessary baggage, he continued his march on the banks of the Allier, with intention to pass that river, and to invade the Arverni, from whom this revolt had originated, and whose chief was now at the head of it. This prince, knowing that the river Allier is never fordable till autumn, and till the melting of snows on the Cevennes begin to abate, ordered all the bridges upon it to be demolished, and hoped to prevent the Romans from passing it during the greater part of summer. As soon as Cæsar marched from Noviodunum, he presented himself on the opposite bank of the river, and regulated his motions by that of

<sup>19</sup> Nevers.

the enemy. The two armies commonly decamped, marched, and encamped again in sight of each other; and Cæsar never affected to elude the vigilance of the Gauls, till he saw an opportunity to do so with advantage.

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It happened that one of the bridges of the Allier had been but imperfectly destroyed; most of the piles were yet fast in the ground, and appeared above water; so that a passage might be effected in a few hours. The country around was woody, and furnished cover, or a place of ambush, to any number of men. From these circumstances Cæsar conceived the design to over-reach the enemy. He put his army in motion as usual, but himself remained with a sufficient detachment in the neighbourhood of the ruined bridge, which he meant to repair. In order that the Gauls might not be led to suspect that any part of his army was left behind, he ordered that those who were to move should divide, and present the same number of separate bodies, the same distinction of colours and standards, which they were accustomed to show on a march of the whole army; at the same time, as he knew that the Gauls would endeavour to keep pace with his people, in order to hasten and increase their distance, he ordered them to make a quicker and a longer march than usual. When he supposed that this feint or stratagem had taken its full effect, he began to work on the piles which were left in the river, and in a few hours repaired the bridge so effectually, that he passed with the division of the army he had reserved for this purpose, and instantly fortified a post to cover them on the opposite bank. From thence he sent orders to recall the main body; and before the enemy were apprised of his design, had reunited all his forces on the left of the river.

Vercingetorix, as soon as he had intelligence that the Romans had passed the Allier, fell back to Gergovia<sup>20</sup>, the capital of his own

<sup>20</sup> Now supposed to be the neighbourhood of Clermont.

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principality, in order to take measures for the safety of that place. It being situated on a height, having an ascent of above a mile from the plain, and surrounded by other hills, which made part of the same ridge, he ordered a stone wall to be built six feet high about half way up the ascent to the town, and encamped as many as the space could contain within the circuit of this wall. He occupied the other hills at the same time with separate bodies, having communications with each other and with the town. By this disposition Cæsar found all the approaches of the place commanded, and no possibility of investing the whole by lines of circumvallation, or by any chain of posts. He pitched his camp at some distance from the foot of the hill, and from thence in a few days got possession of a height in his way to the town, on which he posted two legions, with a lane of communication, fortified on both its flanks, leading from this advanced station to his main encampment.

In this posture Cæsar foresaw, that all the heights in his neighbourhood being in possession of the enemy, while he pressed upon the town, he himself might be hemmed in, and cut off from all the supplies necessary for the support of his army. To preserve his communication, therefore, with the Allier and the Loire, he ordered his allies from the opposite side of these rivers to advance with the forces he had formerly required of them, to occupy the country in his rear, and to cover his convoys. They accordingly took the field; but their leaders having been for some time inclined to favour the general cause of the Gauls, they thought this a favourable opportunity to declare their intentions. Being arrived within thirty miles of Cæsar's army, they halted; and, upon a report which was industriously spread amongst them, that he had murdered some of their countrymen who were already in his camp, they put all the Romans in their company to death, and took measures to join their countrymen who were assembled for the defence of Gergovia. They had

not yet moved to execute this resolution, when Cæsar had notice of what was intended, and with his usual diligence arrived, after a march of thirty miles, with four legions and all his cavalry, in time to prevent its effects. He presented himself as a friend; and thinking it safest for the present to disguise his resentment, he produced into public view all the persons who were said to have been killed by his orders, convinced such as had been deceived of their error, and brought them, with the seeming cordiality of allies, to his camp.

Cæsar made a merit with the Ædui of this act of clemency towards their people; but found that the spirit of defection was not confined to these detachments; that it had pervaded the nation; that the violence committed in the camp was an effect of the resolutions adopted by the whole people; that, in pursuance of the same measures, his purveyors and commissaries had been assaulted and pillaged even where they thought themselves secure, as in a friend's country; and that he could no longer rely on the affections of any nation in Gaul.

The leaders of the Ædui, however, on hearing of the lenity that was shown to such of their people as were in the power of Cæsar, pretended to return to their duty; and Cæsar, not to break at once with the only supposed ally which remained to him beyond the Cevennes, affected to consider the late disorders as the effect of a mere popular tumult, and declared himself willing to rely on the wisdom of the State itself for the reparation of wrongs which a few ill-advised persons of their country had committed.

This able commander appears, on many occasions, to have trusted greatly to the superiority of the Roman soldiers, as well as to that of his own reputation and conduct as a general. His confidence in both was required in the highest degree to support him in continuing, or even in attempting, a siege under his present difficulties, beset by  
numerous



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numerous enemies, who were in appearance ably conducted ; while he himself was deserted by those who were reputed his friends.

In his last march to repress the defection of his allies, he had left his camp exposed to the attacks of the enemy, and defended only by two legions against the whole force of so many nations as were assembled for the defence of Gergovia. These seized their opportunity in his absence, made a vigorous attack, and must have prevailed, if he had not returned with the utmost celerity to relieve his camp.

With the same confidence in the superiority of his men, Cæsar soon afterwards made an attempt to force the wall, which, as has been mentioned, the Gauls had built on the ascent of the hill which led to the town ; and having made a feint on the opposite side with part of his horse, joined by the followers of the army mounted on horseback, who showed themselves at a distance to appear like cavalry, he drew the enemy from the place he meant to attack, actually passed the wall, and made himself master of part of their camp. A few of his men penetrated even into the town ; but not being supported, were surrounded and slain ; even those who had succeeded at first under favour of the feint by which he had drawn off the enemy, were, upon the return of the Gauls to the defence of their camp, repulsed with considerable loss. In consequence of this defeat, it was no longer doubtful that Cæsar would be under the necessity of raising the siege.

In order to begin his retreat without any appearance of fear, he formed his army two days successively on the plain before his entrenchment, and offered the enemy battle. On the third day he decamped ; and, with the credit he derived from this species of defiance or challenge, in three days he arrived at the Allier, repaired his bridge, and repassed undisturbed by the enemy. His passage of the same river, a short time before, was esteemed as a victory, and his  
return,

return, without having gained any advantage, and merely for the safety of his army, was undoubtedly considered as a defeat. The low state of his fortunes, checked and baffled by a Gaulish leader, yet a youth, and unexperienced, encouraged the nations on the right of the Loire, even while he was advancing towards them, to declare for the liberties of Gaul; and as a commencement of hostility, they carried off or rifled the treasure he kept for the pay of his army, and seized all the spare horses and baggage which he had left at Noviodunum<sup>21</sup>, as at a place of security at the confluence of the Allier and the Loire.

He himself was yet inclosed between these two rivers, having enemies on every side, and no magazines or stores for the supply of his army. He deliberated whether he should not fall back on the province of Narbonne; but the danger to which he must expose Labienus, commanding a division of the Roman army on the Seine, the difficulty of passing the mountains of Auvergne, then occupied by his enemies, and the discredit which his arms must incur from such a retreat, prevented him. He determined therefore to advance; passed the Loire by a ford above its confluence with the Allier; found a considerable supply of provisions and forage in the country of the Ædui, and continued his march from thence to the Seine.

Labienus, with the troops he commanded in that quarter, had besieged Lutetia, the original germ from which the city of Paris has grown, then confined to a small island in the Seine, and had made some progress in the siege, when he heard of Cæsar's retreat from Gergovia, of the defection of the Ædui, and of preparations which were making by the nations on his right against himself. In these circumstances, he laid aside his design on Lutetia, and ascended by the left of the Seine to the country of the Senones, through which Cæsar was now advancing to meet him. In passing the river at Melodunum<sup>22</sup>,

<sup>21</sup> Nevers.<sup>22</sup> New Melun,

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he was attacked by the enemy, but obtained a considerable victory; and, with the credit of this event in his favour, continued his march to a place which is now called Sens, near to which he was soon afterwards joined by Cæsar.

While the Romans were thus reuniting their forces on the Seine, Vercingetorix had passed the Loire, and held a general convention of the Gaulish nations at Bibracté. He was attended by deputies of all the cantons from the Moselle to the Loire, except the Treviri, Remi, and Lingones<sup>23</sup>. The first stood in awe of the Germans, who kept them in continual alarm. The two last professed an attachment to the Romans, who were still masters of the field in their neighbourhood.

The leader of the Gaulish confederacy being at this meeting confirmed in his command, made a requisition for an augmentation of force, chiefly of cavalry, and accordingly increased this part of his army to fifteen thousand. To the end that he might give the Romans sufficient occupation in their own defence, he projected two separate invasions of the province of Narbonne: one to be executed by the nations which lay between the Rhône and Garonne, towards Toulouse; the other, from the Soane and the upper parts of the Loire, towards Geneva and the left of the Rhône. He himself, though still determined to avoid any general action, was to harass the enemy in their movements, and to cut off their supplies of provisions.

Cæsar, on his part, wished to open his communication with the Roman province, that he might have access to cover it against the designs of the enemy, and to avail himself of its resources for the subsistence of his army. For this purpose it was necessary for him to return, by the Soane and the Rhône, through a level country which was in possession of the enemy, to whom he was greatly in-

<sup>23</sup> Now Treves, Rheims, and Langre.

ferior in cavalry. He sent into Germany for a reinforcement of horse; and the natives of that part of the continent being already sensible, that wherever they were admitted to act as soldiers of fortune, they were qualifying themselves to act as masters, without scruple bestowed their services for or against any cause; two thousand of them joined Cæsar, but so ill mounted that he was obliged to supply them with horses, by borrowing such as belonged to his officers of infantry, and as many as could be spared from his cavalry. To compensate their defect in horses, the men were brave, and, in many of the operations which followed, turned the event of battles, and determined the fate of the war.

The Roman army being thus reinforced, Cæsar began his march to the southward; and having passed the heights at the sources of the Seine, found the Gauls already posted in three separate divisions, contiguous to the different routes he might take, with numerous flying bodies of horse, ready to harass him in any movement he should make in their presence. By continuing his march, he soon gave their leader an opportunity to try his fortune in a sharp encounter, in which the whole cavalry of both armies came to be engaged. The Gauls were routed chiefly by the valour and address of the Germans, to whom Cæsar imputed his victory. This event was decisive in respect to the cavalry, that part of both armies on which it was supposed that the fate of the war must turn. And Vercingetorix, not to expose his infantry to the necessity of a general action, instantly retired to the heights from which the Seine, and a number of other rivers which mix with it before its confluence with the Marne, have their source. Cæsar, no longer apprehensive of the enemy's horse, resumed the confidence with which he always pursued his advantages, and followed his flying enemy into this retreat.



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Vercingetorix, with his very numerous army, took post at Alefia, a place raised on a hill at the confluence of two rivers ; the point on which it stood being the termination of a ridge which separated the channels by which these rivers descended to the plain. The fields on one side were level, on the other mountainous. The Gauls were crowded together on the declivity of the hill of Alefia, under the walls of the town, and in that position thought themselves secure from any attack. But not aware of the resources, enterprize, and genius of their enemy, while they endeavoured to render themselves inaccessible, they had got into a place in which they might be cooped up ; and Cæsar immediately began to surround them, making a proper distribution of his army, and employing working parties at once on a chain of twenty-three posts and redoubts.

Vercingetorix, though too late, perceiving the enemy's design, sent his cavalry to collect what provisions could be found in the neighbouring country ; but these troops, in consequence of their late defeat, not being able to keep the field against the Roman and German horse, he proposed to diminish the consumption within his lines by dismissing them altogether, giving them instructions to make the best of their way to their several cantons, and there to represent the situation in which they had left the army, and the necessity of making a great and speedy effort from every quarter to relieve it. He had eighty thousand men under his command, and might be able to subsist them for thirty days, and no longer.

Cæsar, from the enemy's having sent away their cavalry, concluded that they meant to act on the defensive, and to remain in their present situation until they should be relieved. With little apprehension of disturbance, therefore, from within his lines, he proceeded to execute amazing works ; at once to secure his prey and to cover himself against any attempts which might be made to rescue them. This great commander owed many of his distinguished successes to

the surprising works which he executed ; so far exceeding the fears or apprehensions of his enemy, that they found themselves unexpectedly forced into difficulties with which they were not prepared to contend.

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The Roman armies in general, and those which served under Cæsar in particular, had learned to make war with the pick-ax and the shovel, no less than with the javeline and the sword, and were inured to prodigies of labour as well as of valour. In the present case they were made to execute lines of circumvallation and countervallation over an extent of twelve or fourteen miles. They began with digging, quite round the foot of the hill, a ditch twenty feet wide, with perpendicular sides, in order to prevent any surprise from the town. At the distance of four hundred feet from this ditch, and beyond the reach of the enemy's missiles, was drawn the line of countervallation, consisting of a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a rampart twelve feet high, furnished, as usual, with a palisade. At a proper distance from this first line which fronted the town, so as to leave a proper interval for the lodgement and forming of his army, he drew another line, consisting of the same parts and dimensions, fronting the field. From the nature of the ground, part of these works were upon the hills, and part in the hollows or valleys ; and the ditches, wherever the level permitted, or could not carry off the water, were allowed to be filled.

As he had reason, at least after the distress of a blockade began to be felt, to expect from a garrison, which exceeded his own army in numbers, the most vigorous sallies from within ; and, by the united exertions of all the Gaulish nations in behalf of their friends, every effort that could be made from without ; and as his own army, consisting of no more than sixty thousand men, could not equally man, in every place, works of such extent, he thought it necessary to cover

his lines with every species of outwork then practised in the art of attack or defence, the *Cippi*, *Liliæ*, and the *Stimuli*.

The first were forked stakes, or large branches of trees planted in rows in the bottom of a ditch five feet wide, bound together to prevent their being pulled up separately, and cut short and pointed to wound the enemy who should attempt to pass them.

The second, or *liliæ*, consisted of single stakes sharpened and made hard in the fire, planted in the bottom, of tapering or conical holes, of which there were many rows placed in quincunx; so that a person who had passed in the interval of any two must necessarily fall into a third. This device was commonly masked or concealed with slender brushwood covered with earth.

The last, or the *stimuli*, were wooden shafts set in the ground and stuck thick with barbed hooks, to fasten or tear the flesh of those who attempted to pass them in the night, or without the necessary precautions.

All these several works, it appears, the Roman army completed; considerably within the thirty days for which Vercingetorix had computed that his provisions might last. Both parties concerned in this blockade, without any attempt to hasten the event, seemed to wait for the several circumstances on which they relied for the issue. Cæsar trusted to the effects of famine, and the Gauls to the assistance of their friends, who were in reality assembling in great numbers from every quarter to effect their relief. They are said to have mustered at Bibracte <sup>25</sup> no less than two hundred and forty thousand foot, with eight thousand horse. But if these numbers are not exaggerated, they may be considered as a proof how far those nations were ignorant of the circumstances on which the fortunes of armies

<sup>25</sup> Autun;

really turn. The supreme command of this multitude was given to Comius, a chieftain of one of the northern cantons, who having some time made war in conjunction with the Romans, owed the rank which he held in his own country to the favour of Cæsar, but could not resist the contagion of that general ardour with which his countrymen now rose to recover their freedom.

While this great host was assembling, the unhappy garrison of Alesia received no tidings of relief. Their provisions being near exhausted, they began to despair of succour. A council was held to deliberate on their conduct, and to form some plan of escape. Some were of opinion that they ought to surrender themselves, and to implore the victor's mercy. Others, that they should make a general sally, endeavour to cut their way through the enemy, and escape or perish with swords in their hands. Critognatus, a warrior of rank from the canton of the Arverni<sup>26</sup>, treated the opinion of those who proposed to surrender as mean and dastardly; that of the second, as brave rather in appearance than in reality. "Bravery," he said, "does not consist in sudden efforts of impatience and despair, but in firmly enduring for any length of time what the circumstances of war may require. Shall we think merely, because we have no communication with our friends, that they have deserted us, and do not intend to make any effort to save us? Against whom do you think Cæsar hath constructed so many works in his rear? Against whom does he man them in your fight with so much care? He has intelligence, although you have not, that a powerful army is preparing to relieve you. Take courage, and wait the coming of your friends. Even if your provisions should fail, the example of former times will point out a resource. Your ancestors, being surrounded by the armies of the Cimbri and the

<sup>26</sup> Auvergne.



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“ Teutones, rather than surrender themselves, fed on the bodies of  
 “ those who were unserviceable in the war ; and by this expedient  
 “ held out till the enemy was obliged to retire. And yet, on that  
 “ occasion, our ancestors had less cause than we have to make every  
 “ effort of constancy and fortitude. *Their* enemies were passing,  
 “ and meant only to plunder a country which they were soon to  
 “ abandon ; *our* enemies come to bind us in perpetual chains, and to  
 “ establish a dominion at which human nature revolts.”

The Gauls kept their resolution to hold out, but rejected the means that were proposed to supply their necessities, or reserved them for a time of greater extremity. The proposition of Critognatus is, by Cæsar, who was himself the unprovoked author of so much distress, and who continued, without remorse, to gratify his ambition at the expence of so much blood, mentioned with horror as an act of nefarious cruelty<sup>27</sup>. So much are men affected with appearances which shock the imagination more than with the real measure of what is hurtful to mankind. What followed, however, was probably no less cruel on the part of the Gaulish army than it was on the part of Cæsar ; the first, to lessen the consumption of food, turned out the women, children, and unarmed inhabitants of the town to the mercy of the enemy ; and Cæsar, in order to accumulate the sufferings of the besieged, would neither relieve nor suffer them to pass. From these circumstances we may presume, although it is not mentioned, that they must have perished a spectacle of extreme anguish and suffering in the presence of both armies.

In the midst of these extremities, Comius, with the united force of the Gaulish nations, at last appeared for the relief of Alesia, and with their multitudes covered the neighbouring hills. Being favoured by the nature of the ground, they were enabled to advance within five

<sup>27</sup> Nec prætereunda videtur oratio Critognati propter ejus singularem ac nefariam crudelitatem. De Bell. Gall. lib. vii. c. 76.

hundred paces, or less than half a mile, of Cæsar's lines. On the following day the cavalry on both sides began to act. The Gaulish horse, trusting to their superiority in numbers, or to the defensive plan which the Romans were likely to follow on the present occasion, drew forth on the plain below the town, and proposed to encourage their friends by braving the enemy. Cæsar thought it necessary to repel this species of insult, and sent his cavalry to accept the challenge. An action began about noon, and lasted till the setting of the sun, when the Gaulish horse, who till then had maintained the fight with great obstinacy and valour, being taken in flank by the Germans in Cæsar's service, were obliged to give way. Both sides, on this occasion, had mixed parties of infantry with their horse; and the Gaulish foot, who were engaged in this action, being now abandoned to the swords of the enemy, fled in the utmost confusion to the rear of their own army.

After this action nothing passed for a day and a night; but it appeared that, during this time, the Gaulish army in the field were collecting faggots and hurdles to fill up the trenches of Cæsar, and preparing grapplings to tear down the palisade and the parapet; and that they only waited till these preparations should be finished to make a vigorous attempt to raise the siege. They accordingly came down in the middle of the night, and, with a great shout, the only signal they supposed could be understood by their friends in the town, gave a general assault on Cæsar's line of circumvallation, as far as their numbers could embrace it, and without any choice of place.

Cæsar had assigned to every legion and separate body of men their station, and had repeatedly, to render them familiar with his disposition, given the alarm, and taught them to repair to their posts; he had placed Mark Antony and Trebonius, with a body of reserve, to succour any part of the lines that might be in danger of being forced. So prepared, he now received, without any surprise, the general assault.

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assault of the Gauls. His men suffered considerably from the first shower of missiles that came from so numerous an enemy; but as soon as the assailants advanced to the outworks, and felt themselves entangled in the snares which had been laid for them, and against which they had taken no precaution, they were sensible that they fought at a great disadvantage, and desisted at once from this rash and inconsiderate attempt.

The besieged, in anxious expectation of what was to pass in the field, hearing the shout that was raised by their friends, returned it to make known their intention, to co-operate in every attack, and instantly begun to employ the preparations which they likewise had made to fill up the trenches, or force the lines. They continued, during the greater part of the night, to cast such materials as they could throw into the broad ditch at the foot of the hill; but, when day appeared, seeing that their friends had retired, without making any impression on the exterior line, they too, not to expose themselves in an attempt in which they were not to be seconded, withdrew to their station on the hill.

From this disappointment the Gauls, both within and without the blockade, were sensible of their error in having made an attack before they had examined the enemy's works. To correct this mistake, they visited the whole circumference of Cæsar's lines. They observed, in a particular place, that the exterior line was interrupted by a hill which it could not embrace without making a great circuit. That Cæsar, to avoid so great an addition to his labour, and so much outline to defend, had encamped two legions in that place with their usual entrenchment, which formed a kind of fortrefs on the summit of the hill, trusting to this camp as a redoubt that would connect his defences on that side.

This place was chosen by the Gauls for a second and better concerted attempt than the first; and they determined, instead of the night to make their attack at noon-day, when the enemy were most

likely to be off their guard. Five-and-fifty thousand men were selected for this service; and they began their march early in the night, arrived at their ground before break of day, and lay concealed under a ridge of hills till noon. At this time they came forward, furnished not only with grappling irons to tear down the palisade, which was formed on the parapet, but with hurdles and faggots to fill up the ditch, and to smother the stimuli from which they had suffered so much in their former attacks.

Cæsar, though not thrown off his guard, either by the time of the day, or by his former success, was sensible, that he was now attacked in his weakest place. He ordered Labienus instantly, with six cohorts, to support the legions that were posted in that station; and as he had reason to expect, at the same time, a general assault, both from within and from without his lines, to favour this principal attack, he ordered every separate body to its post of alarm; and he himself, with a considerable reserve, took a station from which he could best observe the whole, and be ready to sustain any part that was pressed. He had given Labienus instructions, in case he found that the lines could not be defended, to fall forth, and bring the action to an issue, in which the Romans were generally found to have an advantage by mixing with the enemy sword in hand.

The Gauls, who were shut up on the heights of Alésia, only waiting to second the attempts of their friends in the field, began the action on their part nearly about the same time; and the Romans, being alarmed with hostile cries and shouts, at once both in their front and in their rear, were in danger of being seized with a panic, from which the best troops, on occasion, are not exempted.

Labienus was so much pressed where the Gauls made their principal effort, that Cæsar detached two several parties from his reserve to sustain him. First, a body of six cohorts under Decimus Brutus, and afterwards a body of seven cohorts under Fabius. At length, upon



receiving information that Labienus had not been able to prevent the enemy from passing the intrenchment, but that he meant, with all the troops who had joined him from different stations, amounting to nine-and-thirty cohorts, to make a general sally according to his instructions, and to mix with the enemy sword in hand; he himself instantly moved to support him.

Cæsar had, by this time, observed, that the enemy, by a gross misconduct, had made no feint or no attempt on any other part of the lines to favour their principal attack; and he therefore, with those he still retained as a body of reserve, not only left the post of observation he had taken in the beginning of the action, but ventured even to unfurnish some other parts of the line as he passed, and advanced with great rapidity to join in the sally which Labienus was about to attempt. In his coming he was known from afar by the conspicuous dress which he generally wore in time of battle; and his arrival, on this occasion, with the reinforcement which he brought, greatly animated that part of his army which had begun to despair of the event. He had, in this critical moment, with his usual genius and presence of mind, ordered his cavalry to get out of the lines; and, while the foot were engaged in front, to take the enemy in flank or in the rear. If the event had been otherwise doubtful, this movement alone, it is probable, must have secured it in his favour. The Gauls, although in the attack they had acted with ardour, yet lost courage when pushed to defend themselves; and, upon the appearance of Cæsar's cavalry in their rear, took to flight, and were pursued with great slaughter.

This flight at once decided the fate of both attacks; of the Gauls, who were shut up in Alesia, and of their countrymen, who had come to their relief. During the night, those in the field, discomfited by their repulse, were separating, leaving their chieftains, and dispersing in different directions. Many fell a prey to the parties  
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who were sent in pursuit of them. Those from within the lines, who had suffered so long a blockade, now seeing all their hopes of relief at an end, were no longer disposed to contend with their fate. Vercingetorix, having assembled the leaders together, told them, That, as he had undertaken this war, not from motives of private ambition, but from an earnest desire to recover, if he could, the freedom of his country, so he was now ready to become a sacrifice to the safety of his countrymen, and in any manner they thought proper to dispose of him, whether dead or alive, was willing to be made the means of appeasing the victor's revenge.

At this consultation it was determined to surrender; and Vercingetorix suffered himself to be delivered up. With respect to the treatment he received, Cæsar is silent; but it is probable, that, like other captive chiefs, on such occasions, he was destined to grace the future triumph of his conqueror; though, upon a fair review of the parts they had severally acted, likely to furnish a comparison not altogether to his advantage, and in some respects fit to obscure his glory.

The other prisoners also, except those who belonged to the cantons of the Ædui and Arverni, underwent the ordinary fate of captives; and, in this capacity, were exposed to sale, or divided as plunder among the troops. Cæsar reserved the prisoners of the Ædui and Arverni, on this occasion, to serve him as hostages in securing the submission of their respective cantons, and in obtaining from thence an immediate supply of provisions.

## C H A P. IV.

*Cæsar remains in Gaul.—Pompey assumes Piso into the Office of Consul.—Succession of Servius Sulpicius and M. Claudius Marcellus.—Arrangement for the Provinces.—Motion to recall Cæsar.—Continued Debates in the Senate.—Operations of Cæsar in Gaul.—Intrigues in the City.—Affairs in the other Provinces.—Campaign of Cicero.—Succession of Consuls.—State of Parties in the City and in the Senate.—Arrival of Cæsar in Italy in the Spring.—Return to Gaul.—Parts with two Legions to Pompey and the Senate.—Alarm of Cæsar's March.—The Consul Marcellus commits his Sword to Pompey.*

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THE seventh and the most difficult campaign of the war in Gaul being now at an end, Cæsar sent Labienus, with two legions beyond the Soane<sup>\*</sup>; Caius Fabius, with two more, to the heads of the Marne and the Meuse; other officers with separate bodies, amounting in all to three legions, into different stations beyond the Loire and towards the Garonne; Quintus Tullius Cicero, with some other officers, to a station allotted them on the Soane, to superintend the formation of magazines and the supply of provisions, which were chiefly transported by the navigation of that river.

Cæsar himself having now no other object of equal importance with that of securing the possession of a country so populous and of so great extent, from which he might draw such resources of men and of revenue, as must put him on the foot of a great monarch, determined to pass the winter on this side of the Alps. He had ob-

<sup>\*</sup> The Arar.

tained a dispensation from the law which excluded him from the Consulate, so long as he retained his army; but as it was not yet time to avail himself of his privilege, he resolved, by remaining at a distance, as much as possible to shun the notice of such parties at Rome as were known to observe his proceedings, and to state them as matter of general alarm. He nevertheless did not suffer any thing of moment to pass in the city without taking some part by means of his agents and partizans, and was continually employed in gaining to his interests all those who were likely to come into office, or who, by their personal consideration, were of any importance in the State, and ever strove to exclude from office such as were disinclined to himself, or who could not be gained.

Pompey had now, for some months, exercised the office of sole Consul. In that time he had, in some measure, restored the authority of government, and had exercised it with moderation. He had shown himself qualified to act the part of an excellent prince, though ill qualified to endure the equality which is claimed by the citizens of a commonwealth. His continual desire of unprecedented honours was one of the evils that distressed the republic. This evil, however, was partly mitigated by the facility with which he parted with power. Having enjoyed his present dignity from the first of March to the beginning of August, he took for colleague his father-in-law Metellus Scipio, suspending the prosecution under which he then lay, for bribery, in soliciting votes at a preceding election.

The newly elected colleague of Pompey, desirous to signalize his administration by some act of reformation, moved and obtained the repeal of the act in which Clodius had so greatly circumscribed the power of the Censors; and he attempted to revive the authority of this magistracy, but in vain. Few citizens, now in public view, could bear the rigorous inspection of this once awful Tribunal, as few had the courage to undertake or to exercise its trust. The institution accord-

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ingly had fallen into difuse, because it was not fitted to the times. And there being few of the People that were fit either to censure, or that could bear to be censured, it was not in the power of laws to revive what the general sense and manners of the age had abolished.

Disorders arising from the weakness of government had come to that extreme at which states must either correct themselves, or undergo some fatal change. The example of punishments inflicted, and of prosecutions still carried on against persons lately in office, for the illegal methods employed at elections, deterred many from offering themselves for any of the offices of State; and the late law, excluding Consuls, Prætors, and other magistrates from any provincial appointments for five years after the expiration of their term, removed one powerful motive by which citizens were induced to seek for such honours.

At the elections for the ensuing year only three candidates appeared; M. Marcellus, Servius Sulpicius, and M. Cato: all of them supposed to be of the Senatorian party; but very differently considered by those who now endeavoured to rule the State. Marcellus had, in fact, recommended himself to Pompey; and Sulpicius, as afterwards appeared, had been gained by Cæsar; and both were warmly espoused by these powerful patrons in the present contest in opposition to Cato, whose success might have proved a considerable obstruction to Cæsar's designs.

It is observed of this competition, that it was carried on without bribery or tumult. As the competitors were supposed to be all of the Senatorian party, the Senators thought their interest secure whichever of the candidates should prevail. And as the Senatorian party divided upon the occasion, the influence of Cæsar and Pompey easily cast the balance on the side of Sulpicius and Marcellus. Cato, during the competition, continued in the same habits of friendship as usual with both; and when the choice was decided in their favour,  
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instead of withdrawing from public view, as was common under such disappointments, he went to the field of Mars as usual from the assemblies of the People, stript and went to exercise, and continued from thence forward to frequent the Forum in his common undress. To those who condoled with him, or pressed him to continue his suit for another year, as he had done when first disappointed of the Prætorship, he made answer, That he thought it was the part of a good man to undertake the public service, whenever he was intrusted with it, and to make his willingness known, but not to court the public for employments as a favour to himself. "The people," he said, "at the time that they refused me the Prætorship, were under actual violence : in this case, they have made a free choice, and it appears that I must either violate my own mind, or renounce their good-will. My own mind is of more consequence to me than their favour ; but, if I retain my character, I shall not be so unreasonable as to expect consideration from persons to whom it is not agreeable."

When the new Consuls were received into office, their immediate predecessors being by the late act precluded for five years from holding any provincial government, it became necessary to fill stations of this sort with those who had formerly been in office, and who hitherto had not been appointed to any command in the Provinces. Accordingly Bibulus, who had been the colleague of Cæsar in his Consulship, was appointed to the government of Syria, vacant by the death of Crassus. Cicero was named to succeed Appius Claudius in Cilicia and Cyprus, Atius Varus was appointed Prætor in Africa, and P. Cornelius Spinther in Achaia. Pompey, who had hitherto enjoyed a dispensation from the law, in continuing to hold by his lieutenants the government and command of the army in Spain, while he filled

U. C. 702.  
Serv. Sulpicius, M.  
Claud. Marcellus, Coss.<sup>a</sup> Plutarch. in Caton. p. 268.

the office of Consul in the city, now professed an intention to take possession of his province in person, and he actually set out from Rome for this purpose; but was induced to suspend his journey by a motion, which was made in the Senate by Marcellus, soon after his accession to the office of Consul.

Cæsar was now in possession of a very important privilege, which entitled him to sue for the Consulate, without resigning the command of his army. His view in coveting this privilege; his continual augmentation of the troops in his province; his address in attaching the army to himself; his insinuation; his liberality; his assiduity to gain every person that could be won, and to preclude from power every one likely to oppose himself: the whole tendency of his conduct, and the enormous power he had acquired, began to be observed, and gave a general alarm. What Cato had so often represented to no purpose, began to be generally perceived; and persons, formerly the least attentive to the warnings they received, would now have been glad to remove Cæsar from the post of advantage they had given him.

The greater part of the Senate had become remiss in their attendance, and regardless even of their own political interests. The few who exerted themselves, were distracted with personal jealousies and distrust of each other. Cicero in particular, who before his banishment had been strenuous on the side of the aristocracy, now grown timorous from the sufferings he had incurred, was chiefly attentive to his own safety, which he studied by paying his court to the prevailing powers. There was no bar in Cæsar's way, beside the great consideration and the jealousy of Pompey, who had assisted him in procuring his privilege to stand for the Consulate in absence; but now saw its tendency, and wished to recall it. It was probably, therefore, with the approbation of Pompey, though after his departure from Rome, that the Consul Marcellus, while the Senate was deli-

berating on the other removes and appointments in the provincial governments, proposed that, the war in Gaul being finished, Cæsar should be recalled; or, if his friends insisted on his being continued in his command, that he should not be admitted on the list of candidates for the Consulate, until he presented himself personally for this purpose.

This motion gave rise in the Senate to warm debates, which were frequently adjourned, and as often resumed. The Consul Sulpicius, supported by numbers of the Tribunes who were in the interest of Cæsar, opposed the proceeding. Pompey himself, under pretence that he waited the issue of these debates, stopped short in his journey to Spain, passed some time at Ariminum in reviewing the new levies which were destined to reinforce the troops of his province; and at last, being summoned to attend the Senate on the fifteenth of August, to consider of the provincial arrangements<sup>3</sup>, he returned to Rome.

On this day, Pompey affected to censure the violence with which it had been proposed to recall, before the expiration of his term, an officer legally appointed. He acknowledged his opinion, that Cæsar ought not to unite the government of a province, and the command of an army, with the dignity of Consul; but dissuaded the Senate from taking an immediate resolution on that head. The debate was adjourned to the first of September<sup>4</sup>. Then no meeting of the Senate could be formed; but as soon as the subject was again resumed, the late Consul Cornelius Scipio, the father-in-law to Pompey, proposed, that on the first of March, when the persons destined to succeed the present Consuls must have entered on office, a day should be fixed to consider of the province of Gaul, and moved that this ques-

<sup>3</sup> Cicero. *Epist. ad Familiares*. lib. viii. ep. 4.

Dio. *Cass. lib. iv. c. 58, 59.*

<sup>4</sup> Cicero. *ad Familiares*. lib. viii. ep. 9.



tion should be resumed in preference to every other business<sup>5</sup>. Marcellus accordingly prepared, and laid before the Senate, a decree for this purpose on the last of September. By the first clause of this decree, the Consuls elected for the following year were required, on the first of March, to move in the Senate the consideration of the consular provinces, to admit no other business to precede or to be joined with this, and to suffer no interruption in the meetings of the Senate, even on account of the assemblies of the people. By the same clause, it was resolved, That the three hundred Senators, appointed judges for the year, might be called off from their sittings in the courts to attend the Senate on this business; and if it should be necessary to make any motion on this subject in the assemblies of the People at large, or of the Plebeians<sup>6</sup> separately, that the Consuls Sulpicius and Marcellus, the Prætors, the Tribunes, or such of them as shall be agreed upon, should move the people accordingly.

To this clause were prefixed, in the usual form, the names of twelve Senators, as the authors or movers of it.

By a second clause, bearing the same names, a caution was entered against any obstruction to be given in this business by persons empowered to controul the Senate's proceedings; and it was resolved, That whoever should put a negative on this decree, should be declared an enemy to his country; and that the Senate, notwithstanding any such negative, should persist in recording its own decree, and in carrying its purpose into execution. In the face of this resolution, the Tribunes C. Cælius, L. Venicius, P. Cornelius, C. Vibius Pansa, interposed their negatives.

By another clause, the Senate resolved, That on the same day, the case of the armies of the republic should be taken into consideration, and all who claimed their dismission, either on account of the

<sup>5</sup> Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 9.

<sup>6</sup> Ad Populum Plebemve ferrent. Ibid.

length of service, or any other consideration, should be heard; and that this likewise should be entered as a decree of the Senate, notwithstanding any negative interposed to the contrary. Here the Tribunes C. Cælius and C. Panfa, again forbade the decree. The last clause related to the mode of carrying into execution the purpose of the Pompeian law, with respect to the nomination of Pro-prætors to the province of Cilicia, and the other eight Prætorian provinces; and on this clause likewise, the two last mentioned Tribunes entered their negative<sup>7</sup>.

Thus the resolutions of the Senate, though preserved in their own records, were, by the continual interposition of the Tribunes, prevented from having any real effect. And Cæsar, from the disputes which had arisen on his account, had sufficient warning, if this had been necessary, to prepare himself for an approaching conflict. It is indeed likely, that though in action the principal characters of his mind were decision and rapidity, yet no man ever laid his designs more deep, looked forward to consequences more remote, or waited with more patience the proper time for the execution of his purpose. He had now, by the unremitting application of eight years, acquired the advantage, for the sake of which he had coveted the command in Gaul; he was at the head of a numerous army, which he had gradually augmented from two or three legions, the establishment of his province, to twelve, well inured to service, and attached to his person. He was in possession of a privilege to stand for the Consulate, without disbanding his army; and when he should unite the first civil and political authority in the state, with an army at the gates of the capital, there is no doubt that he might be considered as sovereign of the empire. His apparent right to the advantages he had gained was such, that the resolutions of the Senate against him, however

<sup>7</sup> Cicero ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 3.

necessary to the preservation of the commonwealth, might have the semblance of injustice, and were likely to engage both his own army and the populace of Rome in his quarrel. He himself prepared for the issue, by removing every cause of embarrassment in his province, and by paying fresh court to the legions under his command with gratifications and bounties.

He had dispersed or destroyed all the great armies, which the utmost efforts of the Gaulish nations, in the preceding campaign, had been able to assemble against him; but he had not reconciled the spirits of that people, nor inured them to his government. He had a plausible ground, therefore, from which to refute the allegations of the Senate, who proceeded in their resolutions against him, on a supposition, that the war in his province was ended; and at the same time, had a fair pretence to gratify his army with the spoils of the country. For these purposes, soon after he had placed his army in winter quarters, he had intelligence, or affected to believe, that the war was likely to break out afresh in different cantons; and under this pretence, took occasion to carry his legions successively into action. Leaving M. Antony to command at Bibracté \* on the right of the Loire, he himself, with the eleventh and twelfth legions, passed that river, took the canton of the Bituriges by surprise, plundered their habitations, carried many of the people into captivity, and continued to lay waste the country, until they and all the neighbouring cantons on the left of the Loire, to avert these calamities, surrendered themselves at discretion.

From this expedition, in which he spent forty days, he returned to his quarters, and ordered the two legions, which had been thus employed, a gratuity of two hundred sesterii, or about thirty shillings a man to the private soldiers; and of about two thousand ses-

\* Afterwards Augustodunum, now Autun.

tertii, or sixteen pounds, to the Centurions. This money, it is observed by the historian<sup>9</sup>, was not immediately paid; but was retained by Cæsar as a pledge in his own hands, or remained as a debt due to the army, giving to every individual a special interest in the safety and success of his general.

About eighteen days after this first division of the army was brought back to its quarters, other two legions were employed on a like expedition between the Loire and the Seine<sup>10</sup>. The inhabitants of this tract were to suffer military execution, upon a complaint that they infested the newly acquired subjects of Cæsar beyond the Loire. He accordingly marched to protect his new allies; and being arrived in the country, from whence they were said to be invaded, found the supposed enemy, by the devastations of the preceding campaign which had ruined their towns and villages, reduced to live in temporary huts, in which they withstood with difficulty the inclemency of the season, and were rather objects of pity than of hostile resentment. On the approach of the Romans, they fled to the woods, where they perished in great numbers, from the effects of famine and cold. To force them to an immediate surrender, or to cut off all hopes of advantage from delay, Cæsar made a disposition to prevent their having any respite from their present sufferings. He ordered the ruins of Genabum<sup>11</sup> to be repaired as a place of arms, quartered his legions there, and kept the horse and light infantry in the field to pursue the natives, to seize their persons, and to multiply the evils to which they were exposed. In this service too, it was likely that the army was rewarded by the distribution of captives, the only spoils of such an enemy, and came to have a demand on Cæsar for gratuities equal to those which had been granted to the eleventh and twelfth legions.

<sup>9</sup> Hirt. de Bell. Gallico.

<sup>10</sup> To the country of the Carnutes.

<sup>11</sup> Now Orleans.



These operations led on to the spring, when a more real service took place on the frontiers of the low countries. From that quarter, the people of the Remi<sup>11</sup> had given information, that the Bellovaci, or inhabitants of what is now called the Beauvais, with other cantons on the right of the Oise, were actually arming, and meant to make war on the Romans and their allies.

On this intimation, Cæsar thought proper again to call forth the eleventh legion into service; and it is remarkable that this legion, though now in its eighth campaign, is expressly said to have been thus employed out of its turn, in order to improve a discipline, in which, when compared to the other legions, they were deemed to be still defective. The eighth and ninth legions, the one from the station of Fabius, and the other from that of Labienus, were ordered to join them in the country of the Suefones<sup>12</sup>, near the confluence of the Oise and the Aisne. With this force Cæsar passed the Oise; but arrived too late to surprize his enemy. The Bellovaci<sup>13</sup>, with some of their neighbours, apprehending, from the fate of the nations on the Loire, that they could not rely for safety on their innocence, nor on the care which they had taken to avoid giving offence to the Romans, had taken arms for their own security, and had retired with all their effects to a strong post. They had a hill in their front, beyond which there lay a morass, and in that situation they thought themselves sufficiently secure without any artificial work.

Cæsar posted himself in their neighbourhood; and supposing that the superiority of their numbers would inspire them with confidence, took measures to augment their presumption, and to derive some advantage from the errors they were likely to commit, under the effects of this disposition. He affected unusual caution, fortified his camp with uncommon care, scarcely ventured abroad to cover

<sup>11</sup> Rheims.<sup>12</sup> The Soissons.<sup>13</sup> The Beauvois.

his foragers, and seemed to be entirely occupied in securing himself.

The enemy however continued to avoid any general action, and were satisfied with the successful war they were suffered to make on the foraging parties which were sent from the Roman camp. Being joined by five hundred German horse, they attacked and destroyed the cavalry, which had come to the assistance of Cæsar from the cantons of the Remi and Lingones<sup>14</sup>, and on which he chiefly relied for covering the avenues to his camp. By this loss he might have been in a little time reduced to great distress, or even forced to retire, if he had not procured a speedy reinforcement, by ordering Trebonius, with the two legions lately stationed at Genabum<sup>15</sup>, and a third from Avaricum<sup>16</sup>, to join him without delay.

The Gauls, on hearing of this great accession of strength to their enemy, and recollecting the fatal blockade and ruin of their countrymen at Alesia, determined to change their ground. They began to execute this resolution in the night, by removing their sick, wounded, and baggage; but had made so little progress at break of day, that their intention was discovered, and Cæsar, before they began their march, had time to pass the morass, and to take possession of the rising ground in their front. This he did with the greatest dispatch; and though he did not think it expedient to attack them in their present position, he had it in his power to take advantage of any movement they should make, and continued to awe them and to keep them in suspense.

The Gauls therefore, instead of being able to depart as they expected before day-light, were obliged to continue to front the enemy, in order to cover the retreat of their baggage. They still flattered themselves, that Cæsar before night would be obliged to

<sup>14</sup> Rheims and Langres.<sup>15</sup> Orleans.<sup>16</sup> Bourges.

retire

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retire to his camp ; but observing, that while the greater part of his army continued in readiness for action, he began to entrench himself where he stood, they bethought themselves of a stratagem to elude his design. They brought forward the wood and straw, which remained, as usual, on the ground of their late encampment, laid them in a continued train along the front, and having set them on fire, produced such a line of smoke, as darkened the whole fields between the two armies. Under this cover they began their retreat, and before Cæsar could venture to penetrate the cloud of smoke in pursuit of them, had gained a considerable distance. On the first sight of this uncommon appearance, he suspected their design, and began to advance ; but the precautions, which he was obliged to take, in order to guard against an ambuscade or surprize, gave the Gauls the time they wanted to effect the first part of their retreat undisturbed.

Before night they halted again, about ten miles from their former station, and recurred to the same means they had hitherto employed to distress the Roman army. They succeeded in most of their attempts on the parties that were sent abroad by Cæsar to procure him provisions ; and having reduced him to the necessity of depending intirely for the subsistence of his army on what a particular district could supply, they formed a design, with the choice of their army, to surround and cut off the parties, which they expected he must employ on that service. Cæsar had intelligence of their design, and prepared, in his turn, to counteract them. He placed his army in a proper position to surprisè the great detachment they had made ; and having thus taken or destroyed the flower of their army, obliged the remainder, who were thrown into despair by so great a loss, to surrender themselves at discretion ; in consequence of this surrender, he got possession of all the cantons in that neighbourhood.

The Belgic nations being thus finally subdued, and Cæsar having no longer any enemy to oppose him in the field, except a few desperate bands from different parts of the country, who, either from fear of his severity, or aversion to his government, had deserted their settlements, he determined to act against them in different quarters at once, and to cut off the retreats, which, in case of distress, this remnant of the nations who lately opposed him mutually gave to each other. He sent C. Fabius, with twenty-five cohorts, to act on the left of the Loire; the twelfth legion, towards the sources of the Garonne with orders to cover the approaches to Narbonne from the incursions of any stragglers, whom his intended severities might force upon desperate attempts on that side. He himself, with Labienus and Mark Antony, proceeded to the Meuse, where the territories of the late unfortunate Ambiorix<sup>17</sup>, beginning to be re-peopled, and the nation reinstated under its former leader, were become again the object of his vengeance. To convince this unhappy people, that they were not to enjoy peace under the government of a Prince who had presumed to circumvent and to destroy a part of the Roman army, he renewed his military execution against them, issuing his orders, as in the former instance, to spare neither sex nor age.

While Cæsar himself was employed in this manner, C. Fabius being arrived at the place of his destination, between the lower parts of the Loire and the Garonne, found a considerable force in arms against Caminius Rebilus, the Roman officer, who was stationed in that quarter. The natives had laid siege to a fortress that was in possession of the Romans; but alarmed by the approach of Fabius, they withdrew, and endeavoured to pass the Loire to the northward. In this attempt, being intercepted in their march, and obliged to fight the Roman detachment, they were defeated with great slaughter. After this calamity,

<sup>17</sup> Now Liege, Juliers, and Guelderland.



about five hundred, who escaped from the field under Drapes, a prince of that country, formerly distinguished in the war against the Romans, took their flight in the opposite direction, and proposed to attack the Roman province of Narbonne, in order to compensate their losses with its spoils.

Fabius, in consequence of his victory, received the submission of all the nations from the Loire to the Seine, and quite down to the sea coast. And having taken measures to secure his conquest, followed Drapes to the southward, overtook him beyond the Garonne, and obliged him, being no longer in condition to make any attempt on the Roman province, to take refuge at Uxellodunum<sup>18</sup>, a place of strength, situated on a steep rock, at the confluence of some of those streams, which, falling from the Cevennes, form the Garonne by their junction.

Here Caninius and Fabius having joined their forces together, made dispositions to invest their enemy; but before their works were completed, Drapes, while he had yet access to the fields, willing to spare the magazines which he had made up in the town, ventured abroad with a detachment, at the head of which he was surprised and taken. The natives, however, who remained in the place, being supplied for a considerable time with provisions, resolved on a vigorous defence; and, by keeping the Roman army for some time at bay, began to raise up anew the hopes and expectations of the nations around them. Cæsar thought the reduction of this place an object that required his own presence. Having therefore sent Labienus to the Moselle, and having left M. Antony to command in the low countries, he himself, with his usual dispatch, crossed great part of Gaul, and appeared on the Garonne, equally unexpected

<sup>18</sup> Supposed to be Cadenau.

by his own people, and by the enemy who were besieged in the town of Uxellodunum.

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The place being strong by nature, and in no want of provisions, could be forced only by cutting off its access to water. For this purpose Cæsar lined the banks of the river with archers and slingers, and effectually prevented the besieged from supplying themselves from thence. He proceeded next to exclude them from the use of a spring which burst from the rock in the approach to their town; for having got the command of the ground, he pushed a mine to the source from which the water came, diverted it from its former direction, and, by depriving the besiegers of this last resource, obliged them to lay down their arms and trust to his mercy. In this, however, they experienced what the author<sup>19</sup>, from whom these accounts are taken, considered as more than the usual severity of antient war. Cæsar, according to this historian, having given proof of his clemency, bethought himself now of an example of justice; and for this purpose ordered such as had carried arms in defence of Uxellodunum to have their hands struck off<sup>20</sup>. And this refined act of cruelty being joined to the many barbarous executions with which the conquest of that country had been achieved, thus ended the war in Gaul.

The usual time of putting the troops into winter quarters not being arrived, Cæsar thought proper to visit the nations upon the Adour, or what is now called Gascony<sup>21</sup>; the only part of his new conquests in the acquisition of which he had not acted in person. He marched through this country at the head of two legions, and was every where received with the most perfect submission. From thence he repaired to Narbonne, the capital of his

<sup>19</sup> Hist. de Bell. Gall. lib. viii. c. 44.

testator esset pœna improborum. De Bell.

<sup>20</sup> Cæsar quum suam lenitatem cognitam omnibus sciret.—Omnibus qui arma tulerant manus precipit. Vitam concessit quo

Gall. lib. viii. c. 44.

<sup>21</sup> Aquitania.

original province, held the usual meetings for the dispatch of civil affairs, and made a disposition for the quarters of his army during the winter. By this disposition two legions were stationed in the high country, from which spring the Garonne and the Loire, or in the territories of the Limovaci and Arverni<sup>22</sup>: two at Bibracte between the Soane and the Loire; two between the Loire and the Seine<sup>23</sup>; and the remaining four under the command of Trebonius, Vatinius, and Quintus Tullius Cicero, in different parts of the low countries. To this extremity of his new conquests he himself repaired, and fixed his quarters at Nemetocenna<sup>24</sup>, in the centre of his northern stations.

By this distribution of his army, Cæsar formed a kind of chain from the frontier of his original province, quite through the heart of his new acquisitions to the Meuse and the Scheld. And by his seeming anxiety for the safety of the northern extremities of his province, and still more by his own distance from Italy, he probably lulled for a while the vigilance or jealousy of his principal opponents at Rome. His own attention, however, to the state of politics was never less remitted.

Mark Antony, a person profligate and dissipated; but when the occasion required exertion, daring and eloquent, destined to be frequently mentioned in the sequel of this history, now began to be employed by Cæsar in the affairs of the city; and, under pretence of standing for the priesthood, was sent from Gaul, where he had recently served in the army, to bear a principal part among the agents and emissaries of his general. These agents were continually busied in magnifying his services, and in gaining to his interest every person of consideration who could in any degree advance or obstruct his designs. In the conquest of Gaul, they alleged that he added

<sup>22</sup> Limoges and Auvergne.<sup>23</sup> At Tours & Chartres.<sup>24</sup> Supposed to be Arras.

to the patrimony of the Roman People a territory of no less than three thousand miles in circumference, and a revenue of forty millions Roman money<sup>25</sup>. They took care at the same time, in his name and by his directions, under the pious pretence of celebrating the memory of his daughter, the late wife of Pompey, to cajole the people with public entertainments and feasts; and proceeded to execute, at a great expence, the splendid works which Cæsar had formerly ordered.

He himself, at the same time, was careful to secure the affections of the army; doubled their pay, and was lavish in all the other articles which were derived from his bounty. Besides his occasional liberality to the legions in time of the war, he gave, or engaged himself to pay, to each particular soldier, what to persons of that condition was a considerable object. In the city he even entered into the secrets of every family, and, as has been mentioned, gained the master by courting the mistress or favourite slave. His purse was ever open to gratify the covetous with presents, to relieve the necessitous, and to silence the creditors of those who were oppressed with debt. He encouraged the prodigal to squander their patrimonies, and freely lent them the aids which their extravagance rendered necessary to them. He kept a correspondence at the same time with dependant and foreign princes; and took upon him the protection of provincial towns, in order to secure their affection and their confidence<sup>26</sup>.

While Cæsar was thus extending his influence in the empire, he had amused Pompey by assigning to him, in all their arrangements, what was apparently the place of honour and of importance at the head of affairs at Rome; as he had gratified Crassus likewise by leaving him to choose the most lucrative government, while he himself submitted to be employed as a mere provincial officer, to explore a barbarous country, and to make war with its natives. But by thus

<sup>25</sup> Plutarch. in *Vit. Catonis*, p. 268. *Sueton. in Jul. Cæs.* c. 25. Between about three and four hundred thousand pounds,

<sup>26</sup> *Sueton. in Jul. Cæs.* c. 26, 27, 28.



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yielding the supposed preference of station to his rivals, he actually employed them as the willing tools and ministers of his own ambition. The former, with all his disposition to emulation and jealousy, and perhaps for some time the dupe of these artifices, imagined that Cæsar advanced by his permission, and that the present state of parties was the fruit of his own address. As he himself, for the most part, endeavoured to obtain his ends by means indirect and artificial, he was the more easily duped by those who affected to be deceived by him, and who were able to over-reach him. Although it was impossible for him now to remain any longer insensible to the superiority which Cæsar had acquired, or to those still more important objects at which he was aiming, yet he had not hitherto taken his part openly nor directly against him, but contented himself with employing others in ill-concerted and ineffectual attacks, which he sometimes disowned, and always feebly supported. At last, and in the prosecution of the measures of which we have observed the beginning in the Senate, he hazarded the whole authority of that body against Cæsar, without having provided any military power to enforce their commands.

Pompey himself, while most under the influence of ambition, and when he had it most in his power to trample on the civil constitution of his country, had shewn a respect for the commonwealth, which kept him within bounds that were consistent with this species of government; and he imagined that no man could presume to surpass himself in pretensions to rise above the ordinary level. In the course of debates relating to the present state of affairs, he generally spoke ambiguously, or affected to disbelieve the designs that were imputed to Cæsar; but finding, on the last motion which was made to recall him from Gaul, that the eyes of the whole Senate were turned upon himself, he was forced to break silence; and, with some degree of embarrassment, said, that although it was his opinion, that the proconsul of Gaul could not, in consistence with justice, be instantly recalled, yet  
that

that after the first of March he should have no difficulties on the subject. "But," says one of the Senators, "What if this motion should then have a negative put upon it?" "I shall make no distinction," replied Pompey, "between Caesar's refusing to obey the order of the Senate, and his procuring some one here to forbid that order." "But what if he persist in demanding the Consulate while he retains his province and his army?" "What," replied Pompey, "if my own child should offer me violence?"

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After the attempt which had been made to fix the question of Caesar's recall for the first of March, Pompey being at Naples, was taken ill, and supposed to be in danger. His recovery gave a general satisfaction, of which he had afterwards very flattering proofs in his progress through Italy. He was every where met by processions, found the ways strowed before him with flowers, and was received by multitudes, who appeared to be frantic with joy for the return of his health.

Whatever part Pompey himself or his emissaries may have had in procuring these demonstrations of respect and affection, it is probable he was highly flattered with them, and either mistook them himself, or hoped that others should mistake them, as the proofs of a consideration and power which no attempt of his rival could overset or impair.

The principal attention of all parties, during this summer and autumn, as has been mentioned, had been turned to the affairs of Caesar, and the dangerous tendency of the course he pursued: and they were but for a little while diverted from this object by an alarm on the side of Syria. The Parthians, encouraged by their late success against Crassus, passed the Euphrates with a great army, commanded by Pacorus, son to Orodes, under the direction of Osaces, a veteran

<sup>27</sup> Cicer. Epist. ad Familiares, lib. viii. ep. 8.

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and experienced leader. They had, during the preceding winter, made an alliance with the king of Armenia, and were to be joined by his forces in this invasion. The disaster of Crassus had rendered the Parthian name terrible at Rome; and this intelligence struck a momentary panic in the city, as if an enemy were already at the gates. Some proposed to give Pompey the command in Syria; some to send Cæsar thither; and others, to send both the present Consuls to the army with a proper reinforcement<sup>28</sup>.

But before these measures could be determined, or before any reinforcement could be ready to join the army in Syria, the people were relieved of their fears by Caius Cassius, the general then commanding in that province, who had obliged the Parthians to withdraw from Antioch; in their retreat attacked them, and made great slaughter. Olaces in that action received some wounds, of which, in a few days afterwards, he died, and the Parthian army continued in their retreat during the following year beyond the Euphrates; sensible, in their turn, that a war carried over the wastes of that desolated frontier might be ruinous to any power by which it was attempted.

Bibulus; the present Proconsul of Syria, soon after the retreat of the Parthians, arrived in his province, and, according to the established practice of the Romans, laid his pretensions to a triumph for the victory which, under his auspices, though before his arrival, had been obtained by his lieutenant.

This invasion of Syria, as well as some disturbances in his own province, furnished Cicero, at the same time, with the occasion of some military operations, of which we have a particular account, in his letters, and which, though not material to the military history of the times, are not unworthy of notice, as they relate to this eminent personage. He had taken possession of his command in Cilicia, and

<sup>28</sup> Cicer. ad Familiares, lib. viii. ep. 10.

however better fitted by his habits for the Forum and the political assemblies at Rome than for the field, possessed abilities to qualify him for any station, put himself at the head of an army, and prepared for the defence of his province. He had set out from Rome in May; and having had a conference with Pompey at Tarentum, arrived at Brundisium on the twenty-first of that month<sup>29</sup>.

The military establishment of Cilicia being no more than twelve thousand foot and two thousand horse, Cicero applied for an augmentation of it, and on the fourth of June was still at Brundisium, waiting for an answer to this application. But finding that his request, having been opposed by the Consul Sulpicius<sup>30</sup>, was unsuccessful, he set sail from that place, arrived at Actium on the fifteenth of that month, and, passing through Athens, reached his province on the last of July. Here he found the troops, in consequence of a mutiny which had recently broke out among them, separated from their officers, dispersed in places of their own choosing, the men of entire cohorts absent from their colours, and considering themselves as exempt from any authority or government whatever. Trusting to the respect that was due to the name and commission of Proconsul, he ordered M. Annius, one of his lieutenants, to assemble as many as he could of the mutinous troops, and to encamp at Iconium in Licaonia. There he joined them on the twenty-fourth of August; and, having intelligence of the Parthian invasion, took measures for the security of his province; marched, without loss of time, to Cybistra, on the frontier of Cappadocia; took under his protection the king Ariobarzanes, who was then threatened by a powerful faction in his own kingdom, and by receiving him as a prince in alliance with the Romans, dispelled the storm that had been gathering against him. He accepted, at the same time, of the offers that were made by De-

<sup>29</sup> Cicero ad Familiar. lib. iii. ep. 3.<sup>30</sup> Ibid.



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jotarus to join him with all his forces; and being in this situation when he received accounts that the Parthians had presented themselves before Antioch, he supposed that his presence might be wanted to cover his own frontier on the side of Syria. He accordingly moved to that quarter, in order to secure the passes of the mountains. Here however he learnt, that the storm had blown over; that the enemy had retired, and had sustained a considerable loss in their retreat; and that Bibulus was then at Antioch. This intelligence he communicated to Dejotarus, intimating, at the same time, that his assistance was no longer necessary.

The province of Cilicia had been for some years subject to the Romans; but the inhabitants of the mountainous parts had never acknowledged their authority, nor even that of their own national sovereigns. Cicero, on his arrival in the neighbourhood of their country, finding that the people had retired to their strong holds, and were still determined to oppose his authority, formed a design to surprise them; and, for the better execution of his project, made a feint to withdraw to Epiphania, where he halted for a day, as if to refresh his troops. On the day following, which was the eleventh of October, in the evening, he put his army again in motion towards the mountains, and before morning arrived in the midst of his enemies, who by this time had returned to their usual habitations; cut them off separately, pursued such as fled, forced their strong holds, and in about sixty days reduced some towns and a considerable tract of country, which had never before acknowledged the Roman government.

The troops, on this occasion, saluted Cicero with the title of Imperator; which being usually given to victorious leaders<sup>31</sup>, was commonly understood as the suffrage of the army for obtaining a triumph. He himself, accordingly, on this circumstance, together

<sup>31</sup> Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xv. ep. 4.

with the service which gave occasion to it, afterwards grounded his claim of that honour. This claim he scarcely seems to have seriously entertained; he even treats it as a jest in some of his letters: yet the triumph being in these latter times considered rather as the means of acquiring a certain rank in the commonwealth, than as the just reward of military merit, he submitted his claim to the Senate, and urged his friends to support it. His conduct as governor of a province, at a time when this station was supposed to give a licence to every species of rapine and oppression, did honour to his own disposition, and to those literary studies in which he was taught to choose the objects of his ambition and his habits of life. In this character he declined, both for himself and for his attendants, all those presents, contributions, and even supplies of provisions, of which custom or law had authorised the Roman governors, in passing through the provinces, to avail themselves. In his command he distinguished himself by his humanity, condescension, and disinterestedness; was easy of access and hospitable; open, in particular to all persons of literary merit and ingenuity, whom he entertained without ostentation. In such situations other Roman generals, though of great merit, indulged themselves in what was the custom of their times; they drained the provinces to accumulate their own fortunes, or placed their money there at extravagant interest. He was governed by different maxims, and wished to rise above his contemporaries by the fame of his disinterestedness, as well as of his ingenuity and civil accomplishments. Other citizens might possess greater steadiness, and force or elevation of mind; but his fine genius, his talents and fair disposition, of which his weakness indeed often prevented the full effect, still rendered him an important acquisition to either of the parties in the commonwealth. And as they endeavoured to gain, so they even seemed to acquire, his support in their turns.

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Whilst the affairs of the respective provinces were thus administered by the commanders to whom they were intrusted, the usual time of elections at Rome being arrived, L. Æmilius Paulus, and C. Claudius Marcellus were elected to succeed to the Consulate for the following year. Soon after these elections attempts were made, though without effect, to carry into execution some of the regulations devised by Pompey, in his late administration, to check the corruption of the times. Calpidius had been engaged in the last competition, and immediately upon his disappointment was brought to trial for illegal means employed in his canvass. He was acquitted; and, in resentment, retorted the charge on Marcellus, in order, if possible, to annul his election; but failed in the attempt.

Of those who were now elected Consuls, Caius Marcellus, as well as his relation and immediate predecessor Marcus Marcellus, was understood to be in the interest of Pompey. Æmilius Paulus, a Senator of rank, and of course interested in the preservation of the republic, the honours of which he was so well intitled to share, was expected to support the measures of the Senate, and adhere to the established forms. Together with internal tranquillity, the government seemed to recover its ancient severity. Appius Claudius, late Proconsul of Cilicia, and Calpurnius Piso were chosen Censors, and appeared to have authority enough to carry into execution the powers lately restored to this office by the ordinance of Scipio. It was expected that these Censors would hold an even balance between the factions. Appius favoured Pompey, and Piso, from his relation of father-in-law to Cæsar, was necessarily disposed to check the partiality of his colleague. The hopes of the Senate were likewise considerably raised by the unexpected nomination of Caius Scribonius Curio to be one of the Tribunes. Servius Pola, after being elected into this office, had been convicted of bribery, the election was set aside, and Curio substituted in his place. This young man was of an honourable family ;  
and

and possessing talents which qualified him for the highest preferments, naturally set out on a foot of independence, and joined those who were for maintaining the freedom of the commonwealth, and their own equal pretensions to honour and power. Being active and bold, as well as eloquent, the Senators were fond of a partizan who was likely to take upon himself much of that fatigue and danger which many of them were willing, even where their own estates and dignities were concerned, to devolve upon others.

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The new magistrates accordingly entered on office with high expectations that the dangerous pretensions of ambitious citizens, particularly those of Cæsar, would be effectually checked. The Consuls were possessed of a resolution of the Senate, requiring them to proceed to the business of Cæsar's province by the first of March. This resolution wanted only the consent of the Tribunes to render it a formal act of the executive power, of which this branch was by the constitution lodged in the Senate. But one of the Tribunes having forbid the decree, M. Marcellus, late Consul, moved that application might be made to this officer to withdraw the negative, which prevented the effect of what the Senate had resolved. But the motion was rejected by a majority<sup>32</sup> of the Senate itself; and many other symptoms of Cæsar's great influence, even over this order of men, soon after appeared.

U. C. 703.  
L. Æmilius  
Paulus, and  
C. Claudius  
Marcellus.

This able politician, probably that he might not seem to have any views upon Italy, had fixed his quarters, and that of his army, in the low countries, and at the extremity of his recent conquests. But, instead of seizing every pretence, as formerly, for making war on the natives of Gaul, he endeavoured to quiet their fears, and to conciliate their affections<sup>33</sup>; and while he kept the whole province in a state of profound tranquillity, collected money, provided

<sup>32</sup> Cicero ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 13.

<sup>33</sup> Hirt. de Bell. Gall. lib. viii. c. 49.



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arms, and completed his legions, as if preparing for a dangerous and important war. His distance from Italy lulled the jealousy of his opponents, and enabled him to carry on his operations unobserved. He spared no expence in gaining accessions to his interest; and when promises were accepted, seemed to make them with unbounded confidence in the means on which he relied for the performance of them. In this he acted as on the eve of a great revolution, the event of which was to raise him above the want of resources, or above the necessity of a scrupulous faith with private persons. He actually remitted at this time great sums of money to Rome; and no less than fifteen hundred talents, or about £ 289,500, to the management of the Consul Æmilius alone, who was supposed to expend this money in erecting public buildings for the use of the city. But not being superior to corruption, at least not to that which was addressed to his vanity, in being made agent and trustee for so popular a leader as Cæsar, he disappointed the hopes of his friends, and in all the contests which arose during his Consulship<sup>34</sup>, became an active partizan for the person who had honoured him with so flattering a trust.

It was likewise very early observed in these debates, that the zeal of Curio, who set out with violent invectives against Cæsar, began to abate; that he for a while endeavoured to divert the attention of the public to other objects<sup>35</sup>; and at last fairly withdrew himself from the support of the Senate, and espoused the interest of Cæsar in every question.

This interest was now likewise strengthened by the accessions brought to it in consequence of the disputes of the Censors. These magistrates concurred in expunging from the Rolls of the Senate such as were of servile extraction, and many even of noble family, on account

<sup>34</sup> Appian. Plutarch.

<sup>35</sup> Cicero ad Familiares. lib. viii. ep. 6.

of some infamy or blemish in their character. But Appius, having carried his affectation of zeal beyond what the age could bear, and being suspected of partiality to Pompey's friends, gave offence to Piso, who, by protecting many citizens who were stigmatized by his colleague, gained them to the interest of Cæsar. From these several causes this party became very numerous even in the Senate, and continued to suspend any decrees that were proposed to deprive Cæsar of his command, or to recall the extraordinary privilege which had formerly been granted to him.

It was afterwards discovered, in the sequel of these transactions, that Curio, some time before he openly declared himself for Cæsar, had been actually gained by him. This young man, like the youth of that age in general, had dissipated his fortune, and contracted immense debts. His popularity was the effect of his profusion; and the load of his debts made him a very uncertain friend to government, and to laws which supported the just claims of his creditors against him. He readily listened to Cæsar, who offered to relieve him of this burden, and actually paid his debts to a great amount<sup>36</sup>; according to some reports, to the amount of ten millions Roman money<sup>37</sup>; according to others, of six times that sum<sup>38</sup>.

Curio, after he took his resolution to join Cæsar, continued to speak the language of his former party, and to act in concert with them, until he should find a plausible excuse for breaking with them. Such a pretence<sup>39</sup> he sought by starting many subjects of debate without consulting them, and by making proposals in which he knew that the leading men of the Senate would not concur. To this effect he devised a project for the reparation of the highways, offering himself to have the inspection of the work for five

<sup>36</sup> Plutarch. Dio. Sueton. Appias.

<sup>38</sup> Valerius Maximus, lib. ix. c. 1.

<sup>37</sup> Velleius, lib. ii. c. 43.—80,729 l. See Arbutnot's Tables.

<sup>39</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xl. c. 61. Appian. de Bello Civile.

years. And when much time had been spent in fruitless debates on this subject, he insisted, that a considerable intercalation should be made to lengthen the year, to give him sufficient time to ripen his projects. Being opposed in this by the college of Augurs<sup>40</sup>, he employed his Tribunitian power to obstruct all other business, and separated himself intirely from his friends in the Senate.

Curio, having in this manner withdrawn himself from his former party, did not at once openly join their opponents; but, with professions of independence, affected to oppose the errors of both; and, by this artful conduct, seemed to have received the instructions, or to have imitated the policy of his leader. When the great question of Cæsar's recall was revived, he inveighed, as formerly, against the exorbitant powers which had been committed to this general, and urged the necessity of having them revoked; but subjoined, that the powers granted to Pompey were equally dangerous, and proposed, that both should be ordered to disband their armies, and return to a private station. The partizans of Pompey insisted, that the term of his commission was not yet expired; nor that of Cæsar's, replied Curio. If either is to be disarmed, it is proper that both should be so; if only one army be disbanded, we are certainly the slaves of that which remains.

There were probably now three parties in the State; one devoted to Cæsar, another to Pompey, and a third that meant to support the republic against the intrigues or violence of either. The latter must have been few, and could not hope to be of much consequence, except by joining such of the other two, as appeared by the character of its leader least dangerous to the commonwealth. Cæsar had shown himself in his political course a dangerous subject, and an arbitrary magistrate. In the capacity of a subject, he had supported every

<sup>40</sup> Cicero ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 6.

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party that was inclined to commit disorder in the State, or to weaken the hands of government. In that of a magistrate he spurned every legal restraint, acted the part of a demagogue, supporting himself by popular tumults, and the credit of a faction, against the laws of his country; and it was the general opinion of considerate persons, that his thirst of power and emolument was not to be satiated without a total subversion of government: that if, in the contest which seemed to impend, his sword should prevail, a scene of bloodshed and rapine would ensue, far exceeding what had yet been exhibited in any calamity that had ever befallen the republic. The description of his adherents<sup>41</sup>, and the character of persons that crowded to his standard, justified the general fear and distrust which was entertained of his designs. All who had fallen under sentence of the law, all who dreaded this fate, all who had suffered any disgrace, or were conscious they deserved it; young men who were impatient of government; the populace who had an aversion to order; the bankrupt, to whom law and property itself were enemies; all these looked for his approach with impatience, and joined in every cry that was raised in his favour.

Pompey, the leader of the opposite party, had never ceased to embroil the State with his intrigues, and even invaded the laws by his impatience for extraordinary and unprecedented honours; yet, when possessed of power, he had employed it with moderation, and seemed to delight in receiving these singular trusts by the free choice of his country; not in extorting them, not in making any illegal use of them, nor in retaining them beyond the terms prescribed by his commission. It appeared, that in nothing he had ever injured the commonwealth so deeply, as in caballing with Cæsar while he rose

<sup>41</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 7.



to his present elevation, from which he was not likely to descend, without some signal convulsion in the State <sup>42</sup>.

This comparison of the parties which were now to contend for power at the hazard of the republic, made it easy for good citizens to choose their side. But they nevertheless naturally wished to prevent the contest from coming to extremities; as in the event of the war, which they dreaded, it was scarcely possible to avoid a military government. They considered the proposal of Curio as a mere pretence to justify Cæsar in keeping possession of his army: but they saw that there was no force in the republic sufficient to resist him. They wished to arm Pompey for this purpose; but were prevented, either by the confidence which he still gave them of his own superiority, or by their fear of precipitating the State into a civil war, by seeming to take any precautions against it.

Cæsar would have considered every attempt to arm the republic as a declaration against himself; and was ready to commence hostilities before any such measure could be carried into execution. The proposal for disarming at once both Cæsar and Pompey, in the mean time, was extremely acceptable to the popular party, who perpetually founded the cry of liberty against the Senate, and lately too against Pompey himself, who, on account of the spirit of his administration when last in office, and the severity of his prosecutions against bribery and other offences, which are not odious to the vulgar, was become in a considerable degree unpopular, and supposed to aim at a tyranny. With such powers as Pompey already possessed, it was reckoned an effort of courage to oppose him. And Curio, in coming from the Senate, with the lustre of having acted so bold a part, was received by the populace with shouts and acclamations, was conducted to his house over ways strewed with flowers, and, like a victor in the circus, pre-

<sup>42</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 3.

sented with chaplets and garlands, in reward of his courageous, patriotic and impartial conduct. This happened about the time that Pompey, as has been observed, was making a shew of his great popularity in the country towns, where he was received with feasts, processions, and acclamations, on occasion of his recovery from a supposed dangerous illness. Cæsar too had a like reception in the towns of the Cisalpine Gaul; but it is likely, that of these three pretenders to popularity, Pompey was most elated with his share of the public favour, and the most likely to mistake these appearances of consideration for the stable foundations of power. Under this mistake probably it was, that when one of his friends asked him, with what force he was to oppose Cæsar if he should march into Italy with his army? "In Italy," he answered, "I can raise forces with a stamp of my foot." He was, however, greatly alarmed by the motion which had been made by Curio, and by the reception it met, both in the approbation of the Senators, and in the acclamations of the People. He wrote a letter, on this occasion, to the Senate, in which he acknowledged the services of Cæsar, and mentioned his own. "His late Consulship," he said, "was not of his seeking; it was pressed upon him to save the republic in the midst of great dangers; the command he then bore had devolved upon him in consequence of his having been Consul, and was given for a term of years, yet far from being expired; but he was ready, nevertheless, without waiting for the expiration of his term, to resign with alacrity what he had accepted with reluctance." He continued, on every occasion, to repeat the same professions, adding, "That he made no doubt, his relation and his friend Cæsar would cheerfully make a like sacrifice to the fears and apprehensions of his fellow-citizens; and that, after many years of hard struggle with warlike enemies, he would now hasten to retire in peace, and to solace himself in the midst of domestic repose."

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Pompey, for the most part, chose to dissemble his sentiments, and advanced to his purpose by indirect means; he was therefore like most artful men, easily over-reached by persons who perceived his designs; and probably, on the present occasion, was the only dupe of his own artifices, or of those that were employed against him. Curio, in the Senate, openly attacked this part of his character, insisting that actions, and not professions, were now to be regarded: that the army of Cæsar was, to the republic, a necessary defence against that of Pompey; that nevertheless, both should be ordered to disband, under pain of being declared, in case of disobedience, enemies to their country; and that an army should be instantly levied to enforce these orders. "Now," said he, "is the time to reduce this assuming and arrogant man, while you have a person who can dispute his pretensions, and who can wrest those arms out of his hands, which he never would have willingly dropped."

The friends of Cæsar, in the Senate, offered to compromise the dispute; and provided Pompey retired to his province, and Cæsar were allowed to retain the Cisalpine Gaul with two legions, they proposed, in his name, to disband the remainder of his army, and to resign the other part of his provinces. "Observe the dutiful citizen and good subject," said Cato, "how ready he is to quit the northern parts of Gaul, if you only put him in possession of Italy and of the city; and how ready to accept of your voluntary submission, rather than employ your own army against you to enforce it<sup>43</sup>."

In the result of these debates, the Senate, upon the motion of the Consul Marcellus, came to a vote on the following questions, which were separately stated, relating to the appointments both of Cæsar and of Pompey. On the first question, Whether Cæsar should disband his army? the *Ayes* were general throughout the house. On

<sup>43</sup> Plutarch, in Catone.

the second, relating to Pompey, the *Noes* greatly prevailed. Curio and M. Antony insisted, that the questions were not fairly put; and that they did not collect the sense of the Senate; that the majority might be of opinion, that both should disband; and that both, therefore, should be included in the same question. To this purpose, accordingly, a third question was put; and the Senate having divided, a majority of three hundred and seventy *Ayes* appeared against twenty-two *Noes* <sup>44</sup>, Whether these proceedings of the Senate were annulled by any informality, or were deprived of effect by any other circumstance, does not appear? The only immediate consequence they seem to have produced, was an order to Pompey and Cæsar, requiring each of them to march a legion to reinforce the army in Syria, where the Parthians, though repulsed from Antioch in the preceding year, had wintered in the *Cyrrhestica*, a district of that province, and threatened to repeat their invasion in the present spring and summer; and this appears to have been no more than a feeble attempt to strip Cæsar of two legions, of which, when it came to be executed, he well knew how to disappoint the effect.

While the subject of Cæsar's appointments occupied all parties at Rome, he himself, with his army, passed a quiet winter in Gaul; and at the end of it, or early in the spring, set out for Italy. He employed, as a pretence for this journey, the election to a vacant place in the college of Augurs, which was fast approaching; and for which his friend Mark Antony was a candidate. Many votes were to be procured in the colonies and free cities bordering on that part of his province which was beyond the Alps; and he made his journey with uncommon speed to secure them: but being informed, on the road, that the election of Augurs was past, and that his friend Antony had prevailed, he nevertheless continued his journey, and

<sup>44</sup> Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. Plutarch. in Cæsar. p. 134.



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with the same diligence as before he received this information, saying, It was proper he should thank his friends for their good offices, and request the continuance of their favour in his own competition for the Consulate, which he proposed to declare on the following year. He alleged, as a reason for his early application, that his enemies, in order to oppress him, or to withstand his just pretensions, had placed C. Marcellus and P. Lentulus in the magistracy of the present year, and had rejected the pretensions of Galba, though much better founded.

He was met in all the provincial towns and colonies of Cisalpine Gaul with more than a kingly reception, with sacrifices and processions every where made by innumerable crowds, which were assembled to see and admire him. Having made the circuit of this province, and founded the dispositions of the People, he returned with great dispatch to his quarters at Nemetocenna<sup>45</sup>, in the Low Countries, where he likewise wished to know the disposition as well as the state of his army; and, for this purpose, ordered the whole to assemble on the Moselle. He foresaw, that the Senate might possibly pass a decree to supersede him; and that he must then depend upon the attachment of his legions, and make war, or submit as he found them inclined; in this, however, it is probable he was in a great measure resolved, or had no doubt of their willingness to become his partners in a military adventure for the sovereignty of the empire.

In this state of affairs he assigned to Labienus his station within the Alps; and seeming to have conceived a suspicion of this officer, or rather knowing that he was not disposed to follow him, in case his commission should be withdrawn by the Senate, nor to co-operate in any act of hostility against the republic, he wished to prevent the disputes which might arise on such an occasion, and

<sup>45</sup> Arras.

to avoid the difficult task of determining how he should deal with a citizen, who being an offender against himself, was nevertheless in his duty to the State, and who either, by his impunity or by his sufferings, might start dangerous questions, and divide the opinions and affections of the soldiers. He dismissed him, therefore, from the army in the northern Gaul, to command on the Po, a station from which he could easily quit the province, and join the forces of the republic; and by this means rid him at once of a person on whom he could not rely, and whom he would scarcely dare to punish for defection. But in whatever manner we understand this separation, it is noticed, that while Cæsar himself remained with the army upon the Moselle, and made frequent movements merely to exercise the troops and to preserve their health, a rumour prevailed, that his enemies were soliciting Labienus to desert him, and to carry off the troops that were under his command. At the same time it was reported, that the Senate was preparing a decree to divest Cæsar of his government, and to disband his army. These insinuations he affected to treat as groundless; observing, that he could not believe such an officer as Labienus would betray his trust; and that for himself, he was at all times ready to submit his cause to a free Senate. The proposals of Curio, and his other friends, he said, had been so reasonable, that the Senate would have long ago accepted of them, if that body had not been under the improper influence of his enemies.

About the same time, Cæsar received the famous order of the Senate to detach a legion from his army to be transported into Syria, and employed in the Parthian war; and likewise to restore that legion which he had borrowed from Pompey. It is probable, that he had desired the last might be sent to him merely to take off a part of his rival's force; and though he now, with seeming cheerfulness, complied with the requisition to restore them, yet he afterwards complained of this measure respecting the two legions in question, as a

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more artifice to turn his own forces against him. In compliance with the Senate's order, he sent the fifteenth legion, then upon the Po, and relieved it by one from his present camp. In dismissing the soldiers of Pompey, he was, under pretence of gratitude for past services, most lavish of his caresses and thanks; and as an earnest of future favour, ordered each private man a gratuity of two hundred and fifty denarii<sup>46</sup>. By this artful conduct, while he parted with the men, he took care to retain their affections, and sent them, together with his own legion, as at best but an uncertain and dubious accession of strength to his enemies<sup>47</sup>.

The officers, who were sent to make these demands, and to conduct the troops into Italy, brought to their employers a very flattering report of the state and dispositions of Cæsar's army: that they longed to change their commander; had a high opinion of Pompey; and, if marched into Italy, would surely desert to him: that Cæsar was become odious on account of the hard service in which he had so long employed them, without any adequate reward, and on account of the suspicion that he aimed at the monarchy<sup>48</sup>. It is in the highest degree probable, that their crafty leader employed proper persons to hold this language to the commissioners of the Senate, and to the officers of Pompey; and to utter complaints of their commander, and of the service, on purpose that they might be repeated in Italy. His own preparations were not of more importance to him than the supine security into which he endeavoured, by this and every other measure, to lull his enemies.

On the approach of winter he conducted his army back to their quarters in the Low Countries, and the interior parts of Gaul. Trebonius was stationed with four legions on the Scheld and the Meuse, and Fabius, with other four between the Soane and the Loire, in the

<sup>46</sup> About 51.

<sup>48</sup> Plutarch. in Vita Cæsar. p. 133. et in

<sup>47</sup> Appian de Bello Civile, lib. ii. Plutarch. in Vita Pompeii, p. 435.

canton of Bibraçté, now Autun. This disposition, like that of the former winter, was calculated to avoid giving any alarm to his opponents in Italy. He himself intended to winter within the Alps, but had no troops on that side of the mountains that could occasion any suspicion; only one veteran legion is mentioned, the thirteenth, which he had sent to replace the fifteenth; that, upon pretence of the Parthian war, had been called away from his province. Upon his arrival in Italy he affected surprise upon hearing that the two legions lately demanded from him had not been sent into Asia, but were kept in Italy, and put under the command of Pompey. He complained, that he was betrayed; that his enemies meant to disarm and circumvent him. "But while the republic is safe, and matters can be made up on amicable terms, I will bear," he said, "with any indignities, rather than involve the State in a civil war".

While the factions that were likely to divide the empire were in this situation, C. Marcellus, now third of this name in the succession of Consuls, together with Publius Lentulus, were chosen for the following year. Before they entered on office a rumour arose, that Cæsar, with his whole army, was actually in motion to pass the Alps. Marcellus, Consul of the present year, assembled the Senate; laid before them this report, and moved, that the troops then in Italy should be prepared to act, and new levies should be ordered. A debate ensued, in which Curio contradicted the report, and, by his Tribunitian authority, forbade the Senate to proceed in any resolution upon this subject.

On this interposition of the Tribune, the Consul dismissed the assembly, using, together with other expressions of impatience, the words following: That if he were not supported by the Senate, in the measures which were necessary for the preservation of the common-

<sup>47</sup> Hirtus de Bello Gallico, lib. viii. c. 46.



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wealth, he should put the exercise of his power into hands more likely to make the State be respected : then, together with Lentulus, one of the Consuls elected for the ensuing year, he repaired to the gardens where Pompey resided ; this officer being obliged, on account of his military command, to remain without the city ; and presenting his sword, bid him employ it for the defence of his country, and with it to assume the command of the forces then in Italy. To this address, Pompey, with an air of modesty, made answer, “ If no-  
“ thing better can be devised for the commonwealth.”

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*Return of different Officers from their Provinces.—Decree of the Senate to supersede Cæsar.—Forbidden by the Tribunes.—Commission to the Consuls and to Pompey.—Their Resolutions.—Flight of the Tribunes Antony and Quintus Cassius.—Speech of Cæsar to the Legion at Ravenna.—Surprise of Ariminum.—March of Cæsar.—Flight of Pompey and the Senate, &c.—Approach of Cæsar.—Embarkation and Departure of Pompey from Brundisium.—Return of Cæsar to Rome.—Passes by Marseilles into Spain.—Campaign on the Segra.—Legions of Pompey in Spain conducted to the Var.*

**I**N this posture of affairs, the officers, who had been sent in the preceding year to the command of provinces; were returned to Rome, and some of them remained with their ensigns of magistracy in the suburbs, to solicit the military honours to which they thought themselves entitled by their services. Bibulus, though not present in the action in which Cassius defeated the Parthians, yet being then governor of the province, and the advantage gained, with the number of the enemy slain, coming up to the legal description of those services for which the triumph was obtained, he entered his claim; and was accordingly, upon the motion of Cato, who probably wished him this consolation for the mortifications he had received in his Consulship, found to be entitled to this honour. It had been long appropriated as the specific reward of victories, obtained by the slaughter of a certain number of enemies, and would have been preposterous in the case of any other merit: Cicero, nevertheless, now likewise applied for a triumph, partly in emulation

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to Bibulus, of whom he expresses some jealousy; and partly, that he might have a pretence for his stay in the suburbs, and for absenting himself from the Senate, and from the assemblies of the people, being very much perplexed how to steer between the parties of Cæsar and Pompey, who had both applied to him by letters to join them in the present dispute<sup>1</sup>. He had, some time before his departure from Cilicia on his return to Rome, sent an account of his military operations to Cato, and to some others of his friends, with an earnest request, that a thanksgiving might be appointed for the victory he had obtained. Such an appointment was reckoned one of the greatest honours which a Roman officer could receive in absence, and might lead to a triumph. Cato replied in terms that were polite; but carrying some degree of indirect reproof for the improper ambition which Cicero betrayed in this request, intimating that his merit was not so much that of a general, as of a humane, upright, and able magistrate; that he had moved the Senate to pass a decree to this purpose in his favour, as thinking it more honourable than a thanksgiving, which always had a reference to some event, depending on chance or the valour of an army; but that, since Cicero had chosen to put his services on the last footing, he had a double satisfaction, that of having done what he thought incumbent on himself, and that of finding that the desire of his friend was gratified<sup>2</sup>.

Cicero at first received this declaration of Cato as a proper expression of friendship, and in the highest degree honourable to himself<sup>3</sup>; but on hearing of the military honours which were decreed to Bibulus upon Cato's motion, he was greatly provoked, and considered this conduct as partial to his rival, and invidious to himself<sup>4</sup>. He was infligated or confirmed in these sentiments by Cæsar, who gladly

<sup>1</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 1.<sup>3</sup> Cicero ad Familiær. lib. xv. ep. 6.<sup>2</sup> Cicero ad Familiær. lib. xv. ep. 5.<sup>4</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 2.

seized the opportunity to incite him against Cato. "Observe," he said, in one of his letters, which is quoted by Cicero on this subject, "the malice of the man, he affects to give you the commendations of clemency and integrity, which you did not desire, and withholds a piece of common respect, which you had asked. This conduct," continues Cicero to Atticus, "bespeaks the envy from which it proceeds. It is not sufferable, nor will I endure it. Cæsar, in his letter to me, has not missed the proper remarks." Such were the concerns that distracted the mind of this ingenious but weak man, even while he himself foresaw a conflict, in which the republic itself, and all the honours it could bestow, were probably soon to perish.

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In the present situation of affairs, every resolution which the friends of the republic could take was fraught with danger, and every day increased their perplexity. To leave Cæsar in possession of his army, and to admit him with such a force to the head of the commonwealth, was to submit, without a struggle, to the dominion he meant to assume. To persist in confining him to one or other of these advantages, was to furnish him with a pretence to make war on the republic. The powers which were necessary to enable Pompey to resist Cæsar, might be equally dangerous to the republic in the possession of the one, as they were in that of the other. This person, on whom the State was now to rely, even while his own consideration, with that of every other Senator, was at stake, did not seem disposed to act, until all the powers that were wanting to gratify his ambition should be put into his hands. With an appearance of ease and negligence, he went upon parties of pleasure through Italy, while every one else apprehended that Rome itself, as well as Italy, must soon become a scene of blood. At an interview with Cicero, whom, on his way to the city, he met near Naples, he himself spoke of a civil war as unavoidable.



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avoidable<sup>5</sup>. Upon his return to Rome, on the twenty-sixth of December, he even seemed averse to any accommodation. He declared his mind openly, that if Cæsar should obtain the Consulate, even upon laying down his arms, the state must be undone; that in his opinion, whenever a vigorous opposition appeared, Cæsar would choose to retain his army, and drop his pretensions to the Consulate; but, continued he, if Cæsar should proceed headlong, and bring matters to the decision of the sword, how contemptible must he appear, a mere private adventurer against the authority of the state, supported by a regular army under my command.

To justify this security, or presumption on the part of Pompey, it must be remembered that while Cæsar was forming an army in Gaul, Pompey, by means of his lieutenants, likewise formed a great army of six complete legions, and many auxiliaries, in Spain; and that if Cæsar should make any attempt upon Italy, it is probable he intended that his army should pass the Pyrennees as fast as that of Cæsar past the Alps, occupy his province, cut off his resources, and while Pompey himself received him with the forces of Italy, that the Spanish army should press upon his rear, and place him at once between two attacks. It ought likewise to be considered, that although few troops were then actually formed in Italy, yet this was the great nursery of soldiers for the whole empire, and multitudes could, on any sudden emergency, be embodied in every part of that country<sup>6</sup>.

Pompey, with these securities in his hands for the final success of his views against Cæsar, suffered this rival to run his career, leaving the Senate exposed to the dangers which threatened them; and under the influence of apprehensions, which he expected would render them more tractable, and more ready in every thing to comply with his own desires, than he had generally found them in times of greater security.

<sup>5</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 8.<sup>6</sup> Cic. ad Familiares. lib. xvi. ep. 12.

In the same strain of policy, Pompey had frequently ventured to foment or to connive at the growing troubles of the republic, in order to render himself the more necessary, and to draw from the Senate and the People offers of extraordinary trust and power. By the address of Cato, and of other active men in the Senate, he had been obliged on a late occasion, when he aimed at the powers of Dictator, to be content with those of sole Consul. It is probable, that he had entertained the same views on the present occasion, and permitted the evils to accumulate, until the remedy he wished for should appear to be necessary. He continued accordingly with votes and resolutions of the Senate to combat Cæsar, who was at the head of a numerous army, ready on the first plausible pretence to fall upon Italy, to seize the seats of government, and avail himself of that name and authority of the republic, on which Pompey himself so greatly relied.

Mean time, the new year commenced, and C. Claudius Marcellus with L. Cornelius Lentulus, entered on their office as Consuls. Both parties were prepared for a decisive resolution on the subject of Cæsar's claims. He himself for some years had wintered near to the northern extremity of his provinces. He was now at Ravenna, the nearest station of his army to Rome; but without any troops, besides what appear to have been the usual establishment of the Cisalpine province; that is, the thirteenth legion, which had been sent thither to supply the place of a legion, with which he had been required to reinforce the army in Syria, and three hundred horse, making in all between five and six thousand men<sup>7</sup>. Soon after his arrival at Ravenna, he had been visited by Curio, who, at the expiration of his Tribunate, made this journey to receive his directions in respect to the future operations of the party; and after their conference, returned to Rome with a letter from Cæsar, addressed:

U. C. 704.  
C. Claudius  
Marcellus &  
L. Cornelius  
Lentulus.

<sup>7</sup> Appian. de Bello Civil. lib. ii. p. 447. Plut. in Cæsar.

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to the Senate, which was presented on the first of January, at the admission of the new Consuls into office<sup>\*</sup>.

The Consul Lentulus moved, that prior to any other business, the state of the republic, and that of the provinces, should be taken under consideration; and alluding to the resolutions which were already on record, relating to Cæsar's province, said, that if the Senate stood firm on this occasion to their former decrees, his services should not be wanting to the commonwealth. He was seconded by Scipio, and was applauded by the general voice of the Senate; but Cæsar had procured the admission of Mark Antony and of Quintus Cassius, two of his most noted and determined partizans, into the college of Tribunes. These could make riots, or furnish the pretence of violence in the city, whenever the military designs of their patron were ripe for execution: they were to be the executors of what had been concerted with Curio, or whatever else should be thought proper to promote Cæsar's designs. They began with threatening to stop all proceedings of the Senate, until Cæsar's letter was read; and prevailed on this meeting to begin with that paper. It was expressed, according to Cicero, in terms menacing and harsh<sup>°</sup>, and contained in substance a repetition of the proposals, which Cæsar had been all along making through Curio, and his other adherents at Rome, "That he should be allowed to retain the honours, which the Roman People had bestowed upon him; that he should be left upon a foot of equality with other officers, who were allowed to join civil office at Rome with military establishments in the provinces; and that he should not be singled out as the sole object of their distrust and severity".

This letter was considered as an attempt to prescribe to the Senate, and unbecoming the respect due to their authority. It was

<sup>\*</sup> Dio. Cassius, lib. xli. c. 1.

<sup>°</sup> Suetonius in Cæsare, c. 29.

<sup>°</sup> Cicero ad Famil. lib. xvi. ep. 12.

by many treated as an actual declaration of war. The debates were renewed on this subject for some days successively, from the first to the seventh of January. On the last of these days, a resolution was framed, ordering Cæsar to dismiss his army, and by a certain day to retire from his provinces, or in case of disobedience, declaring him an enemy to his country. The Tribunes, Mark Antony and Quintus Cassius, interposed with their negative.

The hands of the Senate being thus tied up by the prohibition or interdict of the Tribunes, it was moved that the members should put on mourning, in order to impress the People with a deeper sense of the calamity which was likely to ensue from the contumacy of these factious officers. This likewise the Tribunes forbade; but the Senate being adjourned, all the members, as of their own accord, returned to their next meeting in habits of mourning, and proceeded to consider in what manner they might remove the difficulty which arose from this factious interposition of the Tribunes. In the conclusion of this deliberation, it was determined to give to the Consuls and other magistrates, together with Pompey, in the character of Proconsul, the charge usual in the most dangerous conjunctures; *to preserve the commonwealth by such means as to their discretion should appear to be necessary.*

This charge suggested to the minds of the People, what had passed in the times of the Gracchi of Saturninus and of Cataline. The Tribunes, who had occasioned the measure, either apprehended, or affected to apprehend, immediate danger to their own persons: they disguised themselves in the habit of slaves, and, together with Curio, in the night fled from Rome in hired carriages<sup>11</sup>. The Consuls repaired to Pompey in the suburbs; and, agreeably to the order of the Senate, claimed his assistance in discharging the important duties

<sup>11</sup> Appian. de Bello Civili, lib. ii. Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 3. Cicero ad Famil. lib. xvi. ep. 12.



with which they were jointly intrusted. It was agreed, in concert with him, that they should support the authority of the Senate with a proper military force, that they should proceed to make new levies with the greatest dispatch; and in order to give effect to these preparations, that Pompey should have the supreme command over the treasury, and all the forces of the republic, in every quarter of the world.

Winter was now set in, or fast approaching. The season, although nominally in the month of January, being only about fifty days past the autumnal equinox, or about the twelfth of November, Cæsar had few troops on the side of Italy; the force of his army was yet beyond the Alps, and the officers now entrusted with the safety of the commonwealth, flattered themselves that much time might be found to put the republic in a state of defence, before his army at this season could pass those mountains, even if he should be so desperate as to make war on the commonwealth; which Pompey did not even, in this state of affairs, appear to have believed.

When Cæsar received accounts of the Senate's resolution, he drew forth the troops then at Ravenna, and in a harangue enumerated the wrongs which for some years he alleged had been done to himself; complained that his enemies had now found means to excite against him even Pompey, a person whose honour he had always promoted with the warmest affection; that the interposition of the Tribunes, in behalf of the army and of himself, had been defeated by means of threats and of actual force; that their sacred persons had been violated, in order to oppress him; that resolutions, which had never been taken but in the most dangerous and threatening conjunctures, to prevent ruinous laws from being carried by insurrection and violence, were now formed against peaceable magistrates, and in times of profound tranquillity; he therefore exhorted the army to maintain the honour of an officer, under whom they had now, for nine years, faithfully served the republic; under whom they had gained

gained many victories in Gaul and in Germany, and reduced a most warlike province into a state of absolute submission. He was answered with a shout of applause, and a general acclamation from the ranks, that they were ready to avenge the injuries done to their general, and to the Tribunes of the People.

On receiving these assurances from the troops then present, Cæsar immediately dispatched an express to the quarters of the twelfth legion, which, from the time at which it afterwards joined him, appears to have been already within the Alps with orders to march. The remainder of his army being supposed in the low countries, or in the heart of Gaul, it would not have appeared to an ordinary capacity, that even in case of hostilities any decisive operation could take place before the spring. At that season, indeed, the measures now taken by both parties seemed to threaten a dangerous convulsion; but it is not to be doubted that Cæsar had foreseen, or prepared, many of the most important circumstances of the present conjuncture; that he had brought his affairs into that posture, at which he intended hostilities should commence; and that the seeming neglect with which he suffered himself to be taken with so small a force on the side of Italy, was probably the best concerted preparation he could have made for the war. While he brought no alarming force towards Rome, his antagonists continued secure, and made no effectual provision to resist him. He apprehended more danger from the legions which Pompey had formed in Spain, than from any force then subsisting in Italy, and he made his disposition against those legions, by placing the strength of his army between the Pyrennees and the Alps. There the army formed in Gaul, served him sufficiently in his design against Italy, by securing him from any interruption on that quarter. When the war broke out, being well aware that the effects of surprise are often greater than those of force, even if

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he had wished for more troops in Italy, it is probable that he would not have awaited their coming.

On the very day that he delivered the harangue just mentioned to the legion that was quartered at Ravenna, he ordered a chosen body of men, in the manner of stragglers roving for pleasure through the country, and armed only with swords, to take the road separately, and without any appearance of concert, to Ariminum, the first fortified place of Italy beyond the Rubicon, which was the limit of his province; there to remain, and at a certain time of the night to seize upon one of the gates. He likewise ordered a party of horse to parade at some distance from Ravenna, and there to wait for an officer who was to deliver them orders. He himself passed the day, as usual, in forming combats of gladiators, and in attending the exercises of the legion; at night he went to supper at the usual hour, and after he had taken his place, pretending business, or some slight indisposition, which called him away from the company, he mounted a carriage that waited for him, drove through a gate opposite to that of Ariminum, and having travelled for a little time in that direction, turned into the road on which he had posted the party of horse; and having joined them, marched about thirty miles before break of day, entered Ariminum by a gate which the party he had sent before him kept open; and thus without any resistance took possession of the place.

It was of importance, that the first report of hostilities at Rome should carry an account of his success; not merely of his having made an attempt. This circumstance may justify the measures which he took to surprise a place which, without so many precautions, might have been easily reduced, though at the hazard perhaps of delay for a few days. He himself indeed, in his Commentaries, makes no mention of any such measures, nor of the doubts and hesitations under which he is said to have halted on the banks of the  
 Rubicon,

Rubicon, by the passing of which he entered into a state of war with the commonwealth.

At Ariminum his little army, on the following day, arrived from Ravenna, and the Tribunes, Mark Antony and Quintus Cassius joined him from Rome. He presented them to the army in the disguise in which they affected to have escaped from the violence of a tyranny then established in the city. "Observe," he said, "to what extremities persons of noble birth, vested with the sacred character of Tribunes are reduced, for having supported their friends, and for having pleaded the cause of an injured army<sup>12</sup>." The occasion was suited to popular eloquence; and this eminent master of every art did not neglect the opportunity. He is said to have acted his part with great vehemence; to have torn open his vest from his breast, and to have shed tears; frequently held up to view the hand on which he wore his ring, the common ensign of noble birth among the Romans, and declared, that he would sacrifice all the honours of his rank to reward those who were willing to support the public cause, and who adhered to himself on the present occasion. From these signs, where he was not distinctly heard, it was supposed that he promised the honours of nobility, and a large sum of money to every soldier in his army<sup>13</sup>.

Lucius Cæsar and the Prætor Roscius, who, while the decree against Caius Cæsar was depending in the Senate, made offer of their good offices to treat with him, and bring matters to an amicable accommodation, were now come without any public commission, probably to hinder their friend from taking any desperate resolution. They brought, at the same time, a private message from Pompey, with some expressions of civility, and an apology, taken from the necessity of the public service, for the hardship which he supposed himself

<sup>12</sup> Appian. de Bell. Civile, lib. ii.

<sup>13</sup> Sueton. in Cæs. c. 33.



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to have put upon Cæsar. Pompey, in this message, protested, "That he had always preferred the public to private considerations;" and subjoined, "That he hoped Cæsar would not suffer any passion to carry him into measures hurtful to the State, nor, in avenging himself of his private enemies, stretch forth his hand against the republic."

Such professions had little credit with Cæsar; but if they were to be of any weight with the public he was not likely, in his turn, to fail in the use of them. He desired those persons, by whom Pompey had favoured him with this message, to carry for answer, "That the republic had always been to him dearer than his fortune or his life; but that he could not suffer the honours which the Roman People had bestowed upon him in public, to be contemptuously torn away by his private enemies. His commission, he said, would have expired in six months; his enemies, in their eagerness to degrade him, could not bear even with this delay, but must recall him immediately. The Roman People had dispensed with his attendance at the elections, yet he must be dragged to town at that time to gratify private malice. These personal insults he had patiently borne for the sake of the public; and being resolved to disarm, requested the Senate only that others should disarm as well as himself; that even this was refused, and new levies were ordered throughout Italy; that two legions which had been called off from his own army, under pretence of the Parthian war, were now retained against him; that the whole State was in arms; for what purpose but for his destruction? that, nevertheless, he would suffer any thing for the good of the commonwealth. Let Pompey repair to his province; let all parties disband, and no army whatever be assembled in Italy; let no one pretend to overawe the city; let the assemblies of the People and of the Senate be free; and, in order the more speedily to terminate these disputes, let

"the

“ the parties meet and confer together ; let Pompey say where he will  
 “ be waited on, or let him name a proper place of meeting ; at a  
 “ friendly conference every difficulty will be soon removed <sup>14</sup>.”

From this time forward Cæsar affected, on every occasion, to have no object in view but to prevail on his enemies, by some reasonable accommodation, to save the republic from a ruinous war, and to stop the effusion of innocent blood <sup>15</sup>. He continually repeated his proposals of peace, while he urged his military operations with uncommon rapidity. He ordered new levies at Ariminum, and sent Antony to occupy Arretium <sup>16</sup>, a pass in one of the branches of the Flaminian Way through the Apennines ; and as fast as troops could march he seized Pisaurum <sup>17</sup>, Faunum, Auximum, with the town of Ancona, and all the places necessary to give him the command of that district, or to open his way to Rome.

A general consternation spread over all the country before him ; the people fled from their habitations, and communicated the alarm, with every sort of exaggeration, to the city. Pompey had relied much on the name and authority of the commonwealth, and no less on his own. Others thought themselves secure while this renowned and experienced commander gave them assurances of safety. Now, like a person awake from a dream, he seemed to perceive the whole was illusion. Cæsar paid no regard to the authority of the Senate, nor stood in awe of the State. He was at hand, with the reputation of a general equal to Pompey, at the head of troops fresh from service, and inured to blood. The republic was but a name ; and they who composed it, though respectable at a distance, were, on the approach of an enemy, irresolute, disunited, and incapable of the exertions which such an occasion required. Orders had gone forth

<sup>14</sup> Cæsar de Bell. Civil. lib. i.

<sup>16</sup> Arrego.

<sup>15</sup> Cæsar. Appian. in lib. viii. Ad Atticum,

<sup>17</sup> Pisaro, Feno, and Osimo.

post ep. 13.

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to raise troops in every part of Italy; but no great progress in so short a time could yet have been made in that service. Besides the two legions which had served so long under Cæsar himself, there were not any forces embodied in the country. These were justly suspected of inclining to their former general; and, instead of enabling Pompey to meet the danger which threatened the commonwealth, furnished him, at the head of such troops, with particular reasons for his keeping at a distance from the enemy. In a letter to Domitius Ahenobarbus, "I sent you word," he writes, "that with these two legions I did not choose to be near Cæsar"<sup>18</sup>. If I should retreat, therefore, "at his approach, be not surpris'd".

Domitius had been appointed to succeed Cæsar in the government of Gaul; and, with some other officers in the Picenum<sup>19</sup>, had made some progress in raising troops. Their numbers, perhaps, surpassed those of Cæsar. If Pompey, therefore, had thought it possible to defend the city, he must have hastened to that quarter, and have put himself at the head of those troops. But he was timorous in hazarding his own reputation, a weakness from which Cæsar was altogether exempt, and which was unworthy of the great military talents of either. Pompey seldom committed his fate where the prospect was unfavourable, or events extremely uncertain. Cæsar, on such occasions, never chose to trust his affairs in any other hands than his own.

Pompey, acting under these motives, assembled the Senate, and informed them that it was necessary to abandon Rome; that he would meet them again at Capua, where he proposed to assemble his forces; that he should consider all those who remained in the capital

<sup>18</sup> Meaning probably that he did not choose to give them an opportunity to desert.

<sup>19</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. viii. ep. 2. Ad Domitium.

<sup>20</sup> March of Anconia.

to countenance or to witness the violences of Cæsar as equally guilty with those who should be found in his camp.

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It being unlawful for the officers of the republic to absent themselves from the city, the Senate passed an act to dispense with their attendance at Rome, and to enable them to exercise the powers of magistracy wherever the necessities of the State might require their presence. These preparations for dislodging the government, together with the actual flight of Pompey, damped all the courage that remained in any order or class of the People. It made Cæsar appear at once more odious and more terrible<sup>21</sup>. It was generally expected<sup>22</sup> that he would exceed either Cinna or Sylla in rapacity and cruelty<sup>23</sup>; and that the city, if he should surprise his opponents there, would become a scene of blood. The Consuls, and most of the other officers of State, fet out with their ensigns of power. All night the gates were crowded with Senators and other persons of rank who fled on this occasion; some with their families and most valuable effects, others alone, and distracted by the general panic, without knowing whither they were to retire, or to what fate they were leaving their families.

Cæsar, in the mean time, making a rapid march through Umbria, or what is now the dutchy of Urbino<sup>24</sup>, and the Picenum, or March of Ancona<sup>25</sup>, not only took possession of every place as he passed, but gained daily accessions of strength by the junction of the new levies that had been raised to oppose him. Soldiers are averse to the losing side; and Pompey's flight put an end to his military power in Italy. The Prætor Thermus had, with five cohorts, amounting, if complete, to twenty-five hundred men, taken post at Iguvium<sup>26</sup>, among the Apennines, on the Flaminian Way. Observing that Pompey's party in general was retreating, and that Curio was advancing

<sup>21</sup> Cicero ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 11.

<sup>24</sup> Umbria.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. ep. 12. 22.

<sup>25</sup> Picenum.

<sup>23</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 7.

<sup>26</sup> Gubio.



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towards him with a part of Cæsar's forces, he resolved to abandon his post; but as soon as he began to execute this purpose, and was on the road to Rome, the troops deserted him on the march, returned to the post from which he had removed them, and declared for Cæsar.

The dispositions of the towns of which Cæsar had got possession, made it unnecessary for him to leave any garrison behind him, and permitted him to advance with all his forces. Auximum<sup>27</sup> declared for him before his arrival, and obliged Atius Varus, who held that post for the republic, to abandon it. This officer was overtaken by Cæsar's advanced parties, and, like Thermus, was deserted by his People.

At Cingulum, in the Picenum, Cæsar was joined by the twelfth legion, to which, on his first motion from Ravenna, he had sent orders to march. With this accession of force, he advanced to Asculum<sup>28</sup> on the Fronto; and having dislodged from thence Lentulus Spinther, who commanded ten cohorts, the greater part of these troops deserted to him. The remainder put themselves under the command of Vibullius, who was just arrived from Pompey to support the hopes of the cause in that quarter.

As Cæsar made his principal push on the Adriatic side of the Apennines, the troops that were suddenly raised for the republic were, without any well-concerted plan, drawn together upon that coast. And Pompey himself had not yet openly laid aside the design of making head against Cæsar in those parts. Vibullius having assembled in all about fourteen cohorts, fell back to the Aternus, now called the Pescara, and joined L. Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium, a pass in the Apennines that commanded the Valerian way to Rome. This officer having assembled twenty-five cohorts, meant to have joined Pompey wherever he should be found, and had ordered Thermus to follow with five cohorts more<sup>29</sup>; but imagining probably that Pom-

<sup>27</sup> Osimo.

<sup>28</sup> Ofcale.

<sup>29</sup> Pomp. ad Cicer. in lib. ad Att. post ep. 11.

pey still intended to cover Rome from the incursions of Cæsar, and that Corfinium was an important post for this purpose, he determined to observe the motions of the enemy from that place.

Pompey by this time had moved from Capua to Luceria, and seemed to have taken the resolution not only of abandoning the posts that covered the access to Rome, but even all Italy, to Cæsar. The Consuls, the greater part of the magistracy, and the Senate, had followed him to Capua. Here was received the message which Cæsar had given to Roscius and to L. Cæsar. It contained several reflections and insinuations in the highest degree provoking to Pompey; and to this circumstance Cæsar probably trusted, that he should not be bound by any of the offers he had made, and that the odium of rejecting the peace would fall upon his enemies. But the friends of the commonwealth, deeply impressed with the necessity of their own affairs, gladly listened to any terms of accommodation. They objected indeed to the proposed interview between Pompey and Cæsar, remembering the dangerous concerts which at their meetings had been formerly entered into against the commonwealth.

Pompey himself was so sensible of the disadvantage at which he was taken, that he dissembled his resentment of the personal reflections cast on himself, and consented to conditions which he had hitherto rejected with disdain. It was agreed accordingly that he should repair to Spain, and that, his province being in profound peace, he should reduce his military establishment. Cæsar, on his part, besides the conditions he himself had offered, was required to evacuate all the towns which he had lately seized in Italy; and it was proposed that the Consuls, Magistrates, and Senators should return to the city, and from the usual seat of government give all the sanction of public authority to these arrangements. From such appearances it was not doubted that an accommodation must follow. And in this belief Cato, though appointed to command in Sicily,

chose to abide by the Senate while the treaty remained in dependance. And Cicero thought the agreement almost concluded. "The one," he wrote to his friend Atticus, "begins to repent of his precipitation, and the other is sensible he has not a force sufficient to support such a war."

Cæsar therefore was likely to be caught in the snare he laid for his enemies, or obliged to lay aside the disguise which he had assumed in affecting such earnest desires for peace. To avoid either of these inconveniences, he objected to some of the conditions which the opposite party had subjoined to his proposals, and complained of the silence which they kept on others, as proceeding from a deliberate purpose to circumvent and betray him. "Pompey will repair to Spain," he said, "but when? I am required to evacuate all the towns of Italy, while Pompey and the whole State continue in arms against me, and while my enemies not only make new levies, but employ for my destruction legions which they have actually taken away from my own army. If Pompey be sincere in desiring a peace, why does he decline the personal interview which has been proposed for that purpose?"

Cæsar had, by this time, advanced with hasty marches to Corfinium, drove in a detachment from the garrison, which he found breaking down a bridge about three miles from the town, sat down under the walls, and employed three days in fortifying his camp, and in filling the magazines with corn from the neighbouring country. Being joined by the eighth legion and twenty-two cohorts of the new levies from Gaul, with three hundred auxiliary horse, he ordered proper posts to be seized on every side of the town, and effectually shut up those who were within from any relief, or from any communication with their friends. When his works began to appear

<sup>30</sup> Ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 14.

against the place, Domitius published a reward to any one who should carry letters to Pompey. Different messengers were dispatched for this purpose, and brought for answer, that Pompey disapproved of his having allowed himself to be invested by Cæsar, had foretold him the bad consequences of this measure, and now earnestly exhorted him, if possible, to extricate himself; for that it was not in his power with these doubtful legions, which had been so lately drawn from Cæsar's army, or with new levies, to force the hardy and veteran troops of the enemy<sup>31</sup>.

This answer Domitius endeavoured to conceal from his army; encouraged them with hopes of a speedy relief from Pompey, and seemed intent on the defence of the place, while he was actually taking measures to get off in person, without any hopes of preserving the forces he had assembled for the commonwealth. This design being suspected, the troops surrounded his quarters in the night, took him prisoner, and to pay their court, while they delivered up their general and surrendered the town, made offer of their own services to Cæsar.

Upon this surrender, Cæsar took possession of the gates, manned the walls, and gave orders that no person whatever from his army should enter the place before it was day. He knew, that besides Domitius and Vibullius, there were many Senators and Roman knights now shut up in the town. These he ordered in the morning to be brought before him, expostulated with them on the subject of their enmity to himself, and their precipitation in hurrying the State into this unnatural war. He then dismissed them with the respect that was due to Roman citizens of their rank; and being told that a considerable sum of money, amassed at Corfinium for the support of the troops, had been seized by his people, to complete this scene of

<sup>31</sup> Pompeius ad Domitium, lib. viii. Et ad Atticum, post ep. 12. Cæs. de Bell. Civ.



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unexpected moderation, by an exhibition of disinterestedness as well as of clemency, he ordered this money to be restored to Domitius. The fame of this wonderful mildness and generosity, as he expected, was every where diffused; and though, by over-acting his part in abstaining from the public money, he furnished every thinking person with a sufficient comment on the other parts of his conduct; yet many were happy to understand, that, in this alarming contest, their lives and properties were, from any motives whatever, to be spared.

Rome was now open to Cæsar; but he thought the possession of it of no moment, until he had suppressed the military arrangements that were making in the country, and had decided who was to have the possession of Italy. He therefore, on the very day on which he became master of Corfinium, detached to Sicily, under the command of Curio, the troops that deserted to him in making this conquest<sup>22</sup>. He himself set out for Apulia, and, before sunset, accomplished a considerable march; but while he thus urged the war with the greatest rapidity, sent messengers before him to the leaders of the opposite party, with professions of friendship and overtures of peace.

Immediately after the reduction of Corfinium, Balbus, an officer in Cæsar's army, was dispatched with a message to the Consul Lentulus, containing earnest intreaties, that this magistrate would return to Rome, and prevent the disorders that were likely to arise from the suspension of government. To induce him to comply with this request, Balbus had secret instructions to assure the Consul of a proper appointment in the provinces at the expiration of his year in office. The bearer of this message declared, that Cæsar desired nothing so much as to join Pompey, and to make peace with him on any equitable terms. And the father of this young man, one of Cæsar's retinue, wrote, at the same time, to Cicero, that Cæsar had no object

<sup>22</sup> Cæsar de Bello Civ. lib. i. c. 25.



**ITALY.**  
with the PROVINCES of  
**CÆSAR**  
And part of  
the PROVINCE of  
**POMPEY**





but to enjoy peace and security under Pompey<sup>33</sup>. But while the fame of his clemency at Corfinium, and of this wonderful disposition to peace was spread throughout Italy, and reconciled the minds of many to whom he had been till then an object of terror<sup>34</sup>. While he hoped to amuse his enemies, and to relax the diligence of their military preparations, he advanced with so much rapidity, that, in order to avoid him, they had no more than the time that was necessary to cross the mountains from Capua to Luceria, to fall back from thence to Canusium, and from this last place, without a halt, to Brundisium.

Pompey, while he moved in this direction, having sent Metellus Scipio, and his own son Cnæus into Syria, to provide and assemble the necessary shipping to embark his army<sup>35</sup>; his intention to abandon Italy began to be suspected, and shook the great authority which he still derived from his military reputation. His officers were every where deserted on the march by the new levies, who returned to offer their services to Cæsar. His own presence kept the other parts of the army together, and brought them safe to the port from which it was suspected they were to take their departure from Italy. Soon after his arrival at this port he effectually verified these suspicions, embarking a great part of his army with the Consuls, while he himself, not having sufficient shipping to transport the whole, remained with a second division to wait for the return of his ships.

Such was the posture of Pompey, when Cæsar, with six legions, four of veteran troops, and two newly raised or completed from those who came over to him on the march, arrived at the gates of Brundisium. Even here, he never dropt the project of amusing his enemy with proposals of peace. Cn. Magius, an officer in the service

<sup>33</sup> Cicer. ad Att. lib. viii. ep. 9.

ab his qui eum maxime timuerant, maxime diligetur.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. ep. 13. Si mehercule neminem occidet, nec cuiquam quicquam ademerit,

<sup>35</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio.



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of the commonwealth, having been taken on the march, was dismissed with great courtesy, and a message to Pompey, containing a request, that he would admit Cæsar to an interview; and observing, that differences are soon made up at a conference, which otherwise might occasion many journies and messages to no purpose.

This pacific message, as in other instances, only constituted a part in the military plan of Cæsar, and was accompanied with effectual preparations for a blockade and a siege. It did not as yet appear, whether Pompey meant to transport all his troops, and to abandon Brundisium, or to keep possession of this post, in order to retain a passage into Italy, and to command both sides of the gulf. Cæsar, to try his intentions, and either to shut him up, or to hasten his departure, observing, that the entrance of the harbour was narrow, and might be shut up, began an alarming work for this purpose. He employed numerous parties to throw stones, earth, and other heavy materials into the passage between the two moles, and expected, in a little time, to be able to join them, and thus effectually to exclude all communication with the sea.

In this work the besiegers advanced, for some time, with great rapidity; but being come into deeper water, where the materials they threw in were absorbed or unsettled, and displaced by the motion of the sea, they found it necessary to change their plan, and endeavoured to shut up the harbour by means of floating rafts and hulks firmly anchored in the passage. In executing this project they were disturbed by a continual discharge of arrows, stones, and other missile weapons from vessels in the mouth of the harbour, on which proper engines were mounted for this purpose.

While the parties were thus, without intermission, engaged at the entrance of the port, Cæsar again made a shew of proposing a treaty. As he had received no answer to his former message by Magius, he affected to despair of making any progress by direct ap-

plications to Pompey, and sent into the town Caninius Rebilus, one of his lieutenants, who, being in great intimacy with Scribonius Libo, had directions to make application to him, and, in Cæsar's name, to intreat his good offices in bringing on a negotiation; particularly, if possible, in procuring an interview between Pompey and himself. Representing to Libo, that if an interview were obtained, some way might be discovered to stop the issues of blood, a blessing which, in that case, would for ever be mentioned as the effect of so essential a service performed by Scribonius Libo to his country.

Pompey, upon receiving these proposals, which, though addressed to Libo, were carried directly to himself, made answer, That, in the absence of the Consuls, he could not treat. In this instance, he perceived, no doubt, the insincerity of Cæsar's pacific declarations, and was not tempted to remit the vigilance of his defence, or the ardour with which he now at last prepared for the contest: yet he could not altogether prevent one advantage which Cæsar meant to reap from these repeated professions of moderation and desire of peace, that of appearing in the eyes of the People, not the author of the war, but a person forced to these extremities by the violence and obstinacy of his enemies.

After the works at the mouth of the harbour of Brundisium had been continued three days, and had made considerable progress, the transports which had carried the first division of Pompey's army returned from Dyrrachium, and, as the passage at the mouth of the harbour was still open, he prepared to embark with the remainder of his forces. The inhabitants of the town, being disaffected to him, were likely to give intelligence to Cæsar of all his motions; and he made no doubt that as soon as he should withdraw his guards, they would throw open their gates, and expose him to be attacked in his rear, and possibly to lose such part of his army as might be overtaken on shore. To provide against this event, and to retard Cæsar's entry into the

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town, he built up the gates with solid mortar and stone, and traversed the streets with walls and large ditches replenished with sharp stakes, which were masked or hid with a slight covering of brushwood and earth.

When the legions began to move towards the harbour, the rear guard still endeavoured to present the usual appearances on the ramparts, by occupying every post with archers, slingers, and other light troops. These being to remain in their post while the main body was embarking, had orders, at a signal given, to abandon the walls, and to repair on board the transports which were ready to receive them.

The troops in Brundisium thus began to embark in the night, and Cæsar, having immediate intelligence of it from the town, brought forward his scaling ladders, and, as soon as the ramparts appeared to be deserted, began to ascend them in several places at once, and effected one part of his purpose, by gaining the battlements without opposition; but when he was about to descend from thence into the streets, having notice of the snares and obstructions which were placed in his way, he was obliged to halt, or to advance with so much precaution, that the enemy had time to put off from the mole, and get under sail. Only two transports, that struck and were aground on the banks which had been formed or begun at the mouth of the harbour, fell into his hands. The remainder, with the greater part of the Senate, attended by the officers of State and the ensigns of magistracy, proceeded in their passage to Epirus; thus leaving Cæsar in possession of Italy and of the seats of government, from which the world could scarcely disjoin, in their idea, the right to command.

Cæsar having, in this manner, surprised the republic, and in sixty days obliged all his opponents to evacuate Italy, and to leave him sole master of the forces which began to be mustered against him; it is probable, notwithstanding the question he states relating to the expedience

pedience of following his enemy into Epirus, that he had already taken his resolution to consider the reduction of Spain as the next object of consequence to that of Italy. In that province, which was full of resources, a regular army of seven or eight legions had been for some time formed, with an evident purpose to keep him in awe. He was threatened therefore with the most immediate danger from thence. Some arrangements too were yet wanting for the security of Italy. The professions which he had made of pacific dispositions, and of zeal for the republic, were to be confirmed by showing a proper respect to the forms of the constitution, and by endeavouring to restore a government which he had actually overthrown.

For these reasons, Cæsar contented himself, for the present, with having ordered shipping to be provided at the port of Brundisium, that he might amuse the enemy with appearances of his intending to continue the war on that side, or that he might be actually ready to do so, when he had elsewhere accomplished the purpose on which he was bent. Notwithstanding his pacific declarations, and his ostentation of clemency on every occasion, the People still trembled when they saw almost every citizen of reputation and honour obliged to fly from the seats of government, and, in their place, collected from different quarters of Italy, every bankrupt, every outlaw, and every person of infamous character<sup>36</sup>. These being at variance with the laws of their country, had flocked to Cæsar, and were received by him under the denomination of the injured and the oppressed citizens, whose wrongs he was come to redress.

With this company, still multiplying around him, having given orders to secure Brundisium from the sea, and posted there, and

<sup>36</sup> Cicer. ad Att. lib. ix. ep. 19. Cave autem putis quemquam hominem in Italiam turpem esse, qui hinc abist. Vidi ipse Formiis universos, &c.; et Cicer. ad Att. lib. ix. ep. 1. qui hic potest se gerere non perditum vita mores ante facta ratio suscepti negotii, socii, &c.



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at Sipontum and Tarentum, each a legion ; and having ordered ships from every part of the coasts of Italy and Gaul, he set out for Spain, intending, while the troops, with whom he had over-run Italy, took some repose in quarters, and while those who were destined for the service in Spain were on the march, that he himself should visit Rome, and observe the aspect of his party. His father-in-law, Calpurnius Piso, although, by his relation to Cæsar, hindered from following Pompey, yet would not countenance his son-in-law so far as to remain in the city to receive him. Marcus Lepidus, then Prætor, was the officer of highest rank who continued in his place ; and beside the Tribunes who had been the instruments in kindling this war, was the only magistrate who resigned himself intirely to the victor's disposal. Among the Tribunes, Cæcilius Metellus, though disposed to have followed the Senate, being detained in the city by the sacred duties of his function, had taken his resolution to employ the negative with which he was intrusted, in restraining the violations of law and government, which were to be expected in such a scene as was now to be opened at Rome.

Cicero, upon the commencement of hostilities, having still the ensigns of Proconsul, was appointed to inspect the levies and other affairs of the republic on the coasts of Campania and Latium. Upon Pompey's retreat, he remained in this station with a mind overwhelmed with perplexity and irresolution. He affected respect and gratitude to Pompey, though he surely owed him no obligation, bore him no real affection, and blamed him highly for his flight from Italy ; but in the last perhaps he only meant to justify himself for not having immediately joined him in his retreat, and for not having embarked with more decision in the cause. He sincerely lamented the state of the republic, of which he now certainly despaired, and only wished to steer a course, the safest he could for his own reputation and his person.

Cæsar, in the beginning of this contest, had contributed much to perplex the resolution of Cicero, who generally saw so many objects in every question of State, that it was difficult for him to decide between them. He had been kept undetermined by means of a flattering correspondence, in which Cæsar made repeated applications for his good offices towards preventing the present troubles. Being now in the way of Cæsar from Brundisium to Rome, he was honoured with a personal interview; at which, says Cicero to his friend Atticus, I shall study rather to appear an object of his respect than of his liking. He accordingly, on that occasion, resisted his flattery, and withstood his intreaties to attend a meeting of the Senate, which Cæsar had ordered to be assembled by a messenger dispatched from Formiæ. Cæsar appeared to be piqued at this refusal: "It will be supposed you condemn me," he said, "and others will be led by your example." Cicero replied, "That his case was different from that of others who had less connection with Pompey." "Come, then," continued Cæsar, "and treat of an accommodation with Pompey." "Shall I be at liberty to do so in my own way?" "Who will restrain you?" "Shall I move the Senate then, that the war shall not be carried into Spain, nor into Greece? Shall I lament the treatment which Pompey has received?" "That indeed," said Cæsar, "I shall not like to have said." "I thought so," replied the other, "and chose to absent myself." At parting, Cæsar desired him to consider of the matter. "If you desert me," he said, "I must have recourse to other counsels, and know not what I may be forced to do."

Upon the arrival of Cæsar in the suburbs of Rome, such of the Senators as were in the city, or in the neighbourhood, assembled at his summons. He opened the meeting by enumerating the wrongs

<sup>37</sup> Cicero ad Atticum. lib. ix. ep. 18.

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he had received, and by loading his opponents with the guilt of the present war. "He never had aspired," he said, "to unprecedented honours. The office of Consul was now again open to him by the laws of the commonwealth; and the Roman People had dispensed with his personal attendance in suing for it. An act to this purpose," he said, "had been obtained in the fairest and most constitutional manner. Ten Tribunes had concurred in proposing it. His enemies, particularly Cato himself, had been heard at full length against it, and had practised his usual artifice for disappointing the Senate or the People, by prolonging the debates. Pompey himself was Consul when this act was passed. If he disapproved of the act, why did he not oppose it then? If he approved of it, why rob him now of the privilege it bestowed? He reminded this meeting of the moderation with which he himself had offered to resign his command, while others were so tenacious of theirs; or while they imposed conditions on him, to which they themselves would not submit, and chose to throw the State into confusion, rather than abate the least of their own pretensions. He observed, that his enemies had made use of a false pretence to call off two legions from his army; that they had violated the sacred character of the Tribunes, who were guilty of no offence, but that of protecting him against the oppression of his enemies; that they had rejected all offers of an accommodation, or even of a conference.

"He now exhorted the Senate not to desert the commonwealth, nor to oppose such as, in concert with him, might endeavour to restore the government; but if they should shrink in this arduous task, he should not press it upon them. He knew how to act for himself. If his opinion were followed, deputies should be now sent from the Senate to Pompey, with intreaties, that he would spare the republic. He knew, that Pompey had formerly objected to his having any such deputation sent to himself, considering such

“ advances as a concession of right in him to whom they were made,  
 “ or of fear in those who made them. These, he said, were the  
 “ reflections of a narrow mind; for his own part, as he wished to  
 “ overcome his enemies in the field, so he wished to excel them in  
 “ acts of generosity and candour.”

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Such were the colours in which this artful man endeavoured to disguise his cause; and while he took effectual measures to maintain it by force, employed likewise an insinuation, and an eloquence not less dangerous than his sword. The proposals of a treaty were received in this meeting with joy; but no man was willing, after having assisted at such a meeting of the Senate, to hazard his person in Pompey's camp.

While Cæsar, to reconcile all men to his cause, affected clemency even to those who were taken in arms against him, Pompey, supposing himself entrusted with the powers and severities of the law, had threatened to employ those powers and severities to the utmost extent against every person who staid behind him at Rome. *Proscription* and *massacre* of those who abandoned the commonwealth were the ordinary language at his quarters<sup>38</sup>. He proposed to operate in this case by fear alone, and had forgotten, that legal government itself, on certain occasions, with all its authorities and powers, stands in need of insinuation and of popular arts.

Cæsar, in taking the opposite tone, and in affecting to commit his affairs to the issue of a fair negotiation and treaty, relied on the difficulties that were likely to occur in the conduct of any negotiation; or he presumed upon these difficulties in making offers which he did not wish his enemies to accept. His intention was to load his antagonist with the blame of a war which, it is probable, he had a long time been devising. If he had really meant to

<sup>38</sup> Cicer. ad Attic. lib. viii. ep. 11.



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renew his former concerts with Pompey, he would have employed again the same concealed methods by which those concerts had been formerly obtained, and would not have intrusted the mediation to the Senate, a body which, however composed, had a natural claim to authority, and might have carried their negotiations farther than he proposed. He had ever entertained a serious aversion to the name and pretensions of the Senate. Being altogether indifferent to public interests of every sort, the mediocrity of parts, that must ever appear in the majority of such a body, was to him an object of contempt. He had espoused the cause of every faction, of every tumult, of every criminal against them; and, at one time, rather than be subject to their authority, had proposed, that Pompey himself should transport this army from Asia to usurp the government. Even the few Senators, who, upon the former occasion, from indifference to public questions, or from a disposition to favour his cause, had remained in the city, became the objects of his disgust. Many of them, though willing to be his instruments, were not yet formed for his purpose. When he affected to treat them with respect, they received his addresses as matter of right; when he proposed any measure, they took the matter into serious consideration, and affected to deliberate of what was to be done. "He detests the Senate," said Curio to Cicero, "now more than ever; he will leave them no authority. I meant to have held my commission by a fictitious decree of that body: but he said, I should hold it of himself; and that every honour, and every power should be derived from him<sup>39</sup>."

Cæsar, however, meant to make this remnant of a legal assembly the tools of every ungracious or improper measure he had occasion to execute, and, in particular, to avail himself of their authority in seizing the public money. Pompey, before he left Rome, had been

<sup>39</sup> Cicero, ad Att. lib. x. ep. 4.

authorised to draw from the treasures of the commonwealth whatever money he wanted for the service. At his departure, he ordered the whole to be removed; and the Consul Lentulus was about to execute this order, when a sudden alarm of Cæsar's approach obliged him to desist, and left him time only to carry away the keys of the publick repositories. Cæsar now moved the Senate, that the doors should be opened; and that the public money should be issued from thence to defray the expence of the war<sup>40</sup>. To this motion the Tribune Metellus Celer opposed his negative; and Cæsar, disdaining any longer to wear a mask which subjected him to the observance of insignificant forms, proceeded to the treasury, and ordered the doors to be forced. The Tribune had the boldness to place himself in the way, and was about to reduce Cæsar to the disagreeable alternative of being disappointed of his purpose, or of rendering himself the object of popular detestation, by violating the sacred person of a Tribune, from a veneration to which, he himself professed to have undertaken the war. On this occasion, contrary to his usual character, he appeared to have lost his temper, and threatened Metellus with immediate death. "This," he said, "is easier for me to execute than to utter." It was thought, that if the Tribune had persisted, not only this officer, but numbers of Senators, and many of the more respectable citizens, whom he considered as enemies and promoters of the Tribune's contumacy, would have been involved in a general massacre. "Think not," said Curio, in relating these particulars to Cicero, "that his clemency proceeds from temper, or is secured to you by any real disposition of his mind. It is a mere effect of his policy; he is naturally indifferent to blood, and, if he is provoked, will make it to run in the kennels<sup>41</sup>."

<sup>40</sup> Dio. Cassius, lib. xli. c. 17 & 18.<sup>41</sup> Cicero ad Atticum, lib. x. ep. 4.

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The Tribune Metellus, however, when matters were coming to this extremity, suffered himself to be removed. The doors were forced open, all the money was taken from thence, even the sacred deposit, supposed to have remained from the time of the rebuilding of Rome after its destruction by the Gauls, and still kept as a resource for the utmost exigency of publick affairs, was now carried off. I have subdued the Gauls, said Cæsar, and there is no longer any need of such provision against them. He is said, on this occasion, to have carried off in bars, 25,000 lb. <sup>42</sup> of gold, 35,000 lb. <sup>43</sup> of silver, and in coin, 40,000,000 Roman money <sup>44</sup>.

After this act of violence, it appears that Cæsar distrusted the affections of the people. He had proposed to harangue them in a publick audience, which had been appointed for that purpose; but apprehending that he might be exposed to insult from some one in the crowd, he declined that solemnity, even avoided the public view altogether, and having passed but a few days at Rome, set out for Spain fullen and displeased. It was no longer a doubt, that his victories led to the subversion of the republic, and of every species of civil government whatever <sup>45</sup>.

Marcus Emilius Lepidus, who, as has been observed, was at this time Prætor, and the officer of highest rank then at Rome, was left to govern in the city. Mark Antony had the command of Cæsar's forces in Italy; and by the use which he made of his power, treating persons of the most respectable condition with great insolence, and indulging himself in all the extravagance of debauch, for which his genius appears to have been peculiarly fitted, increased the dis-

According to Arbuthnot, ch. 18.

<sup>42</sup> £ 678,125 0 0

<sup>43</sup> 94,937 10 0

<sup>44</sup> 322,916 13 4 Vid. Plin. lib. xxxiii. c. 3.

£ 1,095,982 3 4

<sup>45</sup> Cic. ad Att. lib. x. ep. 4.

mal apprehensions of the public. He is said to have travelled through Italy himself in an open litter, with Citheridé, a celebrated actress, followed by seven other carriages replenished with courtezans, and even attended by his wife Fulvia, the widow of the late famous Clodius, who, to enjoy her husband's state, and partake with him in the licence of his military power, connived at his infidelities, and made a part in this scandalous train<sup>46</sup>. The whole, a lively specimen of the purpose for which the accomplices of Cataline, and many of the followers of Cæsar wished to be masters of the republic, and a foretaste of the wanton caprice with which this overgrown republic, so long a prey to outrageous faction, was now likely to be made the subject and the sport of a military usurpation.

Soon after hostilities had commenced, Cotta had been sent to command for the republic in Sardinia, and Cato to command in Sicily. Cæsar, when about to carry the war into Spain, thought it necessary, if possible, to get the possession of these islands, as well as to reduce Pompey's forces in every other part of the empire. Having stationed Dolabella, with C. Antonius, on the coast of Illyricum, he ordered Valerius, with a proper force, into Sardinia, and Curio, with three legions, to attack Cato in Sicily. The Sardinians, hearing that one of Cæsar's officers was appointed, in his name, to take possession of their island, declared for his interest, took arms against Cotta, and obliged him to fly into Africa, where he joined Atius Varus, who had occupied that province in the name of the republic.

Cato, some time after his nomination to command in Sicily, and while there were any hopes of a negotiation, remained at Capua, then the quarters of Pompey, in order to give his assistance in forming an accommodation, the least ruinous that could be obtained for the commonwealth. On Pompey's retreat into Apulia, he went into

<sup>46</sup> Cic. ad Att. lib. x. & xiii.



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Sicily, and the province being unprovided with every means of defence, he gave orders to repair, and to build ships in all the ports of the island, and in those of the neighbouring coast of Italy. He had likewise ordered all the towns to furnish their quota of troops; but had not been able to assemble any force, when Curio landed at Messina, with the two legions destined by Cæsar to take possession of the island. Sensible that any attempts to resist this force would only expose the lives of a few well-affected citizens or subjects, who might on this occasion be disposed to support him as an officer of the republic, he discontinued his military preparations, and withdrew from the island.

This officer had often disapproved of Pompey's conduct; and on this occasion, complained particularly of the defenceless state in which he had suffered the republic to be surprised in all its possessions. Cæsar, who no doubt wished to have the suffrage of such a citizen, and of his own enemy against Pompey, represents Cato as complaining that he was betrayed, that the Senate had been deceived, and that the war itself was unnecessary<sup>47</sup>. The conduct of Pompey, not only as a citizen, but as an officer of state and as a soldier, has been censured in many parts of this memorable contest; and it is indeed easy to spy faults after the event, and when experience has exposed them to view. Cæsar himself is said to have censured him for abandoning Italy; and it is probable would have respected him more, if in executing this resolution, instead of passing into Macedonia, he had gone to the head of his army in Spain. His celebrated saying, in leaving Brundisium, when he was about to carry the war into that country, implied an opinion to this purpose, "We go," he said, "from this general who has no army, to an army that has no general."

Cæsar's own disposition of his forces, as has been already mentioned, in assigning what appeared to have been the reasons of his

<sup>47</sup> Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. xxx.

conduct,

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conduct, had been made with the greatest ability ; and the more, that they gave him the appearance of a person acting without design, and suddenly forced to the measures which he embraced. In talking of ordinary men, we may err in imputing too much to design and concert ; but with respect to Cæsar, the mistake to be feared, is not perceiving the whole extent of his foresight and plan. He at once armed himself with a military force, and artfully guarded the appearances under which he was to use it. When the Senate passed their resolution against him, he seemed to be caught unprepared to resist ; but the Senate was still less prepared to attack. He had artfully avoided giving them any cause of suspicion, by any unnecessary assemblage of forces on the side of Italy, while he had sufficient strength to take the full benefit of the consternation into which they were thrown by his first alarm. Though long meditating the invasion of Rome with an army, he contrived an incident, in the flight of the Tribunes, to make it appear the effect of a sudden provocation, and of his zeal in a popular cause. When we consider that Mark Antony was the Tribune who furnished this pretence, there is no doubt that Cæsar had his choice of the time at which it should be presented to him.

At this conjuncture, the greater part of his army still remained beyond the Alps, and in the precise situation in which they were most likely to be wanted to encounter the first considerable difficulty that would probably arise in the war, from the veteran legions which had been levied for Pompey, and which were stationed under Afranius and Petreius in Spain<sup>48</sup>. If these legions had attempted to pass the Pyrennees, the army of Cæsar was stationed in Gaul to intercept them, and he was accordingly secure of being able to finish the war in Italy, without any interruption from thence. When this service was effected, his army in Gaul remained in the most advantageous

<sup>48</sup> See p. 374, 378, 379. the preceding parts of this chapter.

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position, from which to enter upon what was likely to become the second object of his enterprize, the reduction of Spain.

The antagonists of Cæsar, without any apprehension of these dispositions, and perfectly secure before hostilities commenced, were completely surpris'd, overwhelmed, and routed in every quarter on which they attempted to make any defence. Armies indeed had been formed in Italy, according to the saying of Pompey, *at the stamp of his foot*; but they were armies that served the purpose of his enemies, not that of the republic, or his own; and though rais'd to secure Italy against Cæsar, became in the reduction of Italy itself an accession to his force, and were ready to be sent in separate divisions to occupy different provinces of the empire in his name; insomuch, that while Cæsar himself, with the strength of the veteran legions with which he had conquered Gaul, hastened into Spain to reduce what was the most formidable part of his rival's power, his officers were detached with separate bodies of these newly acquired troops, into Sardinia, Sicily, and Africa.

Pompey, although he had never visited his government in person, nor sought for occasions of war, as Cæsar, in order to form his army and inure them to service, had done in Gaul, had nevertheless formed a great military establishment, consisting of seven Roman legions, with five thousand horse, and eighty cohorts of provincial infantry, equal in number to eight legions more; and Cæsar had reason to believe, that this great force, if the war could have been protracted in Italy, would have come upon his rear, cut off his resources in Gaul, or obliged him to defend himself on the north of the Alps. He accordingly, instead of bringing into Italy the legions that lay in the low countries, or the interior parts of his province, had moved them only to the neighbourhood of Narbonne, to be near the confines of Spain, from which this storm was to be dreaded; and meant, if the success of his affairs in Italy should admit of it, that these legions should cross

cross the Pyrennees, and fix the scene of the war amidst his rival's possessions.

Spain had been formerly divided into two provinces, under two separate Roman governors; but the whole being united under Pompey, was committed by him to three lieutenants, Varro, Petreius, and Afranius. The first commanded, from the river Guadiana westward to the extremities of Lusitania<sup>49</sup> and Gallicia; the second, from the Guadiana eastward to the mountains of Murcia; and the third, from thence to the Pyrennees.

Soon after the war broke out in Italy, Pompey sent Vibullius into Spain, with orders to these officers to assemble their forces, and to prepare for the defence of their province. Varro affected indifference in the quarrel, or an equal regard to the opposite parties concerned in it. An accident, he said, had placed him under the command of Pompey; but he had an equal attachment to Cæsar. The other two, from regard to the commonwealth, or from fidelity to their commander in chief, engaged with more zeal in the cause. They determined, in concert with Vibullius, to leave Varro in the western province, while they themselves drew the principal part of their force towards the eastern frontier; and by occupying the passes of the mountains, or some strong post on the Ebro, endeavoured to defend the country entrusted to their care, until Pompey should either arrive in person to take the command on himself, or until, having rallied his forces in Macedonia, he should bring the scene of the war again into Italy. For this purpose, they took post at Ilerda<sup>50</sup>, a place of strength on the Segro, and about twenty miles above the confluence of this river with the Cineia; Afranius with three legions, Petreius with two more, together with five thousand horse, and eighty cohorts of provincial infantry.

<sup>49</sup> Portugal.

<sup>50</sup> Now called Lerida.



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Such were the dispositions that were making in Spain, when Cæsar, having expelled his rival from Italy, took possession of Rome, and having passed a few days in that city, in the manner above related, set out for his army in the province of Narbonne.

Being to pass by Marseilles, he intended to take possession of that city; but the inhabitants were already disposed to favour his antagonists, and shut their gates against him. This ancient Greek colony, after having long defended their settlement against the rude tribes in their neighbourhood, had placed themselves at last under the protection of the Romans; but with a reserve of all their immunities, and an exemption from all the burdens of a Roman province. Cæsar proposed to have entered their city as a neutral place, and to prevail on the citizens to receive him, cited the examples of Rome itself, and of all the other cities of Italy who had opened their gates, and given a passage to his army, without taking any part in the present disputes. To this proposal, the people of Marseilles made answer, That in every case where the Romans were divided among themselves, every ally in their situation must so far preserve their neutrality, as not to receive the forces of either party within their walls; and that in the present case particularly, they lay under such high obligations to the leaders of both parties, that they must carefully avoid giving offence to either.

It soon after appeared, however, that this plausible answer was intended merely to gain time. Vibullius had passed by Marseilles in his way to Spain, and had delivered to the people of that place a message from Pompey, with assurances of support; on which they fully relied. The receipt of this message, was followed by a resolution to admit the officers and men of Pompey's party into their town, and to exclude his antagonists.

Domitius Ahenobarbus, after he had been dismissed from Corfinium, no ways affected by the ostentatious clemency of Cæsar, had,  
in

in pursuance of the Senate's appointment to the government of Gaul, repaired to that province, raised some troops, with which he was expected to take possession of Marcellis, and actually, in a few days after this answer was given to Cæsar, entered the harbour of that place with seven ships, and some land forces on board. Upon his arrival, the people of this republic called in to their assistance the force of some neighbouring cantons from the mountains; repaired their fortifications; replenished their magazines; employed many hands in fabricating arms; and took every other precaution that was necessary, in case they should be attacked, to enable them to make a vigorous defence.

Cæsar being greatly provoked, invested the town with an army of three legions; and having ordered some ships to be built on the Rhône, prepared to assail it at once by sea and by land. He committed the attack by land to Trebonius; and that from the sea to Decimus Brutus. While he was making these preparations, a report prevailed that Pompey was passing the seas into Africa, and intended, with the troops which were in that province, and a body of Numidian cavalry, to reinforce, and to take the command of his army in Spain. It is probable that Cæsar, in like circumstances, would have even taken a shorter road to the head of his army. He appears at least to have believed this report of his enemy, or to have thought it extremely probable, and to have been somewhat alarmed. As if the prospect of meeting with Pompey, having under his direction a well-appointed and regular force, had rendered him doubtful of the affections of his own men, he mentions an artifice practised by himself on this occasion, which may be considered as a specimen of his address, and of the influence which he employed with his army. He borrowed money from the officers, and gave it in gratuities to the soldiers; thus taking a pledge for the fidelity of the one, and purchasing that of the others by his bounty.

While Cæsar was yet employed in opening the siege of Marseilles, he ordered Fabius, who commanded his forces at Narbonne, to advance into the Pyrennees; and if the passes were open or slightly guarded, to penetrate into Spain, and occupy some advantageous station on the frontier of that country. This officer accordingly, having forced the passes of the Pyrennees, penetrated to the Segra, or, as it was then called, the Sicoris; and took post on the right of this river, in the front of the united armies of Afranius and Petreius, who were encamped near the town of Ilerda.

Fabius, not to be interrupted by occasional floods in his communication with the country through which he had passed, and to keep open the ordinary route from Gaul, laid two bridges upon it, at the distance of four miles from each other. By these communications, he was chiefly supplied with provisions; and as the Spanish army had an easy access by the bridge of Ilerda to intercept his supplies, it was necessary to cover every convoy and foraging party with numerous and powerful escorts. Two intire legions, under the command of Plancus, had marched on this service, and were to be followed by a body of cavalry. After the infantry had passed the river, and the cavalry was entered on the bridge, it broke down, and deprived those who were already over, of any communication with the camp. The timber and wreck of the bridge floating by the town of Ilerda, gave the enemy intimation of what had happened, and suggested the design to scour the country on the left of the Segra, with a powerful detachment, in order to intercept any parties who might by this accident be cut off from the main body of the army. For this purpose, Afranius marched with four legions, and might have taken or destroyed those who remained under Plancus on the left of the river, if this officer had not retired to a height, on which he was able for some time to resist the superior numbers of his enemy. In the mean while, Fabius suspecting the danger to which

his detachment was exposed, dispatched two legions more by the other bridge to support the former. On the appearance of this reinforcement, Afranius, whose plan in the present campaign was altogether defensive, thought proper to retire, without hazarding an action, in which he might be exposed to a too hasty decision of the cause.

Two days after this adventure, Cæsar, with an escort of nine hundred horse, arrived in the camp of Fabius. Having examined the situation of both armies, and ordered the bridge on the Sagra to be rebuilt, he proceeded as usual to act on the offensive, and to occupy the enemy's attention with successive operations against them, by which he left them no leisure to form any designs of their own. It was his fortune, indeed, in this and other periods of the present war, to need a speedy decision, which made him take measures that forced his enemies to remain on the defensive, and inspired his men with a notion of their own superiority; an opinion which, after it has been some time received, seldom fails to verify itself.

In a few days after his arrival, he advanced with his army in three divisions to the foot of the hill on which the Spanish army was encamped, and while they continued to observe, and endeavoured to penetrate his intentions, he began to break ground, and to make a lodgment for himself in that place. That his purpose might not be known, until the work was considerably advanced, he kept the first and second lines under arms, and ordered the third, without raising a parapet, or planting their palisades, to sink a ditch fifteen feet wide, and of a sufficient length to cover his front. This being done, he retired with his whole army behind it, and ordered them to lie upon their arms all night. Under cover of this temporary entrenchment, he on the following day completed the usual fortifications of his camp, and brought forward the tents and baggage of his army, which till then had remained under a proper guard on his former ground.

Being now in possession of a post within four hundred paces, or less than half a mile of the enemy's lines; and having a view of the



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ground which lay between their camp and the town of Ilerda, extending about three hundred paces, and mostly plain, with a small height in the middle of it, he formed a project to seize this height; and knowing that the enemy lodged their magazines and stores in Ilerda, proposed to cut off their communication with the town. In this view, he drew up a body of three legions in a proper position, from which to execute his purpose; and ordered the front rank<sup>24</sup> from one of those legions to start from their colours, and with the utmost speed to gain the height which he intended to occupy. The sudden movement of this body explained his design to the enemy, and they instantly put all the piquets and extraordinary guards of their camp in motion to prevent its effects. Having a nearer way, and the advantage of the ground, they prevented Cæsar's party; and being in possession of the height before they came up, repulsed and beat them back to their main body. Here too, they pursued their advantage; and as they rushed with little regard to order, but with an appearance of undaunted courage, on the flanks as well as the front of the legions which Cæsar had advanced, they put the whole in some degree of confusion, and forced them back to the heights in their rear.

While the leaders of the Spanish army probably committed an error in not redoubling their blow, or remained in suspense, Cæsar issued from his camp with a fresh legion to support the flying division of his army, obliged the enemy to retire in their turn, and having overtaken them before they could reach their camp, obliged them to take refuge under the walls of the town.

The ground at the foot of these walls was steep, and the access to it was by lanes and narrow ways. Thither the troops, with whom Cæsar had renewed the action, flushed with victory, had followed the enemy, and got into a situation in which they could not gain any advantage, nor retire without loss. The parties however continued to skirmish during five hours, and being continually reinforced from

<sup>24</sup> Unius Legionis Antesignanos. Cæsar. de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 43.

their respective armies, a general engagement was likely to ensue on ground extremely unfavourable to Cæsar.

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In order to extricate himself with the least possible appearance of disgrace, he ordered a general charge, and having drove his antagonists before him to the foot of the wall, he founded a retreat from thence, and brought off his men, before the enemy could rally or return to the pursuit.

In this manner, Cæsar retired to his camp with considerable loss, and foiled in his design; but on account of the last impression he made on the enemy, with some pretensions to a victory, of which, to support the courage of his troops, he did not neglect to avail himself.

In a few days after this miscarriage, the army of Cæsar suffered a worse and more alarming calamity. The summer being far advanced, and the snow on the Pyrennees melting, all the rivers which are supplied from thence, rose of a sudden to their greatest height. The Segra carried off both the bridges erected by Fabius, and baffled all the endeavours that were used to restore them. As often as any attempt was made for this purpose, the work was interrupted by the enemy from the opposite bank, or the materials were swept away by the flood. Neither the Segra nor the Cinca were passable, and the country between them, though extending in breadth about thirty miles, being exhausted, could no longer furnish any supply of provisions to Cæsar's camp.

About the time that the army began to feel their distress, a convoy which arrived from Gaul, consisting of many carriages, escorted by a large body of Gaulish horse, and accompanied with many officers and persons of distinction, who came to witness the glories of this campaign, the whole, together with their attendants and equipage, amounting to about six thousand men, were attacked by Afranius, and with great loss obliged to take refuge in the neighbouring mountains.

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In consequence of this disaster, and under the sense of the present, and apprehension of the future distress, the *modius*<sup>s</sup> of corn sold in Cæsar's camp for fifty denarii, or at the rate of thirty shillings a peck. All their attempts to procure a supply were frustrated by the difficulties of their situation, or by the vigilance of the enemy. As the height of the floods was a permanent effect of the season, in swelling every river which descends from mountains that retain their snow in the summer, and as the enemy were plentifully supplied from their magazines in the town of Ilerda, or had, by the bridge of that place, an open communication with the fertile country which is now named Catalonia on their right, Cæsar could have no immediate prospect of relief. The Spanish army accordingly triumphed in their good fortune, and sent exaggerated accounts of their advantage to all parts of Spain, to Italy, and to Macedonia. Many persons, who had hitherto hesitated in the choice of their party, were now determined. Varro began to exert himself in his province, and levied two entire new legions in the name of Pompey. Many hastened from Italy into Macedonia, to be the carriers of such agreeable tidings, or to have the merit of declaring themselves of the party of the republic, while the issue of the war yet remained in any degree of suspense.

The triumphs, however, which anticipate events are often deceitful; and, by the overweening security and confidence which they inspire, give an able enemy great advantage, even in his distress, or facilitate the changes of fortune in his favour. Afranius and Petreius, while they trusted to the ordinary course of the seasons, were not sufficiently upon their guard against the superior resources of so able an adversary. They suffered him to build, unobserved, a number of boats, upon a construction which his workmen had learned in

<sup>s</sup> Little more than a peck.

Britain; having a keel in the ordinary form, and some timbers of strength on the sides; but, instead of plank, finished between these timbers with basket-work and covered with hides. These vessels being of easy carriage, were transported by land about twenty miles above Cæsar's camp; and in a first embarkation ferried over a party sufficient to make a lodgement on the opposite bank. Cæsar continued to reinforce this party, until, having an entire legion intrenched on that side, he ventured to employ his carpenters openly in constructing a bridge, which they began at once from both sides of the river. This work was completed in two days, and again gave him access to the left of the Segra, where he surprised some of the enemy's parties, and procured immediate relief by a supply of provisions to his own camp.

About the time that Cæsar had effected this change in the state of his army, he had news of a naval fight on the coast of Gaul, in which his fleet, under Decimus Brutus, had defeated that of the enemy, and given a speedy prospect of the reduction of Marseilles. This report, together with the disappointment he had recently given to the hopes of his enemies, had at once all the effects of victory, and made him appear more formidable than he was supposed to be, even before the distresses which he had lately experienced. His antagonists, from a state of sanguine expectation, sunk into a proportional degree of despondency, and became so much in awe of his superior conduct, that they abandoned the country on the left of the Segra to his foragers, and never ventured, except in the night, to go abroad for the necessary supplies of their own camp. These events affected the natives of the country in a still higher degree, and brought them from every quarter to make a tender of their services in supplying Cæsar with provisions, or in seconding him in his military operations.

In conjunction with the natives, who were now become his allies, Cæsar again found himself in condition to act on the offensive, and to devise new alarms for the enemy. His first object was to render the passage of the river at all times practicable; and as he had failed

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in his purpose of separating the Spanish army from the town of Ilerda, he now proposed to extend his command of the country, and to form a chain of posts, by which he might circumscribe the town itself, together with the enemy's camp, which depended upon it.

The bridge which he had lately built was at too great a distance, and he experienced the insecurity of such communications over torrents, which came with such force and so much inequality from the mountains. Instead, therefore, of attempting to erect any more bridges, he proposed to render the river fordable, by separating its course into many different channels; and for this purpose made a number of cuts, of about thirty feet deep, through the plain, to receive as much of the waters of the Segra as might sufficiently drain the principal stream.

The enemy, as soon as they understood the purpose of these operations, were greatly alarmed. They foresaw that Cæsar, having the passage of the river secured, might command its opposite banks below, as well as above the town of Ilerda, block up the bridge of that place, and, with the aid of the country around him, which, since the late defection of its inhabitants, was ready to support him in all his designs, might have it in his power to prevent their supplies, and distress them, in their turn, for want of provisions.

To remove from a situation in which they were exposed to so many evils, they resolved instantly to abandon their present station, and to retire beyond the Ebro, where the people, either from fear or affection, were still in their interest. They proceeded to the execution of this purpose with much seeming precaution and foresight. Having fixed upon a proper place at which to lay a bridge over the Ebro, they ordered all the boats, within a certain distance on that river and on the Segra, to be collected together for that purpose. They placed a proper garrison in Ilerda, to check the motions of the enemy in their rear, or if he attempted to reduce that place, to employ

employ his forces until they themselves should have effected their retreat, and made their arrangements in the new position they intended to take.

As their first movement in filing off from their present encampment, and in passing through the town of Ilerda, incumbered with all their baggage, was likely to detain them some time in presence of the enemy, and exposed them to the attacks of his cavalry and light troops, they intended no more, on the first day, than to file off by the bridge; and they fixed on a post at which they might halt on the left of the Segra, and make the proper dispositions to continue their march. This post they sent two legions before them to occupy and to secure.

Having taken these preparatory steps, they decamped, defiled without molestation through the town of Ilerda, and came to the ground on which they had taken care to secure their reception; here they halted until the middle of the night, when they again were in motion. They had a plain of some miles before them, bounded by a ridge of hills, which they were to pass in their way to the Ebro. They might be exposed to Cæsar's light troops in crossing this plain; but as soon as they reached the mountains, they could, by securing the passes in their rear, effectually prevent any further attack from the enemy. Thither they accordingly directed their march; but Cæsar, who had observed their intentions, and who had so far succeeded in his operations on the river as to be able to ford it with his horse, sent the greater part of his cavalry, in the beginning of the night, with orders to hang upon the rear of the enemy, and by all possible means to retard their progress.

This service the cavalry performed with so much success, that at break of day the Spanish army, in consequence of the frequent interruptions they had received, were still to be seen from Cæsar's camp. The cavalry, as often as the enemy got in motion, were observed

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to attack them, but when the enemy halted, appeared to stop or retire, and were pursued in their turn. The army of Cæsar being spectators of this scene became extremely impatient, and with the greatest ardour pressed to be led against the enemy. Even officers crowded to their general, and begged they might be allowed to try the ford; they observed of what consequence it was, that an enemy who had been driven with so much labour from one post, should not be suffered to retire in safety to another situation, from which they might renew the war.

Cæsar, affecting to be moved by these representations, and to be prevailed upon to do what it is probable he earnestly desired, instantly made his dispositions to pass the river. He selected the least firm and vigorous men of every cohort for the guard of the camp; placed lines of horse in the river above and below the ford, to break the force of the stream, and to save those who might be overpowered by the strength of the current; in this manner he passed his infantry between the double lines of cavalry without the loss of a man. They had a circuit of six miles to make, in order to avoid the town of Ilerda; but notwithstanding this delay, and the advantage which Afranius and Petreius had gained by beginning their march at midnight, and by their not being discovered until it was day, such were the interruptions given by the cavalry, and the speed with which the legions of Cæsar advanced, that they overtook the enemy's rear about three in the afternoon, and occasioned at once a general halt in every part of their column.

Petreius and Afranius, stunned by the unexpected arrival of Cæsar at the head of his whole army, formed on a rising ground to receive him; and both armies seemed to prepare for immediate action. But Cæsar, knowing the necessity which the enemy were under of pursuing their retreat, and the prospect he had of increasing his advantage on the march, did not think it necessary to attack

them when in order of battle ; he took his ground, however, so near them <sup>52</sup>, that he could profit by every advantage they gave him, and in every attempt they should make to change their situation, could push them into all the disorders of a general rout.

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In this position of the two armies, the Spaniards having some time remained in order of battle, again attempted to resume their march ; but having soon experienced the difficulties of that attempt with an enemy so near them, and being faint with hunger and the fatigue of so many tedious and fruitless operations, they determined to halt and wait for the return of night. They had now no more than five miles to pass on the plain, and hoped, by a rapid motion in the night, to traverse this space before Cæsar could overtake them, or before he could oblige them to halt any where short of the mountains, where they looked for a perfect security.

Both parties appeared to be fixed on their ground for the night, when some prisoners that were brought to Cæsar gave information that the enemy were in motion, and must in a little time be so far advanced as to reach the hills before he could give them any effectual trouble. On this sudden emergence, although his army was by no means ready to march, he ordered every trumpet to sound, as if he were actually in motion. This feint, however slight, had its effect ; the enemy believed that they were to be instantly attacked, or closely pursued on the march, when disordered and incumbered with baggage ; they desisted from their intention, and gave the signal to halt.

Afranius and Petreius, thus baffled in the execution of the first part of their plan, which had been so reasonably formed, began to lose courage, and remained on this ground all night, and the following

<sup>52</sup> The want of cannon or fire-arms enabled a superior army to remain almost in contact with that it intended to harass.



day perplexed with irresolution and various counsels. So far, however, they determined, that before so vigilant an enemy it was safer to march by day than by night; and in this mind they remained yet a second night in the present position.

In this interval Cæsar, having leisure to visit the country over which they were to pass, found it practicable to turn their flank and get to the hills before them. He accordingly moved in the night, and at break of day, before the enemy judged it safe to decamp, he appeared on their right; but seeming to retire, and to leave them at liberty to continue their retreat. So long as his march had this appearance, they were pleased to think that he had moved for want of provisions, and applauded themselves for having patiently waited so joyful an event. But as soon as he had got a sufficient way to his left, he changed his direction, and marched with all possible speed to reach the mountains. They were no longer at a loss to perceive his design, or the danger with which they themselves were threatened. And they instantly, without striking their tents or packing their baggage, moved in the greatest haste to prevent him.

In this operation, Cæsar was now become certain of one or other of two great advantages; either that he should reach the pass of the mountains before the enemy, and so cut off their retreat; or, if they got there before him, that he should be left in possession of their camp and their baggage. He prevailed, however, in the trial of speed, got the first of these advantages by being before them at the ascent of the mountains, where he found a ledge or terras that was sufficiently capacious to receive his army, and which gave him entire command of the pass.

Afranius, on seeing Cæsar in possession of this ground, sent a considerable party to try the ascent of the mountains at a different place, and to gain the summits behind him; in hopes that, if this way was

practicable, he might follow with his whole army, and descend from thence to the Ebro. But the party he employed on this service was, in presence of both armies, surrounded by Cæsar's horse, and put to the sword. The rest of the army, without making any attempt to rescue their friends, beheld this scene with a kind of torpid dejection. They dropped their arms, and staggered in their ranks. The troops of Cæsar, who well understood these signs of extreme terror, became to a degree of mutiny impatient for action; and he himself was sensible that the enemy might in that moment be attacked with the greatest advantage; but as he now thought himself sure of being able to reduce them without a blow, he was unwilling to give them an opportunity, however unlikely to avail them, of making their escape by the chance of a battle. While he endeavoured accordingly to restrain the unseasonable ardour of his own men, the leaders of the Spanish army had time to retire with theirs, and led them back to the camp which they had left in the morning, and to the melancholy possession of tents and of baggage, which they had been willing to abandon, in order to effect their escape.

Cæsar having left proper guards to secure the passes of the mountains, followed the enemy, and took post, as before, so near them, that they could not move without being exposed to his insults.

In this position of the two armies, the centinels and advanced guards had an opportunity to talk together; they mutually regretted the unhappy quarrel in which they were engaged, and both officers and men becoming by degrees more familiar, met between the lines, and even exchanged visits in their opposite camps. Officers of the Spanish army proceeded so far as to talk of an accommodation, and got over their scruples in treating without proper authority from their generals, by proposing to stipulate some honourable terms for them in the peace which they proposed to conclude.

Cæsar

Cæsar was apprised of this correspondence, and, however irregular, connived at a circumstance which he hoped his superior popularity and the splendour of his fortune, would turn to his own account. He flattered himself, that as he had been able to seduce the troops of Pompey in Italy, so he might now deprive his antagonists of the army they had formed in the field to oppose him.

The Spanish generals, being intent on a work they were executing to secure their access to water, remained for some time unapprised of the disorderly correspondence subsisting between the two armies; and Afranius, when he came to the knowledge of what was passing, seemed to observe it with great indifference; but Petreius was greatly alarmed, ran with the officers and the guard who usually attended his person to the space between the lines, dispersed all those who were found in conference together, and put all the soldiers of Cæsar's army who fell in his way to the sword. From thence he went through the camp, and with tears exacted from every legion apart fresh oaths of fidelity to Pompey. He afterwards assembled the whole at the usual place of audience, before the general's tent; and in a speech, composed of insinuation and reproach, endeavoured to confirm them in their duty; and, to the end that he might effectually cut off all hopes of conciliation, ordered all the soldiers of Cæsar's army that could be found within his intrenchments to be brought before him and slain.

Cæsar, at the same time, having many officers and men of the Spanish army in his camp, might have retaliated these acts of severity; but he chose rather to contrast the character of clemency he himself had assumed, with the austere and merciless policy of his enemies; and for this purpose gave their freedom to such officers or men as chose to return to their own party, and rewarded with preferments and honours such of them as were inclined to remain in his service.

Afranius

Afranius and Petreius, by the timely discovery of these irregular practices, having escaped the disgrace of being delivered up to the enemy, to be treated at his discretion, or to be spared only as objects of pity at the intercession of their own army, continued their plan of operations; but by persevering in their resistance, they only enabled their adversary to give still more evident proofs of his superior skill and address. They were sensible that their present post could not be long maintained; it had been taken, in their haste to reach the mountains, from necessity, as an immediate respite from the attacks of an enemy who annoyed their march; and, besides other inconveniences, had a difficult access to water, the brook or river from which they were to be supplied being exposed to the discharge of arrows, darts, and other missiles from the enemy. Their bread, which they had calculated to serve them on the whole route to the Ebro was near exhausted, and they had no immediate prospect of supply. They entered therefore into anxious deliberation on the choice of a retreat, by which they might soonest get beyond reach of an enemy who pressed them with such unremitted alarms. They hesitated whether they should return to Ilerda, where they still had some magazines, or should attempt to reach Tarraco<sup>53</sup> on their left, at the distance of about fifty miles. The length and difficulty of the way, in which they would be exposed to Cæsar's attacks, determined them against the last; and they chose the first, as promising the nearest and most immediate relief from their present distresses. They accordingly, without any precaution, decamped, and directed their march to Ilerda.

The Spanish infantry were now more exposed than they had been on any of their former marches; for their cavalry had been so often discomfited, and had lost courage so much, that they could not be kept to their place in the column, and were now actually received for safety into the centre of the infantry; the rear was therefore

<sup>53</sup> Tarragona.



cruelly annoyed by Cæsar's horse, supported by the whole force of his legions. In ascending the heights, which were frequent in their way, they had the better of the enemy, by throwing their javelins and darts on those who attempted to pursue them from below; and with this superiority they made a stand on every ascent, to force their pursuers back to some distance; but in descending the hills, the same advantage being taken against themselves, they generally ran in great disorder to the plains. And in this manner, the ground being uneven, their march consisted of alternate stops and precipitate flights, extremely fatiguing, and likely to end in a general rout.

The leaders of the retiring army, to prevent this fatal consequence, thought proper again to form upon a rising ground, and attempted a stratagem to amuse the enemy, and to gain some advance on the march before him. For this purpose, affecting to make some permanent lodgment in the place where they halted, they threw up a breast-work, but neither pitched their tents nor unloaded their baggage, and were ready to depart the moment their pursuer gave them an opportunity, by quitting the order of march. Cæsar, trusting to the effects of his late attacks, and to the appearances which the enemy presented, had no suspicion of their purpose, gave orders to pitch, and even suffered his cavalry to separate in parties to forage. This was no sooner observed from the Spanish army, than they instantly resumed their march. It was then about noon, and they made some way undisturbed.

Cæsar seeing himself over-reached, instantly put his legions in motion, without striking their tents or packing their baggage, and leaving orders for the cavalry to follow him as soon as they could be assembled, endeavoured to keep close to the enemy's rear. He was in this situation when the cavalry rejoined him, and, by renewing with double ardour their former operations, obliged the Spanish army again to suspend their march, and, in despair, to take some respite  
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from the continual attacks with which they were harassed, by halting again in a field, which they had no time to examine, and in which they were accordingly very much exposed.

On this ground Cæsar had again a fair opportunity to attack them, and, with little doubt of the event, to terminate the war by a battle; but he persisted in his purpose of forcing this unfortunate army to surrender without any loss or hazard to himself. In this mind he continued to observe them with a degree of insulting indifference. They soon became sensible of the great disadvantage of the position in which they had halted, and endeavoured to change it, without exposing themselves to the enemy, who was so near as to be able to disturb them in every motion they attempted to make; for this purpose they broke ground for a new intrenchment in their rear, and retiring as besiegers advance in the attack of a fortress, changed their situation under the cover of works which they successively raised<sup>53</sup>.

In these slow and toilsome operations they persisted all the night and the following day, and got a new position, in which they were less exposed to the enemy; but subject to a fresh inconveniency, till then unobserved, in the great distance to which they were removed from water.

As soon as this defect was perceived, which was probably not till after the soldier had consumed what he commonly carried in his flask, they discontinued their fatiguing operations; but no man ventured abroad for water, and they remained all night under dreadful apprehensions of what they might suffer from this distress.

On the following day the Spanish army advanced in array to the watering-place, and, at the hazard of a general action, proceeded to supply themselves with this necessary article. They were suffered to avail themselves of this temporary relief; but none attempted to procure any food, and they soon after, in order to supply their own

<sup>53</sup> Cæsar de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 81.

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immediate wants, and to lessen their consumption of water and forage, killed all the beasts of burden in their camp. While they endeavoured, by means of these temporary expedients, to await the event of any change that might offer in their favour, Cæsar formed a design to cut off all their hopes at once by a line of circumvallation. In conducting or covering this work, his legions were commonly under arms. And the enemy, sensible of the extremity to which they were soon likely to be reduced, advanced in front of their camp to interrupt him; and there might have decided their fate by an action upon equal terms. But they had no courage left; the habit of acting upon the defensive had impressed them with a sense of inferiority, and their frequent miscarriages had made them distrust the conduct of their officers. Though now in a state of suffering, from which nothing but victory could extricate them, or which nothing but the blood of their enemies could avenge, they, without making any effort for either purpose, retired again within their intrenchment.

In that situation, however, their distresses in a little time became entirely insufferable. After four days had passed in their camp without water or sustenance of any sort, their leaders desired an interview with Cæsar; and, not to expose themselves in so humbling a state to the troops of either army, begged that their meeting might be held apart from both. The conference was accepted; but Cæsar would not allow it to be held in any private place: he insisted that Afranius and Petreius should meet him in the space between the two armies; and having previously demanded, as an acknowledgment of his victory, that the son of Afranius should be delivered up as an hostage, he came to the place of meeting, surrounded by multitudes who crowded from both armies to witness the scene.

Afranius pleaded in behalf of the troops he commanded, that they had done no more than their duty to Pompey, and no more than the service of the province in which they had been stationed re-

quired ; but acknowledged the distresses to which they were reduced, and implored the victor's clemency.

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Cæsar, in return, upbraided the leaders of that army with their obstinate animosity to himself, and with their late cruelty to innocent men, who had committed no other offence than that of having embraced their fellow-citizens as friends, and that of being desirous to terminate this unnatural quarrel in an amicable manner. " That army," he said, " had been raised and kept on foot for the sole purpose of making war upon him. For this purpose numerous fleets had been equipped in times of profound peace, and seven entire legions, under able and experienced officers, had been kept in this peaceable province, where there was not the least pretence of a war ; that every measure was concerted for his destruction ; that in order to raise one citizen to uncommon honours and powers, a new species of arrangement had taken place, by which a person remaining at the gates of Rome, governing in the city and in every district of Italy, might likewise have the command in two warlike provinces, and be allowed a great military establishment in time of profound peace ; that, on the contrary, in order to distress himself, the ordinary rules of the service had been set aside ; and that to him alone had been denied, what had always been granted to every citizen who faithfully served the republic, the privilege of retiring, if not distinguished with honours, at least without being loaded with injuries and affronts ; that he had borne these indignities, however, with patience, and mentioned them now, not as a prelude to any severities which he meant to inflict, nor as an excuse for any singular advantage he meant to take of their present distresses ; that he demanded no more than peace ; his antagonists should go unhurt, provided they left the province, and became bound not to serve his enemies for the future against him ; that no one should be forced to take any active part on his side ;




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“ that all who committed no injury against him should be considered  
“ as his friends ; and that every man now in his power should be at  
“ liberty, without any other conditions than these.”

It is difficult to determine whether the sword or the tongue of this singular man were most dangerous to the state he attacked. It is probable that many of his present audience were as much convinced by his eloquence, as they had been subdued by his military skill, and thought him a person no less forced to his present extremities by the wrongs he had suffered, than able to do himself justice by the force of his arms. His speech was received by the late partizans of his rival with evident signs of pleasure. To be discharged after a certain period of the most faithful services was all that a Roman soldier, in the ordinary times of the republic, could claim. To receive this favour at the hands of a victorious enemy, by whom they expected to be treated as captives, gave sudden and unexpected joy.

After the material articles were adjusted in this manner, some questions arose with respect to the time and place in which the vanquished army should be dismissed from their colours. Numbers of them, though Roman citizens, had been enlisted in Spain, and were natives or settlers in that province ; others had been transported from Italy, and wished to return to their country. It was determined, therefore, that the first should be disbanded immediately ; the others march to the Var, and there be set free, and not be subject to be pressed into any service whatever. Cæsar undertook to supply them with provisions on their march. He ordered their effects, if any were found in his camp, to be restored to them. He paid his own soldiers a high price for what they were in this manner desired to restore. By this measure he gained several advantages ; he lightened his baggage ; he made a gratification to his own men, without the imputation of bribery ; and he gained his late enemies by an act of generosity. The vanquished army accordingly came to Cæsar with all





their complaints, and appealed to him even from their own officers. It was impossible for mankind to resist so much ability, insinuation, and courage.

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About a third of the captive army were dismissed from their colours in Spain; the remainder passed the Pyrennees, preceded by one part of Cæsar's army, and followed by the other; who, being thus separated to the van and the rear, and always encamping close to their prisoners, led them, in terms of the capitulation, to the frontiers of Cisalpine Gaul<sup>54</sup>.

While the main body of Cæsar's army thus conducted the remains of the Spanish legions to the place of their destination, Varro yet remained in the western province of Spain; and Cæsar, in order either to effect a conjunction which had been concerted between them, or to force him to surrender, sent Quintus Cassius with two legions to that quarter, and himself followed with an escort of six hundred horse. Upon the report of his approach, the natives, as usual, having taken their resolution in favour of the successful party, declared for the victor. One of the legions of Varro that lay at Gades<sup>55</sup> advancing in form with their colours, came forward to Hispales to receive him, and made offer of their services. Varro himself agreed to surrender the forces he commanded, both by sea and by land, and was received at Corduba. Here Cæsar held a general convention of the province; and having thanked the people for the favours they had shewn to his cause, he remitted the contributions, and withdrew all the burdens which Varro, acting under the authority of Pompey, had imposed upon them. In this, as in other examples, he endeavoured to dispel the fears which his enterprize at first had occasioned, and secured the attachment of the provinces by a sense of the ease and the freedom which his success had procured them. The fleets and armies

<sup>54</sup> Cæf. de Bell. Civ. lib. i.

<sup>55</sup> Now Cadiz.

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which joined him upon every conquest he made, enabled him to station troops for the security of every new acquisition, without dividing the forces on which he was to rely for the future operations of the war. He accordingly, in the present instance, left, under the command of Quintus Cassius, five legions, consisting chiefly of the troops which had been levied by Varro; and he himself embarking on board a fleet which had been fitted out for his enemies, went by sea to Tarraco, now Tarragona, and from that place by land to Narbonne and Marseilles.

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*The Siege of Marseilles continued.—Its surrender.—Cæsar named Dictator.—Return to Rome.—Mutiny at Placentia.—Cæsar with Servilius Isauricus Consuls.—Forces and Disposition of Pompey.—Departure of Cæsar to Brundisium.—Transports the first division of his army to Acroceranus.—Message to Pompey, and their several Operations.—The Lines of Dyrrachium.—Cæsar baffled in his attempt to invest Pompey.—Action and Defeat of Cæsar.—His Retreat.—March of both Armies into Thessaly.—Battle of Pharsalia.*

THE city of Marseilles had not surrendered to the forces which Cæsar had left under the command of Trebonius and Decimus Brutus to besiege it. Brutus, according to the disposition which had been made to block up the place by sea, as well as by land, was stationed under the island at the mouth of the bay. His squadron consisted of twelve ships, but so hastily built, that no more than thirty days had elapsed from the felling of the timber to the launching of the vessels. They were manned, however, with the choice of Cæsar's legions; and, in order to frustrate any advantage which their antagonists might have in the construction or management of their ships, they were furnished with contrivances to grapple and make fast their gunwales to those of the enemy, in order to decide the contest with their swords.

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The Marseillians had equipped ten galleys, of which the greater number, though not all, were decked. These they joined under the command of Domitius, who had been named by the Senate to succeed Cæsar in Gaul, with the seven ships which this officer had brought into their harbour; and having manned them with mariners

from

from the neighbouring coasts, they came abroad into the bay, in order to force Brutus from his station, and to open their communication with the sea. In the beginning of the action, the Marseillians being superior to Cæsar's fleet in the number of their ships, and in the skill of their mariners, had a considerable advantage. But as soon as they suffered themselves to be entangled by the grapple, the Gaulish sailors, though of a very hardy race, could not withstand the arms and discipline of the legionary soldiers, and were defeated with the loss of nine of their ships.

This was the victory already mentioned, and which contributed so much to the reputation of Cæsar's arms, while he lay before Ilerda; and which, joined to the other circumstances of his good fortune, procured him the alliance of so many nations in Spain.

While Brutus thus kept his station in the bay of Marseilles, Trebonius practised all the usual methods of attack to reduce the city. This place being covered on three sides by water, and on the fourth only accessible by an isthmus or neck of land, which was defended by walls and towers of a great height; he opened two separate attacks, probably on the right and the left of the isthmus, and at each of these attacks, appears to have employed the sloping mound or terrace<sup>1</sup>, which, in the sieges of the ancients, where the defence depended on the height of the battlements, corresponded to the sap of the moderns, and was calculated to conduct the besiegers, by a gradual ascent, to the top, as the other conducts them to the foot of the walls. This work was supported on the sides chiefly with timber, and built up with fascines, hurdles, and earth, rising in the present case to an elevation of eighty feet, and in breadth, as was formerly observed in that employed against the Bituriges<sup>2</sup>, probably no less than three hundred and fifty feet, so as to receive a proper column of infantry

<sup>1</sup> Agger.<sup>2</sup> Bourges.

in front, and to embrace a proper extent in the walls. The workmen employed in the front of this laborious approach were covered with screens, mantlets, and penthouses of great length; and such was the consumption of timber in the construction of the whole, that the neighbouring country is said to have been cleared of its woods.

A mere trading city, long disused to war, or accustomed to rely on foreign protection, we may suppose to have been ill provided, either in the state of its arsenals, or in the spirit of its citizens, for such an attack. But this little republic, still bearing the character of an independent state, being in the neighbourhood of mountains inhabited by fierce nations, who looked upon its wealth as a tempting prize, and owing its safety to the strength of its walls, and the state of its arsenals, was still suitably provided for its own defence; and the People, although long inured to peace, still kept in mind the duties which the necessities of war might oblige them to render to their country. They were now supported by the presence of the Roman Proconsul, and had hopes of a speedy relief from Pompey, whom, in opposition to Cæsar, who was in rebellion against the legal government of his country, they considered as head of the commonwealth. They accordingly exerted great perseverance and valour in defence of their walls; and by a continual discharge from the battlements, and by frequent sallies, in which they set fire to the works of the besiegers, greatly retarded the progress of the siege. They had engines of a peculiar force, from which they darted arrows of a monstrous size and weight, being beams twelve feet long, and proportionally thick, and pointed with iron, which none of the screens or coverings, usually employed in making approaches, could resist; and Trebonius was accordingly obliged to proportion the strength of his timbers and penthouses, and the thickness of his parapets, fascines, and earth on his terrace, to the weight of these enormous weapons.



While such efforts were made on both sides at this memorable siege, Pompey had detached Nasidius with sixteen galleys from the coast of Macedonia to endeavour the relief of Marseilles. This squadron had entered the straits of Messina by surprise, and, having cut out of the harbour a ship which belonged to Curio's fleet, proceeded on their destination to the coast of Gaul. Being arrived in the bay of Tauroentum, now La Ciotat, in the neighbourhood of Toulon, they sent intimation of their coming, in order to concert operations with those in the harbour of Marseilles.

The besieged were greatly animated with these hopes of relief; and having already drawn from their docks as many ships as supplied the place of those they had lost in the late engagement, they now manned them with the choice of their citizens, and determined once more to try their fortune at sea. When this fleet was about to depart, numbers of women and many citizens, who, on account of their age, could not take part in the service, crowded to the shore, and with tears exhorted the soldiers and mariners to be mindful of their own and their country's honour, on the eve of becoming a prey to their enemies. Multitudes of people, at the same time, drew forth in procession, and crowded to the temples with prayers and supplications for the success of this last effort they were to make in defence of their commonwealth.

This bustle in the streets of Marseilles, with the motion of the shipping in the harbour, being observed from the camp of Trebonius, which was situated upon a height, and which had a view into the town, gave sufficient intimation of what was intended; and Brutus was warned to be upon his guard: but the Marseillians, having found a favourable wind, had the good fortune to clear the bay, and, without any interruption from his squadron, joined Nasidius at Tauroentum. Here an action soon after ensued, in which the Marseillians made great efforts of valour; but were ill supported by Na-

fidius, who, unworthy of the command with which he had been intrusted, withdrew at the beginning of the action, and fled to the coast of Spain. The Marseillians, being left to sustain the contest alone, lost nine of their ships, of which five were sunk, and four were taken.

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These tidings were received at Marseilles with inexpressible sorrow; but did not alter the resolution of the inhabitants to persevere in their defence, and in the use of every possible method that could be employed to protract the siege, and to give Pompey time to devise more effectual means for their safety. They accordingly, with great vigour and success, counteracted the ordinary operations of the siege, burning and demolishing a considerable part of the works which were raised up against them, and obliging the besiegers frequently to renew their labours.

The first attack, against which the besiegers were not able to find an adequate defence, came from a work which had not been a part in the original plan of the siege, but had been devised by the soldiers who had succeeded each other on the guard of the agger, or mound of approach, as a lodgment or cover to secure themselves from surprise. It was at first no more than a square of ten yards, inclosed with a brick wall five feet thick; but so situated, that if it were raised to a proper height, it might cope with the battlements, and greatly annoy the besieged. To give it this consequence, masons were employed to raise it, and great efforts of ingenuity were made to protect them in their work. A moveable penthouse, of great thickness in the roof, and screened on the front and sides with net-work made of cables, or the strongest ropes, was raised on beams or rafters of a proportional strength, and contrived to be hoisted up by machinery, to keep pace with the building, and to cover the workmen as they rose on the successive courses of masonry which they laid. With these precautions, a tower was gradually raised on the

foundation of the original brick wall, to the height of six stories ; and being furnished with ports or embrasures on every floor, gave the besiegers, by means of their missiles, the command of all the space from thence to the ramparts. They accordingly, under the cover of engines, that made a continual discharge from this tower, filled up the ditch, and pushed up a gallery to the foot of the wall. In this position, notwithstanding all the efforts of the besieged, by a continual discharge of heavy stones from the battlements, to destroy or overwhelm the supports of their gallery, they undermined the foundation of the rampart, and brought some part of it in ruin to the ground.

The inhabitants, greatly alarmed at the sight of a breach, which might soon be enlarged to admit of being stormed, made some signals of truce, and sent to beseech Trebonius that he would suspend his operations, and wait for the arrival of Cæsar, in whose clemency they hoped to find some protection against the fury of troops, who had already threatened the inhabitants with a massacre.

Trebonius, accordingly, moved by these intreaties, and by the instructions he had received from Cæsar, not to deliver up the town, in case it fell into his hands, to the rage of the soldiers, suspended his operations, and supposing the petition of the inhabitants equal to an offer of surrender on their part, entrusted his works to slender guards, who, in their turn, relying on the submissive professions of the people, were proportionally remiss in their duty. The citizens, tempted by the opportunity which was thus offered them to strike an important blow, and to throw back to a great distance all the posts of the enemy, made a vigorous sally from the town, and being favoured by a high wind, which blew directly on the works of the besiegers, set the whole on fire, and reduced to ashes, in a few hours, what had been the labour of many months to erect.

As Trebonius had already exhausted the greater part of the materials which the country around him could furnish, it appeared difficult for him to resume the attack. But he himself, as well as the troops under his command, being greatly exasperated by the late breach of faith in the town, made every effort of ingenuity and courage to repair their losses. They substituted brick-work for timber in supporting the sides and galleries of their terrace; and advanced with so rapid a progress in their new approach, that the besieged, now greatly spent with toil, and disappointed in their hopes of relief, were struck with fresh and more alarming apprehensions of what they might expect from the resentment of troops whom they had incensed with a recent and just provocation; and they returned to their suit for mercy, with more humble and more sincere intentions of submission.

While messages were passing to this effect, Domitius Ahenobarbus, sensible that he could no longer serve the cause of his party at this place, embarked with his attendants and friends on board of three galleys which still waited his orders in the harbour. Having the opportunity of a high and favourable wind, which made it unsafe for the squadron of Brutus to weigh, or to quit their anchors in pursuit of him, he endeavoured to escape from the bay. In this attempt two of his vessels were taken, the third, with himself on board, got off, and reserved him to take that share which yet remained for him in the growing misfortunes of his party throughout this disastrous war.

Such was the state of affairs when Cæsar arrived from Spain, and expecting, in the present contest for empire, to profit as much by the reputation of his clemency, as by the terror of his arms, listened to the supplications of the people of Marseilles, and took possession of the town without any act of resentment or severity whatever. While he was yet at this place, he had accounts from Rome, that his party

in



in the city had procured an act of the People to vest him with the power of Dictator. The ceremony of his nomination had, in the absence of both Consuls, been performed by Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, then Prætor in office, who, though a person of mean capacity, was, by the chance of his situation, involved in many of the greatest affairs that followed; and, though but a single accomplice in the crimes of this guilty age, escaped its violences, to become almost the only example of an ignominy and disgrace, which so many others had merited no less than himself.

Cæsar, being thus raised, though by an irregular step, to a legal place in the commonwealth, hastened to Rome, in order to be invested, for the first time, with the character of Dictator. In his way he was stopped at Placentia by some disorders which threatened a mutiny among the troops who were assembled at that place. The legions, elated by victory, and filled with a sense of their own importance in a contest for the sovereignty of the empire, were become impatient of discipline, and in haste to avail themselves of that military government they were employed to establish. In entering Italy they treated Roman citizens as their subjects, and the country as their property. Being restrained, they resented the severities which were practised against them, entered into cabals, and even talked of abandoning Cæsar, and of declaring for Pompey. Here, however, the usual courage and ability of this singular man supported him. He brought the mutinous troops, under arms, before him, and put them in mind how much he had ever coveted, and been anxious to obtain the affections of the soldiers; but assured them, that it was no part of his intention to earn those affections by making himself an accomplice in their crimes. "Shall we," he said, "who profess to be the deliverers of our country from oppression, become ourselves the greatest oppressors? Shall I, who am intrusted with the command of a Roman army, become the patron of licentiousness, and, in  
" order

“ order to indulge for a moment the passions of my foldiers, fuffer  
 “ them to ruin their own fortunes for ever? What fhould induce  
 “ me?—The fear of violence to my perfon, or the danger to which  
 “ my life may be expofed?—If my life were attacked, there are enow  
 “ to defend it. But what is life compared to the honour of a Ro-  
 “ man officer, which I am concerned to maintain? There are perfons  
 “ who have faid, That they will defert my caufe, and go over to  
 “ Pompey. Let them. They fhall foon have an opportunity to do  
 “ fo. If Pompey be my enemy, what is there I fhould more ear-  
 “ neftly with than to find his caufe entrusted with fuch men? men  
 “ who make war on their friends, and difobey their officers. He  
 “ had been flow,” he faid, “ in proceeding to the fatal extremes which  
 “ were now become neceffary. The guilty,” he continued, “ had  
 “ been long known to him; but he had endeavoured to conceal their  
 “ offences, in hopes that remorse and fhame; or the fear of juftice,  
 “ would have made the aétual application of punifhment unneceffary;  
 “ but that he muft now, though with the greateft reluctance, pro-  
 “ ceed to the laft of remedies.”

In order that he might not involve the whole of thofe who were  
 prefent in the fame desperate caufe, he affected, in this harangue, to  
 treat the offence he was to punifh as the crime of a few. They were  
 now to be fet apart, he faid, and their punifhment fhould purge the  
 army, and retrieve its honour. In purfuance of this plan, he affected  
 to believe, that the ninth legion were the principal authors of this  
 mutiny. He ordered a few of them for immediate execution, and  
 boldly difmiffed the whole of the legion from his fervice. The re-  
 mainder of the army, having thus obtained an implied exculpation,  
 in token of their own innocence, vied with each other in applauding  
 the juftice of their general. Even the legion, which was difmiffed from  
 the fervice, detefting, as a punifhment on themfelves, what they had  
 threatened to execute as an aét of refentment againft their commander,  
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beset him with humble and earnest intreaties, that he might be pleased to receive them again into his service. He affected great difficulty in granting this request; but, after much sollicitation, suffered himself to be gained by their professions of penitence\*.

With a considerable accession of authority, acquired by his success in quelling this mutiny, Cæsar proceeded to Rome, where he assumed the title and ensigns of Dictator; being the first example of any person, since the abdication of Sylla, intrusted with this alarming power. It was said to be conferred upon him, however, merely in compliance with form; and that there might be a proper officer, in the absence of both the Consuls, to preside at the elections. His own object, at the same time, being to gain to his party the authority of legal government, and, in his conduct, to give proofs of clemency and moderation, without any intention, for the present, to perpetuate or even to exercise any of the high powers of Dictator, he proceeded to hold the elections, and was himself, together with Servilius Isauricus, chosen Consul for the following year. In the interval that followed, before their installation, he continued to assemble the People in the character of Dictator, and obtained some laws respecting the times, and the distracted state of the public affairs. Credit and trade were at an alarming stand; he procured an act to facilitate the recovery of debts, by delivering the effects of the debtor to be divided among his creditors, upon an estimate of what the different subjects might have been sold for at the time that the war broke out.

Many being supposed to hoard great sums of money, as the only means of preserving it from the violence of the times, or being unwilling to lend on such securities as were then to be had, Cæsar

\* Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 27—35. Appian, de Bello Civ. lib. ii. p. 547. Sueton. in Cæs. c. 69. Lucan. lib. v. 244.

procured another act, by which any person was forbid to have in his possession, at once, above sixty thousand Roman money<sup>5</sup>.

He obtained a general act of indemnity, from which Milo alone was excepted, restoring persons of every denomination, who, at the breaking out of the war, lay under the censure of the law, and were in exile for corrupt practices in the State; and, in pursuance of this measure, procured a pardon for all the disorders which had been committed in opposition to the late government; but for none of the irregular efforts that had been made in support of it. He opened the city at once to all the inhabitants of the Cisalpine Gaul, and by a single vote gave them a title to be enrolled with the People of Rome as members of the republic<sup>6</sup>. In these, and in other affairs of less moment, while his troops were in motion through Italy, he employed a few days in the city, and being ready to depart, resigned the power of Dictator. This resignation, made by a person possessed of a military force, and hitherto victorious, was considered as an evidence of his moderation, and served to dispel the fears of those who expected to see the immediate establishment of a military government. He was now about to assume the office of legal magistrate, and to appear in the character of Roman Consul against those who, lately trusting to the name and authority of the republic with which they were vested, had treated himself and his adherents as rebels; but who now, in their turn, might appear to incur all the disadvantages of that imputation which he was about to retort upon them; and with the additional charge of an attempt to dismember the empire, and to arm so many of the provinces against the sovereignty of the State.

The competitors in this famous contest were in or but a little past the prime of life: Pompey was fifty-seven, and Cæsar fifty. The first had been early distinguished as an officer, and for many

<sup>5</sup> About 500l.

<sup>6</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 36, 37, 38. Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.



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years had enjoyed a degree of consideration, with which that of any other Roman citizen was not allowed to compare. His reputation, however, in some measure, had sunk, and that of Cæsar rose on the first shocks of the present war; but the balance was not yet absolutely settled, and the minds of many were held in anxious suspense. Cæsar, wherever he acted in person, had always prevailed; but where he was not present, his affairs wore a less promising aspect.

His forces under Curio had acquired an easy possession of Sicily; and this officer, encouraged by his first success, transported two legions into Africa, found Varus encamped near Utica, obliged him to retire into the town, and was preparing to besiege it, when he received intelligence that Juba, king of Numidia, was advancing to its relief with all the powers of his kingdom. This prince had been induced to take part in the war by his attachment to Pompey, and by his personal animosity to Curio, who, in his Tribunate, had moved for an act to deprive him of his kingdom.

Curio, upon this intelligence, wisely withdrew from Utica to a strong post in the neighbourhood, and sent orders into Sicily to hasten the junction of the troops he had left behind him in that island. While he waited their coming, some Numidian deserters arrived at his camp, and brought accounts that Juba, with the main body of his array, had been recalled to defend his own dominions; and that only Sabura, one of his generals, with a small division, was come to give what support he could to the party of Pompey in Africa.

Upon this information, Curio formed a design to intercept the Numidian general before he could be joined by Varus; and for this purpose, leaving a guard in his camp, he marched in the night to attack the enemy, where he was informed that they lay on the banks of the Bagrada. His cavalry being advanced, fell in with the Numi-

dian.

dian horse, and put them to flight. Encouraged by this advantage, he hastened his march to complete the victory; and Sabura, by whose art the last intelligence had been conveyed to him, likewise, after a little resistance, fled before him. By this means, Curio was gradually insnared into the midst of Juba's forces, was surrounded, and attacked on every side. He attempted, in vain, to take refuge on a height which he had in view, and, with the greater part of his army, was put to the sword. The few who escaped, with those who had been left in the camp, endeavoured to find a passage into Sicily, and, being disappointed, surrendered themselves to Varus, by whom they were treated with clemency; but being observed, and distinguished by Juba, who arrived at Utica on the following day, were claimed as his captives, and put to death.

About the same time, Dolabella, to whom Cæsar had given the command both of his sea and land forces on the coast of Illyricum, was, by Marcus Octavius and Scribonius Libo, expelled from thence; and Caius Antonius, attempting to support Dolabella, was shut up in a small island, and, with his party, made prisoners<sup>†</sup>.

The principal storm, however, with which the new government was threatened, appeared on the side of Macedonia. In this country, Pompey himself was now at the head of a great force. He had transported five legions from Italy; and, since the middle of March, when his last division sailed from Brundisium, he had been in the quiet possession of Greece, Macedonia, and all the eastern part of the empire. He had sent his father-in-law, Cornelius Scipio Metellus, into the provinces of Asia and Syria, to collect the forces and the revenues of those opulent countries; and dispatched his own son Cneius with instructions to assemble all the shipping that could be found on that coast. He likewise sent general orders to all the Roman officers

<sup>†</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 41 & 42.

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in different parts of the empire, and to the allies or dependants of the Roman People, to join him with every power they could raise. Seven thousand citizens of rank had followed him from Italy<sup>a</sup>. Numbers of veterans, who had been settled in Thessaly, repaired to his standard. He was joined by one legion from Sicily, another from Crete, and two from Asia. He had two legions under Scipio in Syria, had assembled three thousand archers, and as many slingers; had hired, in the neighbourhood of Macedonia, two thousand foot and seven thousand cavalry. Dejotarus sent him six hundred horse; Ariobarzanes five hundred; Cotus, a Thracian prince, five hundred; the Macedonians furnished two hundred; five hundred, being the remains of Gabinius's army, had joined him; his son brought eight hundred from his own estates; Tarcundarius three hundred; Antiochus Commagenes two hundred: amounting to fifty-five thousand legionary troops, eight thousand irregular infantry, and ten thousand six hundred horse. In all seventy-three thousand six hundred<sup>b</sup>.

He had likewise assembled a numerous fleet; one squadron from Egypt, of which he gave the command to his son Sextus; another from Asia, under Lelius and Triarius; one from Syria, under Caius Cassius; that of Rhodes, under Caius Marcellus and Coponius; that of Achaia and Liburnia, under Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius: the whole amounting to above eight hundred galleys, of which Bibulus had the chief command, with orders to guard the passage from Italy to Greece, and to obstruct the communications of the enemy by the Ionian Sea.

Pompey had likewise formed large magazines of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, and Cyrene. The principal resort of his land forces was at Berrhœa, on the fertile plains between the Axius and Haliacmon, that run into the bay of Thermæ. The Roman Senate,

<sup>a</sup> Plutarch, in Pompeio.

<sup>b</sup> Cæsar, de Bello Civile, lib. iii.

was represented at Theſſalonica by two hundred of that body, who, together with the two Conſuls, held their aſſemblies, and aſſumed all the functions of the Roman State. The Roman People were likewiſe represented by the concourſe of reſpectable citizens, who repaired to the army, or to this place<sup>10</sup>. But though ſo many members of the government, thus violently expelled from Rome, conſidered themſelves as the real conſtituents of the commonwealth, they ſuffered the uſual time of elections to elapſe, and did not attempt to preſerve in their retreat the ſucceſſion of officers, in oppoſition to the elections that were made at Rome. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus, at the expiration of their year in office, took the ſeveral commands allotted to them, as uſual, under the title of Proconſul.

The general had been extremely active in forming, as well as in aſſembling this powerful armament. He intended, early in the ſpring, to take poſſeſſion of Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other towns on the coaſt, probably with a view to fall upon Italy, with a weight which now appeared ſufficient to enſure the high reputation as a commander, which his ſucceſſes, on other occaſions, had procured him.

Cæſar, on his part, had drawn all his army to the coaſt in the neighbourhood of Brundifium; but it was not likely that he would attempt to paſs a ſea which was commanded by the enemy's fleet, or venture upon a coaſt where he had not a ſingle port, and in the face of a ſuperior army, now completely formed and appointed, under the command of an officer, whom no man was ever ſuppoſed to excel. The formality of entering on the office of Conſul, to which he had been elected, it was ſuppoſed, might detain him at Rome till after the firſt of January; and Pompey accordingly made no haſte in

<sup>10</sup> Dio. Caſſ. lib. xli. c. 43.



taking his intended stations on the coast of Epirus, from which he might either act on the defensive, or invade Italy as the occasion might require “.

It was difficult, however, to foresee what such an enemy as Cæsar might attempt. Having staid no more than eleven days at Rome, while he acted in the character of Dictator, and obtained his election as Consul, without waiting for his admission into office, he set out in December for Brundisium. At this place twelve legions and all his cavalry were already, by his order, assembled. He found the numbers of his army considerably impaired by disease, being come from the more healthy climates of Spain and Gaul to pass the sickly season of autumn in Apulia. In any other hands than his own, an army so reduced would have scarcely been fit for the defence of Italy against such forces as were assembled to invade it ; and his march to Brundisium would have appeared altogether a defensive measure, and intended to counteract the operations of his enemy from beyond the seas. The season too appeared extremely unfavourable to any hostile attempts on Greece. Cæsar, however, had determined to prevent the designs of his enemy, and to keep him involved in all the disadvantages of a defensive war.

No more transports were collected in the harbour of Brundisium than were sufficient to receive about twenty thousand foot and six hundred horse. Cæsar, nevertheless, immediately on his arrival, informed the troops of his intentions to embark, and of his resolution to fix the scene of the war in Greece. He cautioned them not to occupy transports with unnecessary baggage and horses, and exhorted them to rely on the consequences of victory, and on his own generosity, for a full reparation of any loss they might sustain by leaving their effects behind them. He embarked seven legions in the first

“ Appian. de Bello Civile, lib. ii.

division, and with these he himself sailed on the fourth of February. He turned from the usual course, and steering unobserved to the right, arrived next day, where the enemy, if they had really been apprised of his embarkation, were least likely to expect him, on what was reputed a very dangerous part of the coast, under a high and rocky promontory, that was called the Acroseraunus.

As soon as the fleet had come to an anchor, Cæsar having Vibullius Rufus, one of Pompey's officers who was taken in Spain, till now detained as a prisoner, he dismissed him with a message to his general in the following terms: "That both parties had already  
 " carried their obstinacy too far, and might learn, from experience,  
 " to distrust their fortunes; that the one had been expelled from  
 " Italy, had lost Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, with one hundred and  
 " thirty cohorts (or thirteen legions)<sup>10</sup>; that the other had sustained  
 " the loss of an army in Africa, cut off with its general", and had  
 " suffered no less by the disasters of his party in Illyricum; that their  
 " mutual disappointments might instruct them how little they could  
 " rely on the events of war; that it was time to consult their own  
 " safety, and to spare the republic; that it was prudent to treat of  
 " peace while the fortunes and the hopes of both were nearly equal;  
 " if that time were allowed to elapse, and either should obtain a  
 " distinguished advantage, who could answer, that the victor would  
 " be equally tractable as both were at present?

" But since all former endeavours to procure a conference, or to  
 " bring on a treaty between the leaders themselves, had failed, he  
 " proposed, that all their differences should now be referred to the  
 " Senate and People; that, in the mean time, each of them should  
 " solemnly swear, at the head of their respective armies, That,  
 " in three days, they should disband all their forces, in order that,  
 " being disarmed, they might severally be under a necessity to submit  
 " to the legal government of their country; that he himself, to remove

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C. Julius  
Cæsar,  
P. Servilius  
Isauricus.

<sup>10</sup> The armies of Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, &c.    <sup>11</sup> The army of Curio and C. Antonius.

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“ all difficulties on the part of Pompey, should begin with dis-  
 missing all the troops that were under his command, whether in  
 garrison or in the field ”.

It appears that Cæsar, if these declarations had been accepted, might have been somewhat embarrassed for evasions; but equally bold in all his measures, he risked this event, or rather foresaw it could not happen, as he was sure that this offer of peace, like the former, would be rejected; and the rather, that it would be considered as an effect of his weakness, and of the danger into which he had fallen by his rash debarkation with so small a force. At any rate, there is no doubt that his message was intended, in the usual strain of his policy, to amuse his enemy, or to remove the blame of the war from himself. As he usually accompanied such overtures of peace with the most rapid movements and the boldest resolutions, the moment Vibullius set out, he disembarked his troops, and in the night dispatched the transports on their return to Brundisium to bring the remainder of his army.

His landing on the coast was the first intimation received by the enemy of his intention to pass a sea, which they supposed sufficiently guarded by their fleets, and of his purpose to carry the war into a country, in which they thought themselves secure by the superiority of their numbers, and of their other resources. Bibulus, upon this alarm, put to sea, and came in time to intercept about thirty of the empty transports on their return to Italy. These he burnt; and, sensible of his own remissness in suffering so great a body of the enemy to pass, he distributed his ships along the coast, and determined, for the future, to keep the sea in the face of every difficulty, and under every distress.

In the mean time, Cæsar marched directly to Oricum, where Lucius Torquatus, on the part of Pompey, was posted, with orders to de-

<sup>11</sup> Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

send himself to the last extremity. But Cæsar, as soon as he appeared in the character of Roman Consul, preceded by the ensigns of office, prevailed on the garrison to desert their commander, and to surrender the place. Without stopping here, he proceeded to Apollonia, was received in the same manner by the inhabitants, in opposition to the officer who commanded for Pompey. In consequence of these examples he was acknowledged by all the towns of Epirus, and continued his march with the greatest dispatch towards Dyrrachium, where Pompey had collected his stores, and formed his principal magazines. By his unexpected arrival he had hopes of being able to surprise that important place, and to make himself master of it, before a sufficient force could be assembled to cover it.

Pompey, in execution of the plan he had formed, was on his march from Macedonia towards the coast of Epirus, when he was met by Vibullius, and received from him the first intelligence of Cæsar's landing. He was not amused with the message which this officer brought him, nor did he attempt to retort the artifice, by affecting to be deceived. He even expressed himself in terms harsh and impolitic, "That he neither chose to return to his country, nor "to hold his life by the concession of Cæsar;" and, without returning any answer, detached some parties towards the coast where the enemy was landed, with orders to lay waste the country, break down bridges, destroy the woods, and block up the high ways with the timber they felled<sup>13</sup>. He sent expresses to Scipio, with an account of Cæsar's arrival in Epirus, and with orders to hasten his passage into Europe, with all the forces he had been able to assemble in Asia. He himself advanced with great diligence; and being informed on the march, that Oricum and Apollonia had already fallen into the enemy's hands, he hastened to save his magazines and stores

<sup>13</sup> Appian. lib. ii.



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at Dyrrachium, and without stopping, night or day, marched in such disorder, that many deserted as from a cause already ruined or desperate. He arrived, however, in time to prevent the designs of Cæsar on Dyrrachium; encamped under the walls, sent a squadron of ships immediately to retake or block up the harbour at Oricum, and ordered such a disposition of the fleet as was most likely to prevent the passage of a second embarkation from Italy.

Cæsar, finding himself prevented at Dyrrachium, halted on the Apfus; and, in order to cover Epirus and wait for the second division of his troops from Italy, prepared to intrench himself on the banks of that river. Having accordingly secured the main body of his army in this post, he himself returned with a single legion to receive the submission of the towns in his rear, and to provide for the supply of his camp.

In the mean time Bibulus, on the part of Pompey, blocked up the harbour at Oricum, and commanded the passage from Italy with his fleet.

Calenus, on the part of Cæsar, who had orders to lose no opportunity of transporting his army from Brundisium, actually embarked and put to sea; but being met by a packet from Cæsar, with intelligence of the dispositions which had been made by the enemy to intercept him, he returned, suffering one of the vessels that had accompanied his fleet to keep on her way, in order to carry an account of his motions; but she was taken by the enemy and destroyed.

Bibulus, who commanded the fleet which lay before Oricum, being precluded from the land by the parties which Cæsar had posted along the shore, forced to bring his daily supplies of wood, water, and other necessaries at a great disadvantage from Coreyra, and reduced to great distress, endeavoured, under pretence of a negotiation, to obtain a cessation of arms. But Cæsar, who came in person to Oricum, on hearing of this proposition, supposing that the  
design

design of Bibulus was to find an opportunity, under cover of the truce, to procure some supply of provisions and water, rejected the offer, and returned to his camp on the Apfus.

Pompey had advanced from Dyrrachium, and took post on the opposite bank of that river. Dion Cassius and Appian agree that he made some attempt to pass the Apfus, and to force Cæsar in this post; but that he was prevented by the breaking of a bridge, or by the difficulties of a ford. According to Cæsar's own account, the armies continued to observe each other, and the troops, separated only by a narrow river, had frequent conferences from the opposite banks. It was understood that in these interviews no hostilities should be offered. Of the two parties, that of Cæsar was the more engaging to soldiers; notwithstanding his own affectation of regard to the civil constitution of the republic, his military retainers still hoped to remain in possession of the government. He therefore encouraged the communication of his men with those of the opposite party. On this occasion Vatinius, by his direction, went forward to the bank of the river, and raising his voice, complained of the harsh treatment lately offered to Cæsar, in the contempt shewn to all his overtures and advances to peace. May not one citizen, he said, send a message to another, when he means only to prevent the shedding of innocent blood? He proceeded to lament the fate of so many brave men as were likely to perish in this quarrel; and was listened to with profound silence by many of both armies, who crowded to the place.

These remonstrances on the part of Cæsar, delivered by an officer of high rank, and appearing to make so deep an impression on both armies, when reported at Pompey's quarters, seemed to be too serious to be slighted. An answer, therefore, was given by the direction of Pompey, that on the following day A. Varo should be sent to any place that should be agreed upon as safe between the two armies, and there receive the propositions that should be made to

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him. The parties accordingly met at a place appointed, and multitudes from both armies crowded around them. Pompey considering the whole as an artifice to gain time, or to find an opportunity to debauch his men, probably gave instructions to break up the conference, in a way that for the future should keep the troops at a greater distance from each other. Soon after the officers met, some darts, probably by his directions, were thrown from the crowd. Both sides being alarmed by this circumstance, they instantly parted, and withdrew under a shower of missiles, in which numbers were wounded.

The fate of the war seemed to depend on the vigilance of the fleet, and on the difficulties with which Cæsar had to contend in bringing any reinforcements or supplies from Italy. Bibulus, from the effect of fatigue, was taken dangerously ill; but could not, upon any account, be persuaded to leave his station, and died on shipboard. There being nobody appointed to succeed him in the command at sea, the leader of each of the separate squadrons acted for himself without any concert. Scribonius Libo, with fifty galleys, set sail from the coast of Epirus, steered towards Brundisium, where he surpris'd and burnt some trading vessels, one in particular laden with corn for Cæsar's camp. Encouraged by these successes, he anchored under the island which covered the mouth of the harbour: from thence he kept the town in continual alarm, landed, in the night, parties of archers and slingers, with which he dispersed or carried off the patrols which the enemy employed on the shore; and thus, master of the port of Brundisium, expected fully to obstruct that outlet from Italy, and to awe the neighbouring coast. To this purpose he wrote to Pompey, that the other divisions of the fleet might go into harbour; that his squadron alone, in the post he had taken, was sufficient to cut off from Cæsar all reinforcements and further supplies. But in this he presumed too much on the first effects of his own operations.

Antony,

Antony, who commanded the troops of Cæsar in the town of Brundisium, by placing numerous guards at every landing-place on the contiguous shore, effectually excluded the squadron of Libo from any supply of wood or water, of which his ships, for want of stowage, could not have at any one time a considerable stock ; and he reduced them to such distress for want of these articles, that they were obliged to abandon their station, and to leave the harbour again open to the sea.

In the mean time, pressing orders arrived from Cæsar to hasten the embarkation of the troops. Dion Cassius and Appian relate, that he himself being impatient of delay, embarked alone in disguise on board of a barge, with intention to pass to Brundisium ; that, after he had been some time at sea, the weather became so bad, as to determine the master of the vessel to put back ; but that being prevailed upon by the intreaties of Cæsar, he continued to struggle with the storm for many hours. They farther relate, that the mariners being likely to faint, the passenger at last discovered himself, and encouraged them to persist, by telling them that they carried Cæsar and his fortunes ; that, nevertheless, he was forced to give way, and afterwards intrusted his orders to a messenger ; but that he returned to camp before it was known that he had been absent. He himself says, that some months being past, and the winter far advanced, he suspected that some opportunities of effecting the passage of his second division had been lost ; that he was become highly impatient, and wrote to hasten the embarkation ; informing his officers, that they might run ashore any where between Oricum and Apollonia ; as the enemy's fleet, having no harbour in those parts, were frequently obliged, by stress of weather, to depart from the coast.

Upon these orders, the troops with great ardour began to embark. They consisted of four legions and eight hundred horse, under the command of Mark Antony and Calenus. The wind being at south,  
and



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and no enemy appearing in the channel, they set sail, and steered for the coast of Epirus, but were drove to the northward; and on the second day passed Apollonia, and were discovered by the enemy from Dyrrachium. As they were far to the leeward of that part of the coast on which Cæsar had instructed them to land; and as it was vain for them with this wind to attempt getting to the southward, they chose to give way at once, and steer for some convenient harbour northward of all Pompey's stations. But in following this course, as they passed by Dyrrachium they were instantly chased by Quintus Coponius, who commanded Pompey's squadron at that place, chiefly consisting of Rhodian galleys. The wind at first was moderate, and Coponius expected easily to weather the head-lands that were to leeward of his post; and, though it rose considerably after he set sail, he still continued to struggle against it. As soon as Antony observed this enemy, he crowded sail, and made for the nearest harbour; being in the bay of Nympheus, about three miles beyond Lissus<sup>14</sup>, on the coast of Dalmatia. This bay opened to the south, and was very accessible, though not secure with the present wind. He chose, however, to risk the loss of some ships, rather than fall into the enemy's hands; and made directly for this place. Soon after he entered the harbour the wind shifted to the south-west, from which his ships were now sufficiently covered, and he debarked without any loss. At the same time the wind, in consequence of this change, blowing more directly on the land, and more violently, bore hard on Coponius, forced him upon the shore, where the greater part of his galleys, being sixteen in number, were stranded and wrecked.

Such of Antony's transports as got safe into the bay of Nympheus landed three veteran legions, with one of the new levies, and eight hundred horse. Two of his transports, one with two hundred and

<sup>14</sup> Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii. c. 26.

thirty of the new raised troops; the other, with somewhat less than two hundred veterans, being heavy fighters, fell asleep; and it being night before they arrived, mistook their way, and, instead of the bay of Nympheus, came to an anchor before Lissus. Ottacilius Crassus, who was stationed with a body of horse in that place to observe the coast, manned some small boats, surrounded these transports, and offered the troops who were on board favourable terms if they would agree to surrender. Upon this summons the new levies accordingly struck; but the veterans ran their vessels ashore, and having landed, fought their way, with the loss of a few men, to Nympheus, where they joined the main body of their army that was landed with Antony.

The colony at Lissus had been settled by Cæsar, as a part of the province of Illyricum, and now appeared to favour his cause; Ottacilius therefore thought proper to withdraw with his garrison; and Antony having stationed some of the transports at this place to enable Cæsar to embark his army for Italy, if, as was reported, Pompey should attempt to remove the scene of the war into that country; and having sent the remainder back for the troops which were still left at Brundisium, he dispatched messengers to Cæsar with the particulars of his voyage, and an account of the place at which he had landed.

The fleet, with this division of the army under Antony, had been seen on the coast, from the stations both of Pompey and of Cæsar, steering to the northward; but it was not known for some days what was become of them. Upon the arrival of the intelligence, that they had effected a landing to the northward, both parties determined to move to that quarter. Pompey decamped in the night, and knowing the route which Antony was likely to take, placed himself in his way, giving orders that the army, without lighting fires or sounding their trumpets, should remain in profound silence. Antony, however, having intelligence of this disposition of the enemy, did not

§ advance,

advance. Cæsar, in the mean time, to favour his junction, was obliged to make a considerable circuit, ascended on the banks of the river Apfus to a ford at which he passed; from thence continued his march to the northward, and seemed to advance on Pompey's right, while Antony remained in his front. In this situation, Pompey, apprehending that he might be attacked on different sides at once by Cæsar and by Antony, thought proper to quit his station; and leaving their armies to join, fell back to Asparagium, a strong post about a day's march from Dyrrachium.

Cæsar having obtained this great reinforcement, was no longer so anxious as he had hitherto been for the preservation of his possessions upon the coast. His enemies, by the superiority of their fleets, could prevent his receiving any regular supply of provisions from the sea. It was necessary for him, therefore, in order that he might have some other resource, and be in condition to act on the offensive, to extend his quarters by land, and to cover some tract of country from which he could subsist his army. For this purpose he removed from Oricum the legion that was stationed at that place; taking such precautions as were necessary to secure his shipping in the port from any surprize by sea. He drew the greater part of the vessels on shore, sunk one in the mouth of the harbour, and placed another at anchor near it, mounted with a considerable tower, and manned with a proper force. Being thus secured on the coast, he sent numerous detachments in different directions: L. Cassius Longinus, with a legion of new levies, into Thessaly; C. Calpurnius Sabinus, with five cohorts and a party of horse, into Ætolia; Cn. Domitius Calvinus, with two legions, the eleventh and twelfth, into Macedonia; giving strict charge to each of these officers, that they should collect all the forage and provisions which those or the neighbouring countries could furnish.

As Pompey had relied much on the authority of government, with which he was vested at the beginning of the war, and which he believed gave his party a dispensation from exercise of those popular arts, with which Cæsar thought proper to recommend his cause, he threatened to punish the refractory, more than he encouraged or rewarded the dutiful; and he often therefore extorted services from the provinces, neglecting the necessary attention to conciliate their affections; and such were the effects of this conduct, that the detachments which now appeared on the part of Cæsar were every where favourably received. Sabinus made himself master of Ætolia. Longinus found the people of Thessaly divided, and was joined by one of the parties. Calvisius, upon his arrival in Macedonia, had deputations from many towns and districts of the province, with assurances of favour and submission; and by these means the possessions of Cæsar, even in those countries on which his antagonists had chiefly depended, began to be equal to theirs.

It was thought an unpardonable error in Pompey, thus to suffer his quarters to be over-run by an enemy who had but recently acquired a footing on the coast, and whose army was, in number of cavalry and light infantry, as well as of regular foot, greatly inferior to his own. Pompey, however, knowing the interest which Cæsar had in bringing the contest to a speedy decision, did not choose to divide his forces, and he relied for the security of the southern and inland provinces, on the legions which were soon expected to land from Asia on the eastern shores of Macedonia or Thessaly.

Scipio, being the father-in-law of Pompey, had been employed in assembling the forces of Asia, and had, by severe exactions, availed himself of the resources of that opulent province. He was still occupied in this service at Ephesus, when he received from Pompey an account of Cæsar's arrival in Epirus, and an order without delay to transport his army into Europe. He accordingly, soon after the



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arrival of Cæsar's detachments at their several places of destination, debarked in the bay of Thermé, or of Thessalonica, and penetrated into Macedonia, directing his march towards the quarters of the two legions which Cæsar had sent thither under the command of Domitius Calvinus, and gave a general alarm on his route; but being arrived within about twenty miles of Domitius, he turned on a sudden into Thessaly, as thinking Longinus, who was stationed in that country with one legion of raw troops, might be made an easier prey.

To lighten his march, he left his baggage under a guard of eight cohorts, commanded by Favonius on the Haliacmon, a river which separates Macedonia from Thessaly, and proceeded with great dispatch towards the quarters of Longinus. This officer, greatly alarmed at his sudden approach, and mistaking, at the same time, for an enemy a body of Thracian horse which were coming to his own assistance, hastily withdrew by the mountains, and continued his retreat to Ambracia. Scipio was about to pursue Longinus on the route he had taken, when he was recalled by earnest representations from Favonius, the officer he had left to guard his baggage; informing him, that his post was in the utmost danger of being forced by Calvinus, who was on his march through Macedonia for that purpose. Scipio accordingly returned with all possible dispatch to the Haliacmon, and arrived at the post of Favonius, after the dust which arose from the march of the enemy had appeared on the plain; and thus came barely in time to sustain his party, and to rescue his baggage.

The armies continued to occupy the opposite banks of the Haliacmon; and as Scipio, by the flight of Longinus, was become master of all Thessaly, Calvinus continued in possession of Macedonia, and from thence secured a considerable source of supply to Cæsar's army.

It would have been of great moment to Pompey's affairs, and not inconsistent with the dilatory plan he had formed for the conduct of

the war, to have risked an action between these separate bodies on the Haliacmon, rather than to have suffered his enemy to retain the command of so many posts of consequence ; and Scipio accordingly passed the river with a view to bring on an engagement ; but after some stay on the plain, finding no opportunity to attack the enemy with any hopes of success, he repassed the river, and having occupied his former station, there passed some partial encounters between such as were advanced on the different sides, but without any considerable event.

While so many large bodies, detached from the principal armies, were thus contending in Thessaly for the possession of the country, Pompey remained to cover the ground, which was of greater importance to him, in the neighbourhood of the sea, and the port of Dyrrachium. Having, at the distance of about a day's march in his rear, this town and harbour as a place of arms, when he had deposited his magazines and stores, and from which he received his ordinary supply of provisions, he had taken his measures to protract the war ; and trusting to his own superior resources, both by sea and by land, did not doubt that by waiting until the countries which Cæsar had occupied should be exhausted, he might force him to retire from the contest without the risk of a battle. To hasten this event, he endeavoured every where to straiten his quarters in the country, and to block up or destroy all the harbours he had on the coast.

Cnæus, the eldest of Pompey's sons, commanding the Egyptian fleet, in execution of this plan which had been laid to harass the enemy, without exposing their cause to a general hazard, attacked Cæsar's principal naval station at Oricum, raised the vessel that had been sunk at the mouth of the harbour, forced the armed galley that was stationed before it, and carried off or destroyed all the ships that were laid up in the port. From thence he proceeded to Lissus, burnt thirty

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transports which Antony had left in the harbour ; but having made an attempt on the town, was repulsed with loss.

Cæsar, on the opposite part, sensible of the interest which he had in bringing the war to a speedy decision, advanced upon Pompey, forced a place of some strength that covered his front, and encamped in his presence. The day after he arrived in this position, either to bring on a general action, or to gain the reputation of braving his antagonist, he formed his army on the plain between the two camps ; but as Pompey continued firm or unmoved by this insult, and as the recent losses which Cæsar had sustained in his shipping, and on the coast, rendered his prospect of future supplies or reinforcements every day less secure, he projected a movement, by which he proposed either to force an engagement, or to preclude the enemy from all his resources in the town and harbour of Dyrrachium.

For this purpose, and that Pompey might the less suspect any important design, he decamped in the day, and having a large circuit to make, directed his march at first from Dyrrachium, and was thought to retire for want of provisions ; but in the night he changed his direction, and with great diligence advanced to the town. Pompey having intelligence of the change which Cæsar had made in his route during the night, perceived his design ; and having a nearer way to Dyrrachium, still expected by a rapid march to arrive before him. But Cæsar having prevailed on his men, notwithstanding the great fatigues of the preceding day, to continue their march with little interruption all night, was in possession of the only avenue to the town, when the van of Pompey's army appeared on the hills.

Pompey thus shut out from Dyrrachium, where he had placed his magazines and stores, and from the only harbour he had on the coast, was obliged to take possession of the Petra, a small promontory which covered a little creek or bay not far from the town, and there endeavoured to supply the loss of the harbour, by bringing ships of burden

to unload, and by procuring supplies in boats from his magazines and stores in the town; and in this manner was still in condition to avoid any immediate risk of his fortunes in a single action.

Cæsar, on the other hand, being disappointed in the design he had formed to exclude the enemy from their magazines in the town of Dyrrachium, and seeing no likelihood of being able to bring the war to a speedy decision, his own communication with Italy being entirely cut off, and the fleets he had ordered from thence, from Sicily, and from Gaul, having met with unexpected delays, sent an officer, named L. Canuleius, into Epirus, with a commission to draw into magazines all the corn that could be found in that or the neighbouring districts, and to secure them at proper places for the use of his army. This, however, in a country that was mountainous and barren, itself commonly supplied with corn from abroad, and lately on purpose laid waste by the enemy, was not likely to furnish him with any considerable supply, or to enable him for any time to support a dilatory war. His genius was therefore at work by some speedier course to harass his enemy, and to hasten the end of the contest.

In these circumstances, however, he did not neglect his usual artifices to amuse and distract his antagonists with great professions of moderation, and with overtures of peace. On hearing of Scipio's arrival in Europe, affecting to have despaired of obtaining peace by any farther direct applications to Pompey himself, and willing to appeal to the reason of the father-in-law against the obstinacy of the son, he sent Clodius, their common friend, with letters and instructions, to inform Scipio of the great pains he had taken to obtain an equitable accommodation, "all which, he presumed, had hitherto failed, through the unhappy timidity of those he intrusted with his messages, and from their not having courage to deliver them properly to their general. But subjoined that, through the media-

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“ tion of Scipio, who could deliver himself with so much freedom ;  
 “ who could advise with so much authority ; and who, being at the  
 “ head of a great army attached to his person, could even enforce  
 “ what was just, he might expect a different issue to propositions so  
 “ fair and so reasonable. And that in this event Scipio would have  
 “ the honour of being the restorer of tranquillity and good order to  
 “ Italy, of peace to the provinces, and of prosperity to the whole  
 “ empire.” Clodius was received with respect ; but on delivering  
 his message, it appears, that all farther communication was refused  
 him as a person who came to insult or amuse with false pretensions.  
 Cæsar, indeed, was himself, as usual, so far from trusting to the effect  
 of these propositions, or so far from remitting his own operations in  
 order to confirm his pacific professions, that he even redoubled his  
 efforts in that very quarter which was entrusted to Scipio ; and as he  
 had already possessed himself of Epirus, Acarnania, and Ætolia, he  
 carried his views still farther on that side, and sent Fufius Calenus to be  
 joined by Longinus and Sabinus, and to endeavour, by the isthmus of  
 Corinth, to penetrate into Achaia.

He himself at the same time engaged in a project, which to those  
 who do not recollect the amazing works which were frequently executed  
 by Roman armies, particularly by that of Cæsar himself, will appear so  
 vast, and even romantic, as to exceed belief : this project was no less  
 than to invest Pompey in his camp, though at the head of an army  
 superior to his own, and oblige him to recede from the coast, or sub-  
 mit to be invested with lines, and completely shut out from the country.  
 For this purpose he occupied several hills in the neighbourhood of  
 Pompey's camp, strengthened them with forts, joined those forts by  
 lines of communication across the vallies, and soon appeared to have  
 projected a complete chain of redoubts, and a line of circumvallation.

Pompey, to counteract this daring project, took possession of some  
 heights in his turn, fortified and joined them in the same manner,  
 and

and while the one endeavoured to contract, the other endeavoured to enlarge, the compass of their works. The archers and slingers on both sides, as in the operations of a siege, were employed to annoy the workmen. The armies lay under arms, and fought in detail for the possession of advantageous grounds. When forced from one height which they attempted to occupy, they seized upon another that was contiguous, and still continued their line, though obliged to change its direction.

In these operations, a campaign, that began in January with the landing of Cæsar on the coast of Epirus, already drew on to the middle of summer, and both parties had undergone great labour, and were exposed to peculiar distress. Cæsar's army, already injured at the blockade of Alesia, and the sieges of Marseilles and of Avaricum, to toils like those in which they were now engaged, flattered themselves with a like glorious issue to their present labours. They were in want of bread, and obliged to substitute in its place a kind of root boiled up with milk; but were comforted under this hardship with the prospect of fields which were replenished with ripening corn, and which gave the hopes of a plentiful harvest. They not only continued their countervallations with incredible toil, but turned or interrupted all the rivulets or springs that formerly watered the grounds on which the enemy were now encamped.

Pompey's army, on their part, were less injured to such toilsome operations. They had plenty of bread, which came to them with every wind, from the different coasts that were still in their possession, but were in great distress for want of water and forage: many of their horses had died; the men, too long confined to the same ground, and to the same air, which was infected with filth, and the exhalation of putrid carcases, being reduced to the use of bad water, were become extremely sickly.

Pompey,

Pompey, nevertheless, held his enemy at some disadvantage by the superiority of his numbers, and by the extent of line which he obliged him to form and to defend; and it appears that he availed himself of these advantages with all those abilities of a great officer, which he was justly supposed to possess. He not only forced Cæsar, without hazarding a general action, to recede from many of the heights which he attempted to occupy, and obliged him, with great labour, to widen the compass of his lines; but likewise alarmed him by various attacks on the works which he had already completed, and in some places forced open the bars which the enemy had placed in his way, and recovered his own communication anew with the country before him. But as Cæsar could present his whole army in many places to cover the works he was executing, it was impossible, without risking a general action, which Pompey avoided, entirely to stop his progress.

In the course of these operations it appears, from the text of Cæsar's Commentaries, though incomplete, that the armies changed the ground of their principal encampments as well as the disposition of some separate posts, and mutually harassed each other with frequent surprizes and alarms. And Cæsar mentions no less than six capital actions which happened in one day at the lines of circumvallation, or under the walls of Dyrrachium; and in most of them it is probable that Pompey had the advantage, as he acted on the string, or smaller circumference, while his antagonists moved on the bow, or the wider circle.

Pompey completed his own line of circumvallation to a circuit of fifteen miles, having a chain of four-and-twenty redoubts on the different hills over which it was carried. By this work he obliged Cæsar to recede half a mile beyond him, and to extend his compass to about seventeen miles in circumference.

The extremities of both their works terminated on the shore ; and Cæsar having no boats or ships to oppose to the numerous craft of his enemy, ought, perhaps, by the consideration of this very circumstance, to have been diverted at first from his project. But as he fought merely for occasions of action, he was contented with the hopes of finding them even under such disadvantages. While he was obliged to remain with the strength of his army at that end of his line which was nearest the town of Dyrrachium, in order to prevent the access of Pompey to his magazines, he proposed to fortify the other extremity of it with double works, and had already thrown up, at the distance of two hundred yards from each other, two entrenchments, consisting of a parapet ten feet high, and of a ditch fifteen feet wide ; one facing the lines of Pompey, the other turned to the field, in order to guard against any surprise from parties which, coming by water, might land in his rear. He was likewise about to join these entrenchments by a traverse or flank, to cover him from the sea.

Before this work was completed, Pompey made a disposition to force him at this extremity of his lines, and of consequence to open a way to his rear over the whole extent of his works. For this purpose he brought in the night six entire legions, or sixty cohorts, to that part of his own works which faced this place. He embarked a numerous body of archers, slingers, and other light troops, having their helmets and shields fortified, as it seems was the custom, with basket work, to break the force of the stones which were likely to shower from the enemy's parapets, and furnished with great quantities of fascines and other materials proper to fill up the ditch. This embarkation was effected in the night ; and the officer who commanded it had orders to land part of the troops in the rear of both Cæsar's entrenchments, and another part between them where the work was still incomplete. These separate divisions were to be supported by the whole force of the legions in front, who were to take



advantage of any effect which the missiles from their boats might produce on the flank or the rear of the enemy.

These attacks were accordingly made at day break, in three different places at once, and had all the consequences of a complete surprise. They fell with the greatest effect upon the station of the ninth legion, of which the picquets and other guards being instantly routed, the whole legion was put under arms to support them; but soon infected with the panic, was carried off in the flight. Antony, who occupied the nearest station on the heights, appearing in that instant with twelve cohorts, and a better countenance, stopped for a while the pursuit of the enemy, and furnished a retreat to the troops that were routed.

The alarm was conveyed to Cæsar himself, by fires lighted on all the hills, and he hastened to the ground with as many cohorts as could be spared from the posts in his way; but he came too late, Pompey had already forced the entrenchments, had burst from his confinement, and was beginning to encamp in a new position, where, without losing his communication with the sea, he rendered abortive for a long time Cæsar's purpose of excluding him from the supplies of necessaries or conveniences which were to be derived from the land, and was now in a posture to command a free access to water and forage, from the want of which he had been chiefly distressed in his late situation.

Thus Cæsar, far from reaping the fruits which he expected from the labour of so many months, began to incur the censure of a visionary projector, who presumed to practise on the ablest captain of the age the arts with which he had succeeded against ignorant Barbarians, or, at most, against generals of mean capacity.

These circumstances, however, probably made no impression on Cæsar himself, nor greatly altered the confidence of his army: he presented himself again before the enemy in their new position, and  
pitched

pitched his camp in their presence, still determined to act on the offensive, even in the sequel of attempts in which he had failed. An action accordingly followed, of which the result is evident, although it is difficult, from the imperfect text of his Commentaries, to ascertain the detail. It appears that both armies had changed the ground which they had taken immediately after the last action; that in this remove Pompey had taken possession of the camp which Cæsar had left; and as his army, being more numerous, occupied more ground than that of Cæsar had done, he made a second entrenchment, quite round that which had been formerly occupied by Cæsar. This camp was covered by a wood on one side, and by a river, at the distance of four hundred paces, on the other.

While Pompey lay in this position, he had thrown up a line of communication from the flank of his camp to the river, in order to cover his access to water. But after he had taken this precaution, he thought proper to change his ground, and had moved about the distance of half a mile on his march to occupy a new situation, when, for some purpose that is not explained, he thought proper to send back a legion, or large detachment of his army, to resume the possession of the camp he had so recently left.

Cæsar, on his part, being occupied in fortifying a camp in the last situation he had taken, and observing this detachment sent off from the enemy, thought it gave him a favourable opportunity, by cutting it off, to recover part of the credit he had lost in the late action. While, to amuse the enemy, he ordered his men to continue the work in which they were engaged, he himself marched with twenty-three cohorts, in two divisions, under cover of the wood, came to the ground unobserved, and with the division which was led by himself, mixed with the enemy, who had already taken possession of the exterior lines, and drove them from thence to the interior entrenchment, with great slaughter. The other division being in the mean time to attack the

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same works at a different place, mistook the line of communication which covered the access from the camp to the river for the entrenchment of the camp itself, and before they perceived their mistake, had run along this line to a great distance in search of an entrance; when observing, at last, that the line along which they ran was not defended, the infantry went over it first, and were followed by all the cavalry: but the time which they had lost by their former mistake gave Pompey an opportunity to come to the relief of his detachment. As soon as he appeared, Cæsar's cavalry, finding themselves entangled between the line of communication, the entrenchment of the camp, and the river, began to retire with great precipitation, and were followed by the foot, who fell into great confusion. That part of Pompey's detachment, which, in the beginning of the action, had been defeated by Cæsar, seeing themselves likely to be supported, rallied in the rear-gate of the camp; and the party which Cæsar himself commanded against them, observing the precipitant retreat of the other division, saw dangers and difficulties accumulating on every side. Imagining that they were about to be surrounded, or shut up within the enemy's works, they betook them to flight, crowded back to the ditch, and, in attempting to repass it, were killed in such heaps, or were trodden under foot in such numbers, that the slain filled up the ditch, and made a passage for those that followed.

In this state of general confusion and terror, the presence and authority of Cæsar, which, on other occasions, used to be of so great effect, were entirely disregarded. The bearer of a standard, upon Cæsar's catching it, and endeavouring to stop him, quitted his hold, and continued to run without it; a rider, whose horse he had seized by the bridle, dismounted, and ran off on foot. The rout was complete; but the ditches and works, amongst which the action began, as they embarrassed the flight of the one party, so they retarded the pursuit of the other; and Pompey, who did not expect such a victory,  
remained

remained in suspense. He mistook the flight of Cæsar's army for a  
 feint, to draw him into some ambuscade. In this he was governed,  
 probably, by the high estimation for discipline and valour to which  
 Cæsar's army was so justly entitled; but which no troops can uni-  
 formly support at all times: and if it be true, as is probable, that the  
 flight of an army in actual rout may be always distinguished  
 from a concerted retreat, he on this day committed an unpardonable  
 error; and Cæsar, who may be inclined to exaggerate the oversights,  
 though not the advantages, of his enemy, owns that he himself lost  
 about a thousand men, with above thirty standards or colours, and  
 owed the preservation of his army to the excessive caution or incapacity  
 of Pompey. He himself acted indeed like a person defeated, in-  
 stantly abandoned all his famous lines of Dyrrachium, and all his out-  
 posts; and to make head against the victor, brought all the scattered  
 parts of his army together.

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Pompey, in the mean time, lost the decisive moment, or was not  
 sensible of his advantage till after the time for improving it was past.  
 But this victory, although it had not been perceived in the precise  
 moment in which a signal advantage could have been made of it, was  
 presently afterwards greatly exaggerated. Pompey had from his own  
 army the usual salutations of triumph, or received the title of Im-  
 perator, which he continued to assume, and sent his accounts of the  
 action, by express, to every part of the empire; but had the mode-  
 ration to abstain from the practice that was usual in the case of victories  
 obtained over foreign enemies, that of binding his fasces and his dis-  
 patches with laurel.

Cæsar, by carrying the war into Macedonia, had put himself in a  
 very arduous situation. He had passed over a sea on which the  
 enemy were masters, and had invaded a country of which they were  
 in possession, with forces greatly superior to his own: but this daring  
 adventure, which, even in its first successes, excited astonishment,

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now exposed him to censure, and his attempt to invest so great an officer as Pompey, at the head of an army superior to his own, appeared altogether wild and extravagant. The merit of all his former campaigns, as is common, began to be questioned by those who, after the event, can instruct and correct every general; and the glory he had gained in the former part of the war was entirely obscured. He was even said to have gained the Spanish army by corruption, and to have purchased with money the surrender which he pretended to have forced by his address and his sword. People returned to their first apprehensions, that Pompey was the greatest general which any age or nation had ever produced; that he had effectually put an end to the present contest, and had left nothing for his party to do but to reap the advantages of the victory he had obtained for them.

Some time before this event, and while the minds of men were yet in suspense, Cato, in one of the councils which had been summoned by Pompey, observed that Cæsar had acquired much popular favour by his ostentation of mercy, and by the hopes of protection which he held out to every man who did not actually take arms against him; while Pompey and his followers, by publishing threats against all who did not actually espouse their cause, had rendered the army of the republic an object of terror; he therefore moved, that a proclamation should be issued, containing assurances, that every town not actually in arms should be protected, and that no blood should be shed but in the field of battle. A resolution to this purpose had been accordingly published<sup>1</sup>; but in the present exultation of victory was forgotten. The times were said to require exemplary justice, and to justify executions and forfeitures, not only of those who were actually in arms against their country, but of those likewise who had betrayed its cause by a mean and profligate neutrality. The favourites of Pompey already, in

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, in Vita Pompeii, p. 494.

imagination, sated their revenge, and gratified their avarice, at the expence of the opposite party and of its abettors<sup>16</sup>. Every one considered the use which he himself was to make of the victory, not how it might be secured or rendered complete.

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The shock which Cæsar had received in so critical a time and situation, was, not without reason, supposed to be decisive; he had abandoned his lines, and called in all his out-posts. His army appeared to sink under the weight of their misfortunes. Inferior to the enemy in numbers, greatly reduced by their losses, and fallen in their own estimation, they were not soon likely to recover courage enough to contend for the field again with so renowned and so superior an adversary.

Cæsar, however, was not overwhelmed by these appearances; he knew what was the force of an army which had been taught, by the experience of many years, to repose the utmost confidence in themselves and in their general, and which was not likely to sink, without hopes of recovery, under any single event. He considered their apparent dejection as a symptom of indignation, and of rage more than of fear or debasement; and, instead of blame or reproach, soothed them with consolation, and with the apologies which he industriously framed for their late miscarriage. He bid them recollect their former actions, and not be dismayed by a single accident which befel them in the midst of a career sustained with a spirit so much superior to that of every enemy they encountered: "If fortune has crossed us for once," he said, "we must retrieve our losses by diligence and resolution. Difficulties only excite the brave, and awaken their ardour; you have formerly experienced difficulties, and every soldier who was at Gergovia will remember the effects of perseverance and courage."

<sup>16</sup> Cæs. de Bel. Civ. lib. iii. c. 88.

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He was sensible, however, that some particular officers had set a shameful example; and he supposed, that by singling out these for punishment, he might seem to exculpate the soldiers, and reinstate them in their own esteem. For this reason he dismissed, with infamy, some bearers of standards, who, he alleged, had misled the troops, whose object it is never to part from their colours. By these means the sullen dejection of the legions was changed into rage, and an ardent impatience to retrieve their honour<sup>17</sup>. They did not presume to importune their general to be entrusted so soon again with his fortunes; but they imposed voluntary tasks, by way of penance, on themselves, saying, That they had deserved to be loaded with hardships. Many of the superior officers gave it as their opinion to Cæsar, that whatever resolution he might have taken for the future plan of the war, so favourable a disposition in the army, and so fair an opportunity of yet ending the contest with honour on the very ground on which they had incurred their late disgrace, should not be neglected, nor suffered to escape. Cæsar, however, did not chuse to stake his fortunes on the chance of a feverish ardour, which still had some mixture of consternation, nor to rely on a fury which had more of despair than of rational confidence, against the impetuosity of a superior army recently flushed with victory. Nor was he safe to remain in his present situation, without any posts in his rear to secure his communication with the country, and without any immediate prospect of supply for the subsistence of his army.

For these reasons, Cæsar determined, without loss of time, to decamp and to remove to some distance from the enemy<sup>18</sup>. In the first night after this resolution was taken, and as soon as it was dark, the sick and wounded, with all the baggage, under the escort of a legion, were sent off, with orders that they should not halt till they reached

<sup>17</sup> *Cæs. de Bel. Civ. lib. iii.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

Apollonia, being a march of about thirty miles. At three in the morning the main body of the army, observing a profound silence, turned out of the camp by different gates, and took the same route. Two legions yet remained for the rear-guard. These, after a proper interval, being ready to depart, founded the usual march to make the enemy believe the van of the army was then only beginning to move, and the whole being thus already on their way, and without any incumbrance, they soon gained a considerable distance from the enemy, who was likely to pursue them.

Pompey, as soon as he was apprised of this retreat, drew forth his army, and followed with great expedition. After marching a few miles he overtook, with his cavalry, the rear of Cæsar's army at the passage of the river Genusus; but being received by the enemy's horse, interlined with infantry, could make no impression, and saw them effect the passage of the river without any considerable loss.

Cæsar, having completed an ordinary march, took possession of the lines which he had formerly occupied at Asparagium; but not intending to remain on this ground, gave orders to the legions to rest on their arms. He sent forth his cavalry by the front gate in sight of the enemy, as if with intention to forage; but with orders to turn round the camp, and enter it again by the rear. Pompey supposing, from these appearances, that Cæsar had concluded his march, and that the business of the day was over, followed his example, pitched in the same lines, which he likewise had formerly occupied at this place, and suffered his men to stray in search of forage and wood; many also who, in the hurry with which they decamped in the morning, had left their baggage behind them, were now allowed to lay down their arms, and returned to Dyrrachium in search of it.

Cæsar, who waited only until the halt he had made should produce this effect in the camp of the enemy, again put his army in motion about noon, and without interruption, on the same day



completed a second march of eight miles ; while Pompey's army, having already laid aside their arms and encamped, were not in condition to follow. Cæsar continued his retreat during some of the subsequent days in the same order, having his baggage advanced some hours before him : and Pompey, having lost some ground by the delay of the first day, and having harassed his army in attempting to regain it, on the fourth day intirely discontinued the pursuit.

This respite gave both parties leisure to consider the plan of their future operations. Cæsar repaired to Apollonia to lodge his sick and wounded, to pay off the arrears of his army, and to make a proper disposition for the security of the places he held on the coast. And having already one cohort at Lissus, placing three at Oricum, and four at Apollonia, he continued his route from thence to the southward. He proposed, without delay, to penetrate into Thessaly, and to occupy, for the subsistence of his army, as much as he could of that fertile country. He flattered himself, that if Pompey should follow him thither, to a distance from his magazines and his supplies by sea, the war might be continued between them upon equal terms. If he attempted to retake Oricum and the towns on the coast, he must expose Scipio and the body under his command, in the eastern parts of Macedonia, to be separately attacked ; or, if he wished to preserve Scipio and his army, he would be obliged to quit his design upon Oricum in order to support them. If he should pass into Italy, it was proposed to follow him by the coasts of Dalmatia. And this last alternative of carrying the war into Italy, from the difficulties, the delays, and the discredit to which it might have exposed Cæsar's cause, appears to have been the preferable choice for Pompey. It was accordingly debated in council, Whether, being master of the sea, and having abundance of shipping, he should not transport his army, recover the possession of the seat of government, and strip his antagonist of that authority which he derived from this circumstance ? or, whether he should not stay

to finish the remains of the war in Macedonia? The advantages likely to result from his return to Rome in the capacity of victor, after he had left it with some degree of disgrace, were obvious. But the war appeared to be so near its conclusion, that it was reckoned improper to leave any part of it unfinished. It was argued, that, by quitting the present seat of the war, Cæsar would be left to recover his forces in a country yet full of resources, and would only exchange the western part of the empire for the east, from whence Sylla had been able, and from whence Pompey himself was now about to recover the city and the possession of Italy.

But, what weighed most of all in these deliberations, the safety of Scipio required the presence of Pompey in Macedonia. If he should remove his army from thence, this officer, with the forces recently arrived from Asia, would fall a sacrifice to the enemy.

Upon these motives both armies, having their several detachments in Thessaly, and separate bodies to support or to rescue from the dangers which threatened them; the generals determined to march into that country, and calculated their respective movements, so as to cut off the enemy's parties, or to sustain their own. Cæsar, by his march to Apollonia, had been turned from his way; and having the discredit of a defeat, and being supposed on his flight, was harassed or ill received by the country as he passed. The messengers, whom he had dispatched to Domitius, were intercepted; and this officer, while both armies were advancing, having made some movements in Macedonia in search of provisions, and having, with the two legions he commanded, fallen into Pompey's route, narrowly escaped, and only by a few hours, being surprized and taken.

Cæsar, having arrived in time to rescue Domitius, and being joined by him as he passed the mountains into Thessaly, continued his march to Gomphi. The people of this place having refused to admit him, he scaled the walls, gave the town to be pillaged; and intending, by

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this example, to deter others from retarding his march by fruitless resistance, he put all the inhabitants to the sword. When he arrived at Metropolis, the people, terrified by the fate of Gomphi, threw open their gates; and Cæsar, to contrast this with the former example, gave them protection. From hence to Larissa, where Scipio, having fallen back from the Aliacmon, then lay with a considerable army, the country was open, and Cæsar, or his parties, were every where received without opposition. Having passed all the lesser rivers which fall into the Penius, he took post on the Enipeus, which runs through the district of Pharfalia. Here he commanded extensive plains, covered with forage and with ripening corn; had a very fertile country to a great distance in his rear; and being joined not only by Domitius, but probably likewise by the legion which Longinus commanded in Ætolia, in all amounting to ten legions, he was in condition to renew his offensive operations.

Pompey directed his motions likewise towards the same quarter; but although he had the more direct route, and was every where received as victor in the late action, was still on his march. Scipio advanced from Larissa to receive him; and being joined, they took post together on a height near Pharfalus, and in sight of Cæsar's station, at the distance of thirty stadia, or about three miles<sup>19</sup>. The armies being some time fixed in this position, Cæsar drew forth, in the front of his intrenchment, to provoke his antagonist. It was evidently not Pompey's interest to give an enemy, whom he had brought into considerable straits, an opportunity of relief by the chance of a battle. But as this was a defiance, and had some effect on the minds of the soldiers, it was proper to return it; and both sides, during many days, continued to turn out in the front of their respective lines. Cæsar advanced, on each successive day, still nearer

<sup>19</sup> Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii.

to Pompey's ground ; but there were some difficulties in the way of his farther approach, in which he did not chuse to engage himself in the presence of an enemy, nor did Pompey chuse to quit the eminence on which he had hitherto formed his line of battle.

The summer being far spent, and all the forage and corn of the neighbouring plains being consumed, Cæsar began again to suffer for want of provisions, and having no hopes of bringing the enemy to a battle on this ground, he determined to change it, for some situation in which he could more easily subsist his own army, or by moving about, harass the enemy with continual marches, and oblige them perhaps to give him an opportunity to fight them on equal terms. Having resolved on this plan, and having appointed a day on which the army should move, the tents being already struck, and the signal to march given, while the van was passing through the rear-gate of the camp, it was observed, that Pompey's army, being formed according to their daily practice, had advanced farther than usual before their lines. Cæsar immediately gave orders to halt, saying to those who were near him, " The time we have so earnestly wished for is come ; let us see how we are to acquit ourselves." He immediately ordered, as a signal of battle, a purple ensign to be hoisted on a lance in the centre of the camp<sup>20</sup>. Appian says, That he likewise ordered the pales to be drawn, and the breast-work to be levelled in the front towards the enemy, that his army might not hope for a retreat, not even behind their intrenchments<sup>21</sup>.

It was evidently Pompey's interest to avoid a battle, and to wait for the effect of the distresses to which Cæsar's army must have been exposed on the approach of winter. But this is the most difficult part in war, requiring great ability in the general, together with tried courage and discipline in the troops. A general may be qualified to

<sup>20</sup> Plutarch. in Vita Pompei.

<sup>21</sup> Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii.



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fight a battle, but not dextrously to avoid an enemy who presses him; an army may have that species of courage which impells them in action, but not that degree of constancy which is required to support them long unemployed in the presence of an enemy. In whatever degree Pompey himself was qualified for the part which the service required of him, he was attended by numbers of Senators and persons of high rank, who, thinking themselves in a civil or political capacity, equal with their general, bore the continuance of their military subordination with pain. They said, he was like Agamemnon among the kings, and protracted a war that might have been ended in a day, merely to enjoy his command. Nursed in luxury, and averse to business, petulant in safety, useless in danger, impatient to be at their villas in the country, and their amusements in the town; and anticipating the honours and successions to office which they imagined due to their high merits in the present service, they railed at the conduct of their general, affected courage by urging him to fight, whilst in reality they only wished to terminate the suspense and anxiety of a campaign, which they had not the resolution to endure. Many of the allies, then also present in the army, who were princes of high state in their own dominions, were impatient of longer delay; and the troops of every description, in imitation of so many respectable examples, were loud in their censures of so much caution in their general.

Pompey, urged by the clamours of his army, thought himself under a necessity to come to a speedy decision, and had prepared for battle on the morning of that very day on which Cæsar was about to decamp. Although he was sensible, that, in this conjuncture, it was not his interest to hazard a battle, it is probable, that he did not think the risk was great. He too, as well as others of his party, became elated and confident upon his late success<sup>22</sup>. His numbers greatly

<sup>22</sup> Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. vii. ep. iii.

surpassed those of Cæsar, especially in horse, archers, and slingers; and he trusted, that, by this part of his army, he should prevail on the wings, and carry his attack to the flank, and even to the rear of the enemy. Having the Enipeus, a small river with steep banks, on his right, which sufficiently covered that flank<sup>23</sup>, he drew all the cavalry, amounting to seven thousand, with the archers and slingers to his left, expecting that the event of the battle would be determined on this wing. He himself, therefore, took post to second the operations of the cavalry, at the head of the two famous legions which he had called off from Cæsar at the beginning of the war. Scipio was posted in the centre, with the legions from Syria, having the great body of the infantry divided on his right and his left. The right of the whole was covered by a Cilician legion, and the remains of the Spanish army which had joined Pompey under Afranius. The whole amounted to one hundred cohorts, or about forty-five thousand foot, drawn up in a line of ten men deep<sup>24</sup>.

Cæsar, observing this disposition, formed his army in three divisions; the left was commanded by Antony, the right by Sylla, and the centre by Cn. Domitius. The tenth legion was posted on the right, and the ninth on the left of the whole. He had eighty cohorts in the field; but these so incomplete, as not to exceed above twenty-two thousand men. He saw the disparity of his horse and irregulars on the right, having no more than a thousand horse to oppose to seven thousand of the enemy. In order to reinforce and sustain them, he draughted a cohort from each of the legions in the right to form a reserve, which he placed in the rear of his cavalry with orders to sustain them, or to repel the enemy's horse, when they should attempt, as he expected, to turn his flank. This body formed a fourth division of his army, not placed in the same line with the other divisions; but

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<sup>23</sup> Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. iii.

<sup>24</sup> Frontinus de Stratagematis.

facing

facing obliquely to the right, in order to receive the cavalry that was expected to turn the flank, and to fall obliquely on the rear. He himself passed along the front of the right wing, and earnestly intreated them not to engage till they got the signal from himself. He reminded them of his continual attention to the welfare of the army, desiring them to recollect with what sollicitude he had endeavoured to bring on a treaty, in order to save both armies to the republic; and how far he had always been from any disposition wantonly to shed the soldiers blood. He was answered with shouts that expressed an impatience to begin the action. Pompey had directed the cavalry and archers assembled on his left to begin the attack; and instructed them, as soon as they had driven Cæsar's horse from the plain, to fall upon the flank and the rear of his infantry.

These dispositions being completed, a solemn pause and an interval of silence ensued. The same arms, and the same appearances presented themselves on the opposite sides. When the trumpets gave the signal to advance, the sounds were the same; many are said to have shed tears<sup>25</sup>. Being so near, that they had only space enough in which to acquire that rapid motion with which they commonly shocked, Cæsar's army began to rush forward, while Pompey's, agreeable to the orders he had given them, remained in their places, expecting that the enemy, if they were made to run a double space in coming to the shock, would be disordered, or out of breath. But the veterans, in Cæsar's line, suspecting the intention of this unusual method of receiving an enemy, made a full stop; and, having drawn breath, came forward again with the usual rapidity. They were received with perfect order, but not with that resistance and equal force which motion alone could give. The action became general near about the same time over the whole front. Pom-

<sup>25</sup> Dio. Cassius, lib. xli. c. 58.

pey's horse, as was expected, in the first charge, put Cæsar's cavalry to rout, and, together with the archers and slingers, were hastening to turn the flank of the enemy. But as soon as they opened their view to the rear, being surpris'd at the sight of a body of infantry which was drawn up to oppose them, and being, probably, from their confidence of victory, negligent of order; in their attempts to recover it they were thrown into the utmost confusion, and, although there was not any enemy in condition to pursue them, fled to the heights. The archers and slingers, being thus deserted by the horse, were put to the sword. And Pompey's left, on which he expected the enemy could not resist him, being flanked by the cohorts who had defeated his cavalry, began to give way. Cæsar, in order to increase the impression he had made, brought forward fresh troops to the front of his own line; and while his reserve turned upon the flank, made a general charge, which the enemy no longer endeavoured to withstand.

Pompey, on seeing the flight of his cavalry, an event he so little expected, either thought himself betrayed, or despairing of the day, put spurs to his horse, and returned into camp. As he entered the Prætorian gate, he called to the guards to stand to their arms, and to provide for the worst. "I go the rounds," he said, "and visit the posts." It is likely that surprise and mortification had unsettled his mind. He retired to his tent in the greatest dejection, and yet he awaited the issue<sup>26</sup>. His army, in the mean time, being routed, fled in confusion through the lanes of their own encampment. It was noon, and the victors, as well as the vanquished, were greatly fatigued; but Cæsar seldom left any refuge to a flying enemy, not even behind their intrenchments. He ordered Pompey's lines to be stormed, met with some little resistance from the guards that were

<sup>26</sup> Cass. de Bello Civile, lib. iii. c. 94.



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placed on the parapet, but soon prevailed. The rout and the carnage continued through the streets and the alleys of the camp, to the rear-gate and passages through which the vanquished crowded to recover the fields, and from which, without any attempt to rally, they continued their flight to the neighbouring hills.

When Pompey's army drew forth to battle, their tents were left standing, as in full confidence of victory; and the plate, furniture, and equipage of the officers were still displayed, as if intended for show. Notwithstanding this circumstance, Cæsar had authority enough to restrain his troops<sup>27</sup> from plunder, and continued the pursuit. Seeing crowds of the vanquished had occupied a hill in the rear of their camp, he made haste to surround them, and to cut off their farther retreat. But they themselves having observed, that the place was destitute of water, abandoned it before they could be surrounded, and took the road to Larissa. Cæsar having ordered part of the army to keep possession of the enemy's camp, another part to return to their own, he himself, with four legions, endeavoured to intercept the fugitives in their way to Larissa. He had the advantage of the ground; so that after a hasty march of six miles, he got before them; and, having thrown himself in their way, obliged them to halt. They took possession of a height over a stream of water, from which they hoped to be supplied. Night was fast approaching, and the pursuers were spent with fatigue; but Cæsar yet prevailed on his men to throw up some works to prevent the access of the enemy to the brook. When overwhelmed with fatigue and distress, these remains of the vanquished army offered to capitulate; and while the treaty was in dependence many among them, who were Senators and persons of rank, withdrew in the night, and made their escape; the rest surrendered at discretion. persons of distinction, who had been formerly prisoners, and who had

<sup>27</sup> The spoils of an enemy were commonly secured by the Romans in a regular manner, to be equally divided.

been

been set at liberty, were now put to death. Some were spared at the intercession of their friends, to whom Cæsar permitted that each should save one of the prisoners<sup>28</sup>. The private men took oaths of fidelity to the victor, and were enlisted in his army. Cæsar, having ordered such of his men, as had been on service all night, to be relieved from the camp, he himself marched with a fresh body the same day to Larissa.

<sup>28</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 62.

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*Comparative Loss on the different Sides in the late Action.—Pompey's Flight.—His Death.—Arrival of Cæsar at Alexandria.—Cato, with the Fleet and Remains of the Army from Pharsalia, fleers for Africa.—State of Italy and of the Republican Party.—Adventures of Cæsar in Egypt.—Victory over Pharnaces.—Arrival in Italy.—Mutiny of the Legions.—Cæsar passed into Africa.—His Operations and Action with the Horse and Irregulars of the Enemy.—Post at Ruspina.—Siege of Usita.—Battle of Thapsus.—Death of Cato.*

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IN the famous battle of Pharsalia, Cæsar, by his own account, lost no more than two hundred men, among whom were thirty Centurions, officers of distinguished merit. He killed of the enemy fifteen thousand, took twenty-four thousand prisoners, with a hundred and eighty stand of colours, and nineteen Roman eagles and legionary standards; and on this occasion he cut off many Senators and many of the equestrian order<sup>1</sup>, the flower of the Roman Nobility, who were the most likely to bear up the sinking fortunes of the commonwealth.

Pompey, when he was told that Cæsar's troops had already forced his intrenchments, changed his dress, mounted on horseback, and having passed through the rear gate of the camp, made his escape to Larissa. On the road he fell in with about thirty horsemen who joined him. At the gates of Larissa he received what he wanted for his journey, but declined entering the town, saying, That he

<sup>1</sup> Appian de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.









would do nothing to make a breach betwixt the inhabitants of that place and the victor<sup>a</sup>. From thence he passed by the valley of Tempé to the coast, and rested only one night in a fisherman's cottage. Next morning he put off from the shore in a small boat, with a few of his attendants, and coming in sight of a trading vessel, made signals, and was taken on board. In this ship he steered to Amphipolis, came to an anchor before that place, and, probably to conceal his farther intentions, issued a proclamation addressed to all the districts of Macedonia, and requiring new levies to be made, and all the youth of the province to assemble forthwith at this place. But having received some supplies of money, he remained only one night at Amphipolis. His wife Cornelia, and Sextus the youngest of his sons, were at Mitylené, in the island of Lesbos; thither he proposed to sail, and, without having settled his plan any farther, was anxious to save this part of his family from falling<sup>b</sup> into the hands of his enemies. Having taken them on board, and being joined by some galleys of the fleet, after a delay of some days, occasioned by contrary winds, he set sail, continued his voyage to the coast of Cilicia, and from thence to Cyprus. He meant to have landed in Syria; but being informed that the people of Antioch, upon the news of his defeat, had published a resolution to admit none of his party, he dropt that intention, and contented himself with what aids and reinforcements he obtained on the coasts of Cilicia and Cyprus. He seized the money which was found in the coffers of the farmers of the revenue; and having borrowed, or otherwise procured, considerable sums, he armed two thousand men, and having shipping sufficient to transport them, continued his voyage to Egypt.

The late king, Ptolomy Auletes, had been indebted to the Romans and the patronage of Pompey; and the kingdom being now on a

<sup>a</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xlii. c. 2.

<sup>b</sup> Caesar, Appian, Plutarch.

respectable footing, having a considerable military force in the field; this Roman leader, though of the vanquished party, flattered himself, that in the gratitude of the Egyptian court he might find some means to reinstate his affairs.

On the death of that Ptolomy, who had been restored to his throne by Gabinius, two factions had arisen in Egypt. The king leaving four children, Ptolomy the elder, Cleopatra, Arsinoë, and Ptolomy the younger, had by his will bequeathed his crown to Ptolomy the eldest of his sons, together with Cleopatra the eldest daughter. This brother and sister being by the laws permitted to marry, were in the capacity of husband and wife associated on the throne. But the council of the young king proposed to set aside the will by excluding Cleopatra. In execution of this design, having obliged her to leave the kingdom, and to fly for protection into Syria, they had taken post with a great army at Pelusium to prevent her return, she being said to have assembled a numerous force in Asia for that purpose<sup>4</sup>. Pompey observing this army upon the shore, concluded that the king was present, came to an anchor, and sent a message with intimation of his arrival, and of his desire to join his forces with those of Egypt.

The council of Ptolomy consisted of three persons, Achilles, who commanded the army; Photinus, an eunuch, who had the care of the finances; and Theodotus of Samos, who was the preceptor or literary tutor of the young king. These counsellors, knowing that the Romans had been named executors of the late king's will<sup>5</sup>, and in this capacity might restore Cleopatra to her share in the throne, and that Pompey, in name of the republic, might assume the supreme direction in Egypt, were greatly alarmed upon receiving his message, and came to a resolution to put him to death. By this atrocious action they expected to rid themselves of one dangerous intruder,

<sup>4</sup> Cæsar de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

<sup>5</sup> Cæsar, *ibid.*

and to merit the favour of his rival, who by this decisive stroke was to become the sovereign of the empire, and fully able to reward those who took a seasonable part in his quarrel.

With this intention Achilles, with a few of his attendants, came on board in a small boat, delivered a message from Ptolomy, inviting Pompey to land. In the mean time some Egyptian galleys, with an intention to secure him, drew near to his ship; and the whole army, with the king at their head, were drawn out on the shore to receive him. The size of the boat, and the appearance of the equipage which came on this errand, seemed disproportioned to the rank of Pompey; and Achilles made an apology, alleging, that deeper vessels could not go near enough to land him on that shallow part of the coast. Pompey's friends endeavoured to dissuade him from accepting of an invitation so improperly delivered; but he answered by quoting two lines from Sophocles, which implies, that *whoever visits a king, though he arrive a free man, must become his slave*. Two of his servants went before him into the boat to receive their master; and with this attendance he put off from the ship. His wife Cornelia, and Sextus the youngest of his sons, with some other friends, remained upon deck, sufficiently humbled by the preceding strokes of fortune, anxious for the future, and trembling under the expectations of a scene which was acting before them. Soon after the barge had left the ship, Pompey looking behind him, observed among the Egyptian soldiers a person whose countenance he recollected, and said to him, Surely, fellow soldier, you and I have somewhere served together. While he turned to speak these words, Achilles beckoned to the other soldiers, who understanding the signal to put the Roman general to death, struck him with their swords. Pompey was so much prepared for this event, that he perceived the whole of his situation at once, and sunk without making any struggle, or uttering one word\*. This was

\* App. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. Plut. in Pomp. Livii epitome, lib. cxii.



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done in the presence of the king of Egypt and of his army, who were ranged on a kind of amphitheatre formed by the shore. The vessel in which the unhappy Cornelia with her family was left, and the little squadron which attended it, as if they had received a signal to depart, cut their cables and fled.

Thus died Pompey, who for above thirty years enjoyed the reputation of the first captain of his age. The title of *Great*, originally no more than a casual expression of regard from Sylla, continued, in the manner of the Romans, to be given him as a mark of esteem, and a name of distinction. He attained to more consideration, and enjoyed it longer than any other Roman citizen; and was supplanted at last, because, for many years of his life, he thought himself too high to be rivaled, and too secure to be shaken in his place. His last defeat, and the total ruin which ensued upon it, was the consequence of an overweening confidence, which left him altogether unprepared for the first untoward event. The impression of his character, even after that event, was still so strong in the minds of his enemies, that Cæsar overlooked all the other remains of the vanquished party to pursue their leader.

The accounts which Cæsar received at Larissa made him believe that Pompey must have passed into Asia; and he accordingly, on the third day after the battle of Pharsalia, set out in pursuit of him with a body of horse, ordering a legion to follow. In passing the Hellespont, he was saluted by some galleys which guarded the Straits, under Lucius Cassius. These surrendered themselves, and, with their leader, made offer of their service to the victor. From thence he continued his march by the coast of Ionia, receiving the submission of the towns in his way. And being come into Asia, he had intelligence of Pompey's operations in Cyprus, of his departure from thence, and of his continuing to steer for the coasts of Egypt. In order to be in condition to follow him thither, he put into the island of Rhodes,

Rhodes, where he provided transports sufficient to embark the legion which he had ordered to follow him from Thessaly, and another from Achaia, with eight hundred horse. To these he joined a convoy of ten armed galleys of this island, and some Asiatic ships <sup>7</sup>.

With this force Cæsar set sail for Alexandria, and arrived, after a passage of three days <sup>8</sup>. Here he learned the catastrophe of Pompey's life; and had presented to him by the courtiers of Ptolomy, who were impatient to recommend their services, the head of the deceased severed from the body, with his seal, which was known throughout the empire, being that with which his signature was put to all letters, acts, and public writings: but Cæsar either really was, or affected to be, seized with a momentary compunction; is said to have turned away from the sight, and to have wept <sup>9</sup>. This able actor probably had tears, as well as words, at command; and could sanctify, under the most specious appearances, the evils which his ambition had produced. From this event, however, which he thus affected to regret, and no sooner, he became secure, and seems to have dated the termination of the war. He accordingly landed without precaution, and being detained at first by the usual periodical winds of the season, became entangled in difficulties, or engaged in pleasures, which occasioned a very unaccountable stay, suspended the expectations of the whole empire, and gave to those of the opposite party leisure to consult their safety in different ways.

Cato, upon the march of Pompey into Thessaly, had been left to command on the coast of Macedonia; and his quarters, after the battle of Pharsalia, became a place of retreat to many who escaped from the field, or who, at the time of the action, had been detached

<sup>7</sup> Cæf. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

<sup>8</sup> App. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. The two  
legions which he led in this service amounted  
only to three thousand two hundred men; so

much had the army in general suffered in  
their late campaigns.

<sup>9</sup> App. *ibid.*

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on different services. He assembled great part of the fleet at Corcyra; and, with his sea and land forces united, still preserved the aspect of a vigorous party. Cicero, Cnæus the eldest son of Pompey, Afranius, Labienus, and other persons of distinction had joined him. Among these Cicero, as being the first in rank, was offered the command; and having declined it, narrowly escaped with his life from the fury of young Pompey, who considered his refusal as a desertion of the cause, and as an act of perfidy to his father, whose fate was yet unknown". Cicero, being protected by Cato and others, who were present, escaped into Italy; and declining the command of an army, reserved, for scenes in which he was better qualified to act, talents which had been, on former occasions, of so much use to his fellow citizens. It appeared that Cato had even disapproved of his having joined either party in this war, and wished him to have devoted his life and his abilities entirely to those services which he was better qualified to render to his country, in the Senate, and in the popular assemblies, than in the field.

It is probable that Cato had already taken his own resolution not to submit to Cæsar, nor to survive the fall of the commonwealth; but he treated with great candour such as chose to make their peace, and to retire from the storm. Having staid a sufficient time at Corcyra, to receive on board such of the vanquished army as chose to take refuge in the fleet; and having afterwards put into Patrae, near the mouth of the Gulph of Corinth, for the same purpose, he still gave every one his option to continue in arms, or to retire. He seems to have supposed that Pompey was gone into Egypt, and he determined to follow him; hoping, that after the junction of this great reinforcement, he might, either there or in the province of Africa, renew the war with advantage. Being, in pursuance of this

<sup>22</sup> Plut. in Vita Ciceronis. Dio. Cass. lib. xlii. c. 10—12.

design, arrived in the African seas, but west of the frontier of Egypt, he met the unhappy Cornelia, with the young Sextus Pompeius, who had recently beheld the death of the husband and the father near the shore at Pelusium. The account which he received of this event determined him not to continue his voyage any farther to the eastward; but to return towards the Roman province of Africa, where the friends of the republic under Varus, in consequence of the defeat of Curio, and the alliance of Juba, still kept the ascendant, and lately received an accession of strength by the junction of Scipio and of Labienus, who had escaped from Pharfalia. But the periodical winds which about the same time began to detain Cæsar at Alexandria, made it impossible, or at least dangerous, for him to continue his voyage along a coast that was covered to a great extent by the famous shoals and sand-banks of the Syrtes. For these, perhaps, and other reasons which are not mentioned, Cato landed at Bérénicé; and from thence conducting his army, then consisting of ten thousand men, in small divisions, through the deserts of Barca, and round the bay of the Syrtes; and having, during thirty days, encountered with many difficulties from the depth of the sands and the scarcity of water, he effected his march to the frontier of the Roman province<sup>12</sup>.

Cæsar, when he passed into Macedonia, had left Italy and the western provinces in a state not likely, in his absence, to create any trouble. But the uncertain, and even unfavourable aspect, of his affairs, for some time after his landing in Epirus, had encouraged those who were discontented to question the validity of his acts, and to disregard his arrangements. The army in Spain having mutinied, deserted from Q. Cassius, and put themselves under the command of M. Marcellus Æfernius, who, however, did not openly declare

<sup>12</sup> Strabo, lib. xvii. p. 836.



himself for either party, till after the event was decided in favour of Cæsar.

At Rome it is probable that few had remained besides those who were inclined to Cæsar's party, or at least such as were indifferent to both; and that some persons, even of the last description, thought they had an interest in his success, as being their only safety against the menacing declarations of his adversary, who, in all his proclamations, treated neutrality between the parties as treason to the commonwealth. But the uncertain state of his fortunes, while the event of the war remained in suspense, and still more after his defeat at Dyrrachium, encouraged or tempted numbers, even in the city of Rome, to declare for Pompey. Marcus Cælius, who, in the preceding year, had, upon disgust, or hopes of promoting his own fortune, gone with Antony and Curio to join Cæsar, and who was now, by the influence of the prevailing party, elected one of the Prætors; being moved by a fresh disgust from the party he had joined, or by its apparent decline in the field, openly declared himself against Cæsar's measures, offered protection to debtors against the execution of his laws relating to bankrupts, drove his own colleague Tribonius by force from the Prætor's tribunal, and gave such an alarm, that the Senate thought themselves under the necessity of giving the Consul Isauricus the usual charge to guard the commonwealth as in times of extreme danger. Upon this decree the Consul took arms to preserve the peace, and Cælius was obliged to leave the city. About the same time Milo, who still lay under sentence of banishment, ventured, at the head of an armed force, to land on the coast, and attempted to make himself master of Capua. While he was engaged in this enterprize he was joined by Cælius; but both were soon after surrounded and cut off by the forces which Cæsar had left for the protection of Italy<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> Liv. Epitome, lib. cxi. Dio. Cass. lib. xlii. c. 22, 26.

These disturbances, and every appearance of opposition to the party of Cæsar, were again easily suppressed upon the news of his victory at Pharſalia. The populace, who generally range themselves on the victorious side, and who are equally outrageous in every cause they espouse, celebrated the occasion, by pulling down the statues of Pompey and of Sylla. There was either no Senate, and no assembly of the People to resist the torrent with which fortune now ran on the side of military government, or the names of Senate and People were, without debate or difference of opinion, put to decrees, by which the supreme power of life and death over the supposed adherents of the vanquished party was committed to the victor. By these decrees, the power of making war or peace, and of naming commanders and governors in all the provinces, was committed to Cæsar. He was, by a new and unheard-of resolution, made Consul for five years, Dictator for twelve months, and vested with the sacred character of Tribune for life. He alone was appointed to preside in all public assemblies, except those of the Tribes, in which the other Tribunes bore an equal part with himself.

When these decrees were presented to Cæsar, then in Egypt, he assumed the ensigns and power of Dictator, and appointed Antony, who commanded in Italy, general of the horse, or second to himself in the empire. The reputation of Cæsar's clemency had encouraged many, who had recently opposed him, to lay down their arms, and to return to their habitations, trusting to this character of the victor, or to other considerations more particularly applicable to themselves. Cicero returned to Italy, and waited for Cæsar in the neighbourhood of Brundisium. Caius Cassius, who had commanded the fleet which had been assembled for Pompey from the coasts of Syria and Cilicia, having sailed to Sicily, while the army yet lay in Pharſalia, surprised and burnt the shipping, amounting to thirty-five vessels, of which twenty were decked, which Cæsar had assembled at Messina, and  
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was about to have forced the town to surrender, when he was informed of the defeat of Pompey in Thessaly, and set sail for the coast of Asia. Here he waited for Cæsar at the mouth of the Cydnus, without being determined, whether he should attempt to destroy or submit to the victor. From the correspondence of Cassius with Cicero, it appears that, like this distinguished senator, he was about to withdraw from the ruins of a party which he could no longer support. Cicero, nevertheless, afterwards ascribes to him a design of killing Cæsar at this place, if the prey had not escaped him by going to a different side of the river from where he was expected to land. Upon this disappointment Cassius made his submission, and delivered up his fleet<sup>14</sup>. Quintus Cicero went to Asia to make his peace with Cæsar; and many, expecting him in Italy, resorted thither on the same errand. In this number, it was reported that Cato and L. Metellus meant to present themselves as persons who had done no wrong, and who came openly to resume their station in the commonwealth. Cæsar foresaw the difficulties that might arise to himself from the presence of such men; that they would greatly embarrass his government by opposing it, or, in order to rid himself of such troublesome guests, reduce him to the necessity of pulling off the mask of moderation and clemency, which he had hitherto assumed. For these reasons, he chose rather to prevent their coming, than to contend with them after they were come; and sent positive orders to Antony, to forbid Cato, Metellus, and every other person, to whom he had not given express permission, to set their foot in Italy<sup>15</sup>.

U. C. 706.  
C. Julius  
Cæsar Dict.  
Iterum M.  
Antonius.  
Mag. Eq.

Such was the state of affairs at the end of the year of Rome 705, and beginning of the following year, which is dated in the Dicta-

<sup>14</sup> Cæsar de bello Civil. lib. iii.

<sup>15</sup> Ibidem, ep. 6 & 7.

torship

torship of Caius Cæsar. While he himself still remained in Egypt, the government of Italy continued in the hands of Antony. All orders of men vied, in demonstrations of joy, for the success of the victor, and for the ascendant which his party had gained. They still probably hoped to have the form of the republic preserved, while no more than the administration of it should pass from the ruined party to those who were now in power: but in the first steps of the present government they found themselves disappointed. The usual election of magistrates, which, even in the height of the war had never been omitted, now at the end of it, and when no enemy any where appeared to alarm the party, were all of them, except that of the Tribunes, entirely suspended or laid aside. All government centered in the person of Antony, and the administration was altogether military. He himself, immersed in debauch, past the greatest part of his time in the company of buffoons and prostitutes; frequently shifted the scene of his frolics from the town to the country, and travelled through Italy with a field equipage, and a numerous train of carriages, filled with courtezans and their retinue. In these processions he himself is said to have sometimes appeared in a carriage that was drawn by lions<sup>16</sup>. In this tide of success, as he was ungracious and arrogant to citizens of the highest rank, so he was indulgent to the troops, and deaf to all the complaints that were made of their violence and rapine. Being equally apt to set the example of disorder and licence in his own practice, as he was to indulge them in others, his retainers frequently alarmed the city with rapes, robberies, and murders, and made the pacific inhabitants of Italy expect, with the arrival of Cæsar, a continual increase of such disorderly masters to sport on the ruins of the Commonwealth.

The worst men, as usual, were the most forward in paying their court to the party in power. The nearest relations became spies or

<sup>16</sup> Plut. in Vita Antonii, p. 74, 75.



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informers against each other. Fears or complaints uttered were reported as crimes. A general silence and distrust ensued, and all parties wished or dreaded the arrival of Cæsar, according as they expected to lose or to gain by the fall of the Commonwealth. In this interval of expectation, men discovered their gloomy apprehensions, by propagating strange fictions of ominous appearances, or by magnifying things natural into alarming presages and prodigies<sup>17</sup>.

The daily expectation of Cæsar's arrival, for some time, suspended all the usual factions in the city, and suppressed the hopes and designs of his opponents in all parts of the empire: but his unexpected stay at Alexandria, and the unfavourable reports of his situation, which were sometimes brought from thence, began to turn the tide of popularity at Rome, and encouraged the remains of the late republican party, now forced to take refuge in Africa, again to lift up its head<sup>18</sup>.

Dollabella, a young man of Patrician extraction, observing the road which others had taken, by becoming Tribunes of the People, to arrive at power in the commonwealth, procured himself, in imitation of Clodius, to be adopted into a plebeian family, to the end that he might be legally qualified to hold this office; and having accordingly succeeded in this design, revived the wild projects by which the worst of his predecessors had endeavoured to debauch the lower ranks of the People. He proposed an abolition of debts, and a reduction of house-rents. Being opposed by Tribellius, one of his colleagues, their several retainers frequently, as usual, proceeded to violence in the streets; and although the Senate passed a decree to suspend every question or subject of debate until the arrival of Cæsar, these Tribunes continued to assemble the People, kept them in a ferment by opposite motions, and filled the publick places with tumult

<sup>17</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xlii. c. 26.

<sup>18</sup> Cicero ad Attic. lib. xi. ep. 16.

and bloodshed <sup>19</sup>. Mark Antony, second in command to Cæsar, under pretence that such disorders could not be restrained without a military force, took possession of the city with an army; and while he sometimes favoured one party, and sometimes the other, continued to govern the whole at discretion <sup>20</sup>.

The troops about the same time became mutinous in their quarters; and these disorders rose or fell according to the reports that were propagated from Asia or Egypt relating to the state of Cæsar's affairs. The spirits and hopes of the late Republican party, which yet had some footing in Africa and Spain, likewise fluctuated in the same manner. It is highly probable, that if Cæsar had pursued the other remains of this party with the same ardour with which he pursued Pompey in person, or if he could have returned to the capital immediately on the death of his rival, they never would have attempted, or would have been able to renew the contest; but the leisure which he left them, and the ill aspect of his own affairs, for some time encouraged and enabled them to recover a strength, with which they were yet in condition to dispute the dominion to which he aspired.

Cato, who, with the remains of the Republican party from Epirus, had arrived on the coast of Africa, being informed that Varus still held the Roman province on this continent in the name of the Republic, that Scipio was there, and that the king of Numidia persisted in his alliance against Cæsar, determined to join them. At his arrival, Scipio and Varus being on bad terms, he received an offer of the command from the general voice of the army: but his acceptance being likely to increase, rather than to appease animosities, and the preference being constitutionally due to Scipio as of consular rank, Cato had no doubts in declining it. Neither Pompey nor Scipio ever considered him as their personal friend; his services they knew were intended to the Republic, and would turn against them whenever

<sup>19</sup> Eight hundred citizens were killed in these frays.      <sup>20</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xlii. c. 29.

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they came to make that use of their advantages to which it is likely they were both inclined. Pompey was accordingly ever jealous of Cato, and in the last part of the campaign in Thessaly chose to leave him behind on the coast. Scipio adopted the same conduct with respect to this partizan of the commonwealth, and joined to the motives of jealousy, which actuated Pompey, a distrust of the inclination recently shewn by the army to prefer him in the command. In order that he might not interfere in his counsels, he assigned or suffered him to take a separate station at Utica, where he continued to be the principal support of the cause. The inhabitants of this place were obnoxious to Pompey's party; and having formerly received Curio with the forces of Cæsar, and ever favoured his interest, were now doomed to destruction, but saved at the intercession of Cato, who, in this extremity of political evils, wished not to increase the sufferings of mankind by unnecessary acts of revenge and cruelty.

The spirit of the Republic thus reviving in Africa, and the party being in condition to receive all who fled to them for protection, and having the alliance of Juba, the most powerful prince of that continent, soon became formidable both by sea and by land; and if they had chosen to invade Italy in the absence of Cæsar, were in condition to have regained the capital of the empire. Young Pompey having, at the same time, passed into Spain, was favourably received by his father's adherents and clients in that province, and profiting by the misconduct of Quintus Cassius in those parts, was likely to assemble a considerable force.

Gabinus, who commanded for Cæsar on the coast of Illyricum, attempting to penetrate by land into Macedonia, was cut off by Octavius, who had assembled a remnant of Pompey's army on the confines of that kingdom. Domitius Calvinus, whom Cæsar had appointed to command in Bithynia, had received a defeat from Pharnaces the son of Mithridates; and in general, the state of his affairs in other parts of the empire was such, while he himself continued unheard of  
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in Egypt, as to raise a suspicion of some misfortune, supposed to be the only way of accounting for his long stay in that country, and for the seeming neglect of all the advantages he had gained by a conduct hitherto in every instance decisive and rapid. Pompey had fallen by treachery in Egypt, and so might Cæsar. It was now the middle of June, and there was no intimation received in Italy of the time at which he might be expected to return. He had written no letters since the middle of December, nor had any one come from him at Alexandria since the middle of March<sup>21</sup>.

The imperfect accounts which remain of what passed in Egypt during this interval, are as follows: Cæsar, at his arrival, had found the young king under the direction of Pothinus; and Arsinoë, the sister of the king, in the keeping of Ganimedes, two eunuchs, who had the care of their education. From his manner of receiving the present of Pompey's head, these officers conjectured that they had gained nothing by the murder of one of the rivals, that they were engaged in this contest for the Roman empire; and that this action, although it freed Cæsar of an enemy whom he respected and feared, was not to be publicly avowed or rewarded by him. They dreaded the interposition of this dangerous man in their affairs, more than they had dreaded even that of Pompey.

The troops now in Egypt, were the remains of that army with which Gabinus had restored the late king, and which he left to secure his establishment. They were recruited by deserters from the Roman provinces, and by banditti from Syria and Cilicia. They retained the form of the Roman legion; but had precluded themselves from any prospect of return to the Roman service by a mutiny, in which they had murdered the two sons of Bibulus, then Proconsul of Syria. Numbers of the men were married, and had families in Egypt; they were in the practice of disposing of the lives

<sup>21</sup> Cicer. ad Att. lib. xi. ep. 16 & 17.



and properties of the people, of the offices at court, and of the crown itself at their pleasure. A party of this insolent rabble, then in garriſon at Alexandria, and in the character of guards to the perſon of the king, took offence at the parade with which Cæſar landed, and were offended with the number and ſhow of his Liçtors, by which he ſeemed to encroach on the majeſty of their ſovereign. Frequent tumults aroſe on this account, and numbers of Cæſar's attendants were murdered in the ſtreets. The weſterly winds were then ſet in, and he finding himſelf detained in a place where he was expoſed to ſo much inſult, ordered a reinforcement of troops from Aſia, and employed Mithridates of Pergamus to bring all the forces he could aſſemble there to his relief. The party of Cleopatra applied to him for his protection; ſhe herſelf, being ſtill in Syria, ventured to paſs into Egypt, came to Alexandria by ſea, and is ſaid to have been carried, wrapped up in a package of carpet, to the preſence of Cæſar.

In this manner, it is pretended that Cæſar became acquainted with the perſon of this celebrated woman, then in the bloom of youth, and poſſeſſed of thoſe allurements by which ſhe made different conquerors of the world, in their turns, for a while renounce the purſuits of ambition for thoſe of pleaſure. She is ſuppoſed at this time to have become the miſtreſs of Cæſar, and to have made him, though turned of fifty years, to forget the empire, the republic, the factions at Rome, and the armies which in Africa and Spain were aſſembling againſt him. Under the dominion of his paſſion for Cleopatra, he took a reſolution to carry into execution the deſtination made by the late king, and in the quality of Roman Conſul and repreſentative of the Roman People, to whom this office had been entrusted by the will, he commanded both parties to lay down their arms, and to ſubmit their claims to his own arbitration.

Pothinus, fearing the total excluſion of the young king, his pupil, in favour of Cleopatra, called Achillas with the army to Alexandria,  
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in order to defeat Cæsar's purpose, and oblige him to leave the kingdom. This army consisted of twenty thousand men inured to bloodshed and violence, though long divested of the order and discipline of Roman troops. Cæsar hearing of their approach, and not being in a condition to meet them in the field, seized and fortified a quarter of the town, in which he proposed to defend himself. The young Ptolomy being in his power, was prevailed on to dispatch two persons of distinction with a message to Achilles, signifying the king's pleasure that he should not advance; but the bearers of this message, as being supposed to betray the interest of their master, in whose name they appeared, were by the orders of Achilles seized and slain. Cæsar, however, being still in possession of Ptolomy's person, represented Achilles as a rebel and an outlaw, and still, in name of the king, issued repeated orders and proclamations against him.

Achilles being arrived at Alexandria, entered the city, and endeavoured to force Cæsar's quarters; but being repulsed, took possession of that part of the town which was open to him, and blocked up the remainder both by sea and land. The city being thus divided, the Egyptians and Romans fought in the streets, and from the houses which they severally occupied. Cæsar, as he despaired of being able to receive any succours by land, endeavoured to keep open his communication by sea, and sent pressing orders to Syria, Cilicia, Rhodes, and Crete, for reinforcements of men and of ships. Having early discovered that Pothinus, who was still in his power, corresponded with the enemy, he ordered him to be put to death, continued to strengthen his division of the town by additional barriers; and in order to prevent surprise, demolished and cleared away many of the buildings adjoining to his works. Achilles, finding so much unexpected resistance, sent for reinforcements, and a supply of stores and warlike engines, from every part of the kingdom. He traversed, with breast works, the streets leading to Cæsar's quarters, and demolishing the houses in

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his way, effected a chain of works parallel to those of Cæsar, consisting of a parapet and frequent towers. He exhorted the Egyptians to exert themselves for the independency of their kingdom; represented to them, "That the Romans were gradually assuming the sovereignty of Egypt; that Gabinius had come as an auxiliary, but acted as a master; that Pompey, on being defeated in Thessaly, came into Egypt", as to a property which he had a right to employ in repairing his ruined fortunes; that Pompey had fallen in vain, if Cæsar were tamely suffered to succeed him; that if this intruder were allowed to keep possession of the city, until his succours should arrive from Asia, all Egypt for the future must expect to be the slaves of the Romans."

The danger to which Cæsar was exposed, arose no less from the remains of the republican party now assembling against him in Africa, than it did from the force with which he was actually assailed in Egypt. If Scipio had been apprised of his condition in that country, he might in a few days have sailed to Alexandria, and in conjunction with the Egyptians, who would now have accepted of any assistance against Cæsar, have recovered the fall of their party at Pharsalia; but the best opportunities are sometimes lost, because it is not supposed that an enemy could be so rash as to furnish them.

The scene in Egypt was frequently changing by the intrigues and the treachery of different parties in the court. Ganimedes, who had the charge of the young princess, Arsinoë, being hitherto lodged in the quarters of Cæsar, found means to make his escape, together with his ward; and finding the troops disposed to lay hold of Arsinoë as a branch of the royal family, employed assassins to put Achilles to death; and, in name of the princess, took on himself the command of the army. His abilities as an officer, which were very

<sup>22</sup> Hirtius de bello Alexandrino.

considerable,

considerable, and his bounty, secured to him the affection of the soldiers. He continued the attack on Cæsar's quarters in all the ways which were already begun by his predecessor. The town being furnished with water by subterraneous passages from the neighbouring heights, he uncovered the conduits which led to Cæsar's division of the town; and, to render these conduits unserviceable, forced into them great quantities of brine from the sea. The loss however was soon supplied from wells, in which, at a moderate depth, the besieged found plenty of fresh water.

While Cæsar thus counteracted the arts which were employed to distress him, the eighteenth legion, with a considerable supply of provisions, military stores, and engines of war, being arrived on the coast, but unable to reach Alexandria on account of the winds, he thought proper to embark and put to sea, in order to cover this reinforcement, while they made for the port. On this occasion, he was attacked by the Egyptian fleet; but gained a victory, destroyed a great part of the enemy's ships, and brought his own reinforcement safe into harbour. The Egyptians, with great ardour, set to work in all the docks on the Nile, to repair the loss they had now sustained, and were soon masters of a fleet, consisting of twenty-two vessels of four tire of oars, five of five tire, and many of smaller dimensions. Cæsar had to oppose them, nine galleys from Rhodes, eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, and twelve from the coast of Asia. Five were of five tire of oars, and ten of four tire. The remainder were of smaller dimensions, and most of them open. With these forces, having once more engaged off the mouth of the harbour, the Egyptians were again defeated, with the loss of one galley of five tire of oars, another of two tire taken, and three sunk. The remainder retired under cover of the Mole, and of the towers of the Pharos.



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Soon after this action at sea, Cæsar attacked the Pharos, forced the enemy to fly from thence, most of them swimming across the harbour, killed many, and took six hundred prisoners. He forced them at the same time to abandon the tower, which commanded the entrance of the mole on that side. As he pursued them in their flight, and as the mole itself became crowded with his soldiers, who advanced to push the attack, or who came unarmed from the ships, and all the stations around, to witness the scene; the Egyptians seeing these crowds, laid hold of the opportunity, mounted the mole, threw those who were upon it into confusion, forced them over the quay into the water, or into their boats. Cæsar himself endeavouring to escape in this manner, and finding that the boat into which he went, being aground and overloaded, could not be got off, he threw himself into the water, and swam to a ship. In this tumult, he lost four hundred men of the legions, and an equal number of the fleet. The Egyptians recovered all the ground they had lost, got possession again of the tower at the head of the mole, and of the island which secured their ships.

In such operations, with various events, the parties in Egypt past the winter and spring. Cæsar still retained the person of Ptolomy in his possession, and made use of his name to countenance his own cause, or to discredit that of his enemies; but the king being extremely averse to this use being made of his authority, and desirous to recover his liberty, entered into a concert with some officers of his army, to find a pretence for his release. In pursuit of their design, they conveyed secret intimation to Cæsar's quarters, that the troops were greatly disgusted with Ganimedes, and that if Ptolomy should make his appearance in person, they would certainly submit to his orders, and commit the whole settlement of the kingdom to the arbitration of Cæsar. The king was instructed to affect a great dislike to this proposal, and with tears intreated that he

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might be allowed to remain in the palace. Cæsar, either being deceived by these professions, or believing the name of the king to be of little consequence, consented to let him depart; but this artful boy, as soon as he was at liberty, laid aside his disguise, laughed at the supposed credulity of those he had deceived, and urged the attack on the Roman quarters with great animosity.

While affairs at Alexandria were in this situation, accounts were brought that Mithridates of Pergamus, whom Cæsar had sent to procure succours from Asia, was actually arrived at Pelusium with a considerable force; that he had reduced that place, and only waited for instructions from Cæsar how to proceed. These accounts were brought to both parties about the same time, and both determined to put their forces in motion. Ptolomy leaving a proper guard on his works, embarked his army on the Nile, having a considerable navigation to make by the different branches of that river. Cæsar, at the same time, put his army on board in the harbour, and having an open course by the coast, arrived at Pelusium before the king; and being joined by Mithridates, was in condition to take the field against the Egyptian army. Ptolomy, to prevent the return of Cæsar by land to Alexandria, had taken a strong post on one of the branches of the Nile; but here, after a few skirmishes, he was attacked, defeated, and driven from his station. Endeavouring to make his escape by water, the barge <sup>23</sup> which carried him being overloaded it sunk, and himself, with all his attendants, perished.

Immediately after this action, in which the Egyptian army was routed and dispersed, Cæsar, escorted by a small party of horse, returned to Alexandria, and having received the submission of the inhabitants, made such arrangements as he thought proper in the succession to the kingdom. He placed Cleopatra on the throne, in conjunction with her younger brother; and, to remove any farther oc-

<sup>23</sup> Hirt. de Bello Alex.

caſion of diſturbance to this ſettlement, he ordered her ſiſter Arſinoë to be transported to Rome. He left great part of the army to ſupport this new eſtabliſhment in Egypt, and he himſelf, after this ſingular interlude, in the miſt of the conqueſt of the Roman empire, marched with the ſixth legion by land into Syria. At Antioch, he received ſuch reports of the ſtate of affairs, as required his preſence in different quarters. Nine months were elapſed, ſince any orders or directions had been received from him. During this time, the factions of the city, the relaxation of diſcipline in the army, and the threats of invaſion from Africa, had placed his affairs in ſuch a ſtate of hazard, as to urge his immediate appearance in Italy and at Rome; but he thought it of conſequence to his authority to leave no enemy behind him in the field<sup>24</sup>, nor to ſuffer the remains of diſorder in any of the provinces through which he was to paſs. Pharnaces, the ſon of Mithridates, to whom Pompey had aſſigned the kingdom of the Boſphorus, imagining that the civil wars, in which the Romans were engaged, made a favourable opportunity for the recovery of his father's dominions, had paſſed with an army into Pontus, and from thence invaded the leſſer Armenia and Cappadocia, which had been ſeparately allotted by the Romans to Dejotarus and to Ariobarzanes. At the inſtances of theſe princes, Domitius Calvinus, who had been diſpatched by Cæſar after the battle of Pharfalia with three legions to receive the ſubmiſſion of the Aſiatic provinces, hitherto in the intereſt of Pompey, diſpatched to Pharnaces a meſſenger, requiring him inſtantly to withdraw his troops from Armenia and Cappadocia; and, in order to give the more weight to this meſſage, he himſelf at the ſame time took the field with one Roman legion, together with two legions that had been formed by Dejotarus in the Roman manner, and two hundred Aſiatic horſe. He at the ſame time ordered Publius Sextius

<sup>24</sup> Hirt. de Bello Alex.

and C. Prætorius to bring up a legion which had been lately raised in Pontus, and Q. Patifius to join him with some light troops from Cilicia.

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These forces being assembled at Camana in Cappadocia, the messenger, who had been sent to Pharnaces, returned with an answer, that the king was willing to evacuate Cappadocia; but that, having a just claim to Armenia, in right of his father, he would keep possession of that province until the arrival of Cæsar, to whose decision he was willing to submit his pretensions. Domitius, not being satisfied with this answer, put his army in motion towards Armenia. While he advanced, Pharnaces endeavoured to amuse him with negotiations, and to put him off his guard, by permitting the country to receive him with all the appearances of peace and security. Being arrived at Nicopolis, the capital of Armenia, he there received orders from Cæsar to march into Egypt; but being unwilling to quit his supposed prey, risked a battle with the forces of Pharnaces, was defeated, and obliged to fly with the remains of his army, by the route of the mountains which separated Armenia from the Roman province.

Elated with this victory, Pharnaces, at the time of Cæsar's departure from Egypt, had returned into Pontus; had taken possession of the principal towns, and with great severity exercised the sovereignty of the kingdom. About the middle of July, Cæsar, having dispatched Trebonius from Antioch with an account of his own operations, and with instructions to those who commanded in Italy<sup>23</sup>, went himself by sea to Tarsus, where he received, as has been mentioned, the submission of Caius Cassius, who waited for his coming; and who, according to the account of Cicero, till then was undetermined, whether he should make his peace with the victor, or attempt to assassinate him.

<sup>23</sup> Cicer. ad Attic. lib. xi. ep. 23.



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At Tarsus, Cæsar held a convention of the principal inhabitants of Cilicia, and from thence marched into Cappadocia, stopped at Comana to make the necessary arrangements in that province, and continued his route to the frontiers of Galatia and Pontus. Hither Dejotarus, who had espoused the cause of Pompey, who had fought under his banners in Pharfalia, and who, by the gift of that unfortunate officer, still retained the sovereignty of Galatia, came to make his submission. He laid down his diadem, and the ensigns of royalty; and, presenting himself in the habit of a suppliant, pleaded, that, in the late war, the eastern part of the empire, being subject to Pompey, the princes of that quarter had not been free to chuse their party; that he was himself not qualified to decide in a question on which the Roman People was divided; that he thought it his duty to follow the Roman standard wherever it was erected, without considering by whom it was carried. Cæsar, rejecting the plea of ignorance or incapacity, insisted, that any prince in alliance with the Romans could not be ignorant who were Consuls in the year that succeeded the Consulship of Lentulus and Marcellus, and who were actually in the administration of the state at Rome; that they could not be ignorant who was at the head of the republic, and in possession of the capital, and of the seat of empire; and who of consequence was vested with the authority of the commonwealth. But that he himself, in the capacity of a private man, was willing, in consideration of this prince's age, his character, and the intercession of his friends, to forgive the part which he had taken against him. He desired him, therefore, to resume the crown and other ensigns of royalty, and to keep possession of his kingdom, reserving the discussion of the title, by which he held any particular territory, to a future day.

Being joined by a legion which Dejotarus had lately formed in the Roman manner, Cæsar's force now consisted of this, together with the remains of the two legions that escaped with Domitius from Nicopolis,

opolis, and of the sixth, which had accompanied himself from Egypt, now reduced by the sword, and by the fatigues of service, to no more than a thousand men. With this army he advanced towards Pontus. Upon his approach, Pharnaces sent forward a messenger to present him, in honour of his late victories, with a crown of gold, and made offers of submission, expecting to appease him, or to fill up the time until Cæsar should be obliged, by the necessity of his affairs, to give his presence elsewhere. "Come not against me," he said, "as an enemy: I never took part with Pompey, nor declared war against Cæsar. Let me not be treated with more severity than Dejotarus, who did both." Cæsar replied, That he would listen to Pharnaces when he had acted up to his professions; that he had forgiven Dejotarus, and many others, with pleasure, the injury done to himself; but that he could not so easily overlook insults which were offered to the Roman State; and that he did not pardon wrongs done in the provinces of the Roman empire, even by those of his own party. "Your not having joined with Pompey," he said, "has saved you from being a partner in his defeat, but was not the cause of my victory." With this reply to the messages of Pharnaces, Cæsar demanded the instant surrender of the kingdom of Pontus, and full reparation of all the damages sustained by any Roman citizens settled in that province. Pharnaces professed an intention to comply with these demands; but under various pretences delayed the performance of his promise. He had fixed on a hill in the neighbourhood of Ziecla, a place that became famous by the victory which his father Mithridates had there obtained over a Roman army under the command of Triarius: and in order to secure himself, repaired his father's lines, and seemed to be determined to maintain this post.

Cæsar, having lain for some days within five miles of the enemy, advanced to an eminence separated from the camp of Pharnaces only by a narrow valley sunk between steep banks. He came upon

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this ground in the night, and began to intrench himself as usual, having a party under arms to cover the workmen. As at break of day the greater part of his army appeared to be at work, this seemed to be a favourable opportunity to attack them; and Pharnaces began to form for this purpose. Cæsar, imagining that he only meant to give an alarm, and to interrupt his workmen; even after he was in motion, did not order the legions to desist from their work, nor to arm: but seeing him descend into the valley, and attempt to pass it in the face of his advanced guard, he sounded to arms, and was scarcely formed when the enemy had passed both banks of the vale to attack him.

The troops of Pharnaces began the action with an ardour that was suited to the boldness with which they had advanced; and Cæsar's contempt of their designs had nearly exposed him to a defeat. But the action, which was doubtful every where else, was decided by the veterans of the sixth legion, before whom the enemy began to give way, hurried with precipitation down the declivity, and fell into a general rout. Pharnaces fled with a few attendants, and narrowly escaped being taken<sup>24</sup>. This victory gave Cæsar an opportunity to compare his own glories with those of Sylla, of Lucullus, and of Pompey; and was on this account, probably, regarded by him with singular pleasure. "How cheap is fame," he said, "when obtained by fighting against such an enemy<sup>25</sup>?" And in the triumphs which he afterwards led in the sequel of these wars, the trophies of this particular victory were distinguished by labels, expressing in these words, "I came, I saw, I vanquished<sup>26</sup>."

From the peculiar ostentation of the ease with which this victory was obtained, appearing to Cæsar as a measure of his own superiority to Sylla and Pompey, we may suspect that vanity, not less than ambition, was the spring of that emulation from which he had raised

<sup>24</sup> Hirtius de Bello Alex. Velleius. Florus. Liv. Epitome, &c.

<sup>25</sup> Appian. de Bello Civil. lib. ii. p. 185. <sup>26</sup> The famous words, *Veni, vidi, vici.*

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such a flame in the empire<sup>26</sup>. Having, by this defeat, extinguished all the hopes and pretensions of Pharnaces, he restored Domitius Calvinus to his command in that quarter, and to a general inspection of affairs in Asia. This province, which had furnished a principal supply to the public revenue of the State, as well as to the private fortune of Roman adventurers, was now made to pay large contributions in name of arrears of what had been promised to Pompey, or of forfeiture for offences committed against the victorious party.

Cæsar, having issued his orders for the contributions to be levied in Asia, set out by Galatia and Bithynia towards Greece, in his way to Italy; he landed at Tarentum, having been near two years absent from Rome. Many citizens had waited near twelve months at Brundisium in anxious expectation of his coming, and under great uncertainty of the reception they were to meet with. Cicero, being of this number, set out for Tarentum as soon as he heard of Cæsar's arrival, and met him on the road. When he presented himself, Cæsar alighted from his carriage, received him with marks of respect, and continued to walk and to discourse with him aside for some time. There is no particular account of what passed between them in this conversation. On the part of Cicero, probably, were stated the reasons which he assigns, in a letter to Atticus, for his conduct before the battle of Pharsalia, bearing, that he had been averse to the war, that he thought the republic had nothing to gain by the victory of either party, and that he joined Pompey, more influenced by the opinion of others, than decided in his own<sup>27</sup>. Under these impressions, though courted by Cæsar, who wished to have the credit of his name in support of the measures now to be taken at Rome, he chose to withdraw to a life of retirement, and devoted his time to literary amusements and studies. At this time he probably composed

<sup>26</sup> Sueton. in Vit. Cæsaris, c. 37.

<sup>27</sup> Cicer. ad Att. lib. xi. ep. 11.



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C. Jul. Cæsar,  
M. Æmilius  
Lepidus.

most of his writings on the subject of eloquence, as he did some time afterwards those which are termed his philosophical works \*.

Cæsar arrived at Rome in the end of the year seven hundred and six of the Roman æra, in which he had been named a second time Dictator. This year, as has been related, he had passed chiefly in Egypt. Being elected, together with M. Emilius, Consul for the following year, he applied himself, for a little time, in the capacity of civil magistrate to the affairs of State; endeavoured to restore the tranquillity of the city, which had been disturbed in his absence, and to wipe away the reproach which the levities of Antony had brought on his party. He stifled the unreasonable hopes of a general abolition of debts, with which Dolabella had flattered the more profligate part of the community. He told the People, on this occasion, that he himself was a debtor; that he had expended his fortune in the public service, and was still obliged to borrow money for the same purposes. With respect to the general policy of the city, and the case of insolvent debtors, he revived the laws which he himself had procured, about two years before, in his way from Spain to Epirus. But while he appeared to be intent on these particulars, his thoughts were chiefly occupied in preparing to meet the war which the remains of the antient Senate and of the republican party were resuming against him in Africa.

This province, in which Varus, supported by the king of Numidia, had been hitherto able to keep his station as an officer of the commonwealth, was now become the sole or the principal refuge of the republican party. Three hundred citizens, many of them Senators, and exiles from Italy, as well as settlers in that province, had assembled at Utica, and considering every other part of the empire as under the influence of a violent usurpation, stated themselves as the only

\* Cicer. ad Attic. lib. xv. ep. 13.

free remains of the Roman republic ; held their meetings in the capacity of Senate and People ; authorised, under these titles, the levies that were made in the province, and contributed largely to supply the expence of the war. Many officers of name and of rank, Labienus, Afranius, Petreius, as well as Scipio and Cato, with all the remains they had saved from the wreck at Pharsalia, were now ready to renew the war on this ground. The name of Scipio was reckoned ominous of success in Africa, and that of Cato, even if the origin or occasion of the present contest were unknown, was held a sufficient mark to distinguish the side of justice, and the cause of the republic.

These leaders of the republican party, having a considerable force at sea, and having access to all the ports, not only of Africa, but likewise of Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, had furnished themselves plentifully with all the necessaries for war <sup>29</sup>. They had mustered ten legions, which, according to the establishment of that time, may have amounted to fifty thousand Roman foot. They had twenty thousand African horse, a great body of archers and slingers, with a hundred and twenty elephants. They expected to be joined by the king of Numidia, who, to the established character of his countrymen for stratagem and valour, joined the glory of his late victory over Curio ; and was supposed to muster, at this time, besides numerous bodies of horse, of archers, of slingers, and a great troop of elephants ; thirty thousand foot, armed and marshalled, for the most part, in the manner of the Roman legion <sup>30</sup>.

The army already in Africa, as well as the remains of the sea and land forces of Pompey, who were lately arrived from Macedonia, were willing, as has been mentioned, to have placed Cato at their head. But the established order of the commonwealth, for which all the party con-

<sup>29</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. lxi. c. 5.

<sup>30</sup> App. de Bello Civ. lib. ii. Hurt. de Bell. African.

tended, requiring that Scipio, who was of consular rank, should have the preference, Cato, who had no more than the rank of Prætor, and who could not be accessary to the infringement of any established or constitutional form, declined the command. By this circumstance we are deprived of an opportunity to judge how far the military abilities of this great man kept pace with his integrity, judgment, and courage in civil and political affairs.

Scipio being the officer of highest rank in the republican party, and having the supreme command of their forces, notwithstanding that the coasts of Italy were exposed to his attempts, and notwithstanding that the condition of Cæsar himself, if his situation at Alexandria had been known, gave sufficient opportunities for enterprise, took all his measures for a defensive war.

Such was the state of affairs in Africa when Cæsar, who, with all his military character and authority, frequently experienced the difficulty of commanding mere soldiers of fortune, taught to divest themselves of civil principle, or regard to public duty, was likely to perish in a mutiny of his own army, and to end his career by the swords which he himself had whetted against the republic.

The legions, which after the defeat of Pompey had been ordered into Italy, becoming insolent in the possession of a military power which they saw was to be formed on the ruins of the commonwealth, and feeling their own importance, especially in the absence of their leader, would not be commanded by subordinate officers; nor did they, on the return of Cæsar himself, discontinue habits of disorder and licence which they had some time indulged. Being stationed in the neighbourhood of Capua, from whence it was expected they should embark for Africa, they decamped without orders, and marched towards Rome; paid no regard to the authority of Sallust, who, in the capacity of Prætor, with which he had

been vested by Cæsar, endeavoured to stop them, killed many officers and persons of rank who ventured to oppose them, and threw the city into great consternation. On the approach of this formidable body, Cæsar himself is said to have wavered in his resolution. He had some troops attending his person, and there was a legion which Antony had stationed in the city on occasion of the late commotions. With these he at first proposed to meet and resist the mutiny; but he recollected, that even these troops might be infected with the same spirit of disobedience, and that if he were not able to command by his authority, and were forced to draw the sword against his own army, the whole foundations of the power he had erected must fail. While he was agitated by these reflections, he sent an officer with orders to enquire for what purpose the mutinous legions advanced? This officer was told, "That they would explain themselves to Cæsar." Having this answer, and expecting their arrival at the gates, he chose that they should appear to do by his permission, what they were likely to do without it; he therefore sent them another message, informing them that they had his leave to enter the city with their arms. They accordingly came in a body, and took possession of the field of Mars. There, contrary to the advice of his friends, they were received by Cæsar himself in person. Being raised on a conspicuous place, they crowded around him; and, from many different quarters at once, complained of the scanty rewards which they had received<sup>30</sup>, enumerated their services and the hardships they had suffered, and with one voice demanded their instant discharge. Cæsar knowing that they only meant to extort some concessions, which they hoped the consideration of the war, which was still impending in Africa, would oblige him to make; that they were far from wishing to be dismissed, or to resign those arms to which they

<sup>30</sup> Dio. Cassius, c. 51-55.



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owed their own consequence, and on which they grounded their present presumption, affected to comply with their request, owned that their demand was highly reasonable; adding, that the service for which they had been hitherto retained was now at an end, and that he was sensible they were worn out, and unfit to contend with new fatigues.

Cæsar, in concluding a speech which he made to this purpose, employed the appellation of *Quirites*, or fellow citizens; and observed how proper it was that all, who had served out the legal time, should receive the accustomed dismissal. In speaking these words, he was interrupted by a general cry, that they were no *Quirites*, but soldiers, willing to serve. It is alleged, that the name of Roman citizens<sup>31</sup>, though the most respectable form of address in the political assemblies of the People, carried contempt to these military adventurers, and insinuated a state of degradation from that in which they affected to stand. An officer who was prepared for the occasion, or who wished to improve this sentiment in favour of Cæsar, desired to be heard; made an apology for what was past, and offered to pledge himself for the duty and future obedience of the troops. He was answered by Cæsar, That the services of this army were now of little moment to him; that as they desired their dismissal, while by their own confession they were yet in condition to serve, he had taken his resolution, and should instantly dismiss them with the usual rewards. "No man," he said, "shall complain that in time of need I employed him, and now at my ease forget the reward that is due to him. Such as continue in the service until the public tranquillity is fully restored shall have settlements in land; such as have received promises of money at any time during the war, shall be paid now, or in a little time hereafter, with interest." He concluded, how-

<sup>31</sup> *Quirites*, Roman citizens.

ever, with saying, " That as he asked no man to remain in the service, so he should not reject the duty of those who were willing to abide by their colours; that he owed this indulgence to their present requests, and to their merit on former occasions." The whole with one voice desired to be comprehended in this act of indulgence, and went headlong into all the extremes of submission, as they had lately gone into every excess of disorder and insolence; Cæsar was thus again in full possession of his power; but he did not venture to punish the authors of the mutiny. It was safer to reward such as were conspicuous in any particular merit; he therefore selected a few to be distinguished by immediate effects of his bounty, and put the remainder in motion towards Africa, where they might have an opportunity of earning future rewards and the pardon of past offences; and where they might spend against enemies that fury which, at every interval of leisure to recollect their pretensions and their consequence, they were so likely to turn against their leader<sup>22</sup>.

The year was now, according to the vulgar computation at Rome, and in consequence of the usual intercalations being neglected, nominally advanced to the middle of December, but was in reality little past the autumnal equinox<sup>23</sup>, or was in the end of September, when Cæsar, having made the proper arrangements in the city, and in the manner related, appeased the mutiny which threatened to deprive him of his army, was again in motion to carry the war into Africa. The season, which was thought unfit for operations at sea, and which had actually forced his antagonist's ships into port, gave him the opportunity he wished for to effect his passage into that province. He knew that the enemy's fleet could not continue to cruize for any time to observe his motions; and that he might escape them with the advantage of a favourable wind, he had chosen the same opportunity, and

<sup>22</sup> Dio. Cass. lib. xlii. c. 51—55.

<sup>23</sup> Plut. in Vita Cæsaris, p. 154.

in the same season, two years before, to transport his army into Macedonia against Pompey, who, trusting to the numbers and vigilance of his fleet, suffered himself to be surprised, and to be dispossessed of a country which he occupied with so superior a force. Cæsar having gained so much on that occasion, by the rapidity of his motions, now made war with many accumulated advantages of reputation and power, which increased his boldness, and facilitated his success.

Having ordered troops and shipping from different quarters of Italy to assemble at Lillybæum, from whence he had the shortest passage to Africa, he himself arrived there on what was nominally the seventeenth of December, but in reality no more than the thirtieth of September; and although he found no more of his army arrived than one legion, or five thousand men, of the new levies, and six hundred horse, he ordered these, notwithstanding, to embark on board such ships as were then in the harbour; and if the wind had served, would have instantly sailed, even with this small force, trusting that he might be able to surprise some port on the opposite shore, and prepare a safe landing-place for the troops that were to follow. But while he continued windbound at Lillybæum, he was joined successively by a number of legions, which he ordered to embark as fast as they arrived; and, that they might be ready to put to sea with the first fair wind that served, sent the transports to lie under an island near the mouth of the harbour.

Being in this state of readiness with six legions, or about thirty thousand foot, together with two thousand horse; and the wind coming fair on the twenty-eight of December, or, as it is computed, on the twelfth of October, he himself went on board, and leaving orders for the troops that were still in motion towards Lillybæum to follow him without delay, he set sail for the nearest land in Africa. Not knowing of any port to which he might securely repair, he could not, as usual, assign a place of general resort in case of separation, and only gave

gave orders to the fleet to keep close together ; and deferred the choice of a landing-place till after he should have observed the coast, and seen in what part of it the enemy were least guarded against a descent. Soon after he got to sea a storm arose, which dispersed the fleet ; he himself, with the ships that still kept him company, after being tossed four days in a passage of no more than twenty leagues, got under the land of the promontory of Mercury, and from thence, to avoid the forces of the enemy, which were stationed near Utica and round the bay of Carthage, steered to the southward.

The coast of Africa, from this cape or promontory to the bottom of the great Syrtis, over three degrees of latitude, or about two hundred miles, extends directly to the south. It abounds with considerable towns, which, on account of their commerce, were anciently called the *Emporiæ* ; and by their wealth, tempting the rapacity both of the Numidians and of the Carthaginians, were long a subject of contention between these powers. Adrumetum lay on one side of a spacious bay, bounded by the head of Clupea on the north, and that of Vada on the south. The southern coast of this bay contained, besides Adrumetum, the following seaports : Ruspina, Leptis, and Thapsus ; the bay itself extending from the first of these places to the last about thirty-six miles. Scipio had secured Adrumetum and Thapsus, being the extremity of this line, with considerable forces. In order to render the province unfit for the reception of an enemy, he had laid waste the country, and had collected all the provisions and forage into these and other places of strength for the use of his own army.

Confidius being stationed at Adrumetum with two legions, and Virgilius with a proper force at Thapsus, the ports of Ruspina and Leptis, as well as many of the inland towns, were intrusted to the keeping of their own inhabitants. But these, on account of the general devastations lately committed by order of Scipio, were extremely



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tremely disaffected to his party, and inclined to favour any enemy against him.

Cato was stationed at Utica as the last retreat of the Roman Senate, the centre of all their resources, and the seat of their councils.

Scipio had collected the main body of his army near to the same place, supposed to be the principal object of any attempt that might be made from Italy.

Labienus and Petreius had separate bodies, at proper stations, to guard the inlets of the coast round the bay of Carthage; and were so disposed of, that they could easily join and cross over land to the bay of Adrumetum upon any alarm of an enemy, from that side.

Varus had the direction of the fleet. He had kept the sea during summer and on the approach of autumn, but had then withdrawn to Utica, and laid up his ships for the stormy season.

Cæsar, however, according to his custom of taking opportunities when his enemies were likely to be off their guard, venturing to sea, even in this season, seems to have had no information to direct him on his approach to the coast, besides the general report that the enemy were strongest and most to be avoided in the bay of Carthage. In this belief he passed the head-lands of Clupea and Neapolis, and stood in to the bay of Adrumetum. Being seen from the shore, he was followed by Cn. Piso from Clupea, with three thousand Numidian horse, and was received at Adrumetum by Confidius, with a force greatly superior to that with which he himself had brought to the coast. But so little had he attended to the strength of the enemy, or so much was he determined to brave it, that he landed near Adrumetum on the nominal first of January, or about the middle of October, with three thousand foot and an hundred and fifty horse. This hazardous step his high reputation seemed to require or to justify. The enemy might not be apprised of his present weakness, it being occasioned to the accidental separation of his fleet. They were likely

N. C. 6.  
Jul. Cæsar  
Dixat. 3tio,  
M. Emil.  
Lepidus,  
M. Eq.

likely to be awed by his name, and to remain at a distance long enough to let him be joined by the remainder of his army. In the mean time he supported the courage of his own people, by proceeding against the enemy with his usual confidence.

The garrison of Adrumetum, upon this sudden appearance of a force which came to attack them, were thrown into some confusion, and Confidius, instead of taking measures to crush so inferior an enemy before he should receive any reinforcement, thought of nothing but how to secure himself from surprise; shut his gates, manned his walls, and placed all the troops under his command at their posts of alarm. Cæsar, to confirm him in this disposition, sent him a summons to surrender at discretion; and afterwards, at the suggestion of Plancus, who had been in habits of intimacy with Confidius, endeavoured to corrupt or to gain him by an insinuating message; but this officer, being more a man of integrity than he had shewn himself to be an able general, ordered the bearer of the message to be put to death, and sent the letter unopened to Scipio.

Cæsar having received no return to his message, and suspecting that his attempt to corrupt the commander of the forces at Adrumetum might betray his weakness, after only one night's stay in this dangerous situation, determined, on the day after he landed, to remove to some place of greater security. With this view he marched to the southward, and though harassed in his rear by the enemy's horse, continued his march without any considerable interruption or loss. As he advanced to Ruspina, a deputation from the inhabitants of that place came forward to meet him, with offers of every accommodation it was in their power to supply, and of an immediate reception into their town. He encamped one night under their walls; but being inclined to see more of the coast, and not being in condition to divide his little force, he proceeded with the whole to Leptis. Here he was received with equal favour; and

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having entered the town, took measures to protect the inhabitants from the licentiousness of his own people.

This was a convenient post for the reception of his transports; and a few of them accordingly, having some cohorts of foot and troops of horse on board, it being now the third day after he himself had debarked, or about the twentieth of October, put in to the harbour of Leptis. By the report of persons who came in these ships he learnt, that numbers of the fleet, after they had parted company, appeared to be steering for Utica; a course by which they must either run into the hands of the enemy, or lose much time before they could correct their mistake, or recover their way to the southward.

In a state of anxious suspense, occasioned by these circumstances, Cæsar seems to have deliberated, whether it were not proper for him again to embark; and in consequence of his doubts, probably, though under pretence of the want of forage, he still kept his cavalry on board, and with great difficulty continued to supply them with fresh water from the land. But as soon as he determined to keep his footing in Africa, he landed his cavalry, and took the necessary measures to procure supplies of provisions by sea. He sent back the empty transports to receive any troops that might be arrived at Lillybæum, and ordered ten galleys from the harbour at Leptis to cruise for the missing ships of his last embarkation. He dispatched expresses to Sardinia and other maritime provinces, with orders to hasten the reinforcements of troops and the supplies of provisions which were expected from thence; and having intelligence that the enemy had some magazines in the island of Cercina, near the coast of Africa, he sent thither Crispus Sallustius, the celebrated historian, now serving in his army, to endeavour to secure those magazines for his use.

Being determined to keep both the ports of Ruspina and Leptis, which the enemy seemed to have abandoned to him, he was now,

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by

by the arrival of the cohorts which joined him at Leptis, in condition to garrison the town with three thousand men, while he himself returned with the remainder of those who were landed, to keep his possession, at the same time, of Ruspina. This place being unprovided of every necessary for the support of a garrison, he determined to try what provisions could be found in the neighbourhood to subsist his troops till they could be otherwise supplied, or enabled to penetrate farther into the country. For this purpose he advanced with the whole of his little army to forage, followed by all the carriages that could be assembled, and had them loaded with corn, wood, and other necessities, to form some species of magazine for the troops he intended to place in the town. As soon as he had effected this service, it appeared that he had taken the resolution to go in person in search of the transports, on board of which the greater part of his army was dispersed. And with this view having posted ten cohorts at Ruspina, he himself, with the seven others, that made the whole of his strength now on shore, went down to the harbour, which was about two miles from the town, and embarked in the night.

The troops that were to be left at Ruspina, without the leader, in whom their confidence was chiefly reposed, were aware of their danger; so few, surrounded with numerous armies who were likely to assemble against them. They had now been three days on shore, and the enemy had full time to be apprised of their situation and of their weakness. The presence of their general had hitherto supported their courage; they relied on his abilities to repair the effects whether of mistake or temerity; but in his absence they lost all hopes, and expected to become an easy prey to their enemies.

Cæsar, however, fully determined to put to sea, having past the night on board, still continued at anchor; when at break of day being about to weigh, some vessels came in sight, and were known to be a part of the fleet which he so anxiously looked for. These



were soon followed by other ships which appeared successively, and brought him the greater part of the six legions with which he had originally sailed from Lilybæum. Being thus prevented in his intended excursion, he returned to Ruspina, and took post between the town and the shore.

In the mean time it appears, that Labienus and Petreius, commanding the horse and light troops of Scipio's army, in the angle that is formed by the promontory of Clupea, between the bays of Carthage and Hadrumetum, having intelligence that Cæsar was landed, with the utmost diligence assembled their forces, and marched towards the coast from which they had received the alarm.

Cæsar had taken a defensive station behind the town of Ruspina, the place which he chose for the resort and safe reception of his convoys and reinforcements by sea; but he was far from limiting his plan of operations to the defence of this place. On the fourth or fifth day after his landing, although by his own account he had yet no intelligence of the enemy's motions, he thought proper to continue the alarm he had given, and marched from Ruspina with a body of thirty cohorts, or about fifteen thousand foot, and four hundred horse, to penetrate into the country to observe its situation, or to extend the source of his supplies. After he had begun his march for this purpose, and was about three miles from his camp, the parties that were advanced before him fell back on the main body, and informed him that they had been in sight of an enemy. Soon after this report clouds of dust began to rise from the plain, and about noon an army appeared in order of battle. To observe them more nearly, Cæsar, after he had made the signal for the cohorts to form, and to be covered with their helmets, went forward with a small party to view the enemy. He saw bodies of cavalry in every part of the field; and from the imperfect view which could be had of them, as the air was clouded with dust, he supposed their line to consist

intirely of horse. He thought himself secure against such an enemy, provided he could sufficiently extend, his front and cover his flanks; and for this purpose he divided his small body of horse to the right and the left; and that he might not be outlin'd, diminish'd the depth to increase the length of his ordinary column. In making this disposition, however, he had mistaken the enemy's force; it did not consist, as he supposed, intirely of cavalry, but of troops of horse interspersed at intervals with bodies of foot, and he had not observed that considerable detachments were sent under cover of the hills to turn his flanks, and fall upon his rear.

Under these disadvantages on the part of Cæsar, the action began in front by a scattered charge of the Numidian horse, who came in squadrons from the intervals at which they were placed among the infantry, and advancing at full gallop, threw their javelins and darts, and presently retired to their former situation. In this retreat, under cover of the infantry whose intervals they occupied, they instantly rallied, and prepared to repeat the charge.

While Cæsar's infantry was occupied in front with this unexpected mode of attack, his horse were defeated on the wings; and the enemy, in consequence of the disposition they had made, were already on his right and left, even began to close on his rear, and, by the superiority of their numbers, were enabled to continue the impression they made on every side; his men giving way, to shun the arrows and darts of the enemy, were pressed from the flanks to the centre, so that they were forced into a circle, without any distinction of front or rear, and were galled with a continual discharge of missiles, which did great execution.<sup>1</sup>

Cæsar, who so far had suffered himself to be surpris'd and overreached, in this difficult situation, took the benefit of that confidence which his known ability and presence of mind ever pro-

<sup>1</sup> Cæsar's coplis in orbem compulsi, intra cancellos omnes conjeti pugnare cogeantur.

cured him from his troops. Recollecting that the enemy must have weakened their line in every part, by attempting to stretch it over so great a circumference, he prevailed on his legions again to extend their ranks, ordered the cohorts to face alternately to the right and the left, and making a front in both directions, charged the enemy on the opposite sides, and drove them in both ways to a distance from the ground. Without attempting, however, to improve his advantage, or to urge the pursuit, he took the opportunity of the enemy's flight to effect his own retreat, and fell back to the camp behind Ruspina, from which he had moved in the morning.

The speedy march of Labienus and Petreius, from a distance which could not be less than eighty or a hundred miles, accomplished by the fourth or fifth day after the arrival of Cæsar, and their disposition on the day of battle, to avail themselves of their numbers and manner of fighting, was able and spirited. But the event is sufficient to show that the use of mere missile weapons in the open plain against troops who are armed and disciplined for close fight, although it may harass and distress an enemy, cannot have any decisive effect.

In about three days after this encounter, Cæsar had intelligence that Scipio himself was advancing with the whole force of his infantry, consisting of eight legions, or about forty thousand men, and four thousand regular horse: an army which he was not in condition to oppose in the field, and which obliged him, contrary to his usual practice, to adopt a plan of defence. Ruspina lay along the coast, and at the distance of two miles from the shore. As his army lay behind the town; covering part of the space between it and the sea with the fortifications of his camp, he threw up an intrenchment from his camp on one side, and from the end of the town on the other, quite to the shore; so that, by means of the town in front, the fortifications of his camp and these lines in flank, the whole space between Ruspina and the sea was covered with works. And the harbour was thus secured from any attempts of the enemy.

enemy. In order to man and defend these fortifications, he landed his engines from the galleys, and brought the mariners to serve them on shore.

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The choice of this situation, cooped up in a narrow place, exposed to be deprived of any communication with the country, might, in case the enemy had seized their advantage, or in case the reinforcements which Cæsar had expected from the sea, had by any accident been long delayed, have exposed him to the greatest calamities. He himself would not have neglected to hem in an enemy so posted with a line of circumvallation; but the undertaking was too vast for those who were opposed to him, and he was suffered in safety to wait the arrival of his reinforcements, and to collect some immediate supply of provisions from the neighbouring country, as well as to receive convoys which he had ordered from every maritime province.

While Cæsar remained in this post, Scipio arrived at Adrumetum, and having halted there a few days, joined Labienus and Petreius in the station they had chosen, about three miles from the town of Ruspina. Their cavalry immediately over-ran the country, and interrupted the supplies which Cæsar derived from thence. The space he had inclosed within his entrenchments being about six square miles, was soon exhausted even of forage or pasture, and his horses reduced to feed on sea weed, which was steeped in fresh water, in order to purge it as much as possible of its salt.

To encourage the hopes which Scipio entertained from all these circumstances, the king of Numidia, with a powerful army, was on the march, and likely to join him before Cæsar could receive any considerable addition to his present force; but whatever might have been the consequence of this junction, if it had really taken place, it was delayed for some time by one of those strokes of fortune to which human foresight cannot extend. Publius Sittius, a Roman citizen,



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citizen, who had been an accomplice with Cataline in his designs against the republic, and who, on this account, had fled beyond reach of the Roman power, had assembled a band of warriors or lawless banditti, at the head of which he made himself of consequence on the coasts of Africa, and was admitted successively to join the forces of different princes in that quarter. Being now in the service of Bogud, king of Mauritania, and being disposed to court the favour of Cæsar, or hoping to make his peace at Rome by means of a person so likely to be at the head of the Roman state, he persuaded the king of Mauritania to take advantage of Juba's absence, and with such troops, as he had then on foot, to invade the kingdom of Numidia. Juba being about to join Scipio near Ruspina, when the news of this invasion of his own country overtook him, found himself obliged not only to return on his march, but to call off from his allies great part of the Numidian light troops, who were already in their camp.

Scipio, though thus disappointed of the great accession of force which he expected to receive by the junction of Juba, and though even somewhat reduced in his former numbers, still continued to act on the offensive; and in order to brave his enemy, and to receive some species of triumph from supposed offers of battle, repeatedly formed his army on the plain between the two camps. In repeating these operations, he advanced still nearer and nearer to Cæsar's entrenchments, and seemed to threaten his camp with an attack. In return to this insult, or to take off its effects, Cæsar, knowing the strength of his works, affected to hear of the enemy's approach with indifference; and without moving from his tent, gave orders for the ordinary guards, which lay without the entrenchments, not to be discomposed, but as soon as the enemy approached them, to retire behind the parapet with the utmost deliberation; and Scipio, upon this reception, when seemingly most bent on assaulting the lines, being  
satisfied

satisfied as usual with this display of his superiority, returned to his camp.

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During these operations, and while Juba was still detained in Numidia by the diversion which Sitius had occasioned in his kingdom, Cæsar had frequent deserters from the African army, and received deputations from different parts of the country, with professions of attachment to himself as the relation of Marius, whose memory was still recent and popular in that province. Among these advances, which were made to him by the natives of the country, he had a message from the inhabitants of Acilla, a place situated about ten miles from the coast, and equally distant from Adrumetum and from Ruspina, offering to come under his protection, and inviting him to take possession of their town. The people of this place, like most other towns of the province, were extremely disaffected to Scipio, on account of the severities which he exercised, by laying waste their possessions on the approach of Cæsar; and as they dreaded a repetition of the same measure, they were desirous to put themselves in a posture of defence against him. Cæsar accepted of their offer, and sent a detachment of his army, who turning round the enemy's flank, after a long night's march entered the town without opposition. Confidius having intelligence of what was in agitation at Acilla, sent a detachment at the same time from Adrumetum to secure the place; but coming too late, and finding that the enemy had already entered the town, brought forward some more forces on the following day, and endeavoured, but in vain, to dislodge them.

While Cæsar was thus endeavouring to extend his quarters in Africa, and to enlarge the source of his subsistence, Crispus Sallustius succeeded in the design upon which he had been sent to the island of Cercina, and was able to furnish a considerable supply of provisions from thence. There arrived at the same time from Allienus, at Lyl-

lybæum, a large convoy and fleet of transports, having on board two intire legions, the thirteenth and fourteenth, together with eight hundred Gaulish cavalry, a thousand archers and slingers, and a large supply of provisions. As soon as these troops were landed, the transports were sent back to Lillybæum, in order to receive the remainder of the army which was still expected from thence. These supplies and reinforcements at once relieved Cæsar's army from the distress which they suffered; and by so great an accession of strength, amounting to twelve thousand men, put him in condition to break from the confinement in which he had some time remained, and to act on the offensive.

The first object upon this change in his affairs, was to seize upon some rising grounds in the neighbourhood of Ruspina, which Scipio had neglected to occupy, and from thence to pursue such advantage as he might find against the enemy. For this purpose, he decamped after it was dark, on the supposed twenty-sixth of January or eighth of December, and turning by the shore round the town of Ruspina, arrived in the night on the ground which he intended to occupy. This was part of a ridge, which runs parallel to the coast, at a few miles distance from the shore, and which, on the north of Ruspina, turns in the form of an amphitheatre round a plain of about fifteen miles extent. Near the middle of this plain stood the town of Uzita, on the brink of a deep marshy tract, which is formed by the water of some rivulets that fall from the mountains, and spread upon the plain in that place. Scipio had posted a garrison in the town, and had occupied the ridge on one side of the amphitheatre beyond the marsh, but had neglected the heights, of which Cæsar now took possession. It seems, that on these heights there remained a number of towers, or a species of castles constructed by the natives in the course of their own wars. In these Cæsar was furnished with a  
number

number of separate lodgments, which he joined by lines, in order to continue his communication with the camp he had left, and with the port of Ruspina.

He had, in one night, made a considerable progress in these works, and being observed at day-break, Scipio, in order to interrupt him, advanced into the plain, and formed in order of battle, about a mile in the front of his own encampment. Cæsar, notwithstanding this movement of the enemy, did not at first think it necessary to interrupt his works; but Scipio seeming to come forward with intention to attack him, while so great a part of his army was at work, he ordered the whole under arms, still keeping the advantage of his ground on the heights. Some parties of cavalry and light troops came near enough to skirmish between the two armies, and Labienus being advanced on the right beyond the main body of Scipio's forces, Cæsar sent a detachment round a village to attack him, and obliged him to fly in great disorder, after having narrowly escaped being entirely cut off. This flight of Labienus spread so great an alarm over Scipio's army, that the whole, with precipitation, retired to their camp. Cæsar returned to his post, and without any farther interruption, continued to execute the works he had already begun. As soon as these were finished on the following day, he again formed in order of battle, to return the defiance which the enemy had so often given him, while he lay in the lines of Ruspina; and observing that Scipio remained in his camp, he marched on to the town of Uzita, which lay between the two armies. Scipio being alarmed for the safety of this place, at which he had deposited some part of his magazines, advanced to sustain the troops he had posted in the town; and Cæsar, believing that an action was likely to follow, made a halt, with the town of Uzita before his centre, having both his wings extended beyond it to the right and the left. Scipio, not to extend his front beyond the walls of the town, drew up his army in four lines, consisting of



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many separate bodies interspersed with elephants ; but as Cæsar did not chuse to attack the town, supported as it was by Scipio's army, neither did Scipio chuse to expose any part of his line by advancing beyond it. Both armies having remained in this posture till sun-set, returned at night to their respective camps.

Cæsar still persisting in his design to oblige the enemy to hazard a battle in defence of Uzita, projected double lines of approach from his present camp to the town. As the place was accessible to the enemy, and when their army should be drawn up in order of battle, might be made a part of their line, it was impossible for Cæsar to invest the town, or even to approach the walls without hazard of being attacked on his flanks from the field, as well as in the centre from the town itself. In order to cover the approach which he intended to make to the walls, he carried on from his camp on the hills two entrenchments on the right and the left, forming a lane of sufficient breadth to embrace the town. Between these parallel lines his troops advanced to the walls with perfect security, and under cover from any attacks that might be made on their flanks. As soon as this lane was effected to within the necessary distance of the walls, he threw up in front a breast work opposite to the ramparts of the town, and from thence began to construct the works that were usually employed in the reduction of fortified places.

During the dependance of this siege, both parties received great reinforcements. Scipio was joined by the king of Numidia, who having repelled the enemy who attempted to invade his own kingdom, now came with three bodies of regular infantry, formed in the manner of the Roman legion, eight hundred heavy armed or bridled cavalry, with a great multitude of light or irregular troops. Cæsar's army, on the appearance of this new enemy, were much discouraged ; but on seeing that Scipio, even after he was joined by the king of Numidia, still remained on the defensive, they resumed

sumed their former confidence, and were themselves soon after reinforced by the arrival of two more legions, the ninth and the tenth, who on their first approach to the coast, mistook for an enemy some galleys which Cæsar had stationed off the harbour of Thapsus, and under this mistake stood off again to sea, where they suffered many days from sickness, want of provisions, and of water.

These legions having been the principal authors of the late mutiny in Italy, are said to have now come without orders, intending to evince their zeal, and to court their general's favour, at a time when their service might be not only acceptable, but necessary to his safety. The principal historian of this war<sup>34</sup>, however, relates only, that Cæsar having observed Tribunes and Centurions of these legions to have occupied intire transports with their own equipage, to the exclusion of the troops which were then so much wanted for the service, he took this opportunity to execute a piece of justice, which he had thought proper to remit, or to defer on a former occasion. That he dismissed several officers of these legions from the service, with the following terms of reproach: "For you, who have incited  
" the troops of the Roman people to mutiny against the republic,  
" who have plundered the allies, and been useless to the state; who,  
" in place of soldiers, have filled transports with your servants and  
" horses; who, without courage in the field, or modesty in your  
" quarters, have been more formidable to your country than to her  
" enemies, I judge you unworthy of any trust in the service of the  
" republic, and therefore order you forthwith to be gone from the  
" province, and to keep at a distance from all the stations of the  
" Roman army."

The other incidents, which are dated by historians during the dependance of the siege of Uzita, do not serve to make us acquainted

<sup>34</sup> Hirtius.

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with its progress, or with the detail of its operations. The season we are told was stormy, and Cæsar's army, in order to crowd the more easily on board of the transports, had left great part of their equipage behind them in Sicily, and were now without any covering, besides their shields, exposed to heavy rains and hail, accompanied with thunder and appearances of fire, which, to their great amazement, instead of the ordinary flashes of lightning, became stationary, and for a sensible time continued to flame on the points of their spears. While this storm continued, the ground upon which they lay was overflowed with water, or washed with continual torrents from the hills. Cæsar, nevertheless, persisted in the attack of Uzita, and seemed still to flatter himself that the defence of this place would lay the enemy under some disadvantage, which might furnish him with an opportunity to decide the war. The armies were accordingly often drawn out in order of battle, and were present at partial engagements of their cavalry or irregular troops, but without any general action.

In the midst of the great expectations which must have attended the operations of this siege, Cæsar had one of the many occasions, on which he was ever so ready to commit his genius, his reputation, and his life, in acts of seeming temerity, which persons of inferior ability may admire, but never can safely imitate. Varus, with a fleet of fifty galleys, had surprised and burnt the greater part of his shipping at Lepcis, and was in chase of Aquila, who, with an inferior squadron, was flying before him to the southward. Cæsar apprehended that the enemy, in consequence of this advantage, if not speedily checked, must soon be masters of the sea, so as to cut off all his supplies and reinforcements from the coasts. He knew that reputation gained or lost on small occasions, often decides of the greatest affairs; and that adverse circumstances, which if suffered to accumulate, may obscure the brightest fortune, can, if seasonably encountered, by

daring

daring efforts of resolution and courage, he actually turned to advantage. He instantly therefore went in person to Leptis, from whence he put off in a barge, and having overtaken his own squadron, which was flying before the enemy, he ordered them to put about, and to steer directly against their pursuers. Varus was struck with this unaccountable change in the conduct of his enemy, and supposing them to have come in sight of some powerful support, he fled in his turn, and crowding sail, steered for the port he had left. Cæsar gave chase, overtook some of the heaviest sailors that fell astern, and forced the remainder to take refuge in the harbour of Adrumetum. Here he presented himself with an air of defiance; and having given this turn to the state of his affairs at sea, and left peremptory orders to his fleet not to resign the advantage which they had gained by the enemy's flight, he returned to the attack of Uzita. In such actions the fortunate often succeed, because the attempt appears to be impossible; and men of great ability may no doubt venture into the midst of difficulties, with which persons of inferior capacity are by no means fit to contend.

Cæsar, notwithstanding that by this stroke of fortune he preserved his communication with the sea, and received considerable supplies from thence, as well as from the country around him, in which he was favoured by the natives; yet being greatly circumscribed by the superiority of the enemy's light troops, he suffered considerably in his camp from scarcity of provisions; and being, in his present operations against Uzita, to fight with a numerous army in detail, behind the walls of a fortified town, without being able to engage them upon equal terms in any decisive action, he took his resolution to discontinue the siege, and remove to a more advantageous station; or to undertake some enterprise, in which he was more likely to succeed. He accordingly decamped in the night, set fire to the wood and straw that was amassed upon the ground, left the lanes he had fortified



fied with so much labour, and marching by the shore, placed his baggage between the column of the army and the sea, and thus covered it from the enemy, who he expected were to follow him by the ridge of hills which overlooked the line of his march.

The retreat of Cæsar was sufficient to confirm the leaders of the republican party, in the hopes they had formed of being able to wear him out by a dilatory war. They followed him accordingly by the heights, and having observed that he stopped at Agar, a town which he held by the affections of the natives, they took post on three several heights, at the distance of about six miles from his camp. In this position, they were not able to hinder him from making in the contiguous villages and fields a considerable acquisition of provisions and forage, which greatly relieved his army; but, to prevent his farther excursions into the country, and to secure its produce to their own use, they sent two legions, under the command of Caius Mutius Reginus, with orders to take possession of the town of Zeta, which lay about twenty miles from Agar, and on the right at some distance beyond their present camp. Cæsar had intelligence from the natives, that these troops were frequently employed abroad in collecting provisions and forage, and that they might easily be cut off, and the town be surprised. He accordingly formed a design for this purpose; and with a view to the execution of it, removed from the plain of Agar, and fortified a strong camp on a height nearer to the enemy. Here leaving a sufficient guard for his lines, he put the remainder of the army in motion in the night, passed by the enemy's stations, and surprised the town of Zeta, which he entered by break of day, while the greater part of the garrison had left the place in perfect security, and were scattered in foraging parties over the neighbouring country. Having placed a sufficient detachment to secure this new acquisition, he set out upon his return, making a disposition, not to pass the enemy unobserved, which was no longer practicable, but to force his

his way through any impediment they might oppose to his march. The night could no longer be of any advantage to him; he set out, therefore, by day, leading the governor of Zeta, with P. Atrius, who belonged to the association of Utica, his prisoners, together with some part of Juba's equipage, and a train of camels, loaded with plunder which he had taken in the place.

The enemy were by this time apprised of his motions. Scipio was come out of his lines; and, not far from Cæsar's route, had posted himself in order of battle. Labienus and Afranius, with a great power of cavalry and light infantry, had taken possession of some heights under which he was to pass, and were preparing to attack him on his flanks, and on his rear. Cæsar was aware of these difficulties; it was nevertheless necessary to encounter them. He trusted, that the head of his column must force its way; and he placed his whole cavalry to cover the rear of his march. When he came abreast of the enemy, being assailed, as usual, by the African cavalry with peculiar efforts of agility and cunning, he made a halt; and in order, by some great exertion, if possible, to clear his way, and procure to his people some respite in pursuing the remainder of their march undisturbed, he ordered the legions to lay down the loads which they usually carried, and to charge the enemy. They accordingly put all the Africans to flight; but no sooner resumed their march, than they were again attacked, and repeatedly forced to renew the same operations. They had already been detained four hours in passing over a hundred paces, or less than half a quarter of a mile, from the place at which they were first attacked. The sun was setting, and the enemy were in hopes of being able to oblige them to halt for the night on a field, which was destitute of water. Scipio, for this purpose, still kept the position which he had taken in the morning, and from thence observed, and occasionally supported, the operations of the light troops.

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Cæsar perceived the danger to which he must be exposed, if he should halt on this ground, and saw the necessity of continuing his march : but observing, that as often as the cavalry in his rear was engaged, whether they repulsed or gave way to the enemy, he was obliged to stop in order to support them, or to wait till they had recovered their station, he thought proper to change his disposition, brought forward the horse to the head of his column, and substituted a chosen body of foot in the rear, who, although under an incessant discharge from the enemy, continued to move, and enabled him, though slowly, to effect his retreat with a regular and uninterrupted pace. In this manner, notwithstanding the great danger to which he had been exposed, he regained his camp, near Agar, with a very inconsiderable loss.

Having thus got possession of Zeta, a post on the flank or rear of the enemy, Cæsar formed successive designs on Vacca, Sarfura, and Tyfdra, places similarly situated round the scene of the war. His design on the first of these places was prevented by the Numidians, who, having intelligence of his coming, entered before him, and reduced the town to ashes. Both armies being in motion for some days, he forced Sarfura ; but advancing to Tyfdra, with the same intention, he thought proper, upon observing the strength of the place, not to make any attempt against it ; and, on the fourth day, having returned to his station near Agar, the enemy likewise resumed their former position.

While Cæsar remained at this post, he received a reinforcement of four thousand men, consisting chiefly of the sick, who had been left behind the army in Italy, and who now joined their legions, together with a body of four hundred horse, and a thousand archers and slingers. With this accession of strength, he formed a design on Tegea, which was occupied by a detachment of the enemy, supported by the whole of their army, encamped at the distance of a few miles behind the town ; and having advanced, in hopes to force or surprize it, about  
eight

eight miles on the plain, he was observed by Labienus and Scipio, who came forward, at the same time, about four miles beyond their own station, in order to sustain their detachment. These consisting of four hundred horse, divided themselves on the right and the left of the town; and the main armies being formed in order of battle, with this post between them, Cæsar gave orders, that the party of horse, which ventured to shew themselves without the walls of Tegea, should be attacked. The events which followed this first encounter, brought into action several detached bodies, both of horse and of foot, that were sent from the different sides to sustain the parties engaged, but did not lead to any general or decisive action; and both armies retired at night to their respective lines.

In many of these partial engagements which happened in this campaign, Cæsar's cavalry gave way to that of the Africans. In one of their flights Cæsar met an officer, who was running away with his party, and affecting to believe him under a mistake, took hold of his bridle, "You are wrong," he said, "for it is this way you must go to the enemy." Even the legions stood greatly in awe of the Numidian irregulars, by whom they were, on many occasions, surprised with some new feat of agility or cunning; and they were considerably intimidated by the number and formidable appearance of the elephants, which they knew not how to withstand. To fortify the minds of his men, and to prepare them to meet such antagonists, Cæsar had a number of elephants brought to his camp, armed and harnessed like those of the enemy. He exercised his horses in presence of these animals, taught his men in what places to strike where the beast was vulnerable, and how to elude their fury. He likewise made some change in the usual exercise of the legion, such as might the better qualify his men to baffle or repel the artful and desultory attacks of the Numidians; and as he frequently employed his regular troops in foraging parties, he inured them by degrees to depart from



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their usual forms, without losing their courage, and to recover from any casual disorder into which they might be thrown. To show his own confidence in the superiority of his men, he frequently made an offer of battle on equal ground; and, in the manner that was, in their turns, common to both parties, drew a species of triumph from his enemy's declining to fight.

In these operations the campaign drew on to the middle of February, and had lasted about five months; during this time Cæsar had surmounted very great difficulties, arising from the dispersion of his fleet, the uncertainty of his communication with Italy, and the scarcity of provisions in a country laid waste or possessed by his enemies. He was now become master of many towns on the coast, and of a considerable extent of territory; but from the many objects which required his attention in different parts of the empire, he remained under great disadvantage in supporting a dilatory war, in which it appeared that Scipio and Labienus were resolved to persist. In order, if possible, to break their measures, he formed a design upon Thapsus, their principal garrison and sea-port on the southern boundaries of the province. With this view he decamped in the night from his station near Agar, and directing his march to the southward, arrived before Thapsus on the following day. As he had formerly, in order to secure his convoys against any attempts from thence, blocked up the harbour with his ships, he now seized all the avenues which led to the town, and invested it completely from the land.

Scipio and Juba, greatly interested to preserve a place of so much consequence, put their armies in motion, and, to counteract that of Cæsar, followed him by the route of the hills. Seeing him invest Thapsus, they took their first posts on two separate heights, about eight miles from the town. Cæsar, with his usual industry and dispatch, executed lines both of circumvallation and of countervallation. By these lines, which were in the form of a crescent, terminating at both ends in the sea, he embraced the town, and proposed to encamp his  
army

army between them. Scipio was sufficiently acquainted with the ground, to know, that there was near the harbour a narrow channel, or salt-pit, separated from the sea, by a second beach or sand-bank, which it was possible the enemy might not have observed, and by which he might still have an entry to the town, or be able to throw in his succours. He therefore advanced with his whole army; and while he made a feint to interrupt Cæsar in the works he was carrying on, sent a party to occupy the sand-bank, or to throw themselves into the town of Thapsus by that communication. Cæsar, however, had already taken possession of this passage, and shut it up with three several intrenchments or redoubts, so placed as to secure it at once against any sallies from the garrison, as well as attacks from the field.

The combined army, on being thus disappointed of any communication with the town of Thapsus, remained all the day under arms, and gave the enemy an opportunity, which he often affected to desire, of terminating the war by a battle. But Cæsar, either because he had not sufficiently fortified his intrenchments to secure his rear from the town, or because he would not chuse that moment to fight, when the enemy was prepared to receive him, made no advances to engage on that day.

Scipio, remaining on the same ground all night, took his resolution to encamp, and at break of day appeared to be forming the usual intrenchments. Cæsar had then probably completed his own works; and thinking the opportunity fair, or being determined not to suffer the enemy to effect a lodgment in his presence, he made the usual signal to prepare for action; and leaving a proper force to man his intrenchments against the town, drew out the remainder of his army to the field, ordered part of his fleet to get under sail, to turn a head-land in the rear of the enemy; and as soon as the action began in front, to alarm them with shouts, or a feint,

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to land and to attack their rear. Having made these dispositions, he put his army in motion, and being come near enough to distinguish the posture of the enemy, observed, that their main body was already in order of battle, with the elephants disposed on the wings; and that numerous parties were still at work on the lines, within which they meant to encamp. He halted, and made a disposition suitable to that of the enemy. His centre consisted of five legions, his wings each of four; the tenth and second legions composed the right wing, the eighth and ninth composed the left. Five cohorts, together with the cavalry, were selected to support the archers and slingers that were to begin the attack on the enemy's elephants. Cæsar himself went round every division on foot, exhorted the veterans to be mindful of the high reputation which they had to support, and recommended to the new levies to take example from those who were already possessed of so much glory, and who were instructed by long experience, in the arts to be practised in the day of battle against an enemy.

While Cæsar was thus employed, the legions of Scipio appeared to reel; they at one time retired behind their imperfect works, again changed their purpose, and came back to their ground. Many of Cæsar's officers, and many of the veteran soldiers, well acquainted with this sign of distraction and irresolution, called aloud for the signal of battle. But he himself, possibly to whet their ardour, as well as to keep them in breath, again and again halted the whole line.

In this situation of the two armies, Cæsar is said to have been seized with a fit of the epilepsy, to which he was subject; a disease which, although it attacks the seats of understanding and of sense, and suspends, for a time, all the exercises of them in the most alarming manner, does not appear from this example to impair the faculties, nor to be inconsistent with their highest measures, and their ablest exertions.

ertions. The report, however, is not consistent with the narration of Hirtius. This historian, although he allows that the troops, in the last part of their motion to engage, acted without any orders; and while Cæsar wished them to advance more deliberately, that they forced a trumpet on the right to sound the usual charge, and that the whole line, without any other signal, overwhelming by force all the officers who ventured to oppose them, continued to rush on the enemy: yet he observes that Cæsar, instead of being out of condition to act, took his resolution to excite an ardour which he could not restrain; and, in order that he might bring his whole army at once with united force into action, commanded all his trumpets to sound, and himself, mounting on horseback, rode up with the foremost ranks. The battle began on the right, where the enemy's elephants being galled with a shower of arrows and stones, reeled back on the troops that were posted to sustain them, trod part of the infantry under foot, and broke over the unfinished intrenchments in their rear.

The left of Scipio's army being thus routed, the main body soon after gave way; and the whole fled to the camp which they had formerly occupied; but in their flight, being thrown into the utmost confusion, and separated from their officers, they arrived at the place to which they fled, without any person of rank to rally or command them. In this state of consternation they threw down their arms, and attempted to take refuge in the camp of their Numidian ally. But this being already in possession of the enemy, they continued their flight to the nearest heights; and being without arms, awaited their fate in a state of helpless despair. When they saw the troops that pursued them advance, they made signs of submission, and saluted the victors with a shout; but in vain. They were instantly attacked by the victorious army of Cæsar, who, though affecting clemency on former occasions, now seemed to be actuated with a paroxysm of rage and thirst of blood; contrary to the orders



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and intreaties of their general, they put the whole of this unarmed and defenceless multitude to the sword. They are said, on this occasion, to have seized the opportunity of satiating their revenge on some of their own officers who had offended them. One was actually murdered, another, being wounded, fled to Cæsar for protection; and many persons of distinction, Senators and Roman Knights, observing their danger, thought proper to withdraw to some place of concealment, till the present fury of the troops should abate.

In the beginning of this memorable action, the garrison of Thapsus had sallied, but were repulsed with loss. When the contest was over, Cæsar, to induce the town to surrender, displayed the trophies of victory; but had no answer. On the following day, he drew up his army under the walls of the town; and in that place pronounced his thanks to the legions for their behaviour, and, without any reproach for the disorder and cruelty of the preceding day, declared what were to be the rewards which he intended, at a proper time, for the veterans; and, by some immediate mark of his favour, distinguished a few who had signalized themselves. He appointed Caius Rubellius, with three legions, to continue the siege of Thapsus, and Cn. Domitius, with two others, to reduce Tysdra; and having sent forward M. Messala, with a body of horse on the road to Utica, he himself followed with the remainder of the army<sup>35</sup>.

At Utica were assembled, from every part of the empire, all who were obnoxious to Cæsar, or who, from a zeal for the republic, had refused to submit to his power. On the third day after the battle, towards night, a person who had escaped from the field of battle coming to Utica, this unhappy convention of citizens was struck with the greatest alarm. Under the effects of their consternation, they met in the streets, ran to the gates, and again returned to their habitations. They crowded together in the public places, and separated by turns, and passed the night in extreme

<sup>35</sup> Hirt. de Bello Af.

confusion. Cato represented to them, that the accounts they received might be exaggerated, and endeavoured to compose their fears. As soon as it was day he called them together, and laid before them a state of the place, of the works, military stores, provisions, arms, and numbers of men; and having commended the zeal, which they had hitherto shown in defence of the republic, exhorted them now to make the proper use of the means they still had of defending themselves, or at least of making their peace in a body: declared, that if they were inclined to submit to the victor, he should impute their conduct to necessity; but if they were determined to resist, he should reserve his sword for the last stake of the republic, and share with them in the consequences of a resolution, which he should love and admire. He contended, that they were now to consider themselves as assembled, not in Utica, but in Rome; "That the force of  
 " the republic was yet great, and might still, as on former occasions,  
 " rise again from its ruins; that the forces of Cæsar must still be dis-  
 " tracted or separate, to make head against enemies who were ap-  
 " pearing in different parts of the empire; that in Spain his own  
 " army had deserted from him, and the whole province had de-  
 " clared for the sons of Pompey; that Rome, the head of the com-  
 " monwealth, was yet erect, and would not bend under the yoke of  
 " a tyrant; that his enemies were multiplying while he seemed to  
 " destroy them; that his own example should instruct them; or  
 " rather, that the courage which he exerted in the paths of guilt and  
 " of infamy, should animate those who were about, either to die with  
 " honour, or to secure for their country blessings in which they  
 " themselves were to share." At this assembly a resolution was ac-  
 cordingly taken to defend the city of Utica, and numbers of slaves,  
 who were set free by their masters for this purpose, were armed and  
 inrolled. But it soon appeared, that the assembly consisted of persons  
 unable to persist in this resolution, and who were preparing separately

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to merit the favour of the conqueror by an intire and early submission. They soon made a general profession of this design, expressed their veneration of Cato; but confessed, that they were not qualified to act with him in so arduous a scene; assured him, that if they were permitted to send a message to Cæsar, the first object of it should be to intercede for his safety; and that, if they could not obtain it, they should accept of no quarter for themselves. Cato no longer opposed their intentions; but said, that he himself must not be included in their treaty; that he knew not of any right Cæsar had to dispose of his person; that what had hitherto happened in the war only served to convict Cæsar of designs which were often imputed to him, and which he always denied. He will now, at least, own, he said, that his opponents had reason for all the suspicions they suggested against him.

While matters were in this state, a party of Scipio's horse, which had escaped from the field of battle, appeared at the gates of the town, and were with difficulty, by Cato's intreaties, hindered from putting every Roman, who offered to submit to Cæsar, as well as the inhabitants of the place, to the sword. Being diverted from this act of violence, and furnished with some money for their immediate subsistence, they continued their retreat. Most of the Senators, who were present, took shipping, and escaped. Lucius Cæsar undertook to carry to his kinsman a petition from such of the Roman citizens as remained; and said to Cato, at parting, that he would gladly fall at the victor's feet to make *his* peace. To which Cato answered, "If I were disposed to make my peace with Cæsar, I should repair to him in person; but I have done him no wrong, I am not an object of his pardon, and shall not request what it were insolence in him to offer me as a favour." He, however, on this occasion, observed to his own son, that it would not become him to leave his father. "At a fit time," he said, "you will put yourself on the  
"victor's

‘ victor’s mercy, but do not take part in public affairs; the times do not afford a station in which it would be proper for you to act.’ “ And why,” said the young man, “ will you not take the benefit of the victor’s clemency for yourself, as well as for me?” “ I was born to freedom,” he said, “ and cannot, in my old age, be reconciled to servitude. For you these times were destined; and it may become you to submit to your fate.” Having passed the day in aiding his friends to procure the means of their escape, he went to the bath, and supped as usual, without any marks of dejection or affectation of ease; and being retired to his chamber, after some time which he employed in reading, he killed himself. His attendants, upon hearing a noise which alarmed them, burst open the door; and would have dressed the wound, but he tore it up with his hand, and expired in making this effort <sup>36</sup>. Every one, through the day, had been anxious to know what was the design which Cato covered under the appearance of so much concern for others, and of so little care for himself. On the first report of his death, multitudes crowded to the door of his quarters, and gave the most unfeigned demonstrations of dejection and sorrow. The colony of Utica, though originally hostile to his cause, and still in the interest of Cæsar, ordered a public funeral, and erected his statue in the place of interment.

Cato died in the vigour of life, under fifty; he was naturally warm and affectionate in his temper; comprehensive, impartial, and strongly possessed with the love of mankind. But, in his conduct, probably became independent of passion of any sort, and chose what was just on its own account. He professed to believe, with the sect whose tenets he embraced, that it might or might not, in particular circumstances, be expedient for a man to preserve or lay down his life; but that, while he kept it, the only good or evil competent to him

<sup>36</sup> Dio. Cass. Appian. Plutarch. Hirtius de Bello Africano.



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consisted in the part which he took, as a friend or an enemy to mankind. He had long foreseen the dangers to which the republic was exposed, and determined to live only while he could counteract the designs that were formed against it<sup>37</sup>. The leader of the successful party thought proper to apologize for himself, by decrying the virtues of Cato; but the bulk of mankind, in his own and the subsequent ages, were equally pleased to extol them; and he is a rare example of merit, which received its praise even amidst the adulation that was paid to his enemies<sup>38</sup>; and was thought, by the impartial, equally above the reach of commendation or censure<sup>39</sup>.

<sup>37</sup> Sed verè laudari ille vir non potest, nisi hac ornata sunt; quod ille ea, quæ nunc sunt, et futura viderit, et ne fierent contemderit, et facta ne videret, vitam reliquerit. Cicer. ad Att. lib. xii. ep. 4.

<sup>38</sup> See the writings of Virgil and Horace.

<sup>39</sup> Cujus gloriæ neque profuit quisquam laudando, nec vituperando quisquam nocuit, quum utrumque summis præditi fecerint ingeniis. Prag. Livii ex Hieronym. Prolog. lib. xi. in Oseam.

**THEATRE**  
of the  
Campaign  
in  
**AFRICA.**



















